



NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY-KENYA



REPORT ON APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN THE NORTH RIFT REGION OF KENYA

NOVEMBER 2024



REPORT ON

**APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE
SECURITY IN THE NORTH RIFT
REGION OF KENYA**

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PREAMBLE

“The National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K) is well positioned to play a fundamental role in our national transformation by contributing to national development of a formidable, critical mass of well-grounded personnel, strategists, leaders and policy makers as well researchers, creators and innovators who will imagine effective ways of thriving in a constantly changing security and development paradigms”

***His Excellency Dr. William Samoei Ruto, C.G.H., President of the Republic of Kenya,
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and Chancellor of NDU-K***

1st NDU-K Graduation

17 November 2023

The affected communities in the North Rift conflict narrated their challenges as they experienced them on their day to day encounters. They then went ahead to suggest what they think should be a solution to the enduring conflict. In order to capture all the voices, this study used a multi-stakeholder approach including Key Informants Interviews (KII), Focused Group Discussions (FGD) and administered questionnaires to residents living in conflict affected villages of the six counties of the North Rift gazetted and declared as “dangerous and disturbed”.

These researchers found a vandalised electricity line in Kolowa, Baringo North Sub County, simply because of its delayed operationalization, on the same day 8 raiders from Marakwet East had been arrested after a failed raid. In Samburu and West Pokot Counties, they came face to face with bandits in Barsaloi forest and Masol respectively. In Laikipia County, the team encountered a hostile community who denied all incidences of insecurity yet they had buried one of their own within a week of the visit as a result of insecurity. In Turkana, researchers encountered enraged herdsmen running around with guns attempting to pursue raiders who had stolen their livestock the previous day. Researchers also observed that there were several areas where the government presence was not being felt because the National Government Administration Officers (NGAO) were remotely administering their respective areas from the comfort of a “safe town”. These unmanned spaces provided room for criminal elements to thrive.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	alternative dispute resolution
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
ASTU	Anti Stock Theft Unit
CBO	Community Based Organizations
FGD	Focussed Group Discussion
GSU	General Service Unit
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MSR	Main Supply Routes
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NDU-K	National Defence University-Kenya
NGAO	National Government Administration Officers
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPR	National Police Reservist
NPS	National Police Service
RDU	Rapid Deployment Unit
SAGA	Semi Autonomous Governmental Agency

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ASAL regions of the North Rift Region of Kenya have faced multifaceted security challenges. Successive government regimes have put in place various interventions but the insecurity in the region persists. This has led to underdevelopment, and loss of lives, property, and livelihoods. This research sought to analyse the security interventions in the North Rift region with the aim of proffering novel approaches for sustainable security.

The study analysed the nature of conflict, causes of conflict, previous interventions employed by state and non-state actors and the resultant various levels of success. The research employed a mixed-method approach while testing theories and analysing data. The approach included qualitative methods such as focus groups discussions in six counties and interviews to key informants. Their responses were triangulated with the administration of questionnaires to local residents in the hotspot locations and sublocations along the conflict belt.

The nature of conflicts between the warring communities of North Rift are largely similar: loss of human lives, destruction of property, stealing of livestock and displacement of populations. The study posits that the root causes of these conflicts and insecurity are founded in social, cultural, economic, political and historical factors.

The outcome of this study attributes the failure of some of the interventions in ending the conflict to lack of commitment from the government and political goodwill in implementation of some of the interventions. The study unanimously found out that it will take full commitment and support of the government and political goodwill to bring insecurity to its conclusive end. Some of the approaches proposed include comprehensive disarmament, intelligence based operations, streamlining NPRs, enhancing law enforcement and tightening legal and criminal prosecution, as well as effective inventory management of ammunition. Other proposed interventions include politically driven interventions, socio-economic interventions, and technologically driven interventions. The study recommends an establishment of a Centralised Coordinating Body that will be dedicated to North Rift

purposely to drive government efforts and all the NGOs/CBOs. Another option is an enhanced Whole of Government Approach to consolidate all lines of effort in the existing government interventions and be able to roll out a Marshall Plan to comprehensively address insecurity. In addition, winning the support of the local communities by the Security Agencies will be an indicator of effective response rather than seeking compensation for stolen animals.

CHAPTER 1:

BACKGROUND OF THE NORTH RIFT CONFLICT

1.0 Introduction

Intra-state group conflicts and violence have taken space in conflict and peace discourse all over the world. Although this phenomenon has experienced a rapid decline in recent years, the persistence and scale of some internal conflicts have increased substantially. The decolonization process and boundary creation in the newly created states in Africa have brought tensions, especially in plural multi-ethnic communities (Rwantabagu, 2001). Regionally, intrastate conflicts have been prevalent in the Horn of Africa making it the most conflicted region in the whole of Africa, with the North-South civil war in Sudan before the split (1983-2005), the internal Darfur war and the Somali clan wars devastating the region (Bereketeab, 2013). In East Africa, states like Burundi and Rwanda have had intrastate conflicts of gigantic proportions, with the Rwanda genocide being one of the most highly devastating conflicts within the region (Rwantabagu, 2001). Africa experienced 386 individual communal conflicts between 1989 and 2014 (Nadio, 2018).

Locally, Kenya has experienced its fair share of intrastate conflicts since independence. ACLED (2023) reports that there were 250 acts of violence in the country resulting in 240 reported fatalities between January 1st to March 24th, 2023. Out of these, North Rift Kenya has specifically been at the centre of violent conflict, with the pastoralist communities involved in 30% of these acts. Communities residing in the North Rift, including Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Tugen and Marakwet have sporadically fought for land, watering areas, and grazing land among other reasons.

The Government of Kenya and other non-governmental agencies have employed different approaches to help quell these conflicts and bring peace. These approaches include hard and soft strategies (Interpeace, 2023). Rather than subsiding, data shows that violent conflicts

have been on the rise despite these efforts. It is noted that between January and March 2023, 69 acts of violence and conflicts were recorded in the North Rift region, as compared to the same period in 2022, with 73 reported fatalities representing a 77% increase year on year (ACLED, 2023). This situation contradicts the relative stability experienced in the North Rift between 2019 and 2021 (Interpeace, 2023).

1.1 Profile of the North Rift Region Counties

As indicated above, this study focuses on the Arid and semi-arid lands of the North Rift Region. The North Rift region constitutes eight (8) counties namely; Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Bungoma, and Trans Nzoia with Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet, and Baringo falling under the categorization of ASAL counties. The Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) of the North Rift Region of Kenya face multifaceted security challenges that have led to the loss of lives, property, and livelihoods and consequently, underdevelopment. The negative impact of the conflict has spillover effects in the neighbouring counties. In addition to the selected four, the preliminary study informed the need to include Samburu and Laikipia Counties due to the spill over effect of the insecurity in the North Rift Region thus adequately covering the six counties flagged and gazetted by the Kenyan government as “disturbed and dangerous”.

1.1.1 Baringo County

Baringo is one of the largest counties in Kenya covering 11,075.3 Km² but with a relatively small population of 666,763 compared to other counties (Interpeace, 2021). The County is divided into 7 Sub-Counties namely; Baringo South, Mogotio, Eldama Ravine, Baringo Central, Baringo North, Tiaty West and Tiaty East. It consists of thirty (30) Electoral Wards and one hundred and eighty four (184) locations. Its headquarters is in Kabarnet town. The County is predominantly inhabited by the Tugen, (a Kalenjin sub tribe). Minority ethnic groups comprise the Ilchamus (a Maa speaking community) in the South, Pokot, Endorois, Kikuyu, Turkana and the Nubians. The population is mainly concentrated in the highlands and urban centres. The arid parts of the larger Tiaty, part of Baringo North, Marigat and Mogotio are sparsely populated (County Government of Baringo, 2024).

Conflict in Baringo County predominantly affects the Pokot found mainly in Tiaty East and Tiaty West against the Tugen predominantly residing in the Southern parts of Baringo, and the Turkana on the North, Samburu in the North East, Laikipia in the South East and Elgeyo Marakwet in the West. Border areas along the Tiaty belt are usually highly affected by conflict. Worth noting is that, while Tiaty West borders West Pokot county, this is the only border that is not affected by conflict. Baringo County is therefore affected by intra and intercounty conflict. Intra-county conflict in Baringo is experienced along the borders of Tiaty East and West Sub-counties which are predominantly inhabited by the Pokot subtribe, and Baringo North and Marigat Sub counties predominantly inhabited by the Tugen. Intercounty conflict is experienced in the borders with Elgeyo Marakwet, Samburu, Turkana and Laikipia with an exception of West Pokot County. Specifically, conflict in Baringo is experienced along Kolowa, Silale, Churro/Amaya, Tangulbei and Loiyamorok wards.

1.1.2 Elgeyo/Marakwet County

The County of Elgeyo Marakwet borders West Pokot County to the North, Baringo County to the East, Uasin Gishu to the West, and Trans Nzoia to the North West. The County has four Sub-counties, namely; Marakwet East, Marakwet West, Keiyo North and Keiyo South with a total of twenty (20) wards. It covers an estimated area of 3030 Km². The County has an estimated population of 454,480 as per Kenya National Population Census report of 2019. The County is inhabited mainly by the Keiyo and Marakwet communities with minority inhabitants being the Sengwer among others. Conflict in Elgeyo Marakwet County is experienced on its border with Baringo County especially Tiaty West sub county along the Kerio Valley belt. This belt is inhabited by the Pokot of Tiaty West Sub County against the East Marakwet of Elgeyo Marakwet County mainly in the Chesogon area.

1.1.3 West Pokot County

West Pokot County is situated along Kenya's western border with Uganda. It borders Turkana County to the North and North East, Trans Nzoia County to the South, Elgeyo Marakwet County and Baringo County to the South East and East respectively. The County covers an area of approximately 9,169.4 km². Its Headquarters is Kapenguria which is

mainly inhabited by the Pokot community and the minority community of Sengwer. The agriculture and livestock sector is the backbone of the county's economy with more than 80% of the population engaging in farming and related activities. Conflict in West Pokot County is intercounty and experienced on the borders with Elgeyo Marakwet in the South, and Turkana County in North. No conflict is experienced with Baringo County perhaps due to sharing a border with Tiaty West predominantly inhabited by fellow Pokot ethnic groups. In the border with Turkana, conflict is experienced along the Turkwel region, especially in Lebei sublocation and along the Todonyang-Nadapal boundary.

1.1.4 Samburu County

Samburu County covers an area of approximately 21, 000 km² in northern Kenya where the Samburu, Turkana and many other tribes live. It stretches to the north from the Ewaso Ng'iro River to the south of Lake Turkana and also includes Mount Kulal which lies just east of Lake Turkana. Within Samburu County are the towns of Maralal (capital and largest town), Baragoi, Archers Post, South Horr, Wamba and Lodosoit.

Conflict in Samburu County is experienced along the border with Turkana County, Baringo County along the border with Tiaty East and in the south along the border with Laikipia County. In the North, Samburu County experiences conflict with the Turkana ethnic group along the border on Maralal-Muricho-Baragoi road, and the Malaso valley along Morjo, Marti and Baragoi straddling between Samburu, Turkana and Baringo Counties.

1.1.5 Turkana County

Turkana County covers a surface area of 77,000 km² making it the second largest by surface area. Turkana shares an international border with the Republics of Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan while internally, it shares borders with West Pokot, Baringo, Samburu and Marsabit Counties. The predominant ethnic group in Turkana County is the Turkana ethnic group. However other groups including Pokot and Samburu and other minority ethnic groups also live in the county. Its population is approximately 1,000,000 people with the largest town being Lodwar followed by Kakuma, Lokichogio and Lokichar.

Conflict in Turkana County is experienced along its borders with West Pokot, Baringo and Samburu Counties. Among the counties in the conflict zone under study, Turkana County has the longest conflict belt occasioned by its large surface area. Along the border with West Pokot, conflict is predominant in Kainuk, Turkwel belt and Lami Nyeusi areas among others. In its border with Baringo County, conflict is prevalent in Lokwamosing, Napeitom, Lomelo and Silale while bordering Samburu county conflict is largely experienced along Malaso, Nadome, Pura, Kamuge and parts of the Suguta valley among other areas.

1.1.6 Laikipia County

Laikipia County is one of the 47 counties in the Republic of Kenya and located in the Central Rift Valley region. The County covers an area of 9,532 km² and ranks as the 15th largest county in terms of the land size. The County is cosmopolitan with about 32 communities comprising Maasai, Samburu, Rendile, Somali, Pokots, Kalenjins, Meru, Kikuyu, and Turkana among others. The County is largely rural in settlement with the main economic activities being crop farming, livestock rearing, tourism, retail and wholesale trade. It has five administrative sub counties, three constituencies namely Laikipia East, Laikipia West and Laikipia North with a total of 15 electoral wards. From preliminary study conducted, it was found that the conflict in the North Rift has also spilled over to Laikipia County which shares borders with both Samburu and Baringo counties. The county has also been gazetted as “disturbed and dangerous” county alongside the counties initially targeted by this study.

1.2 Background of the North Rift Conflict

The conflicts in the North Rift counties dates back to the pre-colonial times compounded by a long history of marginalisation and experience of violence which has entrenched deep-seated mistrust of the government and fuelled the conviction that communities must provide for their own security. The most significant cases as recorded by NCIC and Interpeace (2021) for each of the six counties are stated as follows:

1.2.1 Baringo County

On 24 April 1950 in what is now known as Kolowa Massacre, the colonial forces killed 1,000 Pokot members of *Dini Ya Roho Mafuta Pole Africa*, an indigenous Christian church in Kolowa. The authorities described the denomination as a dangerous sect due to its pro-independence stance. In 1984 there was conflict between the Tugen and Pokot territorial boundary. In 2005, ethnic conflict between the Pokot and Ilchamus over cattle rustling and boundary disputes happened in Mukutani village. In the same year, five people were killed and over 700 displaced from their homes in clashes between Pokot and Tugen in Baringo South. In 2012, there was a boundary dispute in Kapedo between Pokot and Turkana. In January 2013 one person was shot dead and another was wounded in the Arabal area after heavily armed bandits attacked villages, forcing more than 3,000 people to flee from their homes for safety. Again, in February same year, six people among them three police officers were shot dead after clashing with suspected raiders in the cattle rustling hotspot of Ng'aratuko village in Baringo North. In 2014, 21 police officers deployed to restore peace in Kapedo were ambushed and massacred by suspected tribal warriors. In another incident, two people were killed at Sirata in the cattle rustling hotspot of Mukutani following a violent clash between the Pokot and Tugen Communities. The killings sparked tension in the area and thousands of residents fled their homes. In June the same year Cattle rustlers invaded Mukutani, killing two people and taking over 200 head of cattle. In December 2014, a retired senior sergeant was waylaid by armed bandits, shot dead and his car set on fire. The killing sparked fresh hostilities between Tugen and Pokot communities and residents fled the area for fear of revenge attacks. Thousands of livestock were stolen and property worth millions of shilling destroyed, in 2015 at least 46 people were killed and scores injured in a raid on a village in Nadome by bandits believed to be from Turkana. In March 2017, 800 internally displaced Ilchamus set up camp at Mukutani after spending one and a half years at Eldume camps, where bandits' attack left 11 internally displaced persons dead. In 2019, 13 head of cattle were stolen from Chemorongion. Recent cases from 2021 to mid-2024 involve invasion of chiefs where three were targeted for elimination for spearheading efforts to end

banditry. They reported that two have already been killed and the one surviving has had two sons killed and several livestock stolen. He is still a target. Currently, Bartabwa location is 50% deserted. Schools have been vandalised and in Naruk primary school, the raiders wrote on the wall “*Don’t come back again, you will die*”.

1.2.2 Elgeyo/Marakwet County

The historical conflict in the Elgeyo Marakwet County dates back to 1968 where hundreds of Pokot cattle raiders were massacred in what was named Sangutan War by Marakwet youth firing arrows from the riverbanks of the Marakwet Escarpment. In 1998 there was a massacre at Tot where Pokot killed 14 Marakwet. In 2001 another Tot massacre occurred where Pokot Killed 80 Marakwet and maimed many others during a cattle raid believed to have been politically motivated. In 2018, five people were killed and four others seriously injured in an attack in which more than 300 cattle were stolen at Chesogon market, along the border of West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet Counties. The same year, in a wave of cattle rustling attacks, more than 200 houses were set on fire at Kamelel and Kapen villages on the border of West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet counties forcing 2,000 people to flee their homes. In November 2018, four people, including one police officer were killed in violent inter communal clashes in the Kerio Valley. In recent times, conflicts between Marakwet and Pokot have been occurring along the Kerio Valley. The conflicts are about animals/livestock and the locals reported that there is always harmony amongst the neighbours as long as they don’t own livestock. Cattle rustling is no longer about culture but a commercial enterprise.

1.2.3 West Pokot County

In 1970, the Pokot managed to buy some World War II guns and automatic weapons. In late 1970s and early 1980s, they sought guns from the state for the purpose of maintaining home guards for their own security, and simultaneously obtained illegal guns from their neighbouring communities, the Kenyan Turkana and the Karamojong of Uganda. In 1984, More than 100 Pokot were killed by security forces during punitive disarmament operations in Lotiririr. In the 1990s, a series of retaliatory cattle rustling attacks occurred between

Pokot and Marakwet. In 1995, three people were killed, and more than 4,000 head of cattle stolen in attacks by Turkana raiders. In 2000, 100 people were killed and 1,800 head of cattle and 5,000 sheep were stolen in a cross-border attack on the Pokot by Uganda's Karamojong pastoralists. In 2018, four people sustained gunshot wounds, 116 homes were torched and 2,500 people from both sides were displaced in clashes between the Pokot and Marakwet at Kamelei and Kipisitona. In recent times West Pokot has been relatively peaceful except along the West Pokot and Elgeyo Marakwet borders with massive displacement around Cheptulel area.

1.2.4 Samburu County

In 2004, the government issued eviction letters to households living in Longewan Lonyek, Amaya and Loroki local areas, informing them of the intention to create a conservancy. An estimated 2,000 households were evicted to create room for the conservancy. In 2006, clashes erupted after Pokot raiders killed five people and rustled nearly 1,500 cattle from the Samburu community members. In 2008, Samburu warriors killed 10 Pokot herders and made off with hundreds of livestock at Loroki. Many Samburu moved to Kanampio for fear of reprisal attacks from the Pokot. In 2008 again, about 40 Samburu community members were killed and 500 cattle were stolen by raiders from the Pokot community in the Kanampio massacre. In 2009, there was the Baragoi massacre where 42 Kenya Armed Forces soldiers were ambushed and killed by gunmen at Baragoi, near Kambi Nyoka military camp while pursuing stolen livestock. In 2012, Turkana warriors killed two Samburu herders, injured three and drove away 400 head of cattle. Currently Samburu North has a problem of cattle rustling, stock theft and banditry along Moricho -Turkana Highway. This is a situation where Samburu is the victim or the aggressor. In Samburu East however, the Counter becomes the aggressor whereby Samburu go to Laikipia, Isiolo and Embu to raid.

1.2.5 Turkana County

The history of Turkana County conflict dates back to 1910, when the Turkana armed themselves with rifles smuggled from Ethiopia. In the 1930s, the Turkana gained access to newer assault rifles introduced in the region by Italian troops during their attempts to colonise Ethiopia. In 1939, hundreds of Turkana were killed in a raid by the Nyangatom and Dassanech people of Ethiopia. Italy subsequently gave up its claim to the disputed Ilemi Triangle. In 1939 -1945, during World War II, the British attempted to disarm the Turkana, who continued to carry out sporadic raids on both the Pokot and Marakwet who were still using spears, bows, and arrows. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkana County and the entire pastoralist belt in the North Rift began to access weapons made available by geopolitical conflicts rooted in the Cold War. Turkana Ngorokos, purchased weapons from Sudan and Ethiopia. The entire Horn of Africa region became a huge market for guns. In 1991-1994, an estimated 14 large-scale cattle raids occurred between the Pokot and the Turkana, allegedly resulting in close to 10,000 people dead. In 1995, a Pokot raid resulted in the loss of 2000 goats. In 1999, 30 people were killed when 100 Pokot gunmen attacked a Turkana village and escaped with 2000 heads of cattle. In 2009, At least 20 Kenyans and four Ethiopians were killed in clashes over territorial claims and access to water resources along the Kenya Ethiopia borders. The dispute was between the Kenyan Turkana community and the Dassanech, Nyangatom and Mursi of Ethiopia who depend on the Omo River and Lake Turkana for their livelihoods (The Omo River in Ethiopia drains into Lake Turkana in Kenya). In 2002 -2011, the Turkana and Pokot engaged in a series of retaliatory livestock raids in Turkana South. In 2011 the 'Todonyang' Massacre following an attack by an estimated nine hundred-armed militia saw over 20 Turkana killed and their mutilated bodies recovered around Lake Turkana within Kenyan territory. Another 2,500 Ethiopian civilians living on Kenyan territory increased attacks against Kenyans. The Kenyan government called the Ethiopians illegal immigrants who had taken control of 10 Kenyan villages and vowed to repatriate them to Ethiopia. In 2013, Over 900 people were held captive for nearly a week by 200 heavily-armed Pokot raiders in Lorogon, Julok, Nakwamoru and Kapelbok

villages in Turkana County. In 2014, 21 police officers were killed by suspected Pokot bandits following attempts at disarmament. 2017 Residents of Nakukulas (near the Ngamia oil fields) occupied several sites including one storing 40,000 barrels of oil for early export, demanding work and other benefits. In 2018 Turkana protesters block trucks from transporting oil for export from Lokichar to Kenya's main seaport of Mombasa, demanding jobs, contracts, better security, and an increased share of oil proceeds for the community. Recent insecurity incidents are commercialised cattle raids. Disturbance with Turkana is along Kainuk because of grazing fields. Recent security incidences include arson attacks on NPS and ASTU vehicles which led to a dust-to-dawn curfew along the Kainuk-Likichar highway.

1.2.6 Laikipia County

Laikipia County has five administrative sub-counties, and three constituencies namely Laikipia East, Laikipia West, and Laikipia North with a total of 15 electoral wards. In Laikipia East, conflicts occur in Ethi locations, especially in Ethi and Chumvi sublocations. Communities living there are a mix of Maasai, Meru and Kikuyu. The targeted communities are usually the non-Maa groups. In Laikipia North, conflicts are frequently witnessed in Mkogodo East, Mkogodo West, and Kirimon divisions. The conflicting communities are Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, and Meru. In Laikipia West, unrest have been witnessed in Ol Moran and Ngarua divisions of Kirima subcounty. The diagram below is a map showing the conflict belt for the six counties under study.




Figure 1.1. Map of Study Site showing the six affected Counties

1.3 Research Problem and Rationale

Numerous conflict prevention, mitigation, and peace-building interventions have been undertaken in North Rift counties of Kenya by a multiplicity of actors with varying degrees of success as well as failures. An examination of the conflict reveals two categories of intervention strategies that have been applied previously. First, the government's hard intervention approach to promoting peace and reducing conflict has been based on upholding law and order. Successive government's attempts at hard intervention have been typified by sporadic attempts to disarm communities in the impacted counties by military personnel, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (provincial administration) officers, and other security agencies. These efforts have continued to be highly ineffective given that the regional governments have not put in place adequate commitment and efforts to disarm their communities (Yusri, 2020). The approach may not have produced the desired effects due to its highly reactive and episodic nature. Secondly, Soft Interventions, where state and non-state actors employ attraction rather than force in conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives, have been adopted by multiple government agencies. This is the traditional mechanism of peace-building and conflict management, which has brought about a certain degree of success. However, sustainable peace has continued to be elusive. This study therefore took a critical look at the nature of insecurity, various initiatives for peace in these countries, evaluated the efficacy of the interventions employed and challenges faced. The aim of which was to proffer innovative ways in which sustainable peace may be achieved in the North Rift Region.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

Successive governments in Kenya have put in various interventions to address the insecurity in the North Rift region but the insecurity persists. This research analysed the security interventions in six counties which have been declared “disturbed and dangerous” in the North Rift region. The aim of the study was to proffer novel approaches for sustainable security. The specific objectives of the research were:

- a. To examine the causes of insecurity in the ASALs of the North Rift of Kenya
- b. To evaluate previous interventions employed to address insecurity in the ASALs of the North Rift Region of Kenya
- c. To propose approaches for sustainable peace and security in the ASALs of the North Rift Region of Kenya.

1.5 Conceptual Framework

To ground this research with variables in a causal relationship, a conceptual framework has been developed (Fig. 1.2). It is conceptualized that, ordinarily the state and non-state actors interventions geared towards restoration of sustainable peace in the ASALs of the North Rift region of Kenya would yield the desired results. However, some intervening variables come in to destabilize what would be a straight causal relationship between the independent variables which are the hard and soft interventions previously employed, and the dependent variables which is the state of peace and security in the region. These intervening variables are the socio-cultural and political challenges present in this conflict space, including marginalisation, politicization of security and commercialization of cattle rustling among others.




Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Research Design

The study used mixed method approach combining phenomenological and cross-sectional descriptive research designs which drew inferences using both qualitative and quantitative data to test theories and analyse data (Fig. 2.1). Qualitative methods employed included focus groups discussions in five counties and interviews with key informants while quantitative data was collected using questionnaires administered to respondents who included victims of the conflicts as well as facilitators and individuals working to resolve the conflicts.




Figure 2.1: Schematic diagram of methodology employed in the study.

2.2 Target Population

Kenya has forty seven (47) counties of which twenty nine (29) are categorised as ASAL counties. These are: Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana, Samburu, West Pokot, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, Isiolo, Laikipia, Nakuru, Lamu, Tana River, Taita-Taveta,

Kilifi, Kwale, Embu, Kitui, Meru, Tharaka-Nithi, Nyeri, Machakos, Makueni, Kajiado, Narok, Kiambu, Migori and Homa Bay. The annual rainfall ranges between 150 mm to 550 mm for arid areas and between 550 mm to 850 mm for semi-arid areas per year. The ASALs occupy over 80% of the country's landmass and are home to roughly 36% of Kenya's population. The north rift region constitutes eight (8) counties, namely Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Bungoma, and Trans Nzoia. This study focused on four (4) out of eight North Rift counties namely Baringo, Elgeyo Marakwet, Turkana and West Pokot while including Laikipia and Samburu counties due to the spillover effect, with a total population of 3,498,347. Nandi, Uasin Gishu, Bungoma, and Trans Nzoia are peaceful and have been omitted in this study. Samburu and Laikipia counties, though not categorised as North Rift counties, were included in the study due to their gazettelement by the government as "disturbed and dangerous".

2.3 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Out of the 29 counties categorised as ASAL counties, almost half of them are predominantly pastoral (high mobility of pastoralists and livestock). This in turn has led to high levels of conflict and clashes which may be attributed to access to grazing fields and water, encroachment by other communities, and inflammatory remarks from political leaders, with the North Rift region being highly affected (Schilling, 2012). Out of the 8 north rift counties, Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Baringo fall under the categorization of ASAL counties with Samburu and Laikipia counties experiencing the spillover effects of the insecurity due to their proximity to the 4 ASAL counties of the North Rift.

The study sampled and collected data across the conflict belt as distributed in the locations highlighted below;

Table 2.1: Conflict Hotspots visited

SER NO	COUNTY	SUB COUNTY	CONFLICT LOCATION VISITED
1.	Turkana	<i>Turkana South Suguta Turkana East</i>	<i>Katilu; Kapedo; Kainuk; Kachodin</i>
2.	West Pokot	<i>Central Pokot Sigor</i>	<i>Cheptulel; Porkoyo; Sekerot;</i>
3.	Elgeyo Marakwet	<i>Marakwet East Kerio Valley</i>	<i>Embobut; Kapyego; Koibirir; Endo; Kipchumwa; Kaben</i>
4.	Baringo	<i>Tiaty East Tiaty West Baringo North</i>	<i>Silale; Kolowa; Amaya; Sibilo</i>
5.	Samburu	<i>Samburu Central Samburu North</i>	<i>Loosuk; Elbarta; Nachola</i>
6.	Laikipia	<i>Laikipia North Laikipia East Kirima</i>	<i>Mukogodo West; Mukogodo East; Ildigiri;Ethi; Olborsoit; Kinamba</i>

A total of 24 locations were targeted for data collection, representing 4 per county. The criteria for selection of the location was level of conflict, with those wards highly affected by the conflict and falling within the study area being targeted. However, data collected was strictly based on the conflict belt as identified in figure 1.1 above, with a total of 26 locations being reached as indicated in table 2.1 above. Some counties had three (3) locations while others had more than the targeted four (4). This variation can be attributed to some newly created administrative units in other counties, while in some, though in paper locations were created, on the ground the older locations are what are in existence.

Given the population of 3,498,347 in the study area and a confidence level of 95%, a margin of error of 5%, and a population proportion of 50%, the target sample size for data collection was 385 respondents. This was calculated using Yamane's formula which is; $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$ or

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

where N is population; e is the acceptable margin of error whose industry standard here is 5%; while n is the sample size (Yamane, 1967).

The actual number of respondents who participated in 6 focus group discussions (66), key informant interviews (8) and questionnaire surveys (306) totalled 380 respondents. The questionnaire a response rate was at 79.48% which was then triangulated with data from the FGDs, KIIs and researcher on field observations. Sample selection was purposive and stratified to ensure the representation of each stakeholder in the security space as well as county (or location) appropriately. Below is the breakdown of respondents per study location and county for both FGDs and Questionnaire (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Respondents Distribution per County

S/No	County	FGD respondents	Questionnaire Respondents
1	Baringo	12	49
2	West Pokot	12	59
3	Samburu	12	44
4	Turkana	0	56
5	Elgeyo Marakwet	12	50
6	Laikipia	0	48
7	Multiagency Security team	12	0
8	Non-State Actors (Interpeace)	6	0
Total		66	306

Variation on the numbers of actual respondents was brought about due to access challenges to some places in the conflict belt. Laikipia had the easiest access, while Samburu had the most difficult access due to terrain and security situation. The FGDs were not conducted in Turkana volatile security situation in the earlier and Laikipia whose addition came later due to the spillover effects of insecurity in the region.

2.4 Data Collection

Data collection was conducted through both secondary and primary data collection tools. Secondary data collection included reviews from newspapers, published research, and various government reports, specifically the confidential government report titled '*The National Shared Security Strategy for Enduring Peace and Security in the North Rift Region*' launched in 2023 formed a key part of secondary data. Primary data collection was conducted through key informant interviews with key stakeholders working in the peace and security space in the study site and focus group discussions for qualitative data (see appendix 1 for FGD guide). Respondents included both state and non-state actors, while structured questionnaires were employed for quantitative data (see appendix 2 attached).

2.5 Data Analysis

Collected data was analysed using a two-pronged approach due to the different nature. From the Key Informant Interviews (KII) and FGD, content analysis and coding into the different themes was done. Data from the questionnaires was analysed by use of descriptive statistics.

2.6 Limitations of the Study

A key limitation of this study was the volatile security situation within the conflict belt. There are instances where researchers came face to face with a group of gun-carrying bandits. In one area, the local community became hostile midway through the administration of questionnaires leading the local Chief to advise the researchers against further administration of questionnaires. In some instances, some hotspots became inaccessible. Researchers had to look for alternative similar case scenario locations to administer

questionnaires. This challenge was overcome through closely working with National Government Administration Officers in the Office of the President to provide real-time intel on the various hotspots as well as handle logistics.

CHAPTER 3:

NATURE AND CAUSES OF INSECURITY

3.1 Introduction

The North Rift region of Kenya has long been troubled by recurring insecurity. This insecurity manifests in violent conflicts, cattle rustling, banditry, and communal clashes. The region has historically been a battleground for inter-ethnic tensions, resource competition, and socio-political instability.

This chapter provides an overview of the nature of insecurity in the North Rift and explores the underlying causes, helping to better understand the dynamics that perpetuate conflict in this critical region of Kenya. For effective interventions to be put in place it is paramount that complex and intertwined causes be addressed so as to promote lasting peace and stability.

3.2 Nature of Insecurity

Significant challenges of insecurity with various root causes and manifestations have long characterised the North Rift region. Given that the region is home to over 10 different ethnic communities' majority of which are pastoralists, this compounded with competition for resources such as land and water, harsh climatic conditions, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons have often led to conflicts between these communities.

Insecurity in the six counties declared and gazetted as “disturbed and dangerous” is therefore multifaceted, and rooted in both historical and contemporary issues. Addressing them requires a holistic approach to understanding the dynamic nature of the ever-consistent insecurity incidents among diverse ethnic communities in the region.




Figure 3.1 Response rate as to what is the nature of insecurity in the region

3.2.1 Loss of Human Lives

The North Rift region of Kenya has witnessed significant loss of human lives due to the insecurity experienced in the region. When asked if the nature of insecurity in the area they reside is loss of human lives, 98.25% of the respondents answered in the affirmative (Fig 3.1). The situation is so dire that in some cases individuals have lost up to half of their family members as was the case with one of the participants in the FDGs who tearfully narrated how he lost his two sons and a brother to the insecurity in the region. During the data collection exercise, the investigators also came across Morans with tattoos on their arms and chests, on further inquisition about the body marks it was revealed that those were marks of pride for taking a human life, which is an indication of warrior worship and that there could be some level of disregard for human life.

3.2.2 Cattle Rustling

Livestock is a critical source of income and livelihood for pastoralist communities within the North Rift region and it comes as no surprise that the majority of the respondents felt that the nature of insecurity revolved around cattle rustling. 96.2% of the respondents were of the opinion that cattle rustling is the main cause of insecurity in the region (Fig 3.1). Cattle rustling in the region has become so rampant that some few individuals have given up on livestock farming altogether as was indicated by one Focus Group Discussion participant who stated *“after they stole my livestock, I decided to quit livestock farming altogether, and now I can sleep peacefully at night”*. Additionally, the FGDs revealed that there are sponsors in the area who entrust young, illiterate men with the care of their livestock; these sponsors arm their charges with firearms and pay them to guard and tend to their animals, primarily in areas that are under dispute or protected forests. The same young men are also highly suspected to be engaging in cattle rustling.

3.2.3 Banditry

Non-cattle rustling banditry in the region is another security challenge of concern in the region under study, though, often overshadowed by the more widespread issue of cattle rustling. When asked if the nature of insecurity in the area they reside in is banditry, 85.13% of the respondents answered in the affirmative, while only 12.41% answered in the negative (Fig 3.1). The reason behind such high levels of non-cattle rustling banditry may be well reflected in an explanation given by one respondent who stated *“when people have guns and bullets at their disposal, and in some instances lying idle, then the bearers of the firearms may just be triggered to use them for other means other than just cattle rustling”*. This could explain the frequency of highway robberies and attacks on road users. The bandits usually conduct their attacks on market days when traders are known to move around with cash, and especially so during market days at Baragoi, Marti, Loruk, Kolowa, Chemolingot, Barsoloi, Maralal Kapedo and Marigat Markets.

3.2.4 Forceful Displacement

Forceful displacement in Kenya's North Rift region is a significant issue, primarily driven by violent conflicts, cattle rustling, ethnic clashes, land disputes, and competition over scarce resources. Thousands of people in the region have been forced to flee their homes, leaving behind their land, crops, and livelihoods. When asked if the nature of insecurity in the area they reside in is forceful displacement, 81% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 15.5% answered in the negative (Fig 3.1). The FGDs gave credence to these with a good number of participants being individuals that had fled their homes due to the insecurity in their areas. Almost all the chiefs and some members of peace committees that were present at the FGDs were not operating from their areas of jurisdiction either due to the fact that all the inhabitants had been forced to flee and/or due to fear of attacks from their own people as some are considered traitors and sell outs.

3.2.5 Destruction of Property

The destruction of property in the North Rift region is a widespread consequence of the insecurity in the region and is considered an aftermath of cattle rustling, banditry, ethnic clashes, and competition over resources. These acts of violence have destroyed homes, crops, and businesses, contributing to the region's instability and economic challenges. When asked if the nature of insecurity in the area they reside in is the destruction of property, 75% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 20.7% answered in the negative (Fig 3.1). It is worth noting, as indicated in the FGDs and KIIs, that chiefs, assistant chiefs, village elders, peace committee members and peace advocates are some of the major victims with regard to destruction of property. Some respondents also reported stealing and vandalism of iron sheets, window frames and other building materials in abandoned houses and homes. A few respondents residing in areas where land cultivation is practised also complained of rare occasions where their crops are destroyed by criminal elements.

3.2.6 Revenge Attacks

Respondents and the participants within the study site also raised their concerns about revenge attacks and indicated that they are a significant driver of the ongoing cycle of violence and insecurity. They further stated that these attacks often arise in response to loss of human lives, cattle rustling, ethnic conflicts, and land disputes, as communities retaliate for losses suffered during previous raids or confrontations. Revenge attacks perpetuate violence, destabilising the region and leading to a spiral of retribution that affects both individuals and entire communities. What is more concerning is that the revenge attacks seem to be of a vicious cycle given that when the attacks/killings are done, they target random members of the rival community and not necessarily those that perpetrated the crime and or killings in the first place. This leads to communities in the 6 counties finding themselves in an infinite cycle of killings.

3.3 Causes of Insecurity

The 6 counties under study continue to experience high levels of insecurity mainly driven by an entanglement of factors that revolve around political, socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental aspects among others. Political affiliations, often aligned with ethnic identities leading to competition for power and resources, are often exploited by politicians for selfish political gain. Certain communities feel politically marginalised and excluded from governance, leading to grievances that easily escalate into conflict. The region's diverse ethnic composition may in some cases lead to misunderstandings and conflicts based on ethnicity. From an economic perspective, poverty and a scarcity of resources lead to competition for resources and livestock theft. It would therefore be considered accurate to infer that the causes of conflict in the North Rift region of Kenya are the result of intertwined political, socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental factors.

3.3.1 Politically Motivated Causes

Politicians, especially at the local level, have been known to exploit ethnic divisions and resource disputes for personal or electoral gain. Some FGD participants lamented the fact that some high-level politicians have been on record bailing out cattle thieves and bandits when arrested, an act which in itself says a lot about the level of political involvement in the insecurity being experienced in the region. Political push for territorial expansion seems to be the main political cause for conflict in the region, closely followed by unequal distribution of resources, unclear communal land boundaries, direct incitement from politicians and the existence of double administrative units in that order (Fig 3.2).




Fig 3.2 Response rate to politically motivated causes of insecurity

3.3.1.1 Expansionism

For purposes of this report, expansionism can be referred to as the encroachment of communities or groups into territories occupied by others, often driven by competition for scarce resources such as land, water, and pasture. Such encroachments are fuelled by resource scarcity, ethnic rivalry, and, at times, political manipulation.

When asked if expansionism may be a cause of insecurity in the area they reside, 65.9% of the respondents answered in the affirmative, while 27.1% answered in the negative (Fig 3.2). A KII revealed that the ambition to expand county boundaries could be one of the reasons behind the drive for annexation of territories, with another asserting that it could be driven by the prospect of minerals and natural resources such as geothermal power production, gold, oil and in some rare cases ballast production sites.

3.3.1.2 Unequal Distribution of Resources

The six counties of Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, Samburu, and Laikipia are categorised as arid and semi-arid lands and face significant challenges related to access to essential resources such as land, water, and public services. These inequalities have deepened economic disparities and fuelled tension between ethnic groups, pastoralist communities, and political interests.

Of those surveyed, 65.4% said that they believed that resource inequality was contributing to insecurity in their community while 25.9% of respondents, in contrast, had a negative response (Fig 3.2). Roads serve as an example of how an uneven distribution of resources can contribute to insecurity. Discussions in the focus groups revealed that the Rumuruti-Maralal road's tarmacking resulted in a notable decrease in occurrences of insecurity along the road, and the participants believed that the presence of the road had significantly enhanced security in the surrounding villages. In fact residents moved from the hinterland to more accessible areas due to the opening up of the area by the road. They could now leave their interior lands for animal grazing while they live near the highway. In contrast, it was noted that two un-tarmacked roads—the Chemolingot - Kapedo - Lokori road and the

Kolowa - Tot - Endo - Lumut - Sigor road—fall on the hot spot zones and had significant rates of insecurity occurrences.

3.3.1.3 Political Incitement

Local politicians in their quest to consolidate power, advance financial gains, and/or secure electoral support, have been accused of exploiting ethnic divisions, historical grievances, and resource competition to incite violence among communities. The escalation and manipulation of tension among the various communities for political gain have continued to play a crucial role in perpetuating instability in the region.

When asked if political incitement may be causing insecurity in the area they reside, 51.6% responded in the affirmative. In comparison, 37.3% answered in the negative (Fig 3.2). A number of respondents were of the opinion that some politician’s rhetoric was doing more harm than good to peace building efforts in the region with one particular respondent wondering how rhetoric such as *“tujikakamue kulinda na kupigania jamii yetu”* - lets endeavor to protect and fight for our community- can enhance security. In addition, during the data collection exercise, these investigators came across media clips of politicians from various communities warmongering and pointing fingers against each other.

3.3.1.4 Unclear Boundaries

Within the study region, boundary disputes play a significant role in exacerbating tension and conflict, which often results in violence, displacement, and long-term insecurity. The disputes may arise from competing claims over land ownership and territorial boundaries, with the root cause being traced to historical land issues, colonial-era boundaries, ethnic competition, and the growing pressure on scarce resources.

When asked if the issue of unclear boundaries may be causing insecurity in their area, 56.9% answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 38.7% answered in the negative (Fig 3.2). The issue of boundaries kept cropping up during the FGDs, KIIs and the administration of questionnaires. Interestingly, it has more to do with communal land borders as opposed to

actual county borders, though in some cases the distinction was minimal if any. The role of politicians in instigating the boundary disputes was also highlighted and these investigators also took note of the fact that the issue of boundaries was an integral part of the inflammatory rhetoric by politicians mentioned earlier in this report.

3.3.1.5 Double Administrative Units

For the purpose of this report, double administrative units can be described as localities where two or more communities claim jurisdiction over the same geographical space. In addition, the central government has for one reason or another gazetted and posted 2 chiefs from the disputing communities in the same location/sub-location. Though the names might be different, residents affirm that indeed the geographical space is the same. Despite the problem not being rampant, it can easily be attributed to changes in administrative structures, leading to overlapping governance and disputes over control and resource allocation.

When asked if double administrative units may be causing insecurity in their area, only 23.7% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 77.9% answered in the negative and 19.2% of the respondents were non-committal (Fig 3.2). These may be due to the fact that such cases were only reported in Turkana, Baringo and Samburu Counties with some of the affected localities mentioned being Silale and Kapedo (disputed area along Baringo/Turkana border), Makutano and Mukutani (Baringo county along Tiaty East/Baringo North border), Loruk and Luruk (on the border of Tiaty East/Baringo North sub counties in Baringo County). In these areas, the government has deployed two (2) different chiefs in the same area, serving the two (2) different communities. Residents attribute this to political interference where the political class has influenced creation of these new administrative units.

3.3.2 Culturally Motivated Causes

Cattle rustling was traditionally considered a sort of sport among pastoralists and was a cultural practice. It was under the elders' authority and required their approval. Raiding

cattle was not primarily done with guns. Nonetheless, modern banditry and cattle rustling have taken on new forms that are less controlled by the elders. Cattle rustlers and bandits have become militarized and have relied more and more on firearms.

Although social or cultural phenomena evolve with time, there are still some aspects of continuity among the pastoral communities of the North Rift. For instance, some elders have continued to play significant roles in abetting cattle rustling by sanctioning a significant number of raids. The persistent and incessant raids can be attributed to nomadism, and the shrinking resource base has provoked a desperate struggle for survival in which the existence of some pastoral communities is threatened.

Culturally motivated causes of insecurity in the region stem from deeply entrenched traditions, beliefs, and practices of the local communities with the practices being directly connected to land, livestock and communal identity. The general feeling however was that though some individuals may take advantage of the cultural beliefs and practices of the raiders and criminals, most of whom are said to be illiterate, culture could not be considered to be among the main drivers of insecurity in the region.




Fig 3.3 Response rate to cultural causes of insecurity.

3.3.2.1 Dowry

Communities in the region, as in most parts of the country, pay dowry in the form of livestock. Within these particular communities, the accumulation of cattle is not only a status symbol but also a critical component of marriage. That said however, it may not be considered a highly significant cause of insecurity in the area given that when asked if the need for dowry payment may be causing insecurity in their area, 45.5% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 49.5% answered in the negative (Fig 3.3). This is in line with majority of the FGDs participants who despite coming from the various ethnic communities in the region were of the opinion that dowry was not a driving cause for insecurity and cattle rustling in the region, with a good number further stating that demand for huge dowry payments are a thing of the past and not in line with current trends and/or behaviours in the region. One respondent in Samburu argued, *“Dowry is just an excuse. In fact, stolen livestock cannot be used to pay bride price for a wife. It is a bad omen”*. This contradicts another respondent in Silale, Baringo County who intimated earlier when researchers witnessed the traditional ceremony *sabana* (where circumcised youths were welcomed back in the community for partner selection and later marriage). He said, *“sasa ni wakati wa kuoa, ng’ombe ya mahari iko, na kama hakuna, itapatikana tu”*. Loosely translated to mean, “It’s time for the youths to get married, cows (for dowry) are available, where they are not available, they shall be sought (meaning, raiding shall happen).” The close numbers in terms of those who agreed that dowry is a cause of insecurity (45.5%) and those who argued it is an excuse for raids and not the root cause (49.5%), points to the polarising nature of dowry as a cultural cause of conflict. This can be deduced to mean that indeed, different communities perceive it differently. It is not a clear cause of conflict in the region.

3.3.2.2 Warrior Worship

Warrior worship plays a significant cultural factor contributing to insecurity in the North Rift region of Kenya. In many of the pastoralist communities in this region, such as the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, and Marakwet, the concept of a "warrior" holds great importance

in social and cultural structures. The glorification of warriors (often referred to as Morans or ngoroko) reinforces cycles of violence, conflict and cattle rustling.

When asked if warrior worship may be causing insecurity in their area, 58% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 37.9 answered in the negative (Fig 3.3). Apart from gathering the information from the FDGs of the fact that some morans and Ngorokos would tattoo their bodies either on their chests or arms depending on the community they belong to as an indication of how many lives they have taken away in the battle field, these researchers were able to visually verify that indeed this was the case and some of the Morans and Ngorokos actually displayed the tattoos with pride. KII-4 intimated, *“These morans are worshipped in the community. It is so serious that if a moran kills an inspector of police for example, they are given that rank by their people in the community. They readily get multiple spouses to marry. This encourages youths to aspire and be like them.”* For progress to be made in eradicating the cattle rustling menace and its associated vices, it is necessary to work towards a mindset change among the communities within the region.

3.3.2.3 Laibonism and Seers

Laibons and seers play a significant cultural and spiritual role. They hold considerable authority and influence over community decisions, including matters of security, warfare, and raiding. They are believed to have spiritual powers and are looked upon for guidance and prophecy based on perceived divine insight.

When asked if Laibons and seers may be causing insecurity in their area, 58% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 37.9% answered in the negative (Fig 3.3). The FDGs indicated that Laibons and Seers played a part in perpetrating insecurity, especially cattle rustling. It was reported that other than offering divine guidance before and after a raid, they would sometimes go as far as pinpointing a homestead in a neighbouring community where cattle may be raided with the most unfortunate part being that the Laibons would also benefit from the loot after a raid has been conducted.

When triangulated with data from FDGs and KIIs, this fact was proven right, with KII-5 indicating that Laibons bless the raiders before they go for raids, as well as ‘cleansing them’

after raids as a way of reintegrating them back into the community. He is quoted saying, *“Sometime in 2022, we got information that a certain known Laibon had blessed a group of morans for raids. When we got intel that a raid indeed occurred, we went and arrested him. He therefore couldn’t bless and reintegrate the Morans back into the community. The entire group of raiders were hesitant to reintegrate back into the community and ended up hysterical. Our security personnel easily apprehended them and recovered all livestock they had stolen from the neighbouring community. We released the laibon after this due to lack of evidence to charge him.”* Within some pockets in a number of communities, it is believed that a raid cannot be successful without the blessings of the Laibons.

3.3.3 Socio-Economic Causes

A combination of socio-economic factors, namely the Commercialization of cattle rustling, lack of alternative livelihoods, illiteracy, and historical marginalisation, proliferation of small arms & light weapons, and poverty has continued to plague the region and thus exacerbate tensions between communities, leading to violent conflicts, cattle rustling, and other forms of banditry.




Figure 3.4: Response rate to socio-economic causes of insecurity.

3.3.3.1 Commercialization of Cattle Rustling

Cattle rustling which was once a traditional practice driven by cultural and social factors such as rites of passage or the need to replenish livestock after droughts, has in the recent past been transformed into a commercialised, profit-driven activity involving organised criminal networks.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area they reside is the commercialization of cattle rustling, 84.2% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, only 10.8% answered in the negative (Fig 3.4). As one KII put it, *“these raids involve well-coordinated criminal networks that are highly organised, with clear hierarchies and defined roles”* It was further revealed by the participants that in some cases local youth collude with criminal elements from rival communities by gathering intelligence before raids, for purposes of targeting specific herders or communities that are known to have large herds of livestock. Majority of the chiefs and residents categorically stated that most of the middle men and big players in the cattle rustling syndicate are well known to both the communities and the authorities yet nothing seems to be done to stop and/or apprehend them.

3.3.3.2 Lack of Alternative Livelihoods

The region's predominantly pastoralist communities rely heavily on livestock, particularly cattle for economic survival. When alternative livelihoods are either non-existent, insufficient, or ineffective, people may resort to criminal activities such as cattle rustling and banditry to survive.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area they reside in is lack of alternative livelihoods, 84.2% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, only 10.8% answered in the negative (Fig 3.4). Most of the participants during the FDGs asserted that there was a need for a concerted effort to introduce and support sustainable alternative livelihoods within the region so as to curb insecurity in the region. One participant was categorical that after losing all his livestock to rustlers he decided to no longer rear livestock

and instead chose to concentrate on crop farming, and he has “managed to sleep peacefully ever since.”

3.3.3.3 Illiteracy

The high levels of illiteracy among pastoralist communities limit economic opportunities, hinder conflict resolution efforts, and perpetuate cycles of violence. Illiteracy exacerbates poverty, fuels misinformation, and restricts access to government and legal resources that could help mitigate insecurity.

From the demographic data, 37.9% of the respondents in the region have never been to school. 30.9% of the respondents have never gone beyond primary school, 17.2% have completed secondary school, 9.62% are educated up to tertiary level of education and only 4.96 have attained university education (Fig 3.4). Low literacy levels in the region is therefore a major contributing factor to limited economic opportunities due to over-reliance on livestock farming; youth vulnerable to engaging in criminal activities like banditry and cattle rustling; Perpetuation of Traditional Practices as acceptable norms such as cattle rustling and dowry payment through raids; weak conflict resolution mechanism; youth radicalization and vulnerability to political incitement.

3.3.3.4 Historical Marginalisation

For the purposes of this report, the use of the term marginalisation refers to the exclusion of certain communities from political power, economic opportunities, and social services which often leads to underdevelopment and poverty. Marginalisation in this particular region is a long-standing issue that has deepened social, economic, and political inequalities, creating an environment where grievances and frustrations often result in violence.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area they reside in is the historical marginalisation of cattle rustling, 77% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, only 16.1% answered in the negative (Fig 3.4). This corroborated the

sentiments of KII-6 who opined that historically the region has continued to be neglected and marginalised by subsequent central governments leading to underdevelopment which in turn become a breeding ground for criminal activities.

It has been noted that the conflict in the North Rift has a root in the historical marginalisation of some communities. Since independence, some respondents and FGDs, especially in Baringo County, alleged that the Pokot living in Tiaty were neglected by successive governments.

3.3.3.5 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Easily available firearms and bullets is one of the most significant causes of persistent insecurity in the region. The ease at which individuals can obtain firearms has led to the escalation of conflicts, exacerbation of cattle rustling, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of banditry and ethnic violence. The illegal firearms arms have fuelled a vicious cycle of violence, undermined government efforts to restore peace, and hindered development in the region.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area they reside in is Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 83.7% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, only 11.9% answered in the negative (Fig 3.4). The response was in line with the data gathered from the FGDs and KIIs which indicated that there is an abundant supply of weapons and ammunition in the region with one respondent stating “*hapa kuna silaha mingi kwa mikono ya raia kuliko yenye iko kwa mikono ya serikali*” - meaning there are more weapons in the hands of civilians than in the hands of government security personnel. On further prompting, they revealed that the steady supply of firearms get into the region from Uganda and South Sudan through Transzoia, West Pokot and Turkana counties. It was further revealed that other weapons make their way into the region from Somali via the North Eastern part of the country. With regards to availability of bullets, a considerable number of participants and respondents were of the opinion that apart from bullets getting into the country via the aforementioned firearms routes, based on the

cartridges recovered, a significant number of locally available bullets were found to be accessible to the bandits and criminals with almost all of them pointing fingers to the National Police Service as the main source of locally available bullets.

3.3.3.6 Poverty

The region under study has long suffered from underdevelopment, economic marginalisation and limited access to resources which has led to extreme poverty. Poverty exacerbates the underlying issues of cattle rustling, banditry, ethnic conflict and other forms of violence, as people turn to these activities as a means of survival in the face of economic hardship.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area they reside in is poverty, 76% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, only 19% answered in the negative (Fig 3.4). Most FDGs participants were of the opinion that the region is bedevilled by harsh climatic condition, overreliance on pastoralism, poor infrastructure, low levels of education, historical marginalisation, natural disasters like landslides, prohibitive cultural practices and corruption which have in turn led to relative deprivation of economic opportunities.

3.3.3.7 Drugs and Alcohol Abuse

From The FDGs, KIIs and additional information from the respondents, it became apparent that the abuse of drugs and alcohol was an issue of notable concern and one that fuelled insecurity. A number of chiefs and sub chiefs from various parts of the region reported that some of the arrested perpetrators of cattle rustling and violence were also found in possession of Marijuana and the local brew of chang'aa which led to the believe that most of the perpetrators of crime preferred committing the crimes while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. These researchers on arrival at Kolowa Location in Tiati West came across 8 teenage raiders arrested by locals and security agents while totally intoxicated to the point where they were unable to execute their mission.

3.2.4 Environmental Causes

Environmental causes of conflict in the region are deeply intertwined with the pastoralist lifestyle of the local communities and the harsh climatic conditions in the area. These conflicts often arise due to competition over scarce resources like water and grazing land, exacerbated by environmental degradation, climate change, and the existence and prospects of mineral resources. The North Rift region's fragile ecosystem, prone to frequent droughts and irregular rainfall patterns, makes it particularly vulnerable to resource-based conflicts.




Figure 3.5 Response Rate to Environmental Causes of Insecurity.

3.3.4.1 Drought, inadequate Pasture and Water

Prolonged droughts in the region lead to scarcity of essential resources like water and pasture, intensifying competition among communities and exacerbating conflicts. This competition often turns violent, as communities struggle to survive in a harsh and resource-scarce environment.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area they reside in is drought, 74.4% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 23.6% answered in the negative. When the same respondents were asked as to whether inadequate pasture and water was a cause of insecurity in their area 77% answered in the affirmative while 21% answered in the negative (Fig 3.5). Though most participants and respondents were of the opinion that disputes over pasture, water and drought may be a source of conflict, majority were categorical that the frequent insecurity incidents in the region could not be tied to specific climatic conditions.

3.3.4.2 Minerals

The prospect and existence of minerals in some areas of the region seems to be opening up a new frontier of conflict. While resource-based conflicts over land, water, and grazing areas have been driving insecurity in the region, the discovery and extraction of valuable minerals such as oil, salt, geothermal energy and gold have added a new dimension to insecurity and tension, which needs to be nipped in the bud before it spirals out of control.

When asked if the cause of insecurity in the area was the presence of minerals, 25.4% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In comparison, 66.7% answered in the negative (Fig 3.5). This could be due to the fact that the issue of minerals seems to be a new phenomenon among the communities residing on the borderlines of Turkana, West Pokot and Baringo counties.

CHAPTER 4:

INTERVENTIONS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED

4.1 Introduction

Numerous conflict prevention, mitigation, and peace-building interventions have been undertaken in counties that are in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of North Rift Kenya by a multiplicity of actors with varying degrees of success as well as failures. This chapter therefore takes a critical look at the various initiatives for peace in these counties.

An examination of conflict in the study area reveals two categories of intervention strategies: hard and soft interventions. Hard intervention in conflict spaces refers to the government's approach to promoting peace and reducing conflict from the standpoint of upholding law and order by physical use of security agencies. Soft intervention on the other hand is where state and non-state actors employ attraction rather than force in conflict resolution and peace building initiatives. The former intervention may not have produced the desired effects given that the strategy employed has been reactive and episodic, while the latter intervention by state and non-state actors has been sparse and uncoordinated.




Figure 4.1: Illustration of Hard and Soft Interventions.

The key difference between hard and soft interventions as illustrated above, is the deployment of the use of legitimate force by the government to pacify the region. The level of this deployment increases with soft power having less use of force, while increasing progressively to the side of hard interventions.

4.2 Identified Gaps in the Hard Interventions Previously Employed

In ASALs of the North Rift of Kenya, successive government's attempts at intervention have been typified by sporadic attempts to disarm communities in the impacted counties by military personnel, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (provincial administration) officers, and other security agencies. A multi-agency approach has been used recently to resolve conflicts where formed-up units from various units, such as the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), General Service Unit (GSU), Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU), National Police Service (NPS), and National Police Reservists (NPR), are coordinated by erecting their camps along the borders of two warring communities. Numerous obstacles impede the operations of these hard

interventions, and evaluations of their achievements reveal a range of reactions. These interventions are discussed below:

4.2.1 National Police Reservists (NPR)

Deployment of NPR in helping maintain law and order is anchored on section 110c (b) of the National Police Service Act under the responsibility of the Inspector General of the National Police Service in consultation with the National Security Council. Under section 113 of the Act, however, the County Police Commanders may in writing request any NPR residing under their county to undertake the duties of a police officer. The National Police Service Act provides for the duties and responsibilities of NPRs. Section 110 (3) stipulates that reserve officers can be deployed to assist National Police Service and Administration Police Service in various tasks including, maintaining law and order, preserving peace, protecting life and property, preventing and detecting crime, apprehending offenders, and enforcing law and order.

The section envisages that before deployment, NPR officers must undergo vetting and training. They should be provided with proper uniforms, service identity cards, and weapons. While serving, NPR officers are bound by the same requirements as regular police officers and are supervised by National Police Service.

When asked if NPR's intervention was successful in restoring peace in their respective counties, 204 respondents—representing a significant 88.6% of the respondents spanning all six counties declared “disturbed and dangerous”—answered in the affirmative (Fig. 4.2). This conclusion is supported by a report from the Standing Committee on National Security, Defence, and Foreign Relations of the 13th Parliament of Kenya, which discovered that there was widespread public outcry from residents of the warring communities of ASALs in North Rift over the rise in banditry and cattle rustling when the disarmament program of all the NPRs was conducted as part of the accountability for all the weapons issued by the government to the NPRs (Kipkiror et al., 2024).




Figure 4.2: Response rate as to whether hard interventions have been successful in restoring peace in the respondent's area.

The respondents who are in support of NPR intervention argue that the NPRs are local residents who are familiar with the language, culture and the difficult terrain traversed by the bandits and cattle rustlers. They draw their motivation from the fact that they are residents of the local community and therefore bound to protect the community.

However, there are various gaps associated with NPRs operations including lack of accountability, poor pay, unstructured and politicised recruitment, inadequate numbers, non-clarity of command structure, and infiltration by bandits during recruitment. On the lack of accountability of NPRs, the respondents were of disparate views with 29.2% choosing to be non-committal, while 48.98% of the respondents answered in the affirmative and 21.6% answered in the negative (Fig. 4.3). Consequently, on the challenge of poor pay, unstructured and politicised recruitment, small numbers, non-clarity of command structure, and infiltration by bandits during recruitment, the respondents

answered in the affirmative as follows 65.6%, 48.1%, 91.6%, 50.4%, and 39.4% respectively. It is noteworthy that the mentioned challenges significantly inhibit the effectiveness of NPR's operations as a majority of respondents are in concurrence except for the challenge of infiltration by bandits during recruitment (Fig. 4.3).




Figure 4.3: Response rate on the gaps associated with NPRs operations.

4.2.2 Kenya Defence Forces

In February 2023, following a spike in violent activity by pastoralist militias, the government launched a security operation dubbed Operation Maliza Uhalifu North Rift. The Kenyan government via the gazette notice number 1900 in February 2023 deployed Kenya Defence Forces to support National Police Service in response to security emergencies in the six counties declared “disturbed and dangerous” due to rampant incidents of banditry.

When asked if KDF's intervention was successful in restoring peace in their respective counties, a significant 55.7% of the respondents answered in the affirmative (Fig. 4.2). However, 34.1% of respondents who answered in the negative cited brutality that included killing of their livestock during operations while 10.2% of respondents who were non-committal are from areas far away from KDF camps, thus, have not witnessed KDF's operation in their locality. The relative acceptance of KDF within the warring communities is attributed to their trustworthiness and work ethics as well as other corporate social responsibilities (CSRs) activities they undertake. For instance, military officers have offered free medical camps in Turkana, providing medical care to residents and are helping with the rebuilding of more than 20 schools in the region, destroyed by militia violence (ACLED, 2023).

4.2.3 National Police Service (NPS)

Over the previous two years, the government has stepped up its assault against pastoralist militias. The goal of Operation Maliza Uhalifu North Rift was to disarm the militias and expel them from the North Rift area. The NPR, a volunteer forces that serve as supplemental forces within their areas, are part of the multi-agency security team that is led by police and supported by the military. The administration also implemented and prolonged 30-day dusk-to-dawn curfews in a few designated parts of the region as part of the campaign.

When asked if NPS's intervention was successful in restoring peace in their respective counties, the respondents who answered in the affirmative and in the negative tied at about 45.7% depicting a sharply divided perception of NPS by the communities (Fig. 4.2). In fact, a significant number of residents in these communities view NPS as reluctant and fearful of the bandits and instead of offering security they collaborate with the bandits. One participant at an FGD in Chesongoch in Elgeyo Marakwet remarked:

“Local police intentionally fail to respond in time to our calls when our livestock are rustled, biding their time for cattle rustlers to disappear before they show up. Interestingly, the bandits gift them with honey and other gifts while some of them participate in local businesses.”

There are an inadequate number of police who are ill-equipped for their roles and duties in the region. A Key Informant remarked:

“The local police are inadequate in number and ill-equipped to deal with this menace of banditry and cattle rustling. Last night we pursued the rustlers who had stolen 50 goats in heavy rains and they crossed over the river canal, we couldn’t pursue them further as we could not swim across the river canal.”

4.2.4 Multi-Agency Approach

A multi-agency approach has been used recently to resolve conflicts; formed-up units from various units, such as the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), General Service Unit (GSU), Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU), National Police Service (NPS), and National Police Reservists (NPR) carry out routine operations between the borders of the warring communities. The Joint NPS and Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Operation Maliza Uhalifu Command Centre is situated at Chemolingot, in Tiaty Baringo.

Of the respondents from all six counties, 44% said that the multi-agency approach intervention was successful in bringing peace back to their individual counties, while 32.37% said that it was not (Fig. 4.2).

Challenges to multi-agency approach include difficult terrain with 76.38% of respondents agreeing to it, followed by corruption with 57% of the respondents agreeing to it. Mistrust of the units, Intelligence failure, and unclear command structure are additional challenges with respondent’s agreement at 55.7%%, 52.5%, and 42.2% respectively (Fig. 4.4).




Figure 4.4: Response rate on the gaps associated with multi-agency approach

4.2.5 Disarmament

In an effort to disarm the bandits and bring peace to the North Rift region, the government is implementing Operation Maliza Uhalifu, launched in February 2023. It involves the deployment of military, police rapid response units and intelligence operatives in six North Rift counties. Despite this multi-agency security effort, the armed raids continue.

When asked if disarmament intervention was successful in restoring peace in their respective counties, 25.4% of the respondents answered in the affirmative while 62.1% answered in the negative (Fig. 4.2). A clear indication that disarmament is not well perceived within the warring communities.

The region has a complicated security situation that has existed for decades and is characterised by banditry, cattle rustling, and local conflicts. Although the availability of guns is a major contributing factor to insecurity, many people in the North Rift region worry that disarming both locals and raiders will make them more open to assault. Banditry will persist if there is no socioeconomic improvement and community support for security measures.

Challenges to disarmament as cited by respondents include lack of commitment from government at 78.7%, piecemeal disarmament at 67.9%, and mistrust of government and security agencies at 64.1% (Fig 4.5). Also, residents cited intelligence failure and corruption at 48.7% and 45.5% respectively.




Figure 4.5: Response rate on the gaps associated with disarmament

According to Owino (2024), Kenya is up against the proliferation of illegal weapons. Between 2016 and 2021, Kenya destroyed almost 23,000 firearms as part of a five-year cycle of illicit firearm disposal operations. This is a pitiful 3.6% recovery and destruction rate of the estimated total number of illegal guns in circulation.

The low percentage of illegal gun recovery in pastoral communities highlights a number of issues with national and regional arms control strategy and policy. Kenya has no national gun policy, even with its 2006 arms control action plan. Initiatives to reduce the arsenal are therefore ill-coordinated and fall short of their potential (Owino, 2024).

Owino (2024), who contends that Kenya's proximity to volatile East African nations like Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan raises the possibility of illicit arms flows into the country, supports our findings on challenges to disarmament being lack of commitment

from government. The Nairobi Protocol on small arms, the Mifugo Protocol on cattle rustling, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Transhumance Protocol on cross-border arms smuggling are just a few of the policies and legal frameworks that exist in the region. However, their efficacy is constrained by low ratification and implementation rates. These circumstances contribute to a nexus between illicit firearms, the risk of displacement, and the perpetuation of violence in North Rift.

Civilian disarmament is compounded by mistrust of government by the residents of the region. The residents have no faith in the government to protect them and their livestock. A participant at FGD held in Marigat, Baringo County, while responding to why disarmament has not yielded desired results stated as follows:

“...during the call for amnesty, residents return defective illegal firearms while the functional firearms are hidden in the rock crevices in the hills and forest. For a few residents who return functional illegal firearms, they end up buying new ones after a short while”

In order to tackle the issue of insecurity and banditry in Kenya's North Rift region, it is necessary to align disarming strategies to account for the possibility that they may intensify forced displacement inside susceptible groups. It is essential to involve the community in the exercise and foster confidence between locals and security services in order to reduce the risk that illicit firearms cause and to promote accountability and transparency both locally and nationally.

4.3 Identified Gaps in the Soft Interventions Previously Employed

Soft Interventions is another strategy used beside hard intervention. This is an approach where state and non-state actors employ attraction rather than force in conflict resolution and peace building initiatives. Respondents were asked to rate based on their assessment the level of success of the method. Analysis of the responses are presented as follows:

4.3.1 Interethnic Peace Schools

One approach to enhancing literacy and peaceful coexistence among the ethnic communities is through the introduction of interethnic peace schools. These refer to a common learning facility where children from conflicting communities are brought together to bring peace amongst communities and create trust. These schools bring together pupils from warring communities aimed at enhancing cohesion through learners' interactions in school. Responses indicated that 32.07% of the respondents said that Inter-ethnic schools brought communities together. 17.49% indicated that inter-ethnic peace schools did not help while 50.26% were non-committal (Fig. 4.6). This could be attributed to the challenges faced during the implementation stage where respondents strongly expressed that insecurity around the locations of the schools kept teachers and students at bay.




Figure 4.6: Response rate as to whether soft interventions have been successful to restore peace in respondent's area.

The national government had pronounced itself on establishment of five new model boarding schools for children in Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot and Turkana Counties. The five inter-community schools are part of an education-for-peace initiative. The five primary

schools Dira, Todo, Tuwit, Lomuke and Chepchoren — would provide compulsory education to pupils in the region. By learning together, children from different communities would help create a new generation that would foster long-term peaceful and harmonious coexistence and end years of cross-border hostilities that fuel insecurity. In addition to the national government efforts, the West Pokot County government had similarly embarked on establishment of inter-community peace schools. This initiative was aimed at promoting the peaceful coexistence of communities living along the borders of Turkana, Marakwet, Trans-Nzoia counties, and the Republic of Uganda. Communities living along the county borders are collaborating with the County Government by providing labour and building materials to construct classrooms. Some of the Peace Border School Projects include; Sapulmoi, Nauyapong, Apuke, Sarmach, and Kamelei, Katikomor, Kanyerus, Akulo, all located along the county border. Some of the challenges encountered during implementation of the peace boarder schools are associated with insecurity issues and inadequate funding from the County government (Nzei, 2022).

4.3.2 Grazing Committees

Grazing committees exist in all the main conflict corridors of the North Rift. These committees were created and endorsed by elders, but on the ground, the youth who do the actual grazing disregard the agreements thus leading to violent clashes over pasture. Thus explaining what was observed by the research team in Pura and Loosuk where Pokot herdsmen could deliberately disregard the rules and forcefully drive their cattle to restricted grazing grounds for the Samburu without any reference to the committee. From the responses, there was a very thin line between those who said the committees were successful (41.7%) and those who said they were not (47.2%) as shown in Fig 4.5.

4.3.3 Peace Accords

State and non-state entities involved in resolving issues impacting multiple regions of Kenya have shown interest in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes. These dispute resolution procedures, which have been utilised for many years as a traditional

conflict management technique to ease tensions in the community, are typified by community discussions and negotiations with the aim of reaching agreements. Third parties, including local political leadership—albeit reluctantly—and non-governmental organisations and clergy, are usually responsible for their facilitation. Long-lasting disputes persist unabatedly and have gotten worse despite concerted efforts to settle local issues through such systems. Communities, especially in North Rift Kenya, are seriously threatened by the severity and intensity of these conflicts.

When asked if peace accords have been successful in restoring peace in their respective counties, 41.4% of the respondents answered in the affirmative while 47.2% answered in the negative (Fig. 4.6). A clear indication that peace accords are not well perceived in restoring peace in the regions. ACLED (2023) records no less than 25 local peace agreements involving different communities concluded in 2023 across Kenya, the majority of which – 12 local peace agreements – took place in the six counties declared “disturbed and dangerous”. For example, the Orwa Peace Accord of the year 2021 between Pokot and Turkana following decades of cyclical conflict and deadly violence, and Chesogon Peace Accord of the year 2019 between Pokot and Marakwet communities brought relative calm. However, after a short period spate of violence erupted again between these communities as one of the participant at FGD in Chesongoch, Elgeyo Marakwet County remarked:

“....the peace accords do not help as much because they are never implemented. For instance, the Pokot and Marakwet communities had hoped that Chesogon Peace Accord witnessed by the then Deputy President would yield lasting peace only for the spate of violence to erupt shortly after signing of the accord. This is due to the fact that there are no clear sanctions for breach of the peace accord.”

The gap with community peace accords is how superficially they address the underlying causes of the conflicts. Respondents were unanimous that lack of political goodwill and unclear implementation mechanisms are the greatest challenges to peace accords at 80% and 82%, respectively (Fig. 4.7). In this sense, some peace accords ultimately amount to

nothing more than conferences and discussions, failing to address the underlying historical and socioeconomic grievances. As such, if historical and socio-economic grievances are not addressed, efforts to re-establish order through community peace agreements are probably not going to live up to expectations (ACLED, 2023).

Therefore, without improved coordination with the government's primary security efforts, peace agreements by themselves are unlikely to bring about peace. Local peace agreements would be an invaluable tool to maintain peace in conflict-affected areas provided political leaders and security forces maintain their objectivity and support local peace processes.




Figure 4.7: Response rate on the gaps associated with peace accords

4.3.4 Alternative Livelihoods

The communities living in the six counties have been traditionally livestock keepers. However, in recent times, changes of lifestyle and variable climate have led to a need to diversify their livelihood sources. An alternative livelihood shifts the emphasis from

keeping livestock to other forms of economic activity such as crop farming, agroforestry, tourism, small-scale business, irrigation, and the cultivation of suitable crops such as melon, sorghum, cotton, and beans. The fundamental goal of this intervention was to reduce the motivation for youth to engage in violence by diversifying economic alternatives. This study sought to determine this strategy's degree of effectiveness. 6.41% of respondents did not commit, compared to 67.35% who said it was very successful and 25.37% who said it was not successful, according to the data assessed (Fig 4.6). In spite of the difficulties, this was a powerful demonstration of the communities' readiness to adopt new means of subsistence. Communities strongly responded that the following obstacles would prevent it from being implemented successfully: an unfavourable climate (69.1%), criminal elements sabotaging the program (60.94%), poor program coordination (59.18%), and a lack of community involvement (51.02%) (Fig 4.8).

To corroborate willingness of the communities, particularly those living along the Kerio Valley, involvement in alternative livelihoods, at the FGD held at Chesongoch in East Marakwet, Elgeyo Marakwet County, and one participant opined:

“There was a large tomato and vegetable scale-farmer along the Kerio River, employing both Pokots and Marakwets on his farm. However, the criminal elements from the Pokot community would open fire indiscriminately towards the farm workers, ultimately forcing the farmer and his farm workers to flee.”

The acts of sabotage have instilled fear in a number of residents who have embraced alternative subsistence and some have abandoned it altogether having witnessed their kins shot at while farming.




Figure 4.8: Response rate on the gaps associated with alternative livelihoods

Developmental interventions that provide alternative livelihood if not well executed may not foster mind change to the residents of these communities. According to (Akall, 2021), the irrigation schemes for destitute Turkana living along river Turkwel forced them into a limited set of alternative livelihoods with lower productivity after their grazing land was earmarked for crop cultivation. The irrigation schemes reduced the choices available to pastoralists. As illustrated in the specific examples of alternative livelihoods in Figure 4.9, local Turkana continued to adapt through supplementary livelihood activities.

Major alternative livelihoods vs Number of people




Figure 4.9: Major alternative livelihoods versus number of people (Akall, 2021).

As seen in Figure 4.9 above, 47 of the sample population's households relied on non-traditional means of subsistence like building materials, horticultural production, beekeeping, cash transfers, charcoal burning, basketry, livestock trading, and brewing beer. Among those surveyed, an average of seven households relied on alternative sources of income, this is despite the existence of irrigation of their farms from the Turkwel River (Akall, 2021).

The improvement of service delivery by the government to the affected communities is paramount. Any alternative livelihood program should address the security and economic needs of the pastoral communities. The government for example could build abattoirs and meat-processing factories that will provide both monetary incomes, control the population of the livestock and improve the social amenities in the region. Provision of water sources and drought resistant pastures, opening of road access, and electricity connectivity would go a long way to build community resilience.

4.3.5 Security Roads

The region has a poor road network, thus in order to facilitate commercial activity and security operations, intercounty highways and other security roads must be opened. Several un tarmacked Main Supply Routes (MSRs) intersect the area, including the Maralal - Baragoi - South Horr, Loruk - Nginyang - Kapedo - Lokori, and Loruk - Tangulbei - Mugie roads. Chemolingot-Kapedo-Lomelo-Lokori-Lokichar and Samburu - Amaya - Churo - Tangulbei - Mukutani - Ramacha - Chemorongion - Chebinyiny - Sambaka - Olkokwe - Kisanana roads (encompassing 5 Counties up to Nakuru County) are the most affected inter-county highways. Vandalism has happened to private road contractors' equipment, as evidenced by the Nadome incident on the Tiaty and Lokori routes.

When asked if security roads have been successful in restoring peace in their respective counties, 55.9% of the respondents answered in the affirmative while 30.6% answered in the negative (Fig. 4.6). A clear indication that increased opening of security roads in the region can be a catalyst for restoration of peace. At present, the security roads are inadequate, some are inaccessible and poorly maintained in most of the affected counties, hindering patrols by security agencies. For instance, in the Embobut location, Marakwet East Sub-county, respondents resoundingly vouched for the opening of the Marow-Mongwo-Chemisto road, and opening up security roads in the Embobut forest. In Kapedo, Suguta Sub-county of Turkana County, respondents vouched for the tarmacking of

Chemolingot-Kapedo-Lomelo-Lokori-Lokichar road. Details of the security roads covering the most affected areas (Baringo, Turkana, Samburu, Marakwet, and Laikipia) are as shown in Appendix IV.

4.3.6 Non-State Actors (Churches and NGOs)

A resilient element supporting ethnic communities' attempts to ensure a peaceful future in the North Rift is the actions and endeavours of non-state actors. Here, we're talking about the work that NGOs, CBOs, faith-based organisations, and peacebuilding players do. Periodically, churches in the area host interethnic church services with the goal of promoting harmony and peaceful cohabitation amongst the rival communities. For example, two Catholic churches, one in Kolowa among the Pokot of Baringo County and the other in Chesongoch in Elgeyo Marakwet County, host exchange programs that allow believers from the two ethnic communities to gather for worship.

When asked whether faith-based organisations have been successful in restoring peace in the area, all counties affirmed by a response rate of 88% while those who were negative about the role of religion on restoring peace were 6.4% and those who did not commit were at 5.5% (Fig. 4.6). The 5.5% and 6.4% who were non-committal and negative respectively, are majorly from areas within the counties that faith-based organisations and churches have not adequately penetrated, such as Silale in Baringo county, Kapedo in Turkana county and Masol in West Pokot county.

Similarly, over 60% of respondents affirmed the role of NGOs in restoring peace in the region (Fig. 4.6). This is corroborated by a participant at FGD held in Maralal in Samburu who remarked: *“A program run by Children Peace Initiative Kenya (CPI Kenya) in Samburu County aims to link villages by employing kids as peace ambassadors in an effort to improve community ties. For a week, Samburu youngsters are brought to live with Pokot families, where they share food, sleep, play, and herd animals. Pokot children interact with Samburu households in a similar manner.”*

This program has helped demystify the two groups to one another and has strengthened the links between Pokot and Samburu families, despite its small-scale effects. Many members of conflicting communities in the North Rift are exposed to stereotypes and generational resentment from birth, and the initiative has been hailed as an example of harmonious co-existence. The capacity building for peace workshops and creating safe spaces where conflicting communities can talk about strains in their relationships has been organised by Mercy Corps, World Vision, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), the Community Safety Initiative, the Kenya Red Cross, and ActionAid, among others. In Sigor, West Pokot County, for example, Mercy Corps has hosted multiple peace forums. These facilitate the beginning of a conversation on the underlying causes of the problems between the Turkana and Pokot communities, which have been embroiled in some of the most violent conflicts in the area.

CHAPTER 5:

PROPOSED APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NORTH RIFT

5.1 Introduction

State and non-state actors have over the years proposed initiatives for a lasting peace in the North Rift region, as evidenced by the data and analysis in the preceding chapters. However, sustainable peace has continued to be elusive. The Technical Committee on *"Review of the National Shared Security Strategy for Enduring Peace and Security in the North Rift Region"* proposed a multipronged response to the region's security challenges. Data from respondents serves to reaffirm the need for both hard and soft interventions in pursuit of sustainable peace. As earlier discussed, the challenges to previous interventions were brought about by lack of synergy, persistence, and commitment in pursuing these interventions over the long term. This study proposes new approaches to sustainable peace and security in the region.

5.2 Hard Interventions

Hard interventions refer to measures that use force or coercion to maintain or restore security and order. These interventions often involve military action, law enforcement operations, and other forms of physical security strategies, such as the deployment of security forces, border patrols, counter-terrorism operations, and large-scale policing. The primary goal of hard security is to neutralize immediate threats, deter potential security risks, and safeguard national interests through a show of strength and direct action (ICRC 2013).

5.2.1 Intelligence-led Comprehensive Disarmament

Disarmament has been conducted on an *ad hoc* basis in various places in the region. Unlike in Karamojong side on the Uganda border where Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) conducted comprehensive disarmament for the pastoralist Karamoja community, on the Kenyan side, it has been piecemeal with communities complaining of selective disarmament. To address this challenge and implement zero-ammunition-zero-arms strategy in the community, residents have supported comprehensive and uniform disarmament in all the communities with 87% of respondents supporting it (Fig 5.1), which should be intelligence based. One respondent from Laikipia intimated, “*government should be the only one with guns, civilians should be civilians while security agents remain so*”.




Figure 5.1: Response rate on comprehensive disarmament and disbandment of National Police Reservists.

Strategies for preventing ammo from getting into the hands of the civilian population should be highly centralised and all-encompassing while at the same time ensuring that

strict accountability measures on issuance and use of ammo by security agencies are in place. There is also a need to make communities a part of security, demystify people's fear of the government and change the mind-set of the local population.

Disarmament cannot work if the supply side is not cut off, there is therefore a need to seal loopholes that lead to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The challenge to proliferation is two-fold; domestic and cross-border proliferation. Domestically, some elements in the security formations (especially Kenya Police Service) were accused of being a weak link as they colluded with criminals to sell their ammo for as low as KShs.200 per bullet hence sabotaging the disarmament effort. Residents have accused the police of only going into the communities to "collect dead bodies" and not to provide security. There is a perception that security forces selectively conduct disarmament amongst the communities, thereby exposing such communities leaving them highly vulnerable. A respondent in Loosuk, Samburu County remarked: *"The government disarmed us, we voluntarily gave up our arms, but the neighbouring community still has their guns and continues to raid us. The government needs to disarm everyone and assure security to all communities. If guns leave the communities, raiding will stop"*.

Therefore, it has become necessary to conduct intelligence-led comprehensive disarmament within the region. This will prevent a feeling of victimization amongst the law abiding community members who feel that where disarmament operations are conducted, all residents whether illegal gun owners or law abiding, get treated as criminals without discrimination.

5.2.2 Streamlining National Police Reservists (NPRs)

Streamlining of the administration and operations of NPRs needs to be collectively prioritized within the six counties. As had earlier been discussed in Chapter 4, identified challenges to NPR include command structures, poor pay, politicised recruitment and unequal distribution among the different ethnic groups within the study area. Despite all

these challenges, there was a unanimous agreement that NPR are the most effective first responders to raids by bandits amongst all the formed up units.

When asked if the government should disband the NPR function, residents highly disagreed, preferring that this function be strengthened and empowered even more. To put it into perspective, 79.9% disagreed with disbandment of NPR while 15.4% agreed, with 4.7% being non-committal (Fig. 5.1).

Therefore, there is a need to centralise various functions of the NPR, including but not limited to recruitment, training, command, and general welfare, to ensure efficacy in conducting their functions. Priority should focus on equipping and enhancing levels of training.

5.2.3 Enhanced Law Enforcement & Tightening Legal and Criminal Prosecutions

The cattle rustling criminal enterprise has not been adequately investigated and prosecuted. The vice's funders, leaders and perpetrators seemingly operating above the law. The rule of law is a fundamental principle and value of the Kenyan Constitution 2010. This idea envisions a society in which everyone, regardless of social standing, must abide by a set of rules. Respect for one's life and property is what the rule of law entails. A further aspect of upholding the rule of law is purchasing firearms legally. Property ownership by individuals, associations, or even communities is specifically permitted by Article 40(1) of the Constitution. The Constitution's Article 26 (1) further safeguards life, and Article 28 addresses human dignity. Thus, it is evident that "cattle rustling" is not only against the constitution but also a violation of human rights.

The Penal Code (Cap 63) laws of Kenya also touches on a few things related to cattle rustling that make it an offence. Murder in Section 203 is the first which carries a sentence of death or life imprisonment upon conviction. Section 220 is attempted murder which also attracts a punishment of life imprisonment. Assault causing actual bodily harm in Section 251 is a misdemeanor that carries a sentence of five years upon conviction. Robbery with violence in Section 295 which carries a sentence of death upon conviction

may also be another count. Section 322 deals with handling stolen property, which is a felony that attracts a sentence not exceeding fourteen years imprisonment upon conviction. Section 333 deals with arson which attracts a prison sentence of fourteen years upon conviction. The Fire Arms Act is another legislation that makes cattle rustling an offence.

Disturbingly however, while the law is sufficient, these activities keep thriving with very little prosecution or success in combating the vice. Several leaders and politicians always talk tough but that seems to be all that goes on. To this end, the security forces need to stop talking tough and properly enforce the law.

Expeditious trials and meting out stiffer deterrent sentences to perpetrators and their accomplices, and conducting effective supervision and rehabilitation of cattle rustling and banditry offenders could be pursued. There is need for synergy between the investigating authority and office of director of public prosecution in order to expedite prosecution of offenders.

5.2.4 Effective Inventory Management of Ammunition

Concerns have been raised over the handling of ammunition from manufacturing to the end user. Specifically, some rogue elements have been accused of selling issued ammo to cattle rustlers and bandits. According to KII-7, *“Our police officers openly sell their bullets to bandits in areas like Kapedo in Turkana, this usually happens where there is contact between law enforcement and criminals. While accounting for their ammunition, the law enforcers may have used a few bullets, they however, overstate the amount of ammo used and sell the difference. It’s these bullets which later may take the lives of innocent civilians and other security agents”*.

Therefore, it is necessary that stringent measures are instituted in the supply chain. Currently bullets are manufactured at Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation (KOFC) in batches and issued lot numbers, with each security force receiving a unique lot number. For example, if 1 million bullets are supplied to the KDF they will have a different lot number from the 1 million bullets allocated to the NPS. Unfortunately, that is where the uniqueness ends and the implication is that a policeman in Mandera will have a bullet

with the same lot number as a policeman in Chemolingot. Therefore, there is need for bullets to be packaged in much smaller units, preferably packs of 30 with each pack allocated a digitally generated unique serial number that is also reflected on the cartridge, proper records should then be maintained with regards to who was issued which serialised bullets. This in turn will enable the tracing back of spent cartridges to the individual security agent that was allocated a specific packet of bullets. Where individually issued ammo is found to have been used by bandits, individual culpability should be instituted to concerned personnel.

5.3 Soft Interventions

Soft interventions to conflict typically involve non-coercive and diplomatic approaches aimed at resolution or de-escalation, they may involve among others mediation, negotiation, dialogue, facilitation, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, arbitration and reconciliation efforts. These approaches focus on communication, understanding, and cooperation to address and resolve conflicts.




Figure 5.2: Response rate on various proposed soft interventions

5.3.1 Politically Driven Interventions

These interventions are aimed at mitigating politically instigated recurring conflicts such as ethnic violence, cattle rustling, and disputes over resources. These interventions are designed to promote peace, stability, and social cohesion while involving political and community leadership.

5.3.1.1 Development and Implementation of Well-Structured Peace Accords

Peace Accords have played a significant role in pacifying warring communities within the North Rift region for many years. The Chesogon Peace Accord of 2019 between Marakwet and Pokot communities brought relative calm before violence erupted again due to revenge attacks. As earlier discussed, though noble, the idea of peace accords failed due to lack of political goodwill and unclear implementation mechanism. The latter is critical as it is through a clear implementation mechanism that any individual or community which breaches the accord can be sanctioned. Structured Peace Accords were supported by 88% of respondents, 6.7% were non-committal on their efficacy while 5.2% either disagreed or highly disagreed with this as an intervention (Fig 5.2).

It is further proposed that peace meetings need to involve the political class within the region, collective peace meetings are key to enduring peace. From the survey conducted, it was unanimously agreed that the President of the Republic needs to be involved as well as attend some of the meetings. This assertion is supported by 88.4% of respondents who answered affirmatively to the question on “Presidential-led Peace Meetings with Political Class in the North Rift” as a solution to endemic conflicts in the study area. Conversely, only 7.5% of respondents answered negatively to the statement while 4.1% were non-committal (Fig 5.2). This approach has been supported by the political leaders with Elgeyo Marakwet Governor Wesley Rotich recently asking the Cabinet Secretary for Interior to honour invitations to attend peace meetings (KBC news, 22nd September 2024).

A centralised approach to this mitigation would play a critical role in shaping and implementing the Peace Accords between communities to prevent them from befalling the same fate as the previous ones. Measures to ensure the success of these accords while addressing weaknesses in the implementation of previous ones include the involvement of youths and Morans who are the key perpetrators of insecurity. This key demographic has always been alienated during the development and implementation of the previous accords, which focussed on village elders. Breach of the peace accords by individuals and communities will have a structured mechanism for redress.

5.3.1.2 De-politicisation of Security

In cases where political leaders are found to incite inter-ethnic violence, it is necessary that the national government, and especially the president, reads the riot act to the concerned political leaders. FGDs participants were categorical that in order for the rates of violence to drop significantly, political leaders should be put on a leash and held accountable by the security agencies. This is because some of these political leaders incite violence to acquire and retain political power. In some instances, leaders who are seen to be protecting the youth engaged in cattle rustling, are perceived to care more for their communities and will use their political influence to shield these youth from any form of retribution by security agencies. Aside from political violence and incitement, some politicians are accused of using government resources to purchase weapons, feed and train youth to invade other communities. Where intelligence-led investigations reveal this connection, there is a need for law enforcement to commit to taking stern action and holding the culprits to account. This intervention was supported by 75.5% of the respondents, 13.7% were non-committal while 10.7% outrightly rejected the proposal (Fig 5.3). If implemented, the mitigation will discourage the use of scarce government resources like the Constituency Development Funds (CDF) for illegal activities by other like-minded politicians.




Figure 5.3: Response rate on de-gazettement and holding politicians accountable.

5.3.1.3 De-gazettement of Double Administrative Units

In Chapter 3, it was discussed that some areas in the region have locations with two different chiefs administering over the same geographical space, serving the different ethnic groups. To rectify this issue which adds to community balkanization, it is proposed that the new administrative units superimposed over old ones due to political expediency should be de-gazetted. This intervention was supported by 30.9% of respondents, with 48.6% being non-committal while 20.4% were opposed to it (Fig. 5.3) across the region collectively. This response rate was to be expected bearing in mind only a few areas are affected by the presence of double administrative units. However, for those who were affected and therefore answered in the affirmative, an overwhelming majority highly agreed with this intervention. The government needs to send a message that it does not condone political interference in creation of national government administrative units and

that, for example a Kenyan of Pokot descent who finds themselves living in a Turgen dominated area should be administered under the Turgen area without necessarily having to create a Pokot-centred and administered location. For instance, in Baringo County, the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government should conduct further investigation to determine which locations among Makutano and Mukutani, Loruk and Luruk in Baringo County was first established and de-gazette the new ones. The same should apply to all other contested locations in the region.

5.3.1.4 Championing Affirmative Action

Given the historical marginalization that the six counties have been subjected to over time, there is need for affirmative action aimed at enhancing equity. Affirmative action should include lowering university, college, and secondary school entry requirements for candidates from the area. In the job market, some qualifications should be waived to allow candidates from the area to gain access to alternative livelihoods. KII- 5 was categorical in his thoughts, *“vocational and technical training colleges need to absorb former bandits, who may not have formal schooling in their training programs. They should focus on imparting skills to allow these youths to be gainfully engaged as opposed to engaging in cattle rustling and in so doing we will cut the human resource supply needed for conducting raids. Counties and other employers should waive educational qualifications for some of the positions to absorb this group of people”*. Affirmative action is the intervention that had the highest positive response rate among proposed solutions, across all counties at 95.1% (Fig 5.2) showing the significance of this intervention.

5.3.1.5 Livestock Legislation Aimed at Combating Illegal Commercialization of Livestock

Legislation aimed at increasing profits in the livestock business through policy, regulation, incentives, training, research, and disaster management will aid in the reduction of illicit livestock commercialization. Already, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, through the State Department for Livestock Development and Stakeholders,

has proposed legislation that is aligned with and sensitive to the interests and aspirations of livestock farmers, ensuring a robust and sustainable livestock sector by improving productivity, market access and resilience (Mueke, 2024).

The Bill should be able to help farmers achieve economic stability by ensuring high returns on investment and growing the livestock value chain. In addition to developing a comprehensive regulatory framework for the sector, create a predictable and orderly environment. This will enable long-term growth conducive to focused investment. Unethical practices that are aided by a lack of stringent regulation should be completely addressed in order for investors, particularly farmers, to earn higher returns. The legislation should be able to provide interventions to farmers and value chain actors in case of vagaries of weather.

The need to replace after losing cattle due to climate changes, particularly droughts and the effects of global warming, has contributed to the persistence of cattle rustling and banditry. As a result, a revised livestock off-take and restocking policy is required, along with increased acceptance of subsidized and inexpensive livestock insurance, particularly through the National Livestock Insurance Scheme.

The majority of raided animals ended up in markets outside of the raided zones, as evidenced by the findings that most raided livestock was ferried to neighboring and distant counties. As a result, the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination of National Government, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, the Ministry of Investments, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Roads and Transport, and the County Governments in the affected areas must develop and implement a plan to improve livestock security and regulation.

The livestock industry needs better security and regulation, which is made possible by well-established databases of livestock activities in the impacted areas and in accordance with the National Livestock Policy. This includes: identifying and registering livestock and livestock owners in a unique and county-specific manner (which also includes mandatory micro-chipping of livestock); and preventing the supply of stolen livestock by

better regulating livestock movements, markets, meat, and hides across counties. This intervention can be best implemented through a centralized approach.

5.3.2 Socio-Economic Interventions

Soft socio-economic interventions in the region are aimed at addressing underlying causes of conflict and instability by improving the social and economic well-being of communities. They are aimed at building a foundation of stability, address poverty and unemployment, and foster resilience, ultimately contributing to long-term peace and development in the region.

5.3.2.1 Alternative Dispute Resolution

To mitigate cases of retaliatory attacks amongst the communities in the study area, indigenous knowledge systems must be harnessed, especially in the areas of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) aimed at offering reparation to the victims of cattle rustling and banditry. While the formal process in court focuses on retributive justice by use of sanction, ADR will focus on community and restorative justice. This type of justice focuses on rebuilding relationships and repairing the harm resulting from the crime (Birth, 2022). A well-coordinated centralised approach for all six counties will enable the affected communities to effectively handle issues of compensation for livestock lost, loss of lives, and even injury in line with their traditional beliefs and practices.

5.3.2.2 Championing Adoption of Alternative Livelihoods

An overwhelming 93.3% of respondents (Fig 5.2) affirmed that adopting alternative forms of livelihood can go a long way in building sustainable peace in the study area. Indeed, communities that have adopted alternative livelihoods have reported fewer youth engagement in cattle rustling and associated vices as this was the case among the Ilchamus/Njemps and Turgen communities of Baringo County. Years of advocacy have made these communities adopt farming, though they still have livestock, their numbers are low and have permanent homes as opposed to pastoralism. This finding is corroborated by

both key informants and FGDs participants who argued that this model needs to be replicated amongst all communities. In Laikipia County, residents who adopted alternative livelihoods complained that the pastoralist communities perceive all livestock as belonging to them and do not perceive their action as crime. Therefore, they raid the farming communities off their stock on the premise that they are taking what is naturally belong to them.

Consequently, there is need for a centralized approach to community sensitization and advocacy on the adoption of alternative livelihoods in the 6 counties. Where criminal elements sabotage adoption of alternative livelihood by members of a community, there should be a well-structured strategy for handling restitution to affected farmers to prevent disillusionment as was witnessed in Baringo county where a tomato farmer ceased the practice after one of his workers was shot dead by perceived cattle rustlers, whose main aim was to discourage the adoption of alternative means of livelihoods. Other cases which require restitution for the victims include instances where pastoralists invade farms and let their stock feed on crops when drought sets in.

5.3.2.3 Free School Feeding Programme and Establishment of Technical and Vocational Education Training Centres

A deliberate education programme aimed at improving and incentivizing children's access to literacy and formal education in North Rift pastoralist regions, particularly through: identification and incentive-based enrolment of non-school-going children; incentive special-category bursary allocation and assistance; free school feeding programme in both primary and secondary schools, as well as free boarding at an appropriate age.

According to the study's findings, the majority of sample respondents were males with only a primary school education or below; the highest rates of ignorance and/or illiteracy, particularly among young people in general and male youth in particular, were a major contributing factor to the current threat of livestock rustling and banditry; the most notable offenders of the threat were young men without jobs and with less education.

One of the main obstacles to preventing and combating livestock rustling and banditry among the youth of the pastoral community in North Rift is illiteracy and ignorance. Respondents suggested that some of the major improvements required to sustainably address livestock rustling and banditry include implementing initiatives for improved literacy and accessibility to formal education in the pastoral clusters, as well as improving programs for luring youthful cattle raiders and bandits into formal education that include enrolling into technical and vocational education training centers. This will cut-off the supply of bandits as their source pool will diminish with continued education of young boys. Therefore, in order to improve the access of youth in general and boy-children in particular in pastoralist areas of North Rift to literacy and formal education, the Ministry of Education, along with the Ministries of the Interior and Coordination of National Government, should be intentional in the implementation of programs in the region. For a start, there should be provision for compulsory free boarding primary and secondary schools along the conflict belts.

5.3.2.4 Enhanced Physical Infrastructure Development

There is a need to prioritize intentional and deliberate implementation measures aimed at alleviating the underdevelopment and marginalization of pastoralist areas of North Rift, particularly through the creation of clear County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), through the effective allocation and use of the Equalization Fund, and other funding sources.

Economic and socioeconomic vulnerability, vulnerabilities related to youth unemployment, and developmental marginalization are some of the primary causes and factors that currently sustain cattle rustling and banditry, particularly in the pastoral cluster of the North Rift. Large swaths of the North Rift lack basic infrastructure and facilities. For example, some places have rough, unreliable roads and little to no telephone coverage. This implied that fundamental utilities like telecommunications, security response, health emergencies, and victim assistance could be considerably slowed down.

For cattle rusting and banditry threat to be effectively addressed, respondents were unanimous that one of the key areas for significant improvements be enhanced transportation and communication infrastructure in areas that are vulnerable to banditry and livestock rustling. There is need to improve and/or implement intentional steps to addressing the issue of the pastoralist North Rift regions' underdevelopment and marginalization. Though, the Ministry of the East African Community (EAC), the ASALS and Regional Development alongside other pertinent players have made efforts to mitigate the situation, a dedicated centralized effort to North Rift challenges is desirable.

The approach will be in line with KII - 1 argument *“opening the region up in terms of infrastructure like roads, schools and government institutions will solve the insecurity challenge by 50%”*. The national shared strategy for sustainable security of the North Rift proposed addressing development as a key solution with line ministries contributing a budget line towards this. KII - 1 further stated, *“However, only the Ministry of Education partly honored their pledge with Kenya Shillings 100,000,000 contribution, the rest of the ministries didn't.”*

5.3.3 Technology Enabled Interventions

Technology-embedded interventions addressing insecurity mainly revolve around the use of technologically advanced tools and systems to enhance security and governance. Such interventions are essential for tackling insecurity challenges, particularly those related to banditry, cattle rustling, and armed conflict.

5.3.3.1 Micro-chipping of Livestock

Livestock tracking using implanted chips is also an intervention proposed by residents, akin to what Kenya Wildlife Service uses to track endangered species and to monitor poaching. Chipping is seen as a solution to rampant cattle rustling. This research proposes a centralized approach that will aid cattle owners in chipping their livestock and enable centralised authority to track stolen livestock. In some counties like Samburu however, residents were apprehensive of the efficacy of this intervention given some non-state

actors had unsuccessfully piloted it. On further querying, it was discovered that the tracking technology was not properly deployed and poorly followed through. From the response rate, 78.4% of the respondents were in favour of the intervention while 13.4% were of a contrary opinion (Fig. 5.2).

5.3.3.2 Enhanced Surveillance using UAVs

Emerging technology like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have continued to be applied in combating contemporary security challenges in the world. In the North Rift Kenya, the use of drones has been employed by multi-agency team to monitor security situation and to curb cattle rustling. However, its application is not widespread across the region. Drones should be able to capture high resolution images of bandits and cattle rustlers, and provide real-time data of their location thereby activating security personnel to pursue them. Additionally, drones can be used in uncharted terrain such as those found in parts of West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet, and Baringo, where police helicopters would not be used effectively.

CHAPTER 6:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the major findings of the study with regard to the: nature and causes of insecurity in the ASALs of North Rift of Kenya; the interventions employed to address insecurity in the ASALs of the North Rift Region of Kenya; and propose novel approaches for sustainable security in the ASALs of the North Rift Region of Kenya. The chapter also provides: a conclusion; key recommendations arising from the findings; and areas of further research that could be pursued by future studies.

6.2 Summary of Major Findings

This study was motivated by the persistent insecurity in the North Rift region of Kenya, specifically, those 6 counties gazetted as ‘disturbed and dangerous’ by the government. While various government regimes since independence have grappled with the insecurity situation, most have come up with various interventions that have borne minimum success. The pursuit of sustainable peace has remained elusive. The researchers sought to first understand the nature and causes of insecurity, examine interventions that were previously employed to address the insecurity and their accompanying levels of success, challenges to these interventions, and lastly, propose a novel approach (es) with the view of attaining long-term and sustainable peace. What came to the fore is that there are a multitude of factors causing a metamorphosed nature of insecurity.

6.2.1 Nature and Causes of Insecurity in the ASALs of North Rift of Kenya

The varying nature of insecurity in the region includes loss of human life, cattle rustling, banditry, forceful displacement, destruction of property, revenge and counter-revenge

attacks. These stemmed from different causes classified as ranging from political, socio-economic, cultural as well as environmental causes. Politicisation of security, enactment of double administrative units in the same geographical spaces, incitement against current county boundaries, and marginalization of particular communities formed the core of the political causes. Socio-economic causes of insecurity included commercialization of cattle rustling as a driver of insecurity, lack of alternative livelihoods, poverty and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, while environmental causes included drought that causes lack of water and pasture for livestock. Lastly, cultural causes include warrior worship, dowry payment and the presence of laibons and seers in the community, though there was no evidence to believe that they are a major catalyst for insecurity in the region.

6.2.2 Interventions Employed to Address Insecurity in ASALs of North Rift of Kenya

To combat insecurity in the region, state and non-state actors introduced various interventions, classified as hard and soft interventions. Hard interventions include introduction of NPR, KDF, NPS, Multi-Agency approach and disarmament within the communities. Soft interventions on the other hand, include interethnic peace schools, grazing committees, peace accords, alternative livelihoods, security roads and non-state actor-led peace initiatives. However, all these approaches have faced challenges leading to limited levels of success. While there have been periods of relative calm, these have been few and far between marred mostly by poor coordination and a lack of a centralised all-encompassing approach.

6.2.3 Proposed Approaches for Sustainable Peace and Security in the ASALs of North Rift of Kenya

The study proposed a multifaceted approaches to combating cattle rustling and banditry that include employing both hard and soft interventions. The findings on hard approaches for sustainable peace and security in the region include:

- Comprehensive disarmament that cuts across all the six counties conducted simultaneously in order to minimise exposing the disarmed community to attack from other communities. This disarmament exercise should involve both the community elders and youths working hand –in –hand with security forces. The emphasis should be to urge the communities to voluntarily surrender illegal firearms. A workable mechanism for sealing of porous borders should be designed and implemented.
- Intelligent based disarmament aimed at weeding out criminal elements and illegal ammo in the communities perpetuating cattle rustling and banditry and presenting them to criminal prosecution. The aim is to dismantle the criminal networks and bring the menace to a conclusive end.
- Recruitment and operations of NPRs should be streamlined. The challenges to NPRs that include command structures, poor pay, politicised recruitment, ill equipped, and unequal distribution in the communities should be addressed in order bolster effectiveness of their operations by a well re-structured coordinating authority.
- Enhancing law enforcement and tightening legal and criminal prosecution. While the law is sufficient, cattle rustling and banditry keep thriving with very little prosecution or success in combating the vice. Expeditious trials and meting out stiffer deterrent sentences to perpetrators and their accomplices, and conducting effective supervision and rehabilitation of cattle rustling and banditry offenders could be pursued. There is need for synergy between the investigating authority and office of director of public prosecution in order to expedite prosecution of offenders.
- Effective inventory management of ammunition through packaging in much smaller units, preferably packs of 30 with each pack allocated a digitally generated unique serial number that is also reflected on the cartridge, proper records should then be maintained with regards to who was issued which serialised bullets. This

in turn will enable the tracing back of spent cartridges to the individual security agent that was allocated a specific packet of ammunition.

In addition to hard approaches, soft approaches are proposed that include:

- Politically driven interventions that entail development of well-structured Peace Accords, de-politicization of security, de-gazettement of double administrative units, championing affirmative action, and livestock legislation that is aimed at combatting illegal commercialisation of livestock. In addition, it is proposed for an implementation of a Multi-Ethnic Community Sensitization Programmes. The sensitization programmes led by multi-ethnic community elders, opinion, religious, youth, and women groups leaders to educate the communities on the importance of disarmament, communities' co-existence as well as sharing innovative ways to fill the void created by disarmament including streamlining command, remuneration and increasing strength of NPR.
- Socio-economic interventions that incorporate Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism that in addition will handle reparation of victims to prevent the cyclic revenge attacks, championing adoption of alternative livelihoods, compulsory free education and establishment of technical and vocational education training centers, and enhancing development of physical infrastructure.
- Technology enabled interventions that encompass micro-chipping of livestock as well as enhancing surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles.

6.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, the study findings illustrate and confirm the changed nature of the present-day insecurity in the region. The varying nature of insecurity in the region include loss of human life, cattle rustling, banditry, forceful displacement, destruction of property, revenge and counter revenge attacks. The study has as well unmasked that present-day

livestock rustling and banditry incidents have increased in frequency and large number of livestock taken from the owners, and assumed an apparent upward trajectory in the pastoralist regions of the North Rift. The causes of nature of insecurity are classified as ranging from political, socio-economic, cultural as well as environmental. Political drivers of insecurity include politicisation of security and enactment of double administrative units in same geographical spaces, incitement against current county boundaries, and marginalization. Socio-economic drivers of insecurity include commercialization of cattle rustling, lack of alternative livelihoods, poverty and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, while environmental drivers include drought that causes lack of water and pasture for livestock. Lastly, cultural drivers of insecurity include warrior worship, dowry payment and the presence of laibons and seers in the community.

The study accentuates the various interventions, hard and soft, employed by state and non-state actors and the challenges they face. Hard interventions include introduction of NPR, KDF, NPS, Multi-Agency approach and disarmament within the communities. Soft interventions employed on the other hand include interethnic peace schools, grazing committees, peace accords, alternative livelihoods, security roads and non-state actor led peace initiatives. However, all these approaches have been faced with challenges leading to various levels of success. While there have been periods of relative calm, after a certain duration, conflict erupts due to one issue or another. Challenges to these interventions have ranged from lack of implementation and political goodwill amongst others.

Additionally, the study captures the perceptions of respondents on the proposed approaches for sustainable peace and security in the region. Across all the warring pastoralists' community of North Rift, the study unanimously found out that it will take full commitment and support from the top leadership of the reigning government and political goodwill to bring this menace to its conclusive end. Some of the approaches proposed include comprehensive disarmament, intelligence-based operations, streamlining NPRs, enhancing law enforcement and tightening legal and criminal prosecution, as well as effective inventory management of ammunition. Other proposed interventions include

politically driven interventions, socio-economic interventions, and technologically driven interventions. Finally, it is proposed that the proposed interventions will be centrally coordinated by an established coordinating authority that will be dedicated to the North Rift region purposely to drive state and non-state actor efforts towards sustainable peace.

Moving forward, addressing present-day livestock rustling and banditry will require deliberate, articulate and strategic mitigation policies and programmes focused on the weak links in the problem.

6.4 Recommendations

The study recommends a holistic, multifaceted and multi-agency approach coordinated by legally gazetted established authority dedicated to steering the peace initiatives and development of the six counties to combat the problem, emphasizing the need for both hard and soft interventions such as comprehensive disarmament, enhanced security operations and surveillance, and regulation of the livestock sector, and initiatives to address the underdevelopment and marginalization of the pastoralist regions of North Rift. It also calls for greater community involvement in security efforts through structured peace accords and the creation of education programs to improve literacy and formal education in affected areas. By implementing these recommendations and the envisaged strategies aimed at addressing the main drivers and factors sustaining the menace, the government and its partners can create a sustainable solution to the persisting cycles of livestock rustling and banditry in the country. Hence, the following specific key recommendations could be pursued:

6.4.1. Establishment of a Centralised Coordinating Body Dedicated to Steering the Peace Initiatives and Development of the Six Counties: Across the study area, respondents affirmed the need for the government to create an independent institution, following the example of the Nairobi Metropolitan Services, that will spearhead the restoration of sustainable peace through both hard and soft interventions in the disturbed counties. Currently, though the government has adopted the multi-agency approach to security, this strategy is mired with challenges including focusing on hard interventions as

well as command challenges for the different formed-up units. On the other hand, though the national shared security strategy proposed a whole-of-society and government approach where ministries and departments make budgetary contributions in their line mandates, however, only a couple of ministries honored their pledge. KII-1 during the interview remarked: “According to the strategy, we came up with a budget and each ministry was required to make their contribution, as at now (April, 2024), the ministry of education was the only one to honor their part of the obligation by disbursing funds, while other Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Counties (MDACs) are yet to do so.”

When asked the question ‘should the government create an institution solely dedicated to security and development of North Rift Counties’, the responses were as illustrated in the chart below:




Figure 6.1: Response rate on creation of independent authority.

From the responses highlighted, there is overwhelming support for such an institution with those affirming the need at 93.8%, those opposing being 2.7%, and those who are

non-committal forming 3.5% (Fig. 6.1). This data validates an assertion by KII-4 and KII-7 who both argued that there is a need for the President to appoint an individual who will directly answer to his office on all matters affecting the North Rift counties. In turn, all agencies working in the security and development space in the target counties will report directly to this office. This would solve the command challenges where stakeholder institutions have different reporting lines leading to a lack of synergy and disjointed efforts.

6.4.1.1 Structure of Proposed Centralised Coordinating Body: To effectively deliver on its mandate, the study proposes that the authority be headed by a Chief Executive and that it falls directly under the office of the president. The head of the body will be directly answerable to the President (Fig. 6.2).



Figure 6.2: Structure of the proposed authority.

It is recommended that the centralised coordinating body will have among others two critical divisions under the leadership of the Chief Executive, preferably a Major General. The two Divisions are Security and Peace Building Divisions (Fig 6.2). The Security Division commander will be drawn from the KDF at a rank of Brigadier for a period of three years to enforce Universal Disarmament and provide leadership to the multi-Agency team. On the other hand, the Peace Building Division which shall champion the soft interventions to peace in the area be headed by a civilian with requisite skills and experience. Both Divisions shall report to the Chief Executive Officer appointed by the President.

It is envisaged that uniformed personnel from formed-up units and agents from the National security intelligence service will be seconded from their parent forces to complement the human resource function appropriately. Where personnel are seconded from their parent units, they will fall under the command of the proposed body to enhance efficiency. This will solve the command challenges previously experienced by the multi-agency approach to security.

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APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH KEY INFORMANTS AND EXPERTS

1. Causes of conflict in the ASALs of the North Rift region

- a) In your view what is the nature of insecurity?
- b) In your view what are the main causes of insecurity in this region? Explain
- c) Are there any external influences to peace in this region?
- d) In your view who is most affected by the insecurity?
- e) What factors hinder peace efforts in the region?

2. Interventions employed to address insecurity in the ASALs of the North Rift region

- a) Which interventions have been employed by state and non-state actors to arrest insecurity in the region?
- b) What are the policy objectives of the various interventions?
- c) What is the effectiveness of current interventions?
- d) Explain the challenges associated with current interventions

3. Impact of interventions on security in ASALs of the North Rift region

- a) In your opinion, do you believe that these measures effectively mitigate conflicts in the region?
- b) What are the impacts (institutional, economic, social, ecological, and political) of the policy options?
- c) Why have the previous interventions failed to bring sustainable peace?

- d) What are the possible unintended (secondary) side effects?
- e) In your opinion, what suggestions would you give that would make these measures more effective?

4. Proposed novel approaches to address insecurity in ASALs of the North Rift region.

- a) What are the underlying problems to be solved by the interventions?
- b) Given an opportunity, what would you have done differently in addressing insecurity in the region?
- c) What measures would you suggest to effectively and sustainably address insecurity in the region?
- d) Is there a new approach(es) that in your opinion can better realize sustainable peace in the region?

APPENDIX II KEY INFORMANT GUIDES

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS AND EXPERTS

Introduction

1. The North Rift Region has been plagued with insecurity for a long period of time. The Government of Kenya (GoK) and various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have put in place various interventions but the insecurity in the region persists causing deaths, suffering and loss of livelihoods as well as discouraging investments in the region.

2. It is in view of the above that National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K) has prioritized the endemic insecurity in the North Rift Region for research as part of its mandate to proffer solutions to various national security challenges. Consequently, the University has established a team of five (5) scholars to conduct the research and compile a report with recommendations.

3. The scholars have reviewed various literature relevant to the insecurity in the North Rift Region of Kenya and established gaps on the causes of conflict in the region, the impact of various interventions employed as well as challenges which may have hindered full realization of the objectives intended from the various GoK and NGO peace and security efforts in the region.

4. The researchers intend to fill the gaps with information based on data collected through interviews and questionnaires among other data collection methods.

Key Areas of Interest

7. The questions below provide a guide on areas which the researchers are interested in:

a. Causes of Conflict in the ASALs of the North Rift Region

1. In your view what is the nature of insecurity?
2. In your view what are the main causes of insecurity in this region?
Explain
3. Are there any external influences to peace in this region?
4. In your view who is most affected by the insecurity?
5. What factors hinder peace efforts in the region?

b. Interventions Employed to Address Insecurity in the ASALs of the North Rift Region

1. Which interventions have been employed by state and non-state actors to arrest insecurity in the region?
2. What are the policy objectives of the various interventions?
3. How effective are the current interventions?
4. Explain the challenges associated with current interventions, if any.

c. Impact of Interventions on Security in ASALs of the North Rift Region

1. In your opinion, do you believe that these measures effectively mitigate conflicts in the region?
2. What are the impacts (institutional, economic, social, ecological, and political) of the policy options?
3. Why have the previous interventions failed to bring sustainable peace?
4. What are the possible unintended (secondary) side effects?
5. In your opinion, what suggestions would you give that would make these measures more effective?

d. Proposed novel Approaches to Address Insecurity in ASALs of the North Rift Region

1. What are the underlying problems to be solved in the North Rift Region?
2. Given an opportunity, would you apply the same interventions that have been applied before?
3. What would you do differently or what measures would you suggest to make the interventions more effective and sustainably address insecurity in the region?
4. Is there a new approach(es) that in your opinion can better realize sustainable peace in the region?

Appendix III: Questionnaire

(Please help me fill this questionnaire honestly and accurately)

Section A: Background Information

Demographic Characteristics

Location.....Subcounty.....County.....

Age: 10 -18 years { } 19-25 years { } 26 – 35 years { } Above 36 years { }

Gender: Male { } Female { }

Marital status: Single { } Married { } Separate { } Divorced { } Widowed { }

Education: Never been to school { } Primary { } Secondary { } Tertiary { } University { }
Others { }

Occupation: Livestock keeping { } Land Cultivation { } Business { } Salaried { }

Other, { } please specify

Section B: Nature of Insecurity

1. This is the nature of insecurity in my area

	Nature	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
a	Loss of human lives					
b	Banditry					
c	Destruction of property					
d	Cattle Rustling					
e.	Forceful displacement					
f.	Others (specify)					

Section C: Causes of Insecurity

2. This is the cause of insecurity in my area

I. Political

I	Political Causes	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
a	Incitement					
b	Expansionism					
c	Double administrative units					
d	Unclear boundaries					
e.	Unequal distribution of resources					
f.	Any other (Specify)					

II. Cultural

II	Cultural Causes	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
a	Dowry					
b	Warrior worship					
c	Oloibonism and Seers					
d	Any other (specify)					

III. Socio-economic

III	Socio-Economic Causes	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
a	Commercialization of cattle rustling					
b	Lack of alternative livelihoods					
c	Illiteracy					
d	Historical marginalization					
e	Proliferation of small arms & light weapons					
f.	Poverty					
g.	Any other (specify)					

IV. Environmental

IV	Environmental Causes	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
a	Drought					
b	Inadequate Pasture and water					
c	Minerals					
d	Any other (specify)					

Section D: Success of Interventions previously employed

3. This intervention was successful in restoring peace in my area

	Intervention	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
	Hard interventions					
a	National Police Reservists					
b	Kenya Defence Forces					
c	Multi-agency approach					
d	National Police Service					
e.	Forceful disarmament					
f.	Others (specify)					
	Soft Interventions					
h.	Inter-ethnic peace schools					
i.	Grazing Committees					
j.	Peace Accords					
k.	Alternative livelihoods					
l.	Security roads					
m.	Religion					
n.	NGO led peace process					
o.	Any other (specify)					

Section E: Challenges to Interventions Previously Employed

4. This is the challenge to the interventions employed in my area

Intervention	Challenge	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
Formed Up Units	Unclear Command structure					
	Legal Mandate of KDF					
	Mistrust of Government					
	Difficult terrain					
	Intelligence failure					
	Corruption					
Forceful Disarmament	Piecemeal disarmament					
	Selective disarmament of communities					
	Mistrust of government and security agents					
	Lack of commitment from government					
	Intelligence failure					
	Corruption					
Recruitment & deployment of NPR	Lack of accountability					
	Poor pay					
	Unstructured and politicized recruitment					
	Small numbers					
	Unequitable distribution					

Intervention	Challenge	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
	No clear command structure					
	Infiltration by bandits during recruitment					
	Intelligence failure					
	Corruption					
Peace and grazing committees	Ethnic mistrust					
	Disregard by some communities					
Interethnic peace schools	Insecurity keeping teachers at bay					
Peace Accords	Lack of Political goodwill					
	Unclear implementation mechanism					
Security roads	Inadequate in number					
	Inadequate Patrols					
Alternative livelihoods	Lack of coordination					
	Lack of community involvement					
	Unfavourable climate					
	Insecurity					
	Sabotage by criminal elements					

Section F: Proposed New Approaches to Sustainable Peace

5. The following approach can bring lasting and sustainable peace in my area

	Proposed Approach	Highly agree	Agree	Neither agree Nor Disagree	Disagree	Highly disagree
a	Alternative livelihoods					
b	Structured Peace Accords					
c	Presidential Appointment of Authority for North Rift Security & Development					
d	Comprehensive Disarmament					
e.	Free and compulsory Boarding Schools					
f.	Disbandment of NPR					
g.	Presidential-led Peace Meetings with Political Class in North Rift					
h.	Livestock chipping					
i.	Affirmative action in development of disturbed counties					
j.	Religious led-government backed effort					
k.	De-gazettement of double administrative units					
l.	Government to hold local political leaders to account					
m.	Any other (specify)					

Appendix IV:

SER	IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY	ROAD NAME	COUNTY TRAVERSED	DIST (KM)
1	KeNHA (North-Rift Region)	Chemolingot - Kapedo - Lomelo - Lokori - Lokwamosing	Baringo & Turkana	140
2		Lomut - Amaler - Lokwamosing	W/Pokot & Turkana	90
3		Lomokori - Lokiriyama - Namoruputh - Lorugum - Lodwar	Turkana	85
4		Kalokol - Kataboi - Lowareng'ak - Todonyang	Turkana	90
5		Kilangata - Chesongoch - Tot - Kolowa - Barbelo	W/Pokot, Baringo & E/Marakwet	46
6		Biretwo - Chesongoch - Kerio River	E/Marakwet	83
7	KeRRA (Baringo Region)	Nasorot - Nabukut - Nadome - Loreng - Lomelo	Turkana & Baringo	40
8		Silale (GDC) - Takawia - Loreng - Lomelo	Turkana & Baringo	45
9		Cheptunoyo - Nakoko - Adomeyon - Tapulen - Chesitet	Baringo	35
10		Chemolingot - Kositei - Kapturo - Kabartonjo	Baringo	58
11		Akwichatis - Amaya	Turkana & Baringo	50
12		Nginyang - Chemoril - Naudo	Baringo	30
13		Mukutani - Kiserian - Marigat	Baringo	70
14		Kamrio - Rotu - Kapau	Baringo	63
15		Kolowa - Ngoron - Rotu - Kapau - Kapedo	Turkana & Baringo	160
16		Akwichatis - Mukekamar	Baringo	30
17		Nginyang - Chemoril - Chepungus/ Paka - Tapogh - Kadogoi	Baringo	40
18		Kadogoi - Paka - Silale	Turkana & Baringo	56
19		Churo - Kaptuya - Laikipia nature conservancy	Baringo & Laikipia	45
20		Amaya - Nasur - Chumalenya	Baringo & Samburu	35

SER	IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY	ROAD NAME	COUNTY TRAVERSED	DIST (KM)
21		Nasur - Lochokia	Baringo &	140
22		Pompo - Kokwotigen - Kalapata -	Samburu	25
23		Mukutani	Baringo	50
24		Chemoril - Kasikorian - Ponpon -	Baringo	40
25		Chepkalacha	Turkana and Baringo	50
26	KeRRA (Samburu Region)	Lomelo - Pura - Baragoi	Baringo, Turkana & Samburu	32.5
27	KeRRA (Laikipia Region)	Kona Mbaya- Wamula-Mutara	Laikipia	17
28		Ngoro Theru- Tharua- Karai	Laikipia	14
29		Ilpolei- Kimanju	Laikipia	18
30		Kimanju- Oldonyiro	Laikipia & Isiolo	20
31		Kimanju- Ewaso- Korian Ranch	Laikipia & Samburu	35
32		Sosian- Kirimun- DB Samburu	Laikipia & Samburu	55
33		Kinamba- Mouwarak	Laikipia	46
34		Mugie- Churo	Laikipia & Baringo	22
35		Poster- Ol Moran	Laikipia	15
36		Dol Dol- Kipsing	Laikipia & Isiolo	24
37		Timau-Ethi- Lekusero- Sieku- Tasia	Laikipia & Isiolo	30
38		Kamwenje-Ngerecha -Lonyek Jnc	Laikipia	50
39		KeRRA (Elgeiyo Marakwet Region)	Tereen - Mulwa Ber - Chemusuuk - Chepchoreen - Kolowa Bridge - Sindar	E. Marakwet, Baringo & West Pokot
40	Cherutich - Kitony - Sewes		Turkana & Baringo	20
41	Kapchelal -Chegilet - Tawilwak - kuikui		E. Marakwet & Baringo	30
42	Katkok -Kerio River - Kinyach		E. Marakwet & Baringo	32
43	Cheptarit -Kerio River - Tirbei		E. Marakwet & Baringo	9
44	Kermuk -Kerio River - Ayatia - Chemultany		E. Marakwet & Baringo	12

SER	IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY	ROAD NAME	COUNTY TRAVERSED	DIST (KM)
45		Opening up of roads from Vulnerable centres along Kerio Valley (Liter, Sangach, Kabaldamet, Kaben, Soko Bora, Mogil, Chepkum, Tunyo, Kilos, Kermuk) to -Kerio River (cumulative Length -80km)	E. Marakwet & Baringo	80
46		Construction of 5 bridges across Kerio River (Along Kerio Valley)	E. Marakwet & Baringo	
47	KeRRA (West Pokot Region)	Maron - Wewo - Katilit - Mungwo - Sewes - Lomut	E. Marakwet & West Pokot	30
48		Kamelei B - Segut - Kimnai	E. Marakwet & Baringo	37
49		Kamologon -Chepkoko	E. Marakwet & W. Pokot	40
50	KeRRA (Turkana Region)	Lokwamosing-Lowaat	Turkana & West Pokot	108
51		Lowaat-Napeitom	Turkana & Baringo	100
52		Kapedo-Kapau	Turkana & Baringo	105



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