



NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY-KENYA

**INFLUENCE OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION ON KENYA'S
NATIONAL SECURITY, 2002-2022**

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ND601/0009/2022

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22 OCTOBER 2023

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research work is my original work and has not been submitted for a Degree in any other University/learning institution.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family for their immense support, patience and understanding during the entire coursework. May God bless them abundantly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My sincere gratitude goes out to my supervisor Dr Joe Mutungi, for providing me with his guidance in the course of my studies that have led to the production of this research work. I extend my gratitude to my immediate family, my dear friends, various scholars and my colleagues in the wider KDF family, North Rift Welfare Group members and Course 25-2022/23 and NDC Nyumba Kumi 22/23 who supported me in one way or another in the course of my research journey.

I most profoundly acknowledge the Kenya Defence Forces and National Defence University-Kenya (NDU-K) for the chance and opportunity to train and gain new knowledge and insights. It is with gratitude that I acknowledge the Commandant National Defence College (NDC-K), the faculty, library and production staff together with the entire College fraternity for the support and enabling environment.

To anyone else who made any contribution, I appreciate you wholeheartedly.

God bless you all.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AML	Anti- Money Laundering
APC	Armored Personnel Carriers
ARA	Assets Recovery Agency
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
BOIT	Blending Outsider Insights and Techniques
CBK	Central Bank of Kenya
CFT	Counter-Financing of Terrorism
CIA	Central Intelligence Authority
CRIB	Crime Research and Intelligence Bureau
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Intelligence
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMA	Disaster Management Agencies
DRB	Disaster Response Battalion
DRR	Disengagement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FRC	Financial Reporting Centre
GJLOS	Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector

IAA	Inter-Agency Agreements
IAD	Institutional Analysis and Development
IW	Irregular Warfare
KCGS	Kenya Coast Guard Services
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KMA	Kenya Maritime Authority
KNFPFA	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms
KOFC	Kenya Ordnance Factory Corporation
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
KSAs	Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes
MAC	Multi Agency Cooperation
MACHINS	Multi-Agency Cooperation in Handling Issues of National Security
MASC	Multi Agency Steering Committee
MDM	Multi-Dimensional Missions
MLA	Mutual Legal Assistance
NASD	National Air Support Department
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Centre
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NDU (K)	National Defence University of Kenya
NGAO	National Government Administration Officers
NIS	National Intelligence Services

NPS	National Police Service
NSAC	National Security Advisory Council
NSC	National Security Council
NSCVE	National Strategy for Countering of Violent Extremism
NSI	National Security Industries, Ruiru.
NSOs	National Security Organizations
ODPP	Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
POCAMLA	Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2010)
POTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act (2010)
SSA	State Security Agency
TARUS	Tactical Resourcefulness under Stress
WoGA	Whole-of-Government-Approach
YVE	Youth Violent Extremism

ABSTRACT

Changing societal, economic, and political times continue to herald new realities to the national safety and security of nations. To address the security challenges and threats that emerge therebecause, nations have had to adopt contemporary perspectives. One of the most common and fruitful of these perspectives - in the Kenyan national security setup, is that of multi-agency cooperation (MAC). However, the country lacks a unitary regulatory framework to guide the operationalization of such cooperative undertakings. This descriptive and cross-sectional inquiry examined the collaboration of multiple agencies in the management of national security concerns within Kenya, as well as the enabling tools and approaches thereto. The study sought the input of 111 high-level participants drawn from the National Security Organizations (NSOs) within Kenya through the snowballing sampling procedure. From their feedback, the study established that MAC in Kenya is determined by a host of factors including: trends in crime and criminology; resource constraints amongst agencies; and the sheer number of operators within the national security sector. The study also established that existing gaps in training and capability of each agency/service, the variations in institutional realities and expertise, and the existence of political goodwill also support MAC in Kenya's national security environment. Data from the study indicates that MAC in Kenya is characterized by the sharing of information/intelligence, attempts at capacity building, and greater pursuit of resource sharing amongst line agencies. Similarly, multi-agency cooperation in Kenya is also characterized by the coordination of interventions and collaborative operations. During the study, it also emerged that MAC in Kenya is structured at the cabinet level, but also often takes the peer-to-peer collaboration approach. Other formats of MAC include the in-group approach, and the outsider-insider approach. Finally, the research confirmed the presence of specific legal, policy, and institutional frameworks that guide and enable MAC within Kenya. At its conclusion, the study proposes the adoption of the BOIT model, an approach to multi-agency cooperation that involves blending outsider insights and techniques, as a way of enhancing operational effectiveness and outcomes. In particular, the study lobbies for the establishment of a Multi-Agency Steering Authority (MASC) as the core driver of the BOIT model. The proposed committee would be domiciled under the NSC.

Keywords: Multi-Agency Cooperation (MAC), National Security, Violent Extremism, Collaborative Framework, Deterrent Measures, Counter-Terrorism, National Security Organizations (NSOs), Multi Agency Steering Committee (MASC).

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1.0 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

All countries of the world have had to continuously take proactive measures to safeguard their borders. This has continued to be informed in large part by three factors; the increasing threats of terrorist attacks across the world, along with the growing vulnerability of populations globally, and the dynamic and increasingly sophisticated nature of criminality around the globe (Comiskey, 2020). While many countries have put mechanisms and structures in place to combat crime, there are a host of others that seem ill-prepared to combat the concern. Even countries that seem prepared to handle the threat of criminality and terrorism have to still contend with the ever changing nature of criminality. This has continually forced nations around the world to rethink and redesign their entire approaches to national security. Nearly all countries that have had breaches of national security, or which fear such imminent attacks, now have a dedicated system geared towards the enhancement of national security (Phillips, 2021). One of the most impactful ways of dealing with threats is to adopt a multi-pronged approach that often involves the creation of different agencies within the national security sphere, to focus on specific threats (Goodman, Pulwarty, Risi, and King, 2018). For years, the most preferred approach was the creation of specialized response agencies and units that would be tasked with addressing specific concerns (Peptan, 2019). Thus, many countries have agencies that collect intelligence with the goal of preempting threats to their national security (Akimov et al., 2020). Then there are agencies that analyze such intelligence and make sense of it with the aim of recommending actionable steps towards handling such threats (Ward et al., 2018).

While the strategy of developing new agencies to combat specific threats to national security has proven useful in realizing desired outcomes, it has often resulted in the creation of

inefficiencies along the national security operational chain. For example, there tend to be overlaps of roles and responsibilities among the different agencies (Ward et al., 2018). Wastage of resources due to such overlap, and poor response to events and concerns due to slow sharing of information and coordination of appropriate response strategies (Phillips, 2021). This outcome prompted the need for cooperation between the different specialized agencies dealing with national security concerns. Such collaboration was meant to address the intricate nature of dealings within the national security sphere, and the high level of specialization of agencies therein, with the aim of realizing the most effective outcomes. This is achievable through the collective operations of the national security agencies under an inter-agency collaboration framework. The influence behind such cooperative operation of line agencies is pegged on the broad nature of national security undertakings (Imboywa, 2022), and the variations in expertise required for effective goal-realization (Bienenstock, 2022). It makes it necessary and beneficial for agencies within the national security sector to reach out to, and rope in other agencies therein with the goal of effectively utilizing the joint capabilities and competencies (Pickering and Fox, 2022). The achievement of this would therefore call for national security operationalization under a framework of cooperation amongst the multiple agencies therein.

The specialization of agencies within the entire national security framework tends to increase the likelihood of overlap of roles and responsibilities therein. Such fact could lead to competition rather than cooperation in the pursuit of common goals (Imboywa et al., 2022). The intersectionality of the agencies' roles and tasks may hinder rather than enable the achievement of national security objectives (Phillips, 2021). As such, the best way to ensure the achievement of national security goals would be to promote the harmonious operations of different agencies within the national security sector. Indeed, many countries have embraced Multi Agency Cooperation

(MAC) in managing national security to different extents, with each adopting a collaborative approach to the operations of the various agencies within the national security sector.

1.2 Background of the Study

*“The lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred... and all the various stakeholders working in the international arena, **military and civilian, government and private**, have to learn to stretch outside their comfort zones to **work together and achieve results...**”*

- James Schear (Dep. Ass. Sec. - Partnerships, Strategic and Stability Operations, U.S. DoD) –

The need for multi-agency collaboration first arose with the growing sophistication of criminality. The desire amongst different national security agencies for cooperation and collaboration was founded on the need to streamline the achievement of desired national security objectives (Logan & Lloyd, 2019). This was especially informed by the increasing difficulty faced by each agency in realizing their line objectives alone, particularly in the light of the multi-faceted nature of crime. For instance, national security issues such as terrorism would often be perpetrated across multiple facets and aspects that fell under the purview of both the military and civilian law enforcement agencies. Evidently, the realization of national security objectives would have been hindered if agencies therein continued to operate from a fragmented perspective. With the ever increasing sophistication of criminals came the need for multiple agencies to collaboratively work towards addressing criminality, in ensuring the integrity of countries (Mazarr et al., 2022), whilst also assuring the security of citizens therein and maintaining law and order in the process.

With most countries of the world facing multiple threats to their national security, and the ever-evolving nature of criminality, many began to pursue a collaborative approach to achieving national security goals. Inter-agency collaboration first emerged in earnest within the U.S, in the formative decades of the twentieth century (Sussex, Clarke, and Medcalf, 2017). True interagency

cooperation was first made possible by the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 by President Harry Truman, with the aim of collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence on threats to US national security interests (Kitts, 2022). The work of the agency was however limited to collection and analysis of intelligence on threats, but with limited powers to act on any such threats within the United States. Thus, the information in its possession would have to be forwarded to line agencies such as the police, or the military for further action. In this way, cooperation between and amongst different agencies working within the realm of national security was born. This collaboration grew in kind and stature in subsequent years, with multiple agencies being created to look into specific threats, and to thereafter collaboratively operate towards their elimination (Winstead, 2021). The United States thus became the beacon of interagency collaboration in national security operations. For instance, in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the US, the country founded the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its formation heralded the second phase of collaboration amongst different military, paramilitary, and civilian agencies, bringing them together under the umbrella of national security (Winstead, 2021). With the creation of the DHS, the government of the U.S was able to consolidate major national security issues including immigration, smuggling, organized crime, and the threat of terrorism.

With the success realized by the United States in the collaboration of national security agencies, many other nations adopted the framework. Countries had to shift their approaches to national security from the creation of different specialized units that operated independently in pursuit of national security objectives (Franke, 2022). This was replaced by the creation of enabling conditions to spur collaboration and cooperation between different agencies that already existed within the realm of national security. Thus, the cooperation adopted the form of merging countries' capabilities to counter external threats with the existing abilities to address internal concerns to national security (Bright and Whelan, 2018). Within the United Kingdom, for example,

national security operations have been characterized by the presence of diverse agencies, each pursuing the same goal but influenced by different operational priorities, plans, and even incentives (Thomson, 2021). There are entities that seek to keep the country safe from within including the police, the tax authorities, and the immigration officials. Then there are entities that protect the country from external threats including the armed forces and the intelligence collection entities. Though each of the agencies are tasked with the pursuit of specific mandates related to national security, they operate under a collaborative framework spearheaded by the National Security Council (NSC). At the moment, the council operates under the cabinet's National Security Office, NSO (Thomson and Blagden, 2018). Hitherto the formation of the entity, national security agencies would compete against each other, potentially jeopardize national security outcomes in the pursuit of their own agency-specific mandates.

In Germany, the collaboration between the armed forces that prevent external aggression with the police service that maintains law and order has helped to improve the speed and effectiveness of response to national security threats (Angenendt and Koch, 2019). In this manner, the collection of information on threats to the country, the analysis of intelligence, and the planning and execution of response plans have been improved due to the collaborative efforts of different agencies. This has allowed for the realization of better outcomes in dealing with counter-terrorism undertakings. It has also led to progress in the realms of combating illicit trade and addressing immigration concerns. Further, the cooperation has also aided the general maintenance of law and order within the European nation. Overall, MAC has paid off for the various concerns with the German national security framework.

The success of interagency collaboration in the Americas and Europe provided the impetus for more nations to adopt the framework in handling of national security concerns. In China, MAC has enabled the realization of goals more effectively. Through the sharing of information held by

different agencies within the national security framework, the government of China has been able to meet different objectives (Tang, 2020). For example, under the Super Ministry, whose role it is to coordinate the operations of different government entities, the country has been able to integrate the information available on national security concerns; a fact that then enables informed decision-making through the collaborative framework.

In India, multi-agency collaboration has proven necessary in the development of capabilities geared towards addressing threats to national security. Through the creation of synergies in operations touching on national security, India has been able to develop a well-trained workforce that is capable of responding to different challenges impacting its national security (Munir and Ashok, 2021). The country continues to reap the benefits of interagency cooperation in the interception of threats that range from terrorism to insurrection, and even economic crimes that could have an impact on the security of the world's largest democracy. Through collaborative operations within the realm of national security, the country has been able to improve the capacity of multiple agencies within the sector.

Within Africa, MAC has not been as extensively embraced, as is the case elsewhere in the world. In Nigeria, for example, conflict within different national security agencies have had negative impacts on national security outcomes. For years, the kinks within the national security sector in the country led to the rise in different threats including cyber-crime, insurgency, and infiltration of illicit arms (Abioye and Alao, 2020). However, the realization of drawbacks to such 'sibling rivalry' led to improved efforts geared towards collaborative operations amongst agencies within the country's security sector. In the recent past, the creation of collaborative undertakings that rope in different law enforcement agencies has helped to counter narcotics trafficking in the Niger Delta, while also helping to address the concern of piracy therein (Ikeanyibe et al., 2020).

The collaboration amongst different national security agencies in the country has also had profound effects on the management of counter-insurgency campaigns.

In South Africa, interagency collaboration has been crucial in the development of strategies that overarch the concern of national security. For instance, the country has had great success in addressing concerns such as xenophobia which greatly threaten the security of the country (Cinini and Balgobind, 2019). Secondly, the collaboration of multiple agencies in the pursuit of national security objectives has led to the efficient utilization of resources at the operational level (Cinini and Blagobind, 2019). Further, the collaboration of multiple agencies such as border patrol, and customs agencies have also allowed the country to tackle contemporary national security issues. Among these are the smuggling of drugs and other economic goods, trafficking in humans and trophies, and securing of territorial integrity - both on land and in the sea. More than anything else, the efforts of South Africa's State Security Agency (SSA) have been crucial to the realization of national security objectives.

Within the borders of the Republic of Kenya, multi-agency cooperation has had significant influence over the realization of national security objectives. Through the collective operation of agencies involved in the sector, the country has been able to realize efficient utilization of resources in the pursuit of line objectives (Magara, 2018). There also exists evidence of clear cooperation between intelligence agencies in the country both civilian and military. Other entities therein include first-responder agencies among them; the police, the military- under the Disaster Response Battalion (DRB), and the NGAOs. Other instances of multi-agency collaboration within the national security framework in Kenya includes the cooperation of the police, intelligence agencies, and the immigration department. Similar collaborations also exist amongst national security agencies such as the NGAO network, the police, immigration officials, and intelligence agencies

(Mbugua, 2021). The cooperation amongst agencies has led to the disruption of arms, drugs, human, and wildlife trafficking networks that have national security implications.

Countless interventions have also been enabled through the multi-agency collaboration between the cabinet office, the police, and the KDF, as well as the NGAO framework and intelligence agencies, under the auspices of the National Security Council, NSC (Nguru, 2014). Even with the successful outcomes of interagency collaboration within the Kenyan national security sector, there still remain challenges. These arise from the diversity of line agencies' cultures and priorities. Each of the challenges, whether singly or collectively, impact negatively upon the achievement of Kenya's national security objectives. The challenges also contribute to hindering the effective collaboration of agencies within the security sector. Evidently therefore, there exist boundless areas of improvement in the realization of truly collaborative interagency operations in the course of seeking of national security goals.

1.3 Problem Statement

Kenya lacks a clear regulatory framework to guide the operationalization of multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national security objectives. At the moment, Kenya has a semblance of collaboration amongst the agencies working within the national security sector. Such collaboration often involves periodic fusion of capabilities and competencies, specifically whenever and wherever threats emerge. The cooperation amongst national security agencies, taking on the formats of information sharing, joint decision making and command, and response coordination, usually last for the duration of the respective exercises. That is, the collaboration amongst agencies involved in the Kenyan security sector tends to have a short shelf life. Once mission objectives have been realized, the sister agencies resort back to their default settings. Thus, each agency guards its operations closely till such time that they are again called upon to cooperate in the pursuit of national security objectives.

Given the fast-paced nature of crime and criminality within society, the vulnerability of the country may be exploited at any time by national security threats – both man-made and natural. The threats are further exacerbated by the globalization of threats such as terrorism and cyberspace infiltration. Response to such security threats often call for the collective operations of national security agencies for such threats transcend the arbitrary boundaries and compartmental limitations assigned to each agency. As a result, it is important for the country to always be on high alert, and at the ready to deal with any imminent threats. The country should also be at the ready to respond to calamities and disasters that could have national security implications. Such preparedness could, however, only be achieved in the presence of a well-defined collaborative framework that stands the test of time. That is, clear and decisive response to national security threats and issues can only be realized when line agencies are willing and ready to work with each other in the pursuit of the collective objective that is national security. This would be best achieved through the creation of strong legal, policy, and institutional frameworks meant to aid MAC in Kenya.

1.4 Research Questions

During the process of data collection, the study was guided by a set of questions intended to meet the research objectives. The responses to the questions, and other subsequent queries, provided information that helped in answering the study problem. These research questions included;

1. What determines multi-agency cooperation within Kenya's national security framework?
2. What is the nature and structure of multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of Kenya's national security?
3. Which frameworks enable/catalyze the operationalization of MAC in Kenya?

1.5 Research Objectives.

Emanating from the problem at hand which the research sought to address, the objectives of the study were three-pronged:

1. To examine the determinants of multi-agency collaboration in the management of Kenya's national security concerns.
2. To highlight the nature and structure of multi-agency cooperation within Kenya's national security sector.
3. To consider frameworks that could enhance MAC in Kenya.

1.6 The Literature Review

In connection to the impact of the multi-agency approach in managing national security concerns, this theoretical literature review consulted a number of sources. Each such literature source revolved around the role that interagency collaboration plays in enhancing national security, and the challenges that face attempts at multi-agency collaboration. The literature also incorporated the models of interagency cooperation in the pursuit of national security objectives. The review set off by defining what multi-agency cooperation is, what it entails and how it is manifest in Kenya, and the role it plays in enhancing national security therein. The review also delved into the factors that determine multi-agency cooperation within the country and the approaches that the country should take if it is to enhance the cooperation amongst multiple agencies pursuing its national security objectives. Finally, the review illuminated the resourcing constraints that may impact upon MAC within Kenya.

1.6.1 Definition of Variables

1.6.1.1 Multi-Agency Collaboration

Multi-agency collaboration refers to the partnership of professionals from different agencies, pursuing a collective goal (Omwen, 2020). In connection to the national security of

countries, the phenomenon involves the joint pursuit of national security objectives through the collaborative efforts of line agencies. The phenomenon of multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national security could also connote the pooling together of resources and capabilities by the different units and formations within national security agencies. Ideally, the goal of such would be harmonization of collective security undertakings (Sivenbring and Malmros, 2019). Further, multi-agency cooperation within the workings of national security may imply the collective utilization of capabilities owned by different agencies concerned with the pursuit of national security objectives (Casiano, 2018). From such collaborative approach, the resulting group of practitioners would be able to craft and pursue collective objectives for the working group. This would allow for the sharing of information amongst the agencies, the appropriate division of tasks and responsibilities, and the coordinated achievement of desired national security outcomes (Imboywa et al., 2020). Such collective operations are aimed at improving the efficiency of national security undertakings. In essence, the collaborative operations of agencies under the multi-agency framework was meant to address problems that may arise from variation of national safety focus amongst different entities/agencies within the security sector.

1.6.1.2 National Security

National security refers to the safety, defence, and protection of a nation's interests, ranging from the citizens to the physical territory (territorial integrity), and even to economic integrity (Kokkoris, 2021). The phrase can also be used to imply the defence of a nation's sovereignty against attacks of different forms, both natural and man-made. At its core, national security connotes the maintenance of law and order, peace and safety, and the overall protection of a nation and its citizens from harm (Kokkoris, 2021). Thus, it encompasses all aspects of the integrity of a nation's existence, from the physical to the environmental, economic, and even social (including values and institutions). In light of the concept of multi-agency cooperation, national security

would connote the defense of territorial, environmental, social and economic integrity through the joint operationalization of capabilities by different law and order agencies within a country (Goodman, Pulwarty, Risi, and King, 2018). Overall, national security refers to the sustained existence of safety as concerns a nation's varied interests that range from the physical or territorial, to the environmental, economic, and social aspects (Phillips, 2021).

1.6.2 Theoretical Review

Different schools of thought exist as regards the achievement of national security through cooperation amongst multiple agencies in the sector. Each of these postulations offer varying perspectives on how multi-agency cooperation should be approached, how it might be achieved, and the influence of different actors over the pursuit of line goals. For this study, the most suitable perspective was the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) theory. This is informed by the role that diverse entities within and outside the national security sector play in the realization of sectoral goals.

1.6.2.1 The Institutional Analysis & Development Perspective

According to the institutional analysis and development framework of national security, the existence of collectively-operated institutions within the realm of national security is not spontaneous. It involves the adaptation of norms and values held by different agencies into a coherent approach for tackling emergent threats to nations (Ostrom, 2019). That is, the development of institutional frameworks, such as those that guide interagency collaboration within the realm of national security, involves the re-engineering of different operational frameworks of multiple agencies. As a result, each agency then redesigns its operations to fit into a shared environment where the norms of practice are collectively determined and operationalized in the pursuit of national security objectives (Ostrom, 2019). As a theory, the IAD framework is therefore pegged on the premise that rules of operation in multi-agency collaborations are influenced and

redesigned by concerned parties to establish new guidelines (Bang, 2018). In effect, the theory postulates that there needs to be a common pool of resources, from which the different agencies involved in national security can draw the ability to meet their objectives.

From the perspective of the IAD framework, specific patterns through which the various agencies operate towards realization of national security objectives would need to be established if multi-agency cooperation therein were to be enhanced. First is the historical context of relationship amongst the line agencies. Institutional frameworks can best be developed where agencies have collaborative undertakings in the past (Mazarr, 2022). Second would be the presence of champions that rally the collective towards the realization of end objectives. This would be achieved by identifying and supporting voices that exalt the interagency cooperation framework (Whaley, 2018). Further, interagency collaboration would call for the existence of legal and contractual interactions amongst the agencies involved in the collective pursuit of national security objectives. This would help create the legal basis upon which such cooperative framework would operate in seeking the realization of national security aims (Grossman, 2019).

Similarly, the IAD framework also involves the improvement of operational outcomes through learning from the feedback obtained during previous collaborative engagements. By adjusting operational approaches in line with the feedback received from previous undertakings, the multi-agency frameworks involved in national security operations would institutionalize the enabling factors whilst addressing the drawbacks (Clarke et al., 2021). Finally, multi-agency cooperation within the context of the IAD framework would involve the establishment of new norms of operations. This would encompass the development of new guidelines of practice upon the lessons learnt from previous collaborative undertakings; during which champions of interagency cooperation would spearhead the development of legal and contractual obligations geared towards realizing national security aims (Nguyen, 2019; Cole, 2017). Overall, the multi-

agency cooperation approach is likely to contribute to the realization of one objective of the research, to establish modalities for improving cooperation amongst multiple national security agencies with a view to realizing positive outcomes therein.

1.6.3 Empirical Review of Multi-Agency Collaboration

The concern of multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national security objectives was examined from a three-pronged perspective, touching on the determinants of cooperation amongst multiple agencies, to the nature and legal structure of such cooperation, and then the challenges facing efforts towards such multi-agency cooperation.

1.6.3.1 Determinants of Multi-agency Cooperation

Multi-agency cooperation is made possible by a number of factors that both necessitate and support the phenomenon. While many of these factors cut across jurisdictions, there are some that are specific to each country, given the myriads of varying challenges that each face in the pursuit of national security objectives. In the U.S, multi-agency cooperation was necessitated by the country's search for effective ways of addressing the growing rates of criminality. The intention was to achieve the full utilization of the country's law enforcement capability. Crimes such as drug and substance peddling, robberies, and even murders had grown to unacceptable levels and often cut across multiple jurisdictions or boundaries (Sedgwick, Callahan, and Hawdon, 2021). This complicated the efforts of law enforcement agencies that had limited jurisdiction. For instance, a local law enforcement agency would not be able to pursue criminals across county or state lines, due to limitations of jurisdiction. Thus, there emerged the need for multiple law enforcement agencies to collaborate with their peers in the maintenance of law and order and in the pursuit of justice. More particularly, the need for collaboration between different agencies was informed by the large number of agencies operating within the national security sphere. This raised the concern of cost-effectiveness in addressing emergent national security challenges, particularly in the face

of resource constraints within the larger economy. Need arose within the U.S for the efficient utilization of available resources in meeting both existing and upcoming challenges to security (Power, 2018). The desire for collaboration was also informed by the training and capability gaps that existed between the agencies that protect against external threats, and those tasked with addressing internal security concerns.

In Europe, determinants of multi-agency cooperation mirrored those of the United States, though some were born of the unique realities in the continent. For instance, within the United Kingdom, the cooperation of multiple agencies within the realm of national security is determined by a number of factors. First, the need to minimize the impact of such risks to the country's national security as illegal immigration led to the collaborative operations of security agencies (Avadi and Seth, 2020). Secondly, multi-agency cooperation within the UK is also informed by the desire to tame the illicit flows of finances into and outside of the nation's territory (Pajón, and Walsh, 2022). Just as much, in order for the country to combat emergent threats such as that of radicalization into violent extremism, there has been need for security agencies therein to work collaboratively (Klima et al., 2021).

Within Germany the collaboration amongst agencies was informed by the need to improve the speed and effectiveness of response to national security threats (Tang, 2020). For instance, the cooperation of multiple law and order agencies in the country was influenced by the desire to enhance the planning and execution of response to emergencies. Just as much, MAC within the European nations is determined by the myriads of threats, ranging from terrorism, illicit trade, and immigration concerns. Additionally, the need to both preempt and thwart terrorist attacks, while also responding to others has also led to greater collaboration amongst national security agencies in Germany (Thomson et al., 2018). The nature of national security objectives in Germany, along

with the realities in the country have led to a greater tendency towards the adoption of an inter-agency collaboration approach.

In Asia, multi-agency collaboration has been informed by similar factors as those in the North American and European continents. In China, for instance, multi-agency cooperation has largely been influenced by the need to realize security objectives more effectively (Tang, 2020). In this regard, China's need to ensure the efficient utilization of resources has made it necessary for multiple agencies working within the security sector to cooperate there-amongst. Further, the ability of the different agencies to coordinate their operations in the pursuit of national security objective has made multi-agency cooperation possible within the South East Asian nation. Just as much, limited transparency amongst national security agencies has also had a negative impact on the attempts to realize cooperation within the sector. Afield in India, MAC has been the result of the need to create operational synergies amongst different entities within the realm of national security. The development of a well-trained and highly specialized workforce capable of responding to specific challenges impacting upon national security has also inspired multi-agency cooperation within India (Munir and Ashok, 2021). Additionally, the desire of the Indian government to increase the nation's ability to handle emergent security threats has also catalyzed the cooperation amongst multiple agencies within the country (Taneja and Siyech, 2019). Further, collaboration of national security organizations within the multi-agency framework have also been informed by the country's need to offer assistance and coordinate responses to disasters within its borders (Avadi and Seth, 2020).

Regionally, multi-agency cooperation has been linked to different factors. The desire to achieve national security ends makes it necessary for agencies to cooperate in tackling the myriads of national security threats that may not necessarily require military response alone (Franke, 2020). For instance, in Nigeria, the nature of emergent threats, cutting across different law enforcement

disciplines, has made it necessary for agencies to cooperate in their operations (Jimba et al., 2020). The realization of drawbacks to fragmented operations in pursuit of national security has led to improved efforts on collaborative operations amongst agencies within the country's security sector. Further, the need to counter the trafficking of drugs, and the increasing lawlessness and incidences of piracy in the Niger Delta region, have also spurred the cooperation of multiple security agencies operating to ensure the safety of Nigeria as a country (Nte, 2013). Collaboration amongst different national security agencies in Nigeria has also been informed by the desire to improve the efficient utilization of resources and capabilities therein. This is aimed at achieving positive outcomes for the country. However, conflict within different agencies have had negative impacts on national security outcomes in the country. For years, the kinks within the national security sector in the country led to the rise in different threats including cyber-crime, insurgency, and infiltration of illicit arms (Abiodun et al., 2019).

In South Africa, interagency collaboration has been informed by the development of strategies that overarch the concern of national security. For instance, the pursuit of the efficient utilization of resources at the operational level has made it necessary for the country to operationalize a multi-agency approach to handling issues of national security (Brazer, 2019). Secondly, the desire of the country to tackle emergent national safety concerns have also enhanced MAC within the country (Cinini and Balgobind, 2019). Further on, the desire of South Africa to tackle contemporary national security issues that includes smuggling of drugs and other economic goods, and the trafficking in humans and trophies. Concerns also include the securing of territorial integrity, both on land and in the sea, have inspired MAC within the country (van der Staak and Wolf, 2019). The collaborative efforts of various agencies in the country's security sector are determined by the desire to address training and capability gaps that exists within individual agencies. However, it is evident that such shortfalls could be rectified through cooperative efforts

(Mbugua, 2021). Finally, the cooperation of multiple security agencies in South Africa is influenced by the desire to improve the outcomes of interventions in such occurrences as humanitarian crises (Reid and van Niekerk, 2008). Through collaborative workings of its multiple agencies, South Africa is therefore able to improve the realization of national security objectives.

Within the borders of the Republic of Kenya, MAC has been made possible by different factors and realities. For one, the country's need to realize the efficient utilization of resources in the pursuit of national safety objectives has made it necessary for multiple agencies to cooperate within a national security framework (Mbugua, 2021). For example, the collaboration between the National Police Service (NPS) and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in the response to terrorist threats within the country has enhanced intelligence sharing and response coordination. In this way, the two agencies have improved the utilization of resources by all parties involved (Kibusia, 2020; Mutwiwa, 2021). Similarly, collaborations amongst national security agencies such as the NGAO network, the police, immigration officials, and intelligence agencies have been made necessary by the desire to disrupt contemporary forms of crime (Nguru, 2014). Further, within Kenya, the collaboration of various agencies has been informed by the need to ensure the coordination of response to adverse events. Thus, national security and civilian agencies with air wings have been incentivized to collaborate in the pursuit of national security objectives that range from forest protection to counter-terrorism initiatives. Similarly, collaboration of multiple security agencies in the pursuit of national safety has been informed by the magnitude of adverse occurrences facing the country (Kindochimu, 2022). For instance, under the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the government has been able to coordinate the collaborative response to humanitarian crises. Summarily, collaborative efforts by the line security agencies are therefore meant to enhance the overall realization of national security objectives.

1.6.3.2 The Nature and Structure of Multi-Agency Cooperation

Taking into account the wide nature of national security, and the sheer number of concerns involved therein, different agencies tend to operate therein, with specialized focus. That is, different types of threats are handled by the different agencies within the national security sector. Consequently, the cooperation amongst such agencies vary depending on the determining factors, and on the country in question. Within the United States, the phenomenon of multi-agency cooperation in national security is highly advanced with a central entity developed to oversee attempts at collaboration within the security sector. For instance, the US has operationalized the government accountability office (GAO), which primarily oversees the development of strategic collaborations amongst US government entities, in the pursuit of national security interests (Thomson and Blagden, 2018). Through this office, the country enhances its commitment to multi-agency cooperation in handling national security issues. The GAO allows the different entities operating within the national security sector in the US to coordinate their efforts in pursuit of national safety objectives. Similar manifestations have also been witnessed at the service level, with agencies such as the military under the auspices of the Department of Defense (DoD) developing an entire division known as Partnerships, Strategic and Stability Operations. This division is tasked with enabling smooth interagency cooperation in the pursuit of national security interests (United States Housed of Representatives, 2011). These practices of structuring inter-agency collaboration have allowed the effective realization of national security ends even in the midst of serious concerns such as resource constraints (Winters, 2014). Overall, the creation of frameworks that enhance collaborative undertakings within the United States' national security sector has allowed the country to improve its coordination of national security operations.

Multi-agency cooperation in the realm of national security is also structured differently within the United Kingdom. Though each security agency in the country is tasked with the pursuit

of specific mandates related to national safety, they operate under a collaborative framework spearheaded by the National Security Council (NSC). The council is tasked with the responsibility of offering overarching guidance to the pursuit of national security (Kokkoris, 2021). However, even with the creation of the NSC in 1947, many of the national security agencies within the UK would continue to compete against each other in the pursuit of their own agency-specific mandates. In order to address this, the UK government created the National Security Office (NSO) in 2010. The body operates at the cabinet level, allowing for the centralization of security efforts through a collaborative approach (Fan et al., 2022). Through the NSO, national security agencies within the UK have been able to harmonize their cultures and priorities, and to coordinate their operations (Ikeanyibe et al., 2020). Under the NSO, the UK government has managed to centralize the coordination efforts of national security agencies and actors within the European nation.

Drawing from the examples of America and Europe, many more nations began to operationalize frameworks of MAC. In China, the deliberate development of a cabinet level entity, known as the Super Ministry, has enabled the realization of national safety goals more effectively (Christensen and Ma, 2020). Through the structure, different agencies are able to share information related to, and of importance to the security of China as a country. Under the umbrella of the Super Ministry, the government of the People's Republic of China has been able to coordinate the operations of different government entities. The collaborative structure has also enabled Chinese security agencies to integrate the information, thus enhancing informed decision-making and coordination of response efforts. Effectively, collaborative national security efforts spearheaded by the Super Ministry has enabled the sharing of relevant information, coordination of responses, and pooling of resources together in securing citizens and responding to emergencies within Chinese cities. Overall, the creation of a cabinet-level structure to guide multi-agency cooperation has allowed greater collaboration within the national security sector in China.

Within the subcontinent of India, the nature and structure of multi-agency cooperation is such that it helps in the development of capabilities geared towards addressing threats to national security. For instance, the country has in place a national security council which is the topmost organ dealing with issues touching on the national safety of the world's largest democracy (Singh, 2020). Through the council, it is possible for the security organs within India to create synergies in operations touching on national security. The efforts of the council have also resulted in India's develop a well-trained national security workforce capable of responding to different challenges impacting its national security, both singly and collectively (Munir and Ashok, 2021). Under the council, efforts such as the joint training and operations exercises have been realized, thus helping to improve the country's capabilities of handling threats to its national safety (Taneja and Siyech, 2019). Such collaborative structures have been very helpful in improving the availability and capability of India's human resource within the national security sector. Further, in response to national security risks posed by incidents with large scale impacts, India has also operationalized a collaborative humanitarian assistance structure referred to as the National Disaster Management Framework (Avadi and Seth, 2020). Developed in 2005, this structure has inspired collaboration of national security organizations within the multi-agency framework in offering assistance and coordinating responses to disasters within India's borders (Avadi and Seth, 2020).

Regionally, multi-agency cooperation in national security is structured in near-similar manifestations as those in the American, European, and Asian countries. In South Africa, for instance, there exists the State Security Agency (SSA) which has been crucial to the realization of national security objectives through its improvement of collaboration amongst different entities (Kondlo et al., 2022). The agency brings together different national security organizations, aid and humanitarian entities, and relent civilian actors in the pursuit of national safety (Kondlo et al., 2022). Thus, through the SSA, the country has had great success in addressing concerns such as

xenophobia which greatly threaten the security of the nation. There is also the creation of the cabinet level framework, the National Security Council (NSC) which integrates the objectives, cultures, and operations of the police, military, and other internal security organizations within the country with the aim of improving national safety therein.

In Kenya, there exists varied degrees of cooperation amongst the different agencies tasked with pursuing different national safety goals. These agencies range from military organizations, to quasi-military entities, to law enforcement agencies, and finally to civilian governance, justice, law and order institutions. Within the country's national security framework, the cooperation amongst agencies takes different forms and structures. For one, in the prevention of serious crimes, there is the peer-to-peer collaboration of intelligence agencies with the policing authorities within the country. One such manifestation is evident in the operations of the Crime Research and Intelligence Bureau (CRIB). This is a unit within the police service's Directorate of Criminal Intelligence (DCI), whose role involves the collection and analysis of intelligence on serious crimes with the aim of preventing their occurrence and either stopping the offender or bringing them to book. Such collaboration also occurs in the form of collective operations of the national government administrative mechanism with the policing authorities under the governance, justice, law, and order sector (GJLOS) framework. Collaborative operations to such end include the process of countering violent extremism, combating radicalization, and preempting threats, as well as intercepting the causative agents (Murungi and Njoki, 2022).

As a country, Kenya also has a number of civilian agencies involved in the national security sector including the National Police Service (NPS) whose core mandate is the maintenance of law and order within the republic. Such task involves the prevention of crime, the protection of lives and property, and the response to national security threats (Muthee, 2022). Assisting the police in its mandate is the civilian intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), whose role

revolves around the collection, collation, and analysis of threats to the national security of the country (Lusiola, 2021). There is also the collective framework of national government administrative officers (NGAO), formerly referred to as the provincial administration, and whose mandate includes the coordination of the central government's operations at the level of societal organization (Lusiola, 2021). Other entities within the national security framework include the border, ports, and tax authorities represented by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) whose functions revolve around the collection of government revenue, the prevention of smuggling, and the monitoring of imports, and the Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) which is tasked with the maintenance of surveillance at the country's entry and exit points (Charo, 2021).

Further, there is the collective operation of entities in response to calamities that may have national security implications under the auspices of the National Disaster Management Authority, NDMA (Kindochimu, 2022). The creation of a collaborative inter-agency framework that is the National Air Support Department (NASD) allowed for the merger of aerial capabilities amongst Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Forestry Services (KFS), and Kenya Power & Lighting Company, KPLC (Ministry of Defence). Overall, the cooperation of multiple agencies within the national security framework of Kenya is achieved through the operations of various frameworks that not only enable but also encourage the collaboration of line entities.

1.6.3.3 Challenges to Multi-agency Cooperation

While many countries of the world have made efforts to enhance the extent of multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national security ends, there still remain some bottlenecks to such efforts. The challenges to multi-agency cooperation in handling issues of national security are many and vary from one country to the next. Within the United States, challenges to multi-agency

cooperation exist in different forms, some structural, others bureaucratic. For instance, there remains credible challenges to the ability of multiple agencies within the security sector to collaborate due to the numerous red tapes that exist therein (Nawz and Koç, 2020). Particularly, at the lower levels, there remain high challenges to multi-agency cooperation due to the inability of sister agencies to share information, to coordinate response to threats, and to plug training and resources gaps through collaborative undertakings (Thomson and Blagden, 2018). Similarly, multi-agency cooperation within the United States is also challenged by the differences in cultures there amongst. For example, military organizations have different operational models from the police agencies and other national security entities; a fact that makes the collaboration of agencies markedly difficult (Philips, 2021).

In Germany, though there exists multi-agency operations in nearly all areas of national security, there remain enormous concerns thereto. Among such challenges to the collaboration of multiple agencies is the ineffective administration of cooperative efforts. At the moment, the country “lacks a clear coordination strategy amongst responsible departments” (Brockmeier and Neumann, 2017). This fact has led to improper management of collaborative efforts geared towards national security ends. Similarly, the country also faces great inefficiencies in the management of MAC. This is evident in the wastage of resources meant for the pursuit of national security objectives due to internal competition among the concerned agencies (Mbugua, 2021). The lack of operational synergies amongst the security organs within Germany has led to the overlap of responsibilities, the disjointedness of collaborative undertakings, and the competition rather than collaboration amongst the line agencies.

Multi-agency cooperation in handling of national security concerns in Nigeria is impacted upon by the inadequacy of data systems that help in the pursuit of national safety objectives (Winters, 2014). Such systems, which include the preferential collaborative approaches to

response efforts, are critical in informing ongoing cooperation amongst national security agencies. Secondly, multi-agency cooperation in Nigeria also faces the challenges of inadequate resources. Within the country, inadequate resources – both human and financial, have hampered efforts towards collaborative operationalization of national security goals among concerned entities (Nte, 2013). This has reduced the ability of such entities to pool together their strategic expertise and competencies in the development of a joint approach to the pursuit of national security. Further, that different agencies within the national security sector of Nigeria have varying cultures and operational doctrines also poses a challenge to multi-agency cooperation efforts. That is, each entity has its own set ways of operations; a fact that limits their ability to undertake collaborative efforts meant to enhance national safety outcomes. For instance, in responding to the Boko Haram attack on a girls' school in Chibok, the cooperative efforts of the military, the police, the intelligence agencies, and the federal administration would have gone a long way in hastening result realization (Mbugua, 2021). Even with the challenges to multi-agency cooperation, the country remains committed to collaborative pursuit of its national safety objectives.

The cooperation amongst agencies involved in the national security sector within the Republic of South Africa is negatively impacted by the disharmony in selected response strategies (Kokkoris, 2021). The fact that the national security organizations in the country have competing goals makes it difficult for them to cooperate in pursuing national security ends. However, in light of the emerging challenges to the country's safety, the agencies within the security sector have had to pursue collaborative operations to a greater degree. Secondly, the country's security agencies are also plagued by different orientations, making the operations of each agency compartmentalized from those of others; a fact that is mainly spurred by the high level of specialization therewithin (Ministry of Defence, 2023). Further on, the country also faces challenges to multi-agency operation in the form of inadequate resources to support the

undertaking. Within South Africa, there is less than desired human resource capability to support collaborative operations amongst multiple national security agencies (Kokkoris, 2021).

As a country, Kenya faces a number of challenges that impact negatively upon the ability of its national security agencies to work collaboratively in the realization of line objectives. Foremost among such challenges is sectarianism which presents in the form of sibling rivalry; wherein agencies in the sector compete rather than collaborate in the fulfillment of their respective mandates. The result of this competition amongst the agencies manifests in the improper sharing of information on threats facing the country, the uncoordinated response to adverse national security events, and the elimination of trust in maintaining long-term working relationships (Singh, 2020: Ministry of Defence, 2021). This challenge is often fermented by competing interests amongst the agencies involved in Kenya's national security sphere. Secondly, multi-agency cooperation efforts in Kenya are also impacted upon negatively by the interference of political interests' and the existence of red tapes that hinder the desired cooperation (Christensen and Ma, 2020: Ingeber, 2018). Such administrative drawbacks lead to constraints on the access to information amongst agencies, through delayed authorization of relevant personnel. In this way, there would be bottlenecks to information sharing, threat analysis, response coordination, and collective goal pursuit. This challenge to multi-agency cooperation is particularly disruptive given the role that bureaucracy plays in slowing down response efforts (Ngeno, 2019).

Third, the inadequacy of strategic leadership within the individual agencies operating under the auspices of national security also hinders interagency cooperation within Kenya's security sector (Jirte, 2020). Through adequate and competent leadership, it would be possible to guide greater collaboration whilst designing approaches to national security under the multi-agency framework, whilst also creating a shared vision amongst the multiple agencies working within the realm of national security (Casiano, 2018: Connolly et al., 2020). Finally, MAC within Kenya is

also negatively impacted by the inadequacy of resources that would otherwise enable collaborative surveillance of threat, analysis of intelligence, and coordination of response to such identified threats (Mbugua, 2021). Lack of resources, be they monetary, human, or physical could greatly hinder the ability of different national security agencies to fulfill their mandates, whether singly or collectively. The inadequacy of resources would also extend to the absence of technology that could hasten cooperation in terms of securing communication amongst agencies, enabling the analysis and interpretation of threats, and the information of desired response strategies (Sivenbring and Malmros, 2019). In all, inadequate resourcing continues to hinder the ability of multiple agencies to work together in the pursuit of line security objectives within Kenya.

1.6.4 Gaps in the Literature

From the available literature on multi-agency cooperation within the Kenyan national security sector, it is evident that such collaborative operations have immense positive impacts on the realization of line goals. It is also clear that the cooperation of multiple national security agencies within the country is aided by deliberate actions geared towards improved information sharing, greater capacity building, and collaborative response to emergent security threats. MAC in Kenya is also enabled by the sharing of resources, and the exploitation of collective capabilities of sister agencies therein. Such literature also reveals how challenges that include sectarianism breeds sibling rivalry which impacts multi-agency cooperation. Challenges to such phenomenon also present in the form of the absence of political goodwill, and inadequacy of resources to enable collaborative operations amongst multiple agencies. However, the literature is scanty on the details involving the areas of improvement in the realization of truly collaborative interagency operations whilst pursuing Kenya's national security goals. Further, the literature is also short on the legal, policy, and institutional frameworks that Kenya could adopt in the operationalization of multi-agency cooperation whilst pursuing national security objectives. The research study therefore

examined the most-desirable approaches and tools that could enable better multi-agency collaboration in managing national security concerns within Kenya. The study also examined the possible legal, policy, and institutional frameworks of MAC in Kenya.

1.7 Study Justification

This study proved necessary for a number of reasons. First, the study sought to examine the approaches and tools that would be most-desirable in enabling better multi-agency cooperation in the handling of issues that touch on the national security of Kenya as a country. In this regard, the study was warranted as it promised to help in developing legal, policy, and institutional frameworks that would help strengthen MAC within Kenya. Just as much, the significance of the study lay in its consideration of historical multi-agency cooperation efforts within the Kenyan national security sector. This was critical in drawing vital lessons such as the need for strategic leadership in the realization of success in multi-agency cooperation attempts. The historical focus also makes the study important in the sense that it illuminates the potential lessons to be learnt in pursuing national security objectives under a framework of multi-agency cooperation.

Aside from these factors, the study was important due to the manner in which its findings could be used. The study was expected to inform the development of policy frameworks that guide operationalization of multi-agency collaboration. Thus, the study was meant to contribute towards the formulation of policies on the strategic leadership of multi-agency cooperation efforts. The study's findings may also influence the formulation and implementation of legal protocols that would enable better multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national security goals. Similarly, the policy implication of the study could also extend to the development of institutional frameworks meant to enhance MAC both within Kenya and in other jurisdictions. Secondly, the study was also expected to have significance to the academic sphere wherein the findings to be made could contribute towards enriching the available literature on national security

administration. The importance of the current study to the academic community is also pegged on the identification of gaps within the literature that would further research and innovation on approaches to, and models of, multi-agency cooperation within Kenya, and all over Africa. Overall, the importance of the study lay in its pursuit of better approaches to achieving national security objectives, particularly through a framework of multi-agency cooperation.

1.8 Scope of the Study

Because of the broad reach of the phenomenon of national security, and the time limitations along with resource constraints that promised to face the study, the focus was limited to the maintenance of physical and community security. This helped to sharpen the concentration of the inquiry on how the military could cooperate with the police and intelligence agencies in the country, as well as with civilian authorities and security experts therein. Such focus also proved instrumental in shifting focus away from other concerns of national security that may include the economic, social, and environmental aspects.

1.9 Methodology

Every research effort is guided by an underpinning approach to the analysis of the research problem concerned. Defined as the approach that a study takes to analytically consider and explain a research problem, methodology is defined by the type of data to be collected (Patten and Newhart, 2017). For this inquiry effort, the qualitative method was deemed most appropriate. This is anchored on the fact that qualitative research sought to establish the narrative aspects of phenomena, in this case multi-agency collaboration in handling issues of national security (Rahi, 2017). However, considering that the research study examined both primary and secondary data, it became needful to also incorporate the quantitative method. Thus, a mixed method approach proved most appropriate for the realization of the study objectives. The adoption of a mixed approach was informed by the need to tap into the merits of both qualitative and quantitative

methods. Thus, the study did adopt an embedded strategy wherein it had the depth of qualitative research while also retaining the generalizability character accorded by quantitative inquiry (Creswell and Creswell, 2017).

1.9.1 Research Design

Research design implies the approach that a research would find their collection of data upon (Rahi, 2017). Considering that the study applied the qualitative method, it became most needful to apply both primary and secondary methods to increase the depth and breadth of findings. As such, the most desirable designs to data collection were the descriptive design and the cross-sectional case study design.

1.9.1.1 The Descriptive Design

In a bid to question the impact of multi-agency collaboration in the achievement of national security objectives in Kenya, it became necessary to adopt a descriptive approach. This design is meant to offer narrations on the occurrence of a given phenomenon, in this case multi-agency cooperation. In founding the collection of data on this design, the research established succinct descriptions of what multi-agency cooperation entails (Siedlecki, 2020), and how it has manifested within the country's security sector in the period under consideration. Additionally, the design allowed the study to explore the lived experiences of the intended respondents in so far as multi-agency cooperation is concerned. Through this, the study was able to establish the influence of multi-agency collaboration in handling issues of national security within Kenya, in the period under review. Similarly, the design also allowed the study to gain insights into factors that have determined the cooperation of various national security agencies in pursuing Kenya's safety objectives. Finally, the design was also crucial in the examination of the most-desirable approaches to multi-agency collaboration within Kenya's national security sector. Overall, the descriptive design proved crucial to the primary data collection step.

1.9.1.2 The Cross-Sectional Case Study Design

Multi-agency cooperation in the realm of national security was also examined from the perspective of the cross-sectional case study design. The approach involved the sourcing of multiple points of view from within an identified population of respondents, on a given phenomenon within a specified period of time. The cross-sectional consideration in the design was informed by the nature of multi-agency cooperation in the security sector, which involves the presence of different stakeholders from the multiple agencies involved (Bhardwaj, 2019). On the other hand, the case-study aspect was influenced by the need to investigate the research concern at a particular point in time (Bhardwaj, 2019). This was important in the collection of quantitative data relating to the influence of multi-agency cooperation within Kenya's security sector. In effect, the cross-sectional case-study design allowed the research to narrow down its focus on national security to the specific aspect of multi-agency collaboration, and within the specified period. By so doing, the design helped the research access detailed input from the literature concerning the phenomenon of multi-agency collaboration within Kenya's security sector. Overall, the cross-sectional study design helped the researcher establish the influence that multi-agency collaboration has over the handling issues of national security within Kenya; the factors that determine such cooperation; and the most-desirable approaches to multi-agency cooperation in handling Kenya's national security.

1.9.2 Target Population

For research studies, target population refers to the collective set of individuals that a study aims to draw participants from, and inform the findings to be generated (Martino et al., 2018). From the findings made through the sampling of members of any given population, generalization can be made to all therewithin. That is, target population often share characteristics that make them desirable for the purpose of a given research study. In this study, the target population included

players within the national security sector in Kenya. However, given the wide population, the study's preferred respondents were limited to the military, intelligence agencies, and civilian security organs that work towards the realization of Kenya's safety and security objectives.

1.9.3 Study Sample

Considering the high population of individuals involved in the operations of the multiple agencies working towards the realization of national security in Kenya, it proved more appropriate to select a small number with which to engage during the data collection process. This rationale also applied in the consultation of existing sources of knowledge on the concern. In order to obtain a desirable sample of participants, the purposive sampling method was determined to be best. This method involves selection of study participants based on their ability and willingness to offer input on a given research concern— in this case, the influence that multi-agency cooperation has on the enhancement of national security in Kenya (Campbell et al., 2020). In particular, the researcher found the snowballing approach most desirable. This approach to sampling helped to ensure that the individuals chosen for the study fit the purpose of the research (Bhardwaj, 2020). That is, the method helped ensure that the selected participants possessed knowledge of, and had at least been involved in MAC operations before. The method was also deemed appropriate in light of the sensitivity of information that was sourced from respondents (Parker, Scott, and Geddes, 2019).

Using the snowball approach to purposive sampling, the researcher obtained a sample of 111 respondents from a target population of 373. Of these, 52 were drawn from the national police service, 36 from the KDF, and 12 from the intelligence agencies. A further 6 respondents were sourced from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution (ODPP) and 5 from the office of the Attorney General.

1.9.4 Data Collection

Once a desirable research sample had been established, the researcher then progressed to the data collection phase. At this point, the descriptive design applied the semi-structured interview as the instrument of choice in collecting requisite primary data. The semi-structured interview tool is a desirable instrument as it allows the unbridled input of the participants in response to the prompts developed by the researcher (Parker, Scott, and Geddes, 2019). In this way, the instrument infused the perspective of the researcher in determining the questions to ask of the respondents, thus enabling the researcher to make their contributions to the development of knowledge on the concern of multi-agency cooperation in national security. More particularly, the use of a retrospective point of view during the data collection process allowed the researchers to invite the input of participants on issues that have occurred. Thus, they had to rely on their memory in the description of various aspects of multi-agency cooperation.

For the collection of secondary data, the process involved the selection of relevant content from the available literature on multi-agency cooperation. Thus, the process set off from the search for literature on multi-agency cooperation from relevant databases including *EBSCOhost*, *Google Scholar*, University of Nairobi repository, the National Defence College library, Strathmore University repository, and many other relevant sources of authoritative literature on the security sector operations within Kenya. More specifically, the study relied on information contained within security-industry journals, or security-related research publications that touch on multi-agency cooperation in the country within the twenty-year period under review. The study also sought the input of news reports, contents of government policy papers, and the declassified reports on sensitive security operations covering the period targeted by this research effort. The choice of literature consulted was aligned to the objectives of the research. Consequently, such literature enabled the researcher to establish; the part that multi-agency collaboration plays in handling issues of national security, the factors that determine the cooperation amongst multiple national

security agencies in Kenya, and the best approaches to enhance the process of interagency cooperation within Kenya.

1.9.5 Data Analysis & Presentation

Once the study obtained data from the respondents and the literature sources it consulted, there was need for the analysis of such data. For this effort, the researcher first moderated for fit, all the responses obtained from participants - and from the literature sources. In this manner, any responses deemed to fall outside the objectives of the intended study were struck out whereas those that fit the desired objectives were forwarded to the next stage for analysis (Campbell et al., 2020). After moderation, the information collected was considered in light of the qualitative content analysis method. Through this, the researcher was able to consider and interpret the information offered by the respondents, without any alteration and then feed the information into specialized statistical analysis software that included STATA® and SPSS®. Such software then aided in the processing of such information into a format that could be easily depicted within the study. The emerging data was then presented in the body of the research by outlining of narratives offered by the respondents, as well as the input offered by published sources.

1.9.6 Piloting

In order to obtain the general direction of this study, the researcher, using the research questions, sought the input of a subset of the sample. Through this piloting process, the researcher was able to test the validity and reliability of the data collection instruments. The piloting phase also proved useful in the development of data analysis approaches and tools for the study proper. Similarly, the piloting phase became useful in confirm the hypotheses under which the author operated. The phase was also crucial in identifying the fit of the sample for the purpose of the inquiry thereafter. This was achieved through the inclusion of a small number of respondents from the chosen sample.

1.9.7 Ethical Considerations

In the development of the intended study, the researcher was guided by a number of ethical and legal considerations. First, the researcher had to seek the approval of the institutional review board to commence the research process. Once the authorization was granted, the researcher then considered different ethical cannons relating to research studies. Consequently, the researcher had to negotiate the initial and ongoing consent of research participants (Parker, Scott, Geddes, 2017). This involved stressing the voluntary nature of participation in the intended study with the aim of allowing any respondent who so wished, to pull out at any point during the process. This ethical consideration proved particularly necessary given the sensitive nature of information involved. For example, clearances to comment on certain concerns may have been revoked during or immediately after the collection process. Thus, the need to excuse participation of certain respondents did emerge. Secondly, the researcher considered the ethical cannon of anonymity and confidentiality which demand that researchers take steps and precautions to ensure that identification information of participants is not included in the publication of results, and the analysis of findings. In practice of this ethical guideline, the researcher had to excuse certain responses where there existed sufficient reason to believe they were sensitive to national security concerns. As a result, classified or restricted information was deliberately omitted or, where possible, redacted to maintain integrity of concerned processes. Further, in order to ensure ethics around the inquiry, the researcher also purposed to only apply the responses obtained there during to this specific research effort, and none other.

1.10 Definition of Terms

Agency An entity that is recognized by law, and tasked with the realization of a specific goal.

Collaboration/Cooperation The collective operations of different agencies and entities in the pursuit of a singular objective.

Intelligence Reliable information on the possibility of an event taking place, obtainable through analysis of raw data.

Inter-Agency Agreements Commitments that different agencies make in the pursuit of collective operations.

Issues of National security The legitimate interests of the country, be they economic, sociopolitical, and even ecological.

1.10. Chapter One Summary

- ❖ Inter-agency collaboration first emerged in earnest within the USA by the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947.
- ❖ Success realized by the United States led other nations to adopt similar MAC frameworks.
 - Within Africa, MAC has been less than desirable, though it has aided the realization of national security objectives in Kenya.
- ❖ The problem that the study sought to address is the lack of a clear regulatory framework to guide the operationalization of MAC in Kenya.
- ❖ The study was guided by three main research questions:
 - What determines MAC within Kenya's national security framework?

- What is the nature and structure of MAC in Kenya?
 - Which legal, policy, and institutional frameworks guide/characterize MAC in Kenya?
- ❖ From the theoretical literature review, the existence of collectively-operated institutions within the realm of national security is not spontaneous.
 - The institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) notes that specific patterns have to be established to enable MAC.
 - The risk theory holds that modern realities such as globalization, and increase in criminality have helped create a ‘risk society. The existence of such ‘risks’ inform the likelihood of threat expression.
 - ❖ Available literature is scanty on the areas of improvement in MAC efforts in Kenya, and the regulatory frameworks that it could implement to guide interagency cooperative operations.
 - ❖ The study was necessary because it examined the MAC approaches/tools, considered historical MAC efforts within Kenya, and is expected to inform the development of MAC policy frameworks.
 - ❖ A mixed method was adopted, aided by the descriptive design and cross-sectional case study designs.
 - ❖ The study’s preferred respondents were limited to the military, intelligence agencies, and civilian security organs obtained using the purposive and snowball sampling approaches to select a total of 111 respondents.
 - ❖ On the ethical considerations, the researcher sought approval from the institutional review board, negotiated both initial and ongoing consent of research participants, and ensured the anonymity of respondents.

1.11 Chapter Two Outline

Different factors impact upon the ability of agencies to cooperate in the management of national security concerns. In Kenya, these include: the general increase in the rate and sophistication of crime; the inadequacy of resources for different agencies; and the large number of operators therein. Multi-agency collaboration is also necessitated by the existing training and capability gaps amongst NSOs, and the institutional variations in expertise, as well as political goodwill –or lack of it thereof.

Trends in Crime & Criminology

- ❖ The foremost determinant of MAC in Kenya is the changing patterns and nature of crime within the country.
- ❖ Increasingly sophisticated crimes and criminals increase the vulnerability of the country. This, along with the increase in the rate of organized crime, makes it necessary for different agencies to collaborate in pursuing national security ends.
- ❖ interagency collaboration would enable the disruption of contemporary security issues

Resource Constraints

- ❖ Developing countries such as Kenya continue to make tradeoffs amongst different competing monetary interests, a fact that may threaten national security interests.
- ❖ Considering that security needs are non-negotiable, possible shortfalls in resource availability ought to be addressed through ingenious ways.
- ❖ The adoption of MAC promotes efficiency of resource utilization. Different agencies are able to realize better outcomes even in the face of resource inadequacy.
- ❖ MAC frameworks also helps address resource inefficiencies by unifying command, assigning roles, and streamlining operations objectives and goals achievement strategies

Gaps in Training & Capability

- ❖ Each security agency in Kenya is assigned a specific role to fulfill
- ❖ Agency role/mandate defines how the training and indoctrination of agents/actors. Thus each agency holds different operational perspectives.
- ❖ Emergent and existing security threats make the compartmentalization of capability a hindrance to the achievement of national safety and security objectives.
- ❖ MAC would enable collective capability utilization and common indoctrination, thus increasing the promptness of action and response.

Variations in Institutional Realities & Expertise

- ❖ Different entities within the Kenyan national security landscape hold varying types and degrees of competence. They are also guided by different values and cultures.
- ❖ The multifaceted nature of security calls for the formulation and operationalization of interagency networks to address specific threats.
- ❖ MAC frameworks allows agencies such as NGAO to gain competencies that would not have been possible in the absence of collaboration.

Political Goodwill

- ❖ National security operations have to be anchored upon strong legal and policy frameworks. As such, political goodwill remains an important determinant of success
- ❖ The willingness demonstrated by the Kenyan political leadership has gone a long way in enhancing MAC.

- ❖ Political support also aids in the legal formulation of MAC frameworks, the resourcing of such MAC frameworks, the development of modalities for institutional memory creation and retention there within

1.11 Chapter Three Outline

Multiagency Cooperation within Kenya is characterized by different realities, which inform the nature of such cooperative undertakings. Such cooperation is also founded on different structures.

a. Nature of Multi-Agency Cooperation

The cooperation of various NSOs in Kenya is characterized by:

- ❖ Sharing of Information and Intelligence.
- ❖ Development of Operational Capacity.
- ❖ Sharing of Resources including physical, monetary, and human resources capabilities, and the co-utilization of strategic assets.
- ❖ Coordinated Interventions & Collaborative Operations through the harmonization of command structure, the unification of communication flow, and the formulation of early response.

b. Structure of MAC in Kenya

- ❖ Cabinet-Level Structure which is meant to enhance the decision making at the topmost level through the formulation of policies targeting response to imminent threats.
- ❖ Peer-to-Peer Format that is characterized by the heads/representatives of different NSOs and non-NSOs working together to achieve national safety objectives.
- ❖ The In-Group Approach which excludes non-security agencies from their joint operations as based on the sensitive nature thereof.

1.1.3 Chapter Four Outline

MAC within Kenya is aided by the presence of deliberate actions and frameworks - rooted in law and policy, and domiciled in institutions, which guide cooperative undertakings.

Legal, Policy and Institutional Frameworks that catalyze MAC in Kenya

- ❖ The Protocol on the Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT), 2022
- ❖ The Prevention of Terrorism Acts (POTA), 2010
- ❖ The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA), 2010
- ❖ National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) Act, 1997
- ❖ Legislations on National Security Organizations as established under Chapter 14 of the Constitution of Kenya – 2010.

Policy Frameworks of Multi-Agency Collaboration in Kenya

- ❖ The Inter-Agency Guidelines on Cooperation and Collaboration (IAGCC).
- ❖ The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE).
- ❖ The Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Framework.

Institutional Frameworks of Multi-Agency Cooperation in Kenya

MAC in Kenya is also defined, determined, and enabled by existing institutional frameworks that include different scholarly institutions and policy think-tanks within the Kenyan security sector including;

- ❖ The National Defence University of Kenya (NDU-K) whose constituents include: the NDC, the JCSC, the IPSTC, and the NIRUC, as well as the Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS).
- ❖ National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which coordinates all CVE efforts.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO

THE DETERMINANTS OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

Different factors impact upon the ability of agencies to cooperate in the management of national security concerns. In Kenya, these factors include the general increase in the rate and sophistication of crime within the country, the inadequacy of resources for different agencies operating within the sector, and the large number of operators in the sector - each concerned with a specific end goal. Other factors that determine the ability of multiple national security agencies to collaborate in securing the country include the existing training and capability gaps between different actors in the sector, and the institutional variations in expertise. Finally, multi-agency collaboration in Kenya is determined by political goodwill—or lack thereof, humanitarian considerations, and even environmental concerns.

2.2 Trends in Crime & Criminology

Among the foremost determinants of MAC in the security sector within Kenya is the trend in crime and criminology within Kenya, and by extension, her neighboring states. Crime trends refer to the changing patterns and nature of crime in a given area over a specified period of time. In the last twenty years, Kenya has grappled with changing patterns and nature of crime (Kamau et al., 2020). For instance, the country continues to face myriads of threats that emanate from terrorism and violent extremism, human and drug trafficking, and cyber-crimes, as well as arms and wildlife trafficking. The level of sophistication of the crimes and criminals is ever increasing; a fact that then increases the vulnerability of the country, and exacerbates the likely risks arising therefrom. As such, it is important for the security agencies within the country to seek ways of effectively combating crime. One of the most desirable approaches to so doing is the enhancement of collaboration amongst agencies operating in the security sector. The need for countries to seek

effective ways of handling threats to their own safety and security necessitates collaboration amongst different security agencies (Mutonyi and Sirera, 2020). In Kenya, one of the most formidable national security threats is that of changing crime patterns, and the shifting nature of criminality.

Kenya has had an increase in the rate of organized crime over the last two decades. Common practices that point to such trend include the increasing cases of trans-border offences (Moragori, 2021). In order to adequately address such concern, different agencies would need to collaborate whilst handling national security concerns. For example, in dealing with the concern of cross-border border money laundering, multiple agencies would have to be involved. Similarly, addressing the human trafficking concern emanating from the horn of Africa, and transiting through Kenya, would require the participation of more than just the police. This is founded on the fact that the crime itself takes multiple dimensions and ropes in different actors, all of whom the police may not effectively maintain vigil over due to institutional restrictions. Interagency collaboration would go a long way in managing such concern to national security, just as it would in the disruption of other contemporary security issues that include radicalization and violent extremism. In effect, the need to combat emergent forms of crime breeds the desire for cooperation amongst multiple security agencies in the country. That is, the need for full utilization of the country's law enforcement capability in the fight against new-age crime, and the desire to minimize the impact of such risks to the country, would result in the development of multi-agency partnerships.

Statistics on crime and security in Kenya reveal a marked change in the nature of threats facing the country within the last twenty-five years. For one, there has been an uptake in the incidences of terrorism. For instance, while the country faced only three terrorism-related incidences between 1997 and 2007, the ten-year period thereafter witnessed more than ten

incidences of terrorism with the worst being the Westgate Terror Attack in 2013, the Garissa University Attacks in 2015, and the Dusit-D2 Attacks in 2018 (Ali, 2021). Just as much, there has been an increase in the level of sophistication of threats with the perpetrators and modus operandi changing markedly. For example, while acts of terrorism were often perpetrated by large networks such as Al-Qaeda as was the case in the coordinated 1998 US Embassy Bombings, they are now perpetrated by smaller and highly-effective cells, as was the case with the Dusit-D2 Attacks and the Garissa University Attacks (Kamau, 2021). Further, homegrown threats have continued to emerge in the terrorism front, with Kenyans being radicalized into violent extremism (Chome, 2020). These shifts in realities have necessitated collaboration amongst different agencies.

Further, the changing nature of crime calls for the exploration of all capabilities available within the sector. In the last two decades, the nature and ingenuity of crime has changed significantly with technology applied to the commission and cover-up of crime, thereby exposing the safety of the country. For instance, drug and human smuggling rings have crafted ingenious ways to evade detection and disruption. Elements such as drug traffickers may embrace the use of technologies such as drones, luxury boats, or even submarines to evade detection and capture (Daily Nation, 2014). As such, there is need for collaboration between intelligence agencies, aviation and maritime authorities, and the police in dismantling such threats. Similarly, human traffickers have resorted to the cyberspace wherein online job and opportunity scams are applied to lure victims to trafficking. This calls for the collaborative operations of the police, intelligence agencies, the immigration department, and different cybercrime and international police units. According to 34 out of the 111 respondents consulted for the study, the difficulties in the operational environment led to their participation in MAC setups (as detailed in Fig.2.1a below). Among the responses to such effect include the fact that dealing with contemporary crime calls for the synergy of individual agency/service strengths to address contemporary crime and security

challenges. Other responses include the desire to increase cross-agency capabilities in combating modern multi-faceted challenges. Overall, the dynamic nature of crime and criminality continue to expose the need for multi-agency cooperation in the management of Kenya’s security concerns.




Figure 2-1: Determinants of Multi-Agency Cooperation

Additionally, threats to the security of the nation could emanate from both within and outside of its borders. In this regard, the security sector is comprised of agencies and institutions that ensure the safety of the country from internal threats, while there are those tasked with protecting the country from external threats. The increasing sophistication of threats facing the country, along with their trans-national nature makes it necessary for agencies from both persuasions to work together. As criminals find new ways to evade justice and to fulfill their objectives, so must law enforcement step up its efforts to prevent the achievement of such ends.

Collaboration within the security sector promises one way of combating crime and criminality. Collective operations would confer competencies that would aid agencies preempt and intercept possible threats to the physical security of the country. The growing sophistication of crime calls for ingenuity in approaching national security operations. Cooperation amongst agencies would breed new thinking on how to tackle emergent concerns in the security sphere. Subsequently, the Kenyan security sector should strive toward greater cooperation within and amongst agencies as a way of crafting prevention and response measures to threats.

2.3 Resource Constraints

Often times, countries such as Kenya have had to make the choice between different competing monetary interests. Developing nations, already grappling with low national incomes and struggling under debt obligations, may not adequately meet their different competing needs and demands. Further, slower economic growth may also limit the ability of such countries to adequately finance government operations, key among them being security. Resource constraints remains the leading threat to the effective realization of national security goals for many African nations. Though Kenya's financial standing is better than most other developing countries in the region, resource constraints still persist across multiple spheres of governmental operations – and even worryingly, in the security sector. The Kenyan security sector remains one of the most highly funded in the region, with security allocation growing from Kshs. 144.72 billion in the year 2014 (as detailed in Fig 2.1b below) to almost Kshs. 300 billion in the year 2021 (Parliamentary Budget Office, 2021). This one-eighth increase in the amount dedicated to security operations within such a short period underscores the importance that the sector holds for the Kenyan government. Evidently, the trend has been to grow security allocations, though much still needs to be done if national security objectives are to be fully met. For example, the total proportion of the budget dedicated to security dropped by nearly half over the same period, from 8.5% of the total budget

in 2014 to just 5% of the total budget in 2021 (National Treasury, 2014). This underscores the shrink in available resources, thereby impacting the overall government expenditure allocated to the sector. Considering that security needs are non-negotiable, possible shortfalls in resource availability ought to be addressed through ingenious ways that promote the efficiency of resource utilization.




Figure 2-2: Budgetary Allocation to Security in Kenya, 2014 – 2022 (in Kshs. ‘000,000,000)

Among the possible ways of addressing the resource inadequacy in the security sector is the adoption of collaboration amongst agencies therein. Interagency cooperation provides an avenue for improving the efficiency of resource utilization (Comiskey, 2020). That is, through collaborative dealings amongst agencies, national security objectives could be met in a more cost-effective manner. The phenomenon would allow for the pooling together of limited resources in the pursuit of national security objectives. For instance, in combating illegal trade and smuggling of goods, which threatens the country by starving the exchequer of due taxes, Kenyan security agencies tend to collaborate with each other. More particularly, the Kenya Revenue Authority has often coordinated its response together with the National Police Service, the National Intelligence

Services, and where need be, other line agencies. Through such collaborative workings, the agencies are able to realize better outcomes even in the face of resource inadequacy. Thus, the need to realize cost-efficiency through sharing of resources is a critical determinant of whether or not multiple national security agencies will collaborate in their pursuit of line objectives and missions.

Resource constraints facing the national security sector in Kenya are not limited to just monetary concerns alone, but also extend to human resources. While the United Nations recommends a Police to civilian ration of 1: 450, Kenya lags behind, with a ratio of 1 police officer for every 505 citizens (Sunday, 2017). This means that the country's police service is strained due to low numbers of officers available for the protection of lives and property, as well as the maintenance of law and order. Other agencies within the national security framework also have staffing challenges to deal with; a fact that could impact negatively upon the realization of national security objectives. In their responses, study participants identified different themes in connection to resource constraints. Among these were that their collaborations with other agencies/services in Kenya was necessitated by shortfall in resources thus the need for complementing each other to ensure resource efficient utilization. Similarly, other participants noted that their involvement in MAC was made necessary by the desire to avoid duplication of roles, and to therefore ensure efficiency. As a way of addressing this concern, the Kenyan government has increasingly advocated from a collaborative approach to the operations of different security agencies. Through collaboration within the different entities, it is possible to realize security goals. For example, in the response to threats of terrorism, the country will often call upon the NGAO, NPS, NIS, and even the military. Results of the study indicate that the leading participant agencies and services in MAC frameworks are the police with whom 45% of respondents confirming having worked, the national government administration that has collaborated with 33% of respondents, the

intelligence service at 15%, and the military which has collaborated with 7% of respondents (as indicated in Fig. 2.1c below). Even though each of them might fulfill the set objectives alone, the collective working of the agencies therein is useful in different ways, among them the realization of cost-efficiency in national security operations. Overall, the desire to increase efficient utilization of resources in national security operations would lead to a preference of the MAC approach.




Figure 2-3: Participation of Kenyan Security Agencies in MAC Setups

In the last five years, Kenya – like many other developing countries, has had to deal with a contracting growth of its national economy. This has been occasioned by a confluence of different causative factors including the COVID-19 pandemic that shut down many economically productive activities within the country. While the direct impacts of the pandemic have been widespread, there are other outcomes that are yet to unravel. For instance, the impact of the COVID-occasioned economic slowdown may not be felt immediately but is likely to result in lower availability of resources for use in the national security sector (Okerosi, 2021). This is pegged on the ever-growing security challenges and threats facing the country, and by extension the region. The expected constraint in resources could negatively impact upon goal-realization amongst national security entities. In light of the possible impacts, the best outcomes could be

realized through greater cost-effectiveness. Different agencies in the Kenyan security sector would need to work together in order to ensure greater cost-effectiveness.

The Kenyan security sector has to contend with the existence of competing interest amongst line agencies even as the institutions continue to strive towards the safety of the nation. In light of the inadequacy of resources, concerned parties within the sector have to work out a formula for the allocation of budgeted resources. Collaborative operations would go a long way in addressing competing interests among agencies by creating a shared pool. The collective use of commonly available resources and competencies by different agencies involved in multi-entity operations would help limit the impact of resource scarcity on the country's security sector (Wabwire, 2017). Overall, collaborative workings and the joint conduct of security missions would allow different agencies in the country to realize their goals in a cheaper way.

2.4 Number of Operators

The large number of agencies and personnel working in the Kenyan security sector makes multi-agency collaboration a necessity in the country. At the moment, there exist a large number of agencies, each tasked with the realization of a different aspect of security within Kenya (as detailed in Fig 2.3 below).




Figure 2-4: Main Operators in Kenya’s National Security Environment

The dynamic nature of security threats facing Kenya have made it necessary to craft specific response measures. The country has had to reconsider and reengineer its approaches to security management and the available risk mitigation strategies (Nzau and Mohammed, 2018). One of the foremost approaches that the security sector in Kenya has adopted is the collaborative working of different players therein. The collaborative workings of different entities is informed by different factors. For one, the large number of operators increases the likelihood of overlap of roles and responsibility. The numerous agencies, all working together towards the safety and security of the country, increases the possibility of role and responsibility sharing and overlap (Omweno, 2019).

In order to avoid such eventuality, different agencies need to work together towards a common goal – securing the country and its interests. As such, multi-agency collaboration has provided an avenue for Kenyan security agencies to cost-effectively pursue line objectives.

The presence of so many different national security agencies, and a large number of operators therein could result in slower pursuit of national security objectives. That there exist so many different agencies, each under a different command - and with specific sets of goals, means that the realization of security goals could be slowed down. This is pegged on factors such as varying sources of command, overlap of roles, and possible variations in operations objectives and goals achievement strategies. In order to speed up the outcomes of operations where so many agencies participate, it would be needful to pursue interagency collaboration. Through collaborative workings, agencies could plan their operations faster and collectively, thus allowing for swifter response to emerging threats. For example, in combating the threat of terrorism, collaborative operations of the different agencies would hasten response and increase the chances of success. On the other hand, the independent operations of individual agencies would likely hamper progress due to inter-agency competition. As such, collaboration of the multiple agencies involved in pursuing national safety and security within the country would help to improve the operation synergies realized therein (Hoffman, 2019). Collaborative operations of multiple teams within the security sector would improve the ability to coordinate response, and to fulfill team mandates. It would be difficult for national security agencies in Kenya to make any meaningful headway in the absence of collaboration between and amongst themselves. Overall, the large number of entities involved in the Kenyan security sector makes it needful for them to collaborate whilst pursuing line objectives.

Convergence of threats within the realm of national security in Kenya may also necessitate collaboration amongst the large number of agencies involved in the security sector. Threats to

Kenya's national security present in the form of local, national, and international concerns. Each level of threat is assigned a specific agency which is tasked with the neutralization thereof. However, the increasing convergence of different threat levels makes it difficult to effectively address each, and to ensure the safety and security of Kenyan citizens (Ogotu, 2021). As such, there is need to rope in the competencies of each level of security operation in crafting an effective response to emanating threats. Given the numerous agencies, the most effective approach to operational success would be through collaboration. The collective operations of multiple agencies would offer a unique perspective in handling national security concerns. That is, the cooperation of different agencies would allow the country's security organs to obtain a bigger picture of threats facing the nation, and how they may be interlinked. Resultantly, collaborative efforts would be needed in addressing such threats to the safety and security of the nation.

As the security industry continues to evolve, and as new and ever more dangerous threats emerge, need for additional specialized operations will arise. Growing threats on different fronts, both in the domestic and external fronts, will need to be addressed, even as the country maintains vigilance over the existing security concerns (Mwangi and Mwangi, 2019). For instance, there is likelihood that threats to national security will continue to emerge and evolve on the cyberspace, creating the need for specialized response and preventive services. Given the finite of resources available to the government, security agencies will need to exalt cost-efficiency of operations hence the need for collaborative operations. Characterized by the evolution and emergence of new threats, effective operations within the sector call for the specialization of agencies. Cooperation amongst both existing and future security sector entities would help realize faster results using comparatively fewer resources than would have otherwise been the case. Summarily, the dynamic nature of the security sector calls for the constant reconsideration of both preventive and response efforts within a collaborative multi-agency setting.

2.5 Gaps in Training & Capability

Each security agency in Kenya is assigned a specific role to fulfill within the larger picture of ensuring the safety and security of the country and its residents. This often determines the mandate of such entity, and defines the jurisdiction of their activities. Additionally, such definition of roles and scope of engagement aids in the determination of the administrative, financial, and even operational undertakings. That is, the role and mandate of each agency defines how the individuals attached thereto are trained and indoctrinated, and defines what they are required to do with connection to enhancing national security. Such approach to the management of national security bears benefits in terms of enabling efficient use of agencies and their resources, and the establishment of clear scopes to enhance responsibility (Givens et al., 2018). Each agency is therefore equipped with what it needs to fulfill its part of the overall national security mandate. However, in light of the nature of emergent and existing security threats facing the country, such compartmentalization of capability may hinder the achievement of objectives. It is therefore necessary to create frameworks through which different agencies could effectively realize their objectives despite the gaps.

One of the ways of addressing such concern would be through the pursuit of joint operations among national security agencies in the management of overall security goals. Doing so would be important in addressing the gaps that each agency may face. That is, the desire to respond to both existing and upcoming threats to the country's safety continues to highlight the gaps within the sector, invoking the need for a collaborative multi-agency approach to addressing challenges therein. In effect, the need to reduce the vulnerability of the country to crime calls for the exploration of all capabilities thereto. For instance, the desire to ensure safety within the country, and to ensure the prevalence of law and order has resulted in the collaboration of response agencies such as the police and immigration officials with both military and civilian intelligence

actors. This is informed by the fact that while some agencies are adept at the preemption of threats to the country, others are better suited to thwart or neutralize the threats. In this manner, the collaborative operations of different agencies in the national security sector has gone a long way in conferring effectiveness upon the operations of security agencies in the country. Overall, Kenya's continued adoption of MAC in the security sector will help realize the full utilization of individual law enforcement agencies' capabilities.

The changing reality of security threats on the global front has been an important driver of innovation in the sector. Criminals, in response to the changes in the social, economic, and technological dispensations on the global stage, have continuously sought to metamorph in a bid to avoid detection and neutralization. As such, different agencies have crafted approaches to inform the pursuit of safety goals for their countries, such as the creation of specialized response teams. Given the desire for quick turnaround during analysis of threats, and the promptness of desired response, such agencies need to explore all available capabilities. In this regard, collaborative operations amongst agencies would enhance the processes of planning and execution of response to threats (Brazer, 2019). By pooling together the capabilities of different agencies under a collaborative framework, different agencies would be able to better realize their mandates. For example, intelligence agencies that excel in threat interception but often lack the capacity to act in threat response, would be able to acquire such competence under MAC. In effect, the changing nature of threats facing the country exposes the gaps in training and capability amongst Kenyan security agencies, thereby inspiring the collaboration of different agencies in the sector.

2.6 Variations Institutional Realities & Cultures

The multifaceted nature of security calls for the formulation and operationalization of different agencies to address specific threats. Within the Kenyan security sector, different agencies operate under specified mandates which then guide the way of life therein. Considering the

different reasons for their formation, and the variations in their composition and staffing, each of the agencies operates within unique sets of realities. For example, intelligence agencies are driven by security of information and prone to secrecy and limited sharing, possibly hindering collaboration attempts. On the other hand, police operations are guided by greater engagement with other parties thus tending towards greater collaboration with other stakeholders. While the KDF has a rigid command structure and operations are combative, the agency is likely to engage in structured collaborations. For the national government administration, there is greater tendency toward coordination of different functions, hence the culture is more permissive of collaboration. The variations are highlighted in Fig. 2.5 below.



Figure 2-5: Variations in Institutional Realities among Kenya's Security Operators

The differences in values and cultures guiding the operations of multiple agencies makes it difficult to craft a singular approach to multi-agency collaboration (Van der Staak and Wolf, 2019). For example, there exist not just legal but also institutional frameworks that prevent the engagement of certain agencies with their peers in the security industry. As such, the ability of different agencies to coordinate their operations with others may impact upon the level of transparency that

persist in the implementation of joint operations. Effectively, the variations in institutional realities determine the ability of different agencies within the security sector to collaborate with each other in the management of national safety concerns.

There is established within the Kenya security, the offices of national government administrators. Serving the role of the liaison between the national government and the citizens of the republic, such officers have to among other things maintain law and order, ensure the security of citizens, and enhance effectiveness of government service delivery. Such role is largely administrative, though many times the officers are called upon to lend their expertise on security operations. While NGAOs are capable of ensuring the security of citizens, their work does not call for the bearing of arms, as do the works of police or military officers. As a result, for such government officers to realize their goals more effectively, they need to work in tandem with the police, intelligence agencies, and from time to time the military and other security institutions. In effect, the variations in institutional realities and expertise amongst organizations and personnel in the security sector make it necessary for agencies to work collaboratively in achieving their mandates. The existence of MAC frameworks within the Kenyan security sector therefore allows agencies such as NGAO to gain competencies that would not have been possible in the absence of collaboration.

Similarly, the variation in competence between different national security agencies creates the inspiration for interagency collaboration in the management of national security concerns. Different institutions hold competence in different fields within the overall security sector. While many of these competencies may overlap, there are uniqueness's to each agency that increases their fit for role; placing them above others (Manyonge, 2021). This specialization may lead to the absence of critical competencies required to combat the modern threats facing nations. In Kenya, the cooperation amongst different agencies allows for the pooling of capabilities, particular

technical expertise, whilst pursuing national security objectives. This has the effect of improving speed of response to emergent threats, by allowing the collaborative exploration of abilities. Just as much, the collaboration of agencies with differing expertise also enhances the effectiveness of undertakings. Finally, multi-agency collaboration would allow different agencies to sharpen their competence. Within multi-agency frameworks, different agencies offer their advances towards overall goal realization. In the process, different agencies are able to acquire expertise they may not have possessed therebefore. As such, multi-agency cooperation in the Kenyan security sector is determined by the differing realities and expertise of entities therein.

2.6. Political Goodwill

National security operations have to be anchored upon strong legal and policy frameworks if they are to make any difference to the safety of a country. The responsibility of developing policy and legal frameworks upon which to found security operations falls upon lawmakers. In Kenya, political goodwill has been an important determinant of success in security operations. For instance, the political class in Kenya has been at the fore of approving resource allocation to security operations (Kamau, 2021). Whenever the need arises, the political class in Kenya has stepped up to offer leadership. For example, in 2011 when the Kenya faced external aggression from Al-Shabaab militant operating from Somalia, the political leadership of the country approved the deployment of troops under *Operation Linda Nchi*. Similarly, in the anti-terrorism efforts that followed such deployment, Kenya's political leadership supported operations through timely availability of resources (Njuguna, 2020). That is, the legislature, as well as the executive arms of Kenya's government have been at the fore of supporting different aspects of peace and security operations – both within and outside the nation's territory.

Similarly, whenever the need arises, the Kenyan political class has stepped up and demonstrated support for security operations. One of the most profound demonstration of such commitment has been the development of various policy and legal frameworks to anchor the collaborative operations of multiple agencies. For example, the legislative assembly has been at the fore of enacting laws that not only confer power unto constitutional offices in the security sector, but also allocate resources thereto, while also guiding the operations of such entities. For multiple agencies to collaborate effectively in managing national security concern, there is need to develop clear guidelines for operation. The willingness demonstrated by the Kenyan political leadership has therefore gone a long way in enhancing the cooperative operations within the sector (Comiskey, 2021). Overall, political goodwill remains a critical determinant of multi-agency cooperation whilst managing national security concerns.

3.0 CHAPTER THREE:

NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF MAC IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

The cooperation of various national security agencies within Kenya is founded on the existence of deliberate attempts at improved sharing of information and intelligence, greater development of operational capacity, and a unitary approach of response to emergent security threats. Further, collaboration amongst the national security agencies also depends on the sharing of available physical, monetary, and human resources, as well as the exploitation of joint abilities resting with the sister agencies therein. For the multi-agency frameworks to effectively deliver their intended goals, collaboration there among is guided by different formats. Among them the cabinet-level structure, the peer-to-peer format, and the in-group approach to multi-agency collaboration. Such collaboration is also structured in the form of the outgroup approach. This chapter examines the nature of multi-agency cooperation in the management of national security concerns within Kenya, before delving into the structure of such cooperation.

3.2 Nature of MAC in Kenya

3.2.1 Information/Intelligence Sharing

Multi-agency cooperation within the Republic of Kenya continues to be characterized by different attributes. Among the attributes thereto is the sharing of information among concerned agencies on threats to Kenya's safety. The multi-agency sharing of information is useful in the development of appropriate response strategies (Mwagut and Minja, 2022). For example, in securing the territorial waters of the Republic, different entities share information on potential threats that could breach the country's borders. Through coordination of intelligence on threats, agencies involved in guarding Kenya's territorial waters, among them the Kenya Navy, the Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA), the Kenya Coast Guard Services (KCGS), and the National Police

Service's Maritime Police & Anti-Narcotics Units are able to better fulfill their collective mandate (Makwaka, 2022). In effect, the contemporary maritime threats that continue to face Africa, and particularly Kenya, could be better addressed by increasing the extent to which agencies therein exchange information and share intelligence on potential threats. Through the sharing of information, threats to the nation's security such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, and arms dealing could be effectively countered.

Intelligence sharing as an aspect of multi-agency cooperation is also evident in the fight against crimes such as armed robberies, cattle rustling, and general insecurity within the country. The establishment of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms has helped inject effectiveness in combating arms smuggling in and through the country (Ogotu, 2021). Through the collaborative frameworks, different national security agencies are able to share information on crimes involving arms, thereby easing policing services. The framework also allows for the maintenance of a database on crimes involving arms, enabling different agencies to tap into such resources whenever the need arises. In this way, the sharing of intelligence and information on arms and ammunition in the country allows national security agencies to achieve their mandates of protecting the lives and property of Kenyans, whilst also maintain law and order within the republic. Overall, multi-agency cooperation, as is evident in the establishment of agencies such as the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, are marked by information sharing for the sake of enhancing national security.

MAC frameworks are useful to the pursuit of national security as they enable for better sharing of information on possible threats to the country. That is, MAC frameworks are meant to ease the flow of information between and amongst agencies involved in ensuring the safety of the nation (Lusiola, 2021). The absence of such exchange of information could portend negative outcomes for the country. For a long time, the poor sharing of information remained one

of the major causes of security lapses in the country, particularly in connection to terrorism and efforts to counter the threat (Onyango, 2023). The dysfunctionality of the information and intelligence sharing networks complicate the ability of enforcement agencies to remain vigilant in the face of imminent threats. In the case of the Westgate Terrorist Attacks of 2013 for instance, poor intelligence sharing enabled the actualization of the attack. Had information been shared effectively in time, it is likely that the loss suffered would have been abated - or at least minimized. In the case of the 2018 Dusit-D2 attacks, the cooperation amongst agencies, particularly through the sharing of intelligence prior to the attack and even during, helped to avert the extent of loss and damage realized (Ali, 2021). As a result of the desirability realized therefrom, multi-agency collaboration in Kenya has taken the nature of greater intelligence sharing. This continues to allow multiple agencies within the collaborative national security infrastructure to receive and disseminate information to the relevant agencies thereamong. From the results obtained by this study, virtually all respondents (106 out of the 111 sampled) noted that their collaboration efforts were characterized by the sharing of intelligence with the aim of preventing the occurrence of threats to the safety and security of the republic (as in Fig. 3.1a below). Evidently, agencies come together in Kenya, with the goal of preventing any threat from being actualized, a pursuit characterized by the availing of actionable intelligence to participants in MAC frameworks. In this way, a number of threats continue to not only be intercepted but also neutralized before they breach the safety of the country. To date, multi-agency collaboration within Kenya's national security framework is characterized by the sharing of information amongst line agencies and departments.




Figure 3-1: Nature of MAC in Kenya

Intelligence sharing within the MAC framework in Kenya is also characterized by the active surveillance of potential threats the security of the nation. Different agencies in the security sector work toward the maintenance of vigilance over potential risks. For instance, in order to curb the terrorism threat to the country, line agencies and departments often opt for multi-agency frameworks. Here, the use of information sharing helps improve outcomes of MAC frameworks in preventive national security efforts such as countering-violent extremism, CVE (Mutungi and Muli, 2021). In order to respond to the ever growing threat of radicalization of Kenyan citizens into violent extremism, different security agencies have to adopt a collaborative framework. As such, the security organs within the country would need to collaborate with the community leaders, education stakeholders, and local administrators, as well as the leaders of social/religious groups. Such collaborative efforts would help to improve vigilance over the threat of radicalization and its impacts on the country’s security. Sharing of information would enable the multi-agency framework of collaboration to track the movements of potential targets for radicalization (Mosongo, 2022). Such collaborative framework would also allow security agencies to actively engage different leaders of religion, society, and security agencies thereby minimizing the threat posed by radicalization of Kenyan youth into violent extremism. Further, in the countering of

violent extremism, different agencies such as the NIS, the National Police Service, the Kenya Defence Forces, and NGAOs may have to work together to also de-escalate threats. For example, MAC frameworks could help counter violent extremism by offering amnesty to radicalized youth, debriefing them upon return to the country, and maintaining greater vigilance over their interactions and actions. The MAC frameworks would further help in the eventual reintegration of radicalized youth.

Similarly, the use of information sharing for active surveillance of threats to the country, under a MAC framework would ensure the physical safety and security of the republic. More specifically, the cooperation of different agencies to such ends would help curb incidences of drug, human, and arms smuggling (Nzioka, 2021). For example, in the 2014 operation that nabbed a Kshs 1.3 billion haul of drugs in the Indian Ocean, the collaborative efforts of different agencies under a multi-agency umbrella helped in information sharing (Hoffman, 2019). Thus, the NGAOs, acting in collaboration with different relevant departments of the Police, and other agencies such as the NIS, the Kenya Navy, and the KMA managed to intercept the luxury yacht with the consignment. Evidently, multi-agency cooperation in the form of information sharing has been instrumental to the safety of the nation. The cooperation amongst different agencies has therefore been useful in transforming Kenya and its maritime security agencies from a state of sea-blind to that of sea-vision (Mboce and McCabe, 2021). Thus, MAC in terms of information sharing allows the security entities to preempt, intercept, and neutralize maritime threats to the safety of the country.

In 2020, a multi-agency team comprising the intelligence agency NIS, the NPS, and counterterrorism operatives from the KDF, and civilian agencies worked together to track escaped terror convicts. In this instance, information sharing through the MAC framework offered critical capability in addressing an immediate threat to national security. Similarly, the collaboration of

multiple Kenyan security agencies through information sharing in March of 2021, resulted in the interception of the largest ever arms cache in history in Garissa. The recovery followed the successful collaboration between different national security agencies and members of the public (Wako and Hua, 2021). From the collaborative efforts of the multi-agency team, through information sharing, the national security entities were able to prevent the actualization of terrorism within Kenya's territory. Countless other incidences exist of MAC frameworks exploiting shared abilities in maintaining active surveillance on threats to, and ensuring the physical safety and security of the republic.

Similarly, the multi-agency sharing of information is critical to institutional development the national security sector entities involved. That is, such multi-agency cooperation helps achieve the overall aim of keeping the republic safe and secure by aiding all entities achieve their objectives. Multi-agency cooperation enables the integration of information on active investigations into potential threats to national security (Wako and Hua, 2021). In this way, responsible agencies are able to maintain adequate surveillance, and ensure sufficient security for the nation. Additionally, such information sharing within the multi-agency framework is also useful in the collaborative pursuit of effectiveness among all sister agencies. By sharing information on threats and challenges, as well as capabilities and opportunities, different agencies may help increase sister-agency effectiveness. Multi-agency information sharing could boost sister-agency effectiveness by among other things defining deliverables/targets on aspects such as training, equipping, kitting, recruitment/staffing, and resourcing of agencies (Manyonge, 2021). Overall, multi-agency frameworks, in so far as they allow for easier information sharing, has resulted in the improvement of sister agency effectiveness within Kenya's national security sector.

3.2.2 Capacity Building

Multi-agency cooperation in Kenya is also evident in such undertakings as capacity building of the different agencies and departments therein. Cooperation amongst agencies in the pursuit of national security aims also involves the development of both human and technical capabilities of sister-agencies (Kobia, 2021). On the development of human resource, for example, there exists collaborative operations in terms of training and preparedness. Multi-agency cooperation is useful in the development of a well-trained national security workforce (Ainea, 2021). At the moment, NGAOs receive their paramilitary training from police training institutions and instructors. In this way the officers are able to better prepare for the demands of their job in ensuring safety and security at the grassroots. Similarly, different police officers - particularly from the counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics bureau, also attend trainings in military organizations and institutions. The joint trainings are instrumental to the development of operational and strategic capacities in the participants, allowing them to better fulfill their mandates of securing the nation. Further, intelligence agencies within the country may also tap into the training competencies of the police and military to prepare for active field duty. In effect, the joint trainings conducted amongst agencies within Kenya's national security sector tend to have positive ramifications for the overall safety of the nation. Such capacity development efforts, which can only operate under the multi-agency cooperative framework, help in boosting the nation's efforts at securing its territory, citizens, and resources.



Figure 3-2: Elements of Capacity Building

Multi-agency cooperation, by taking the form of joint capacity development, would allow different national security entities to acquire competencies of responding to different challenges to Kenya’s national security – whether singly or collectively. That is, the improvement of capacity within various national security agencies and departments is instrumental to the development of a common framework for peace and security (Linturi and Wilson, 2021). While the benefits of this attribute of multi-agency cooperation are outside looking and intended to boost efforts at stability within the region, they could be tapped to benefit efforts at national security. Multi-agency frameworks in such regard therefore include entities such as the National Defence University of Kenya (NDU-K) which are instrumental in crafting collaborative operational strategies for multi-agency frameworks working toward national safety and security (Moragori, 2021).

Capacity development as a characteristic of multi-agency collaboration in Kenya is also evident in the KDF’s involvement in cooperative undertakings with different civilian entities and

individuals (as detailed in Fig. 3.1b above). Collaborative frameworks of operation such as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) are instrumental in the development of capacity within and outside the national security sector (Brockmeier and Neumann, 2017). That is, the joint conduct of joint drills with both disciplined forces and civilian organizations such as Red Cross, St. John's Ambulance helps improve the capacity of both NSOs and civilian entities involved within such MAC. Such efforts at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, for example, have led to enhanced vigilance, and improved capacity for response among concerned agencies based at the critical security installation (Christensen and Ma, 2020). In this way, the agencies and departments tasked with ensuring national safety would benefit from skill improvement, enhanced response capability, and expanded preventive competencies. The cooperative framework that ropes in law enforcement, intelligence, and defence agencies could also ensure capacity development by calling upon civilian experts on security and safety to help infuse new approaches and perspectives on national security concerns.

Capacity building within MAC frameworks in the security sector of Kenya is also meant to aid in the crafting, pursuit, and assessment of strategic objectives for different agencies therein. That is, departments and agencies in the security sector could work together with the aim of boosting the capabilities of others (Kirimi, Kinyanjui, and Ngari, 2022). For example, the Kenya Defence Forces has been instrumental in the crafting of operational objectives and approaches for other agencies in the security sector. In the pursuit of police modernization and professionalization efforts, the government has tapped into the expertise and information available in other agencies within the national security sector. Thus, through greater multi-agency collaboration, the KDF has developed the operational preparedness manuals used by police in response to persistent security threats such as cattle rustling. Just as much, the mode of operation used is rooted in the approach developed and practiced by the intelligence community. The multi-agency collaboration approach

to operational preparedness has infused greater efficiency into police and NGAO operations (Linturi and Wilson, 2021). By borrowing the strategic perspectives applied by the KDF and intelligence agencies in pursuing belligerent elements, the police and administrative officers have been able to redefine their own operations, and reorient them toward greater success.

3.2.3 Resource Sharing

The practice of multi-agency collaboration in management of national security concerns is also manifest through the sharing of resources amongst different agencies and departments. In the pursuit of Kenya's safety objectives, many different agencies within the national security sector share their abilities. For one, there is the co-utilization of strategic assets owned by different agencies therein. In this regard, agencies within the national security sector tend to explore the competencies that their sister-agencies may have. The National Police Service, for example, sources its ordnance and munitions from the Kenya Ordnance Factory Corporation, a strategic national security asset owned by the KDF. Similarly, the country's intelligence community and its military also source small arms from the National Security Industries in Kiambu County, which is owned by the National Police Service. Further, the intelligence community, the NGAOs, and the National Police Service, as well as other disciplined forces outfits within the country rely on the National Defence University (K) for scholarly advancement of their professions. That is, there exists a multi-agency approach within the security sector, which co-utilizes the academic capabilities and scholarly assets of the KDF. Among the responses ventured by study participants in such respect include the joint usage of production installations used in manufacture of operational hardware. Similarly, respondents noted the joint usage of training facilities and academic assets owned by any one of the participant agencies within MAC frameworks. Overall, multi-agency cooperation within Kenya's National security sector adopts the form of co-utilization of strategic physical and intellectual assets within the sister agencies.




Figure 3-3: Aspects of MAC Resource Sharing

Resource sharing within Kenya’s national security environment under the multi-agency framework also involves the co-utilization of critical movable assets such as vehicles, ground support equipment, and logistics capabilities. Responses sourced during the process of data collection for the study also identified the aspects of sharing within such setups to include the joint utilization of transport, mobility and logistics resources (as detailed in Fig. 3.1c above). Such sharing of operational resources amongst sister-agencies is helpful in boosting the capacities of individual agencies. For example, in its *Operation Linda Boni* which was launched in 2013 in Lamu County, the Kenya Defence Forces has had to co-utilize its own resources along with those of other agencies within the multi-agency cooperative framework (Waringa, 2021). Other agencies therein, including the local administration (NGAO) and the intelligence operatives therein continue to rely on the mobility and logistics competencies of the KDF to fulfill their mandates. Thus, the agencies, working under a collaborative framework, are able to conduct armed patrols within the expansive forest in a bid to maintain vigilance, and to respond to emergent threats whenever they present (Kamau, 2021). Similarly, the joint utilization of capabilities therein also

allows the multi-agency framework to call for ground support and backup whenever need arises. Thus, assets belonging to the KDF or the NPS such as drones or armored personnel carriers (APCs) may be co-used to help in the identification and preemption of threats, surveillance of such threat, and subsequent mitigation or interception. Overall, multi-agency cooperation through joint utilization of abilities strengthens the response capability of individual agencies.

3.2.4 Coordinated Interventions & Collaborative Operations

Within the Kenyan national security sector, multi-agency cooperation is also manifest in the coordination of intervention efforts. Different national security agencies operate collaboratively in a bid to fulfill their individual and collective mandates of keeping the country safe. Coordination of interventions occurs through different means among them the unification of command (Moragori, 2021). That is, in order for different agencies to work congruently with each other, it is necessary to harmonize the command structure. Unifying the flow of communication within the collaboration framework helps in the development of a common sense of purpose amongst all agencies therein. The coordination of command within the multi-agency context of national security in Kenya would thus be useful in the formulation of early stages of response to imminent threats. From the data collection process, it emerged that coordination of interventions, as a manifestation of the MAC setup in Kenya, was marked by the harmonization of command structures (as shown in Fig. 3.1d below). Thus, respondents admitted having been brought under a singular chain of communication. In many of such command setups, the civilian authority was subordinate to military command, because such operations involved the state of security within the country, as determined mainly by internal threats. Unified command centres help in the integration of the mandates and objectives of each line entity into a singular objective – keeping the country safe. Similarly, the unification of command within the multi-agency framework helps in easing the flow of commands and orders throughout the entire collaborative network. As such,

multi-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national safety occurs through the utilization of common command structure to intervene on threat interception.




Figure 3-4: Coordination of Interventions in MAC Frameworks

Finally, multi-agency cooperation in Kenya’s national security sector is marked by the coordination of operational input. That is, the collaboration of agencies within the sector is useful in the realization of operational synergies. The coordination of response efforts, by helping to integrate available information from different entities on the different threats facing the country, would improve the abilities of sister agencies. For example, multi-agency cooperation through coordinated intervention has helped hasten humanitarian assistance in the past. The collaborative response therefore improves the multi-agency response and intervention capability to adverse events and occurrences. Collaborative operations to such end include the process of countering violent extremism, combating radicalization, and preempting threats, as well as intercepting the causative agents. This is been evident in the responses of the study participants to the extent that the coordination of their interventions was marked by the cooperation of agencies under the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) framework. Such setup roped in the KDF, NPS, Humanitarian Organizations, and NGAOs. The MAC setup thus allowed the multiple

agencies therein to coordinate response to adverse occurrences, mitigate loss, and collaboratively assess preventive strategies. The coordinated intervention attribute to MAC is also evident in the creation of the inter-agency framework that is the National Air Support Department, NASD (Ministry of Defence, 2021). The department, which merged the aerial capabilities of different national strategic sector agencies amongst them Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), National Police Service (NPS), Kenya Forestry Services (KFS), and Kenya Power & Lighting Company (KPLC) to enhance national safety (Ministry of Defence, 2021). Overall, multi-agency cooperation amongst Kenya's national security agencies is marked by the ability to respond to threats is hastened across all agencies involved.

3.3 Structure of Multi-Agency Collaboration

Multi-agency collaboration in the Kenyan security sector is pegged on different formats that not only enable collective operations, but guide the extent to which collaboration occurs. As such, there is the cabinet-level structure, the peer-to-peer mechanism, the in-group approach, and the outgroup perspective.

3.3.1 Cabinet-Level Collaboration

Collaboration amongst the agencies involved in the pursuit of national security could take the cabinet-level approach. Such level of collaboration is meant to enhance the decision making at the topmost (Nte, 2013). That is, cabinet-level collaboration in the pursuit of national security would enable the formulation of policies, and the response to imminent threats on the country's safety. As an approach to the collective operations of security organs within Kenya, the cabinet-level approach to MAC involves the creation of a central entity to oversee attempts at collaboration within the country's national security sector. For example, there is established the National Security Advisory Council (NSAC) in Kenya whose role it is to coordinate matters national security in Kenya (Omweno, 2020). The body is comprised of the top staff from different agencies

and departments within the disciplined services. The NSAC reports to the National Security Council, which is comprised of the president, the deputy president, ministers for security and defence, and the heads of the military, police, and intelligence services. Such framework in meant to enhance the integration of operations within the national security sector. The cabinet level framework of multi-agency collaboration is therefore important to security operations as it aids in the development and unification of operational objectives, cultures, and strategies of different entities. In this way, the cabinet-level structure of MAC in Kenya allows the police, military, and intelligence services to work with other internal security organizations and civilian entities to ensure the safety and security of the republic. Nearly one in every eight of the respondents who took part in this study indicated having worked under this structure of MAC (as detailed in Fig. 3.2a below). Among the responses to such effect included the admission by respondents that they have worked under a setup led by a minister or a permanent secretary. Other respondents also noted having worked in setups led by a senior officer from any one given ministry or another.

Multi-agency collaboration at such top-level within the national security sector of Kenya makes it easier to oversight and improve the largely fragmented operations therein. By enabling the cooperative operations of different entities, the cabinet-level format of MAC hastens the process of policy formulation, implementation, and assessment. That is, the format allows for the greater coordination of multi-agency collaborative operations at the highest level of policy making (Omweno, 2020). As such therefore, the structure allows for the swift and effective allocation of resources to line agencies involved in the pursuit of Kenya's safety and security. Similarly, the format of MAC also aids in the development of capacity within the different agencies operating under Kenya's national security sector. This format also offers adequate overarching guidance to entities involved in the pursuit of Kenya's national security through among other things, the centralization of security efforts and the development of strategic collaborations meant to improve

national security outcomes. Just as much, the cabinet-level format of MAC in Kenya also enhances the commitment to cooperation amongst different agencies due to the involvement of top-policy maker. The MAC framework of collaboration at such highest level would also allow for the free sharing of the most sensitive top secret information on national security. In this way, it would be possible for agencies to coordinate executive decisions more easily in the pursuit of national security objectives.

Finally, the cabinet-level structure of MAC hastens response to imminent threats to Kenya's national security. This is mainly pegged on the provision of capability enhancement to improve outcomes. By and large however, the cabinet level structure of MAC has been focused less on response to threats and more on administrative functions (Omweno, 2020). In the recent past, the utilization of such structure has increased in the face of ever-growing and increasing threats to the country's safety. For example, the structure is today at the centre of efforts to eradicate threats to the physical security of the country such as cattle rustling and banditry in volatile areas such as Baringo, Mandera, and Isiolo counties. Though instrumental to the realization of national security goals in Kenya, MAC under the cabinet-level structure tends to mismatch realities on the ground with policy considerations at such apex-level. In this way, the structure could hinder operational undertakings due to variations in expectations and realities within the realm of national safety and security. That is, such high-level deliberations on collaborative operations may not match operational realities, thus making such format less ideal for immediate and short-term utilization and more for longer-term considerations (Nawaz and Koç, 2020). Overall, the cabinet-level format of MAC in Kenya remains instrumental to the pursuit of the country's national safety.




Figure 3-5: MAC Structures in Kenya

3.3.2 Peer-to-Peer Collaboration

Multi-agency cooperation within Kenya’s national security sector could also take the form of peer-to-peer collaborations. That is, such collaborative approach to national security operations would be characterized by the heads or representatives of different agencies working together to achieve national safety objectives. For example, such structure may include the heads of departments and entities consulting with each other to pursue their assigned national security mandates. This format of MAC remains the most common and preferred in the Kenyan scenario, with different organizational heads working together to not only enhance operational outcomes but determine commonalities to enhance seamless cooperation. Two out of every five respondents (44.6%) noted their previous involvement in this setup of multi-agency cooperation (as detailed in Fig 3.2a above). The study participants describe working with someone of the corresponding rank but not their entire agency, cooperating with an officer from another entity of a designation comparable to theirs, and joint planning with a representative of another agency – at a comparable level to theirs. This format is manifested for example, in the multi-agency framework working to

end cattle rustling in Baringo, Turkana, and West Pokot counties involving the NPS, NGAOs, community leaders, and intelligence agencies. Peer-to-peer collaboration has also been witnessed in the country's response to adverse security events such as the Dusit-D2 terrorist attacks where a multi-agency cooperative framework managed to neutralize the then threat to national safety (Mutwiwa, 2021). Further, peer-to-peer collaboration within the security sector is also evident in the protection of critical infrastructure and strategic national security installations such as airports and other ports of entry/exit. Finally, the peer-to-peer form art of multi-agency cooperation is also evident in the peace efforts in the Merti border area between Isiolo and Meru Counties. Under such collaborative framework, the police act in cooperation with other agencies including intelligence entities, maritime authorities, and immigration & border patrol. Such multi-agency cooperation involves the police working with other national security organs/entities among them the national government administrative framework and intelligence officials, have been involved in disarmament and peace efforts.

As a format of multi-agency cooperation, the peer-to-peer model is desirable because of its competencies. For one, the format makes it easier for different national security agencies to cooperate in the course of goal pursuit, without compromising the institutional or departmental autonomy that each enjoys (Shihundu et al., 2022). That is, the model enables collaboration without impacting on agency independence. In such way, the peer-to-peer mechanism of multi-agency collaboration cuts out bureaucracies that would have otherwise existed. Consequently, the mechanism enables the faster definition of goals, and design of strategies thereby saving time and enhancing cooperation during multi-agency operations. The peer-to-peer structuring of multi-agency cooperation allows for greater collaboration of intelligence agencies with the policing authorities within the country. Such manifestations are evident in the operations of the Crime Research and Intelligence Bureau (CRIB) which is a unit within the Directorate of Criminal

Intelligence (DCI). The collaborative framework enables the concerned national security agencies to collect and analyze intelligence on serious crimes with the aim of preventing their occurrence and stopping the perpetrators. Overall, the peer-to-peer collaboration mechanism makes multi-agency cooperation easier as it allows officers of similar ranks, or positions in different agencies within the national security sector to work together. The comparatively higher extent of collaboration amongst such peers would result from the job similarities and homogeneity of role expectations. As a consequence, the peers would be able to realize better collaboration in their pursuit of multi-agency mandates.

3.3.3 In-group Approach

Even though a wider scope of collaboration portends greater benefits for agencies within a collaborative framework, the pursuit of national security is itself a sensitive matter. As such, national security organization may, from time to time, exclude non-security agencies from their joint operations. That is, multi-agency collaboration in the pursuit of national security may sometimes involve NSOs alone. This format of MAC is effective in the realization of national security ends as it excludes any possible interference from outsiders. As a result, there is greater focus on members of the disciplined forces alone. From time to time however, such cooperation may strictly include members of the Kenya law enforcement and intelligence communities, working in collaboration with national government administration officers. The restriction of membership thereto is based on the sensitive nature of operations to be conducted through such mechanism of collaboration.

One third of all sampled respondents (33.3%), representing some 37 participants, indicated having only worked with other security agencies during their participation in MAC setups (as detailed in Fig. 3.2a above). They indicate having either worked with different units and formations from their service/agency, or with members of other NSOs in the country. Such involvement, the

respondents noted, was either between two entities in the country's national security sector or involving multiple agencies/services. The in-group approach is thus predicated on the commonality of interests between members of the national security in-group, and is useful in the harmonization of perspectives on national security realization (Kirimi, Kinyanjui, and Ngari, 2022). The in-group structure of multi-agency cooperation is also essential in the development of common operational approaches. By cooperating amongst themselves, entities within Kenya's national security sector would therefore be able to better coordinate their responses to national security concerns. In addition, the in-group format of multi-agency cooperation is also useful in the prioritization of national security concerns and objectives. By eliminating the non-members, this mechanism allows remaining entities to focus on national security objectives alone, without the consideration of other metrics, as would have been the case with the involvement of 'outsiders'.

The in-group approach to multi-agency cooperation in managing Kenya's national security has been instrumental in breeding a commonality of interests amongst entities involved therein. Cooperation amongst individuals invested in the national security sector would be useful in inspiring a confluence of interests (Linturi and Wilson, 2021). That is, the in-group approach to collaboration amongst line entities would help develop common perspectives on national security issues and inform the prevailing approach adopted thereby. As such, the in-group approach would be instrumental to the reinforcement of the operational doctrines, cultures, and operational strategies of the police, military, and other national security organizations. Evidently, the in-group approach to multi-agency cooperation is useful as it helps to harmonize the way of life amongst concerned formations, departments, and entities. This is critical in informing the ownership of resultant efforts. One of the most common manifestations of this approach to multi-agency collaboration is in the training of counterterrorism operatives drawn from the various entities

within Kenya's national security sector (Ikeanyibe et al., 2020). Through the commonality of interests inculcated under such multi-agency collaborative framework, along with the chance to work collaboratively with other agencies, it is possible to increase in-group solidarity. This would in turn help promote operational synergies amongst the different agencies working under the in-group multi-agency collaborative framework. From their collaborative workings, entities in the country's national security sector would thus be able to pursue their objectives from a common point of view.

3.3.4 Problems Facing MAC Structuring

Of all the respondents who had taken part in MAC frameworks within Kenya, nine out of ten (89.1%) reported facing difficulties in the fulfillment of assigned mandates. By comparison, only a ninth of such number (at 10.9%) indicated having had no problems during their involvement in MAC frameworks within the country (as in Fig 3.2b below).




Figure 3-6: Respondent Characterization of MAC Operations in Kenya

Among the most pressing of problems identified by the respondents include the difference in organizational structures within the MAC participants. That is, a half of all participants (56 out of 111) identified the theme of structural and operational differences among agencies as the leading problem impacting their ability to cooperate with other entities. To this end, the respondents advanced responses ranging from differing governance regimes, to operational variations, and further on to differing norms and procedures. Other responses to such effect also include incompatible models of operation amongst agencies within their MAC setups. Aside from the problem with structures and procedures of operations, MAC was also hindered by the poor communication within the setups. Two out of every five respondents (44.1% or forty-nine of the 111 sampled) identified poor communication as a core concern impacting upon the smooth operations of MAC frameworks (as detailed in Fig. 3.2c below). In this regard, respondents identified themes that include divergent mannerisms of communication, differing methods and channels of passing and receiving information, and absence of communication guidelines and structures. Similarly, the respondents fronted possible leakage of information within such formats, and incompatible command structures that caused information flow hiccups as potential bottlenecks to the operationalization of MAC setups.




Figure 3-7: Impediments to MAC Success in Kenya

Further, the respondents sampled for this study also identified the competing interests of different agencies and services as one of the leading causes of problems for MAC efforts. Out of the 111 respondents, 37 identified interagency competition as one of the setbacks to MAC (as depicted by Fig 3.2c above). While competing interests was the overarching theme, the respondents used different descriptions to convey such impediment to MAC efforts. Among these were that there existed suspicions amongst agencies thus impeding proper collaboration within MAC setups. Other respondents fronted a lack of trust in other agencies as a bottleneck to MAC, while yet others noted the secrecy of certain agencies and services as a stumbling block to collaboration and cooperation of agencies within MAC frameworks.

Respondents sampled for this study also revealed the presence of poor motivation and low morale among officers from certain agencies and services as a contributor to poor MAC outcomes. From the sample of 111, at least one dozen out of every 37 (33%) noted having worked with

officers and agents who did not depict any emotional attachment to, or fulfillment from, their assigned tasks. This led to limited interests in the MAC operations, further impacting upon the outcomes thereto. Sample responses to this end included; lack of commitment to the end goals, absence of interests in the operations of the MAC setup, and unwillingness to work with others. Finally, the respondents sampled for the study also described differences in skillsets and capabilities as an impediment to smooth MAC operations. The participants detailed how variations in the abilities of agents and officers involved within MAC framework may impede progress of MAC efforts. In all, 37.8% of the respondents admitted to having faced problems in their MAC engagements due to the differential possession of experience and competence by agencies and services involved therein (as shown in Fig 3.2c above).

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR

THE FRAMEWORKS OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION IN KENYA

4.1 Introduction

Cooperation of multiple national security agencies within Kenya is aided by the presence of deliberate actions meant to enhance not only the sharing of information, but also the advancement of individual agency capacities, and collaborative responses to emergent security threats. In this regard, there exist different frameworks, rooted in law and policy, and domiciled in institutions, which guide cooperative undertakings by different national security organizations and actors. This chapter examines the legal guidelines toward such collaboration, before delving into the policy frameworks that enable multi-agency cooperation, and finally considering the institutional frameworks of MAC within Kenya.

4.2 Legal Frameworks of Multi-Agency Collaboration in Kenya

Kenya's national security sector is characterized by the existence of legal guidelines that direct collective efforts towards the pursuit of line objectives. These legal frameworks are not only meant to enhance the operability of each agency within the MAC arrangements, but to also offer a legal basis for cooperation amongst different agencies within such setup. In effect, the legal frameworks that guide the collaboration of different agencies consists of different formal protocols, ratified both within the country and internationally, as well as memoranda of understanding that agencies sign in crafting multi-agency collaborative operations (Imboywa et al., 2020). Many of the formal agreements that anchor multi-agency cooperation in law are intended to address the root causes of security threats, though others entrench collaborative response efforts (Pickering and Fox, 2022). While many of the legal protocols and policy provisions are expressly aimed at securing the country, they also provide for the preventive and response efforts of different agencies and actors, both state and non-state.

4.2.1 The Protocol on the Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT), 2022.

One of the most notable, and recent, of the legal frameworks to MAC in Kenya is the Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Protocol that was developed in 2022 by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP, 2022). The legal framework, which brings together the key players in Kenya's financial and national security sectors is meant to combat the illicit inflows of money into the country. Its primary aim being the prevention of threats that would arise as a result of such monetary flow. The legal framework provides for clear cooperative operations of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) with the National Police Service, the Kenya Defence Forces, and the National Intelligence Services in the prevention of illicit monetary inflows that could end up in terrorism financing (Rudich, 2021). The framework also ropes in the NGAO, and different civilian experts in the realms of national security and financial services, with the aim of providing impetus to the fight against terrorism. By providing a foundational basis for the collaborative operations of the different agencies, the Counter-Financing of Terrorism Protocol entrenches in law, the unitary efforts of different state and non-state actors in the fight against terrorism - which poses the single largest and most significant threat to Kenya's security. The CFT protocol developed by the ODPP is also critical to the process of information sharing amongst concerned agencies (Gebremichael, 2021). This is useful in boosting the ability of each agency to craft line response measures to the threat that terrorist financing poses to the country's safety and security.

Similarly, the existence of the CFT protocol allows for the continuity of collaboration amongst the concerned agencies. That is, the legal framework enables consistency in the fight against terrorism by creating a lasting cooperative arrangement through which different agencies can work together in perpetuity, to combat one of Kenya's most serious national security threats (Kamau, 2021). By anchoring the operations of the concerned agencies in law, the protocol aids in the provision of consistency to MAC efforts within the national security landscape of Kenya.

That the protocol allows for MAC to serve in perpetuity makes it possible for sustained efforts in combatting terrorism. This also ensures the creation of a long-lasting cooperative formation through which institutional memory could be created and utilized for future efforts at prevention of terrorism within the country. Just as much, the CFT Protocol of 2022 also prevents the existence of ‘buck passing’ as a practice, by clearly outlining the role that each agency within the MAC framework is expected to play in combating terrorism financing, and eliminating the risk it poses to Kenya’s safety and security. In this manner, the CFT framework ropes in the line agencies in the assignment of specific roles along the entire criminal justice value chain - from vigilance, to response, to punishment and response (Boccalone, 2021).

Finally, the existence of the CFT legal framework aims to address the absence of continuity that has often hindered effective multi-agency working in the security sector. By establishing an avenue for the collective operations of such agencies, the legal framework ensures continuity of collaboration in the pursuit of national safety objectives amongst the KDF, ODPP, NPS, NIS and NGAO (Muthee, 2022). This, it achieves by creating institutional memory from the experiences and involvement of both NSOs and non-NSOs within the security sector. Similarly, the CFT legal framework is useful in ensuring the consistency of service provision in relation to Kenya’s national safety and security. The legal framework, by roping in the operations of multiple agencies under a common collaborative umbrella, ensures that sustained cooperative efforts can be replicated in future endeavors. In this way, the framework would allow for the creation of consistent service delivery channels. Overall, the CFT protocol of 2022 is useful in the continuity and consistency of Kenya’s national security and safety service provision within the Multi-Agency collaborative framework.

4.2.2 The Prevention of Terrorism Acts (POTA), 2010.

Among the precursors to the CFT Protocol of 2022 was the Prevention of Terrorism Acts which was enacted in 2010 as a legal guideline intended to help secure the nation from threats to its people, infrastructure, way of life, and institutions (Tyitende, 2021). The legal provision entrenched in law the collaborative workings of agencies tasked with preventing the occurrence of terrorism within the country, and those assigned the role of responding to the occurrence of such threat. The legal framework also provides for the cooperation of different agencies through the identification of needs within individual agencies and services (Botha, 2022). Through the identified gaps, POTA would then guide the injection of requisite resources to the agencies, thereby providing impetus to the war against terror. That is, the legal guideline actualizes the avenue for collaborative operations of agencies, by highlighting deficiencies in resource availability. Thus, the POTA legal framework aids in efficient resource utilization. As part of its objectives, POTA also envisions the joint preparation of agents and individuals involved in the fight against terrorism through trainings, drills, and exercises. The legislation provides for the exploitation of all competencies within the national security sphere in Kenya, thus invoking interagency collaboration in pursuit of national security.

As a legal foundation for the collaborative operatives of national security agencies, the POTA framework also provides for the coordination of functions amongst line agencies and services. The legislation codifies the MAC within Kenya's national security environment and attempts to synchronize capabilities therein. POTA, as a legal framework, also seeks to enhance the level of communication between and amongst entities and agencies involved in securing the country. The legislation enhances the effectiveness of communication within interagency operations, with the intention of creating awareness about terrorism and its impacts to the safety of the nation. Evidently, the POTA framework guides the cooperative operations of multi-agency

teams in the early intervention on terrorism concerns. By enhancing communication amongst entities, in the actualization of anti-terrorism operations, the POTA framework also allows interagency teams to implement disruptive intervention actions, thus maintaining the safety of Kenya, from the threat of terrorism. Further, POTA also enables multi-agency operations in the realm of vigilance, informing direct surveillance of identified threats to Kenya's safety. Overall, the legal framework provides modalities of multiple-agency collaboration in the detailed surveillance of threats to the country's security.

4.2.3 The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA), 2010

There also exists within Kenya's national security sector, a formal agreement to maintain vigilance over the financial assets of criminal enterprises. Referred to as The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA) of 2010, the legal protocol formalizes the collaborative operations of multiple agencies in prevention of threats to national security posed by proceeds of crime (Njoroge, 2021). The legal framework establishes money laundering as an offence, with national security ramifications to the country, and thus spells out a raft of measures to combat such offence. Enabling the cooperative operations of multiple national security agencies and financial authorities in the country, POCAMLA seeks to tap into the competencies of such entities in the identification and tracking of proceeds of crime, as well as the seizure and confiscation of such assets (Njoroge, 2021). This is particularly useful in preventing the propagation of resultant threats to national security, key among them terrorism. As a legal framework, POCAMLA establishes modalities of sharing information amongst national security agencies and financial service entities. This is meant to not only maintain vigil over financial flows in the economy, but to limit the impact of such inflows to the safety and security of Kenya (Vinya, 2020). The formation of the protocol was informed by the need for greater information sharing across the different agencies and services involved in securing the nation.

In establishing the POCAMLA protocol, Kenya intended to consolidate the roles of different agencies into a collective effort with a single objective – the prevention of security threat financing. The legal framework therefore establishes the multi-agency cooperative umbrella under which different agencies can avoid the duplication of roles and assignments in preventing illicit flows of financial assets (Botha, 2020). In this way, the singularity of roles makes it easier for Kenya to achieve her national safety and security objectives. The protocol further enables the assessment of needs in the provision of security to the country, and allows for the collective provision of such needs. In effect, the POCAMLA framework enhances the efficiency of resource utilization in preventing illicit financial inflows within the country, and the implications that such could portend for the country. Finally, the legal framework for the monitoring the proceeds of crime also enable accountability of agencies and services involved in the collaborative operations intended to secure Kenya (Das, 2022). That is, the framework allows for greater consistency in the prevention of national security threats that may emanate from unchecked financial flows into, within, and out of the country's economy.

4.2.4 National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) Act, 1997

As part of the drive to consolidate the efforts of different agencies in the provision and assurance of safety and security within Kenya, the republic enacted the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) Act of 1997 (Botha, 2020). One of the earliest legal frameworks for MAC, the NCRC Act -1997 offered national security agencies and services, as well as civilian experts and contributors to consolidate data on different crimes impacting upon the country's safety. That is, the NCRC Act of 1997 established modalities for a scholarly approach toward the management of security and safety of the nation. The act made it the responsibility of the NCRC to collate available information on different threats to the physical security of Kenya. It thus established a repository of crime and criminality, with the aim of informing both present and future safety and security

undertakings. By creating avenues for greater collaboration of agencies, the act itself catalyzed the adoption of a multi-dimensional approach to security and safety. In practice, the NCRC Act – 1997 offers the impetus for the maintenance of a database that guides the operations of different agencies within the national security architecture of Kenya (Kamau, 2022). The law, in integrating the approaches of different national security agencies and services, offers an avenue for crafting collaborative response strategies to national security threats.

The NCRC legal framework as envisioned in the act, is useful in the collaborative operations of NSOs and non-NSOs in the collection and analysis of intelligence on threats facing the republic. The legislation establishes collective research mechanisms into recurrent safety and security threats, and actualizes the collection of intelligence to such end. In this way, the NCRC framework founded in law the reconnaissance of hostile elements, with the aim of providing disruption mechanisms to acts of terror before their commission (Botha, 2020). The legislation also aids in the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the fight against contemporary crimes that threaten the safety and security of Kenya. The law achieves this by “bringing together different actors and players” in the national security industry, each with relevant skills to the overall goals. Under such collective umbrella, the act envisions research into persistent national security threats (KLRC, 2022). In effect, the legislation creates the NCRC as a solid and lasting basis upon which collaborative operations of multiple national security agencies can be achieved within Kenya. Overall, the fact that the NCRC ropes in multiple agencies together under a collective framework provides a wide ensemble of security practices and perspectives thus improving the realization of national safety and security.

4.2.5 Legislations on National Security Organizations

Established under Chapter 14 of the Constitution of Kenya – 2010, the national security provision outlines the need for subsidiary legislation to actualize in law the relevant national

security organs and organizations, NSOs (KLRC, 2022). Chapter 14 of the 2010 Constitution therefore defines national security in article 238 and outlines the national security organizations in article 239 (Sempijja and Nkosi, 2021). The *Constitution of Kenya, 2010* then advocates for the legislation of subsidiary laws to anchor the different agencies and services that constitute multi-agency working within the country's security sector. Among the agencies whose legislative frameworks are anchored in Chapter 14 are the National Security Council, the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Intelligence Services, and the National Police Service (KLRC, 2022).

4.2.5.1 The National Security Council (NSC) Act of 2012

Rooted in Article 240 of the Constitution of Kenya - 2010, the National Security Council Act of 2012 (NSC Act, 2012) formalizes the establishment of the apex body in regards to Kenya's security and safety (Nyanchoga, 2017). The act envisions the composition of the council to include the president, the deputy president, line ministers, and the heads of relevant NSOs. The law codifies the supervisory control of security organs in the country and enables MAC through the integration of policies that actualize collective operations. The act also supports interagency cooperation by establishing a common framework necessary to the discharge of security functions within the republic. That the NSC Act, 2012 also envisions the co-opting of experts from outside of the NSO framework into security operations also aids in the collaboration of multiple agencies, and stakeholders, in the pursuit of Kenya's safety (Onyango, 2023). Finally, the NSC Act, 2012 also creates the National Security Advisory Council (NSAC) whose role it is to issue policy directive to national security agencies and services. One of the key directives therein is the requirement for the exploration of collective competencies that ensure safety and security for Kenya and her citizens (Onyango, 2023). Overall, the NSC Act, 2012 provides legal support for multi-agency operations in Kenya's security sector by integrating policies that enable greater collaboration of NSOs. That is, the NSC Act, 2012 provides the impetus for the collaboration of

the topmost leaders of different entities working in pursuit of national safety within the republic. In this manner, the NSC Act, 2012 actualizes the cabinet-level structuring of multi-agency collaboration in the management of Kenya's national security concerns.

4.2.5.2 The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Act of 2012

Article 241 of the Constitution of Kenya – 2010 provides for the establishment of the Kenya Defence Forces as a collective military entity encompassing the operations of the Kenya Air Force (KAF), the Kenya Army (KA), and the Kenya Navy (KN). The article is then supported by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Act – 2012, a subsidiary legislation spelling out the modus operandi of the Kenyan military. The legislation is geared toward multi-agency cooperation in different ways. For one, the KDF Act - 2012 expressly outlines the modalities of the Kenyan military working with other agencies – both state and non-state, in the pursuit of safety and security within the republic (Kimiti, 2019). Under article 31, for instance, the KDF Act -2012 spells out the need for the military to cooperatively work with NSOs in the interests of securing Kenya's territory from threats to its integrity. The legislation also prescribes the need for the KDF to cooperatively work with other agencies in the restoration of peace in Kenya as a way of enhancing national security and safety (Odhiambo, 2015). Similarly, the KDF Act of 2012 codifies multi-agency operations by providing for the military's involvement in the response to emergency or disaster, as well as the crafting of plans and guidelines of joint security operations (Atubukha et al., 2022). Finally, the KDF Act also enhances the collaboration of multiple agencies and services in the pursuit of national safety by establishing modalities for the coordination of command within MAC frameworks in managing national security concerns within Kenya.

4.2.5.3 The National Intelligence Services (NIS) Act of 2012

In order to actualize the provision of Article 242 of the Constitution of Kenya – 2010, parliament also enacted The National Intelligence Services (NIS) Act of 2012 as a successor to

The National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS) Act of 1998. The legislation establishes the NIS as the body mandated to collect, analyze, and disseminate security intelligence and counter-intelligence within the country (KLRC, 2022). In outlining the roles and expectations of the services, the legislation also establishes a pathway for NIS to work with other agencies in ensuring the safety and security of the nation. In section 5, for example, the act recommends the sharing of intelligence and counterintelligence between the NIS and relevant state agencies for purposes of action in preventing harm to the republic, its citizens, and its interests (Shaffer, 2019). The act also envisions the cooperative operations of the service with different state departments, agencies, and organs in the collection, evaluation, and transmission of intelligence on possible threats to the security of the nation. In this way, the act establishes, and supports interagency collaboration in pursuit of national security.

Further, the *NIS Act, 2012* also establishes support for law enforcement agencies in the detection and prevention of the occurrence of serious crimes that could have negative implications for Kenya's national security. That is, the law establishes modalities through which the NIS can support the collection of security intelligence and counterintelligence on threats to Kenya's security and safety. Similarly, the law also supports MAC by providing for the collaborative conduct of protective and preventive functions related to national security in conjunction with state departments, and other agencies outside of the national security architecture (Onyango, 2015). In this way, the act provides for the NIS to be involved in collaborative operations with other agencies and entities in securing critical infrastructure and personnel. Finally, the NIS act also has positive implications for multi-agency collaboration in Kenya in so far as it establishes modalities for the service to commission research on national security concerns (Nadio, 2019). In this regard, the legislation creates a framework through which the NIS not only cooperates with national security organizations, but also supports the state in securing the integrity of national security information.

Overall, the NIS Act of 2012 prescribes modalities of collaborative workings between the service and other NSOs, government agencies/entities, and other stakeholders operating within Kenya's national security sphere.

4.2.5.4 The National Police Services (NPS) Act of 2011

Also included among the statutes that operationalize the collaboration of multiple agencies is the National Police Services (NPS) Act of 2011, a subsidiary legislation of Article 243 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (Waweru and Maina, 2019). The law, which establishes the police service within the country, provides for a wide range of cooperative undertakings in the management of national security (Ayieko, 2020). For instance, section 34 of the NPS Act, 2011 formalizes the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), a specialized division of the NPS' Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) that is tasked with protecting the interests of the republic including life and property from the threat of terrorism (Otieno, 2019). This section of the act provides for among other things, the collaboration, cooperation, and coordination of efforts between the NPS (by way of the ATPU) with other agencies relevant in combating terrorism. The law, by establishing the unit, therefore envisions greater collaboration between the NPS, the KDF, and the NIS in the pursuit of national security objectives. Just as much, section 35 of the act provides the modalities through which the NPS works with multiple other agencies, chiefly the NIS, in the collection and provision of criminal intelligence for the purpose of developing both preventive and response measures. The law therefore codifies the cooperation of different NSOs in the maintenance of Kenya's national safety and security. Such law also provides for the establishment of the Kenya Police Service standing orders that expressly found the need for cooperation between the service and the KDF in the protection of life and property within Kenya.

The National Police Services (NPS) Act of 2011 also entrenches the practice of multi-agency cooperation by formulating the County Policing Authority in each of the 47 devolved units

of the republic. Established under section 41 of the statute, the County Policing Authority comprises of representatives from the NPS, the NIS, and the 47 County governments (under the command of the NGAO framework (Karuri and Muna, 2019). The policing authorities offer an avenue for greater collaboration of both NSOs and non-state agencies. Thus, the act offers a way for all NSOs to collaborate more effectively with both state and non-state actors in the prevention of crime, and maintenance of national safety and security at the grassroots level. Additionally, the NPS Act, 2012 also legalizes the cooperation of multiple agencies in the security sector by envisioning greater interagency collaboration in human resource development (Karuri and Muna, 2019). That is, the NPS Act – 2012 provides for the police service’s engagement with other NSOs and relevant security sector stakeholders, under a cooperative framework, in efforts to bolster the skills and competencies of officers and agents therein (KLRC, 2022). In this regard, the NPS Act – 2012 ropes in the KDF, NIS, and Security Scholars under a collaborative umbrella to increase individual agency competencies. Through such efforts, the law enhances the realization of national safety and security objectives.

4.3 Policy Frameworks of Multi-Agency Collaboration in Kenya

Within the Kenyan national security sector are also policy guidelines intended to enhance the cooperative operations of different agencies in securing the nation. These policy provisions outline the doctrines that guide the pursuit of national safety and security, as well as the strategies that aid in response to emerging threats.

4.3.1 Inter-Agency Guidelines on Cooperation and Collaboration (IAGCC)

Developed in 2022, the Inter-Agency Guidelines on Cooperation and Collaboration establishes a multi-agency taskforce comprising of different stakeholders drawn from different sectors within the country (Botha, 2020). The guidelines, developed by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions-ODPP, act a tool to inspire engagement amongst multiple law enforcement

agencies within Kenya. The policy framework was the result of participation of different state and non-state actors who deliberated on, and participated in the formation of guidelines to multi-agency collaboration (Kamau, 2022). As a policy document, the IAGCC was intended to help in the establishment of a “...sense of urgency within the criminal justice sector...” This was aimed at responding to emergent threats facing Kenya, foremost among them terrorism. The policy has been instrumental in providing a basis for the collaborative operations of state and non-state actors drawn from a wide range of sectors within the republic. In this manner, the IAGCC policy framework has been critical in addressing the hitherto disjointed approach that security agencies applied in addressing serious threats to the safety of the nation (Ayieko and Gitonga, 2020). The policy creates an avenue through which multiple national security organizations can work collectively.

The guidelines published under the IAGCC provide for the creation of a long-lasting cooperative umbrella of national security operations. The policy invokes the longevity of multi-agency collaborative efforts, by creating a more permanent framework for cooperation (ODPP, 2022). That is, the policy allows for a more permanent setup under which different stakeholders, drawn from multiple agencies within different sectors, can work in perpetuity to ensure national safety. While the major focus of the Inter-Agency Guidelines on Cooperation and Collaboration (IAGCC) policy was “...the investigation and prosecution of terrorism and terrorism financing,” the guidelines have been applied to other security concerns (ODPP, 2022). By enabling the cooperative operations of multiple national security stakeholders, the IAGCC framework enhances the coordination of roles and responsibilities in the realm of national safety. The IAGCC framework also enhances the formation of partnerships amongst different NSOs and non-NSOs, from the investigative to the prosecutorial, and even to the custodial agencies involved in the national security architecture of Kenya. Overall, the IAGCC framework of 2022 offer practical

guides for both state and non-state actors involved in national security operations, mainly with regard to terrorism-related threats.

4.3.2 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)

Within the Kenyan national security policy sphere is also the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE). The policy, a preventive effort geared towards the elimination of terrorist threats before they become actionable, forwards action plans used in addressing the root causes of the threat (Mesok, 2022). The strategy developed a framework through which multiple national security agencies could cooperate effectively and coordinate their activities in the preemption and prevention of terrorist threats facing the country (Tsuma, 2022). As a policy, the NSCVE is geared towards the collation of preventive competencies that exist within Kenya's national security environment. In this way, the policy brings together non-state actors involved in community services with national security entities in a bid to prevent the degeneration of violent extremism into actual terrorism (Otieno, 2019). The policy achieves this by prescribing the modalities for greater MAC amongst different stakeholders. This is integral to the identification of likely targets for radicalization, and necessary for limiting the impact of radicalization upon such persons. As a result, the strategy aids in the dissipation of the threat that radicalization into violent extremism poses to the country's safety. This it achieves by creating a collective forum through which line agencies could maintain vigilance over hostile targets.

As a policy, NSCVE also develops frameworks for the joint development and improvement of capacity amongst NSOs. In such regard, the policy establishes the *modus operandi* for collaborative gathering of intelligence relating to national security concerns (Badurdeen et al., 2022). The policy, in establishing such approaches to national security, enhances the sharing of information amongst agencies working to prevent the occurrence of terrorism, and the mitigation of possible impacts from such occurrence. The strategy therefore forwards not just the preventive

measures in so far as terrorism is concerned, but also mechanisms of dealing with the reintegration of conflict-engaged citizens (CECs) returning from radicalization missions (Mesok, 2022). The model for interagency sharing of information, and collection of intelligence, along with the surveillance of returnee violent extremists, enables for greater disruption of potential security concerns facing the nation. Just as much, the NSCVE as a policy fosters greater accountability and expeditiousness in the handling of terrorism-related issues amongst national security agencies and services (Brun et al., 2022). By developing a common framework for collaboration, the policy enables greater role sharing and distribution of responsibilities, thereby expediting the outcomes of security engagements. Finally, the NSCVE policy guideline is also critical in the homogenization of tendencies and approaches used in countering the security threat that is violent extremism. That is, the policy is critical in the development of a multi-agency framework under which requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs) are collaboratively developed by concerned entities (Papale, 2022). Overall, the policy is crucial to the enabling and management of MAC in the realms of terrorism-preemption and prevention.

4.3.3 The Mutual Legal Assistance Framework

In Kenya, MAC is also guided by the existence of the mutual legal assistance policy framework. An approach meant to enhance the collaborative operations of multiple agencies in matters pertaining to the law, the policy is meant to improve the capabilities of individual entities within different MAC frameworks (KLRC, 2022). In particular, the policy aids in the improvement of the legal competence of different state and non-state actors in the pursuit of national security objectives. As a policy, the MLA framework is useful in the collective utilization of interagency competencies. It offers a way for agencies, services, and stakeholders involved in national security operations to sharpen their grasp of the legal system and to apply such towards greater pursuit of national security (Muthee, 2022). In effect, the policy incentivizes national security agencies to

share their abilities, and enhance the overall capabilities within their cooperative frameworks. By establishing frameworks for agencies to obtain legal assistance when need arises, the policy improves MAC in the pursuit of national safety within Kenya. Overall, by tapping into the legal competencies available within a wide ensemble of national security and allied operatives, the policy improves inter-agency cooperation in the pursuit of national security.

4.4 Institutional Frameworks of Multi-Agency Cooperation in Kenya

Multi-Agency Cooperation within the national security sector in Kenya is also defined, determined, and enabled by existing institutional frameworks. That is, the collaborative operations of different agencies in Kenya's safety and security architecture are both founded upon, and result in, the existence of institutions. As such, there are different scholarly institutions and policy think-tanks within the Kenyan security sector. The mandates of such entities revolve around the conceptualization of an academic perspective to the fight against contemporary threats to national security (Kindochimu, 2021). These entities exist within, and are managed by the different services of Kenya's disciplined forces.

4.4.1 The National Defence University of Kenya (NDU-K)

The National Defence University of Kenya (NDU-K) is the premier scholarly institution in the realm of security within Kenya and the larger Great Lakes region. The entity, awarded a charter in 2021, was meant to become a regional centre of "excellence for policy and strategy" in the realm of security (Ministry of Defence, 2023). The institution, through its different constituents is geared towards improving MAC in different ways, and at various levels, roping in different national security agents and actors. Thus, NDU-K as an entity, offers an institutional framework for the collaboration of different national security agencies in the development of policy and operational plans. These are availed through key constituent institutions of the NDU-K.

4.4.1.1 National Defence College-K (NDC-K)

At the highest level of defence training is the National Defence College - Kenya, which was established with the goal of encouraging a scholarly approach to the management of national safety and security within Kenya. The NDC was established as a centre for improving excellence in security sector undertakings, focusing on the achievement of peace, stability, and prosperity in Kenya and even beyond (Ministry of Defence, 2023). The entity enables MAC in the national security sector by offering training and capacity development for officers and agents drawn from the KDF, the NPS, the NIS, and the Kenyan Civil Service (Ministry of Defence, 2023). By collectively developing the capabilities of top-level officers from the participating agencies, the NDC lays the foundation for longevity of the peer-to-peer approach to multi-agency collaboration. The college also promotes MAC by developing in participants the spirit of the Whole-of-Government-Approach (WoGA) to security management (Ministry of Defence, 2023). That is, the college offers a framework through which all government officers in the security sector and beyond, can cooperate and collaborate to develop, implement, and review security management approaches in Kenya. Overall, the NDC-K bequeaths upon its participants the analytical and innovative skills necessary for creatively and collaboratively approaching contemporary threats to Kenya's national security. Thus, the college – as part of the NDU-K, helps in conferring a multi-dimensional conceptualization of security, thereby inspiring greater cooperation and collaboration amongst both NSOs and non-NSOs.

4.4.1.2 Joint Command and Staff College (JCSC)

The NDU-K also offers modalities for greater multi-agency collaboration within the security sector through its Joint Command and Staff College (JCSC). The college is tasked with the training of middle-level leadership in the defence forces and other national security agencies and services (Ministry of Defence, 2023). Though owned by the KDF, the JCSC is jointly utilized

by NSOs that include the NPS and NIS. The college was established with the aim of conferring Operational Tactical competencies upon mid-level security operatives. This is achieved through the development of operational level capabilities in participants. Thus, JCSC promotes the development in participants of the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs) necessary for Tactical Resourcefulness under Stress (TARUS). Being a centre of excellence in security studies, the JCSC also develops in participants the competencies necessary for irregular warfare (IW), as is the case in counter-terrorism and combating violent extremism (Okech, 2015). In all, the College improves shared awareness among participants, thus homogenizing tendencies and approaches used in security management, and catalyzing collaborative operations under different MAC frameworks. Overall, the JCSC contributes to the development of the in-group approach to MAC within Kenya's national security landscape.

4.4.1.3 International Peace Training & Support Centre (IPSTC)

Originally established to prepare Kenyan troops for international peace missions, the role of the IPSTC has evolved towards a more multi-pronged orientation. The centre now offers education and research into concerns that go beyond peace efforts and into security management, crisis response and disaster management (Ministry of Defence, 2023). With this expansion in its role orientation, the IPSTC now serves as one of the institutions within the larger network of NDU-K establishments that infuse a multi-agency approach into security management. With membership drawn from the KDF, the Police Service and civilian actors in peace keeping, the institution inculcates a multi-agency approach to resilience planning and to the management of disaster preparedness and emergency response (Nzioka and Haro, 2022). That is, the institution injects the insider-outsider approach to MAC in the management of security concerns facing Kenya, and by extension her regional and continental neighbors. The institution also plays a crucial

role in enabling MAC within Kenya's security sector by imparting multi-agency and multidimensional approaches to security and safety management among its learners.

4.4.1.4 National Intelligence & Research University College (NIRUC)

The constituent of NDU-K that offers an institutional bedrock for the cooperation amongst national security agencies in Kenya is the National Intelligence and Research University College (NIRUC). Established in 2021 in response to the expanding scope of threats facing Kenya, the institution offers scholarly leadership in the realm of intelligence and its applications to management of safety and security within Kenya. The institution therefore conducts research into complex security and safety concerns that face the nation, and apply this onto the MAC framework. The college draws its students from diverse agencies and services within Kenya's national security architecture. In this manner, the institution orients research findings towards multi-agency collaborative actions in addressing contemporary national security threats (Ministry of Defence, 2023). Overall, NIRUC contributes to multi-agency collaboration because of its creation of new thinking in Kenya's pursuit of national security.

4.4.1.5 Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS)

The final constituent of the NDU-K is the Centre for Security and Strategic Studies (CSSS), an entity established with the aim of deepening the security awareness within the country (Ministry of Defence, 2023). The centre is tasked with providing linkages to stakeholders drawn from diverse sectors including government, industry, and the private sector. In seeking to link the different stakeholders, the centre aims to support inquiry into defence and security matters. As an institution, CSSS offers sensitization on issues around national security, and contributes to MAC by advocating the whole-of-government approach (WoGA) to the management of security concerns within Kenya (Ministry of Defence, 2023). As a college, CSSS is tasked with the development of cross-sectoral policy on security issues affecting Kenya and the region at large. The institution is

the think tank charged with developing strategic policy for the KDF and its sister security agencies within the republic. Overall, CSSS plays a role in interagency collaboration by including the input of different NSOs (among them KDF, NPS, NIS, and Civil Service) in the development of security policy within its strategic studies.

4.4.2 National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC)

Within the institutional framework of MAC is the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The centre is an independent institution established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2010 (POTA), and operationalized through the joint capabilities and resources of multiple agencies within Kenya's security architecture (NCTC, 2023). The entity is tasked with the coordination of all measures geared towards the prevention and detection of terrorist threats, as well as the deterrence and disruption of such (Mugoh, 2022). In this regard, the centre offers a collaborative framework of NSOs through which the approval and supervision of non-state actor is conducted. The centre also offers the cooperative framework for NSOs to operate with support from non-state entities that include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society/community-based organizations working in countering violent extremism (CVE). Thus, the centre allows NSO in cooperation with non-state actors to develop and exploit soft power in combating the threat that youth violent extremism (YVE) poses to Kenya's safety and security (NCTC, 2023). In effect, the centre offers the institutional framework under which all counter-terrorism activities and de-radicalization efforts are coordinated, regulated, and supervised (Mwangi, 2021). These it achieves through the collaborative operations of NSOs and non-states actors in the national security landscape. The multi-agency approach of the institution is particularly necessary in the development of innovative approaches to prevention and disruption of terrorism. Overall, the NCTC offers a foundation for greater collaboration of line agencies in

the pursuit of national security and safety objectives within Kenya – specifically in the realm of counter-terrorism.

5.0 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

From the outcomes of this study, it is evident that there already exists a semblance of MAC in the pursuit of national security interests in Kenya. Over the years, this approach to security management has gained a bigger foothold, characterizing different undertakings. However there remains a lot to be done if true collaboration and cooperation amongst agencies, services, and actors is to be realized within Kenya's national security atmosphere.

The cooperation of multiple national security agencies within the country has often been necessitated by different factors among them the shifting nature of crime and criminality which exposes the vulnerability of the republic to security breaches. As such, different agencies within Kenya's security landscape have to work together in managing line concerns. Similarly, MAC within Kenya is inspired by the inadequacy of resources across different agencies. No single entity in Kenya has the requisite resources to address the myriad of challenges facing Kenya in the realm of safety and security. Multiple agencies therefore have to cooperate and collaborate in their pursuit of safety and security for the republic, its people, and its interests. Further, MAC is also influenced by the large number of operators, agencies, and services within Kenya's security architecture. Such large number increases the possibility of role duplication and overlap, both of which promote inefficiencies. Thus, there is need for cooperation/collaboration in the management of national security concerns within Kenya. Multi-Agency Collaboration in Kenya is also necessitated by the existing training and capability gaps amongst NSOs, and the institutional variations in expertise therein. Considering the specificity of roles that each agency and service plays in the larger security atmosphere within Kenya, disjointed operations would lead to insufficient and desirable outcomes. As such, in order to plug deficits within each agency, there

emerges a need for interagency cooperation and collaboration. Finally, political goodwill within Kenya has also contributed to the development of MAC frameworks within the country. The support of the political class in Kenya has allowed for the creation of legal, institutional, and policy frameworks through which multi-agency collaboration is realized within Kenya's national security operational environment.

MAC in Kenya's security sector is characterized by different actions and tendencies which allow different agencies to collectively address concerns therein. For one, MAC is defined by the sharing of information and intelligence used in response to potential threats. Such sharing also aids in the flow of information amongst agencies, and supports surveillance of threats in different operations, while also aiding in the development, pursuit, and assessment of strategic objectives for each agency. Secondly, MAC in Kenya also involves the development of operational capacity amongst involved services and agencies. That is, collaborative operations allow for joint training & capacity building amongst agencies, and collaborative preparedness of agencies. Further, MAC in Kenya is also characterized by the joint utilization of available resources and competencies among agencies therein. Finally, MAC within Kenya also involves coordination of interventions and collaborative pursuit of security objectives. To this end, MAC frameworks often involve the joint crafting of intervention efforts, harmonization of command structures, unification of communication flow, and the collective formulation of early stages of response.

The collaboration of multiple agencies within Kenya's security framework is guided by different formats. For one, there is the cabinet-level structure of MAC that is meant to enhance decision making on national security at the topmost level. It enables the formulation of policies, and the response to imminent threats and is domiciled in the National Security Council of Kenya. Secondly, there is the peer-to-peer format of MAC structure that is largely characterized by the heads and/or representatives of different NSOs working together, to achieve national safety and

security objectives - at times even inviting select non-NSOs. This format of MAC remains the most common and preferred structure in the Kenyan security sector. Finally, there exists the in-group approach to MAC which involves NSOs excluding non-security agencies from their joint operations, whenever need arises. This is meant to minimize possible outsider interference, as the restriction of membership is based on the sensitive nature of operations, and is useful in the harmonization of perspectives on national security realization. Further the exclusivity of cooperation amongst NSOs alone aids in the development of common operational approaches, and has been instrumental in breeding commonality of interests amongst the in-group members.

The study also established that there exist within Kenya's security landscape, a host of legal, policy and institutional frameworks that guide MAC efforts. That is, the process of cooperation and collaboration amongst multiple agencies is either predicated on legal and policy frameworks, or founded upon and advanced by different institutions. These frameworks are the result of deliberate actions geared toward operationalizing collaboration and cooperation amongst agencies within Kenya's security landscape. Among the legal guidelines that enhance the operability of MAC arrangements are the various statutes that establish NSOs. Such laws also offer a legal basis for cooperation, and consists of different formal protocols. They include: the Protocol on the Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT), 2022 that was developed by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions; the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2010 that entrenched collaborative workings of agencies tasked with the prevention of terrorism; and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA), 2010 which is a formal agreement amongst various agencies to maintain vigilance over the financial assets of criminal enterprises.

There also exist various legislations that operationalize National Security Organizations, as established under Chapter 14 of the Constitution of Kenya – 2010. The chapter defines national security in article 238 and outlines NSOs in article 239. Among the legislative frameworks

anchored in Article 238 are: the National Security Council (NSC) Act of 2012 which formalizes the establishment of cabinet-level collaboration of multiple agencies; and the National Police Services (NPS) Act of 2011 which establishes the police service and provides for its cooperative undertakings. There is also the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Act of 2012 which codifies the modus operandi of the Kenyan military, and outlines the modalities of its cooperation with other agencies; and the National Intelligence Services (NIS) Act of 2012 that establishes the intelligence agency and outlines a pathway for its collaboration with other agencies/entities in ensuring the safety and security of Kenya.

Different policy provisions also exist to guide interagency cooperation within Kenya's security and safety architecture. These include the Inter-Agency Guidelines on Cooperation and Collaboration (IAGCC) that was developed by the ODPP to provide a "...sense of urgency within the criminal justice sector..." create a long-lasting cooperative umbrella. There is also the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), a preventive policy that collates the competencies of different within Kenya's national security environment to effectively combat terrorism and violent extremism. The policy on Mutual Legal Assistance was developed to enhance the collaborative operations of multiple agencies in matters pertaining to the law.

Within Kenya's security sector also exist institutions that not only enable MAC within the republic, but also establish mechanisms of posterity for such efforts. These include scholarly institutions and policy think-tanks within the Kenyan security sector. The first of these is the National Defence University of Kenya (NDU-K), a premier scholarly institution in the realm of security. The institution is geared towards improving MAC in different ways, roping in different national security agents and actors through its constituents. Secondly, there is the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), an independent institution tasked with the coordinating the prevention and detection of terrorist threats. Finally, there is also the National Crime Research

Centre that was established to collate information on the threats Kenya's physical security, and create avenues for greater collaboration of agencies, while also aiding the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the fight against contemporary crimes. Altogether, the three institutional frameworks are integral to the achievement of MAC within the country's security atmosphere. The institutions also provide modalities for Kenya security operatives to circumvent advances in crime and criminality, and to then effectively address threats to the republic.

In all, this study established that MAC in Kenya is already a part of the modus operandi of many NSOs. The practice is rooted in different legal, policy, and institutional frameworks, and has been influenced by different factors. MAC within Kenya's national security and safety landscape is also manifested in varying manners, and structured in different ways. However, there remains the challenge of ensuring the longevity of such cooperation/collaboration efforts. As such, there emerges the problem of formulation, operationalization, and eventual maintenance of MAC setups. Such longevity of collaboration, which lacks in Kenya's security sector, would be critical in enhancing institutional memory and guiding future security undertakings within the Republic.

5.2 Recommendations

From this study, it is evident that the biggest impediment to MAC within Kenya's security landscape is competition there-amongst the security agencies. The interagency cooperation is also greatly hampered by the quick expiry of the tenure of MAC setups. That is, most MAC frameworks in Kenya tend to crumble after the fulfillment of assigned mandates. Just as much, cooperation within Kenya's national security sector is hindered by the differing organizational cultures, setups, and practices. This fact is further exacerbated by the differing capacities and skillsets within the agencies and services. The poor motivation and absence of emotional investment also impede the proper functioning of agents and officers within MAC frameworks in Kenya. Finally, poor communication and information flow also chokes MAC efforts within Kenya. Many of the

sampled respondents admit facing difficulties in receiving or passing along information within the MAC frameworks they worked. From these concerns, it is emergent that the process of crafting MAC setups should undertake the following considerations:

- i. **Reduction of competition amongst agencies operating within MAC frameworks.** Internal competition tends to slow down the progress of collaborative efforts by limiting the impetus for each agency to work with others (Badurdeen et al., 2022). The abolition of competition amongst agencies would enable the development of a long-lasting cooperative agreement that could improve the extent of agency buy-in into cooperative efforts (Ainea, 2021). This would lead to greater commitment of agencies to the overall mission of the cooperative frameworks they are engaged in. Efforts to this end may also include the pooling together of individual agency resources, a fact that would not only enhance resource availability for MAC setups thereby supporting goal achievement within such frameworks.
- ii. **Institution of Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs)** to guide the collaborative efforts of Kenya's NSOs. The SOPs would help in establishing the *modus operandi* of MAC operations within Kenya by harmonizing operational objectives (Taneja and Siyech, 2019). The SOPs would also entrench collective efforts. Thus, Kenya ought to craft clear policy guidelines on MAC, and provide modalities of interagency engagement to help the country move away from the *ad-hoc* MAC committees of the past.
- iii. **Centralization of Command** through the establishment of a single operational chain of information flow. The domiciling of operations in a central point would aid in role definition for all participants in MAC setups by establishing a common pecking order across entities involved therein (KLRC, 2022). This would allow for easier and quicker information sharing on anticipated threats; collaborative decision making in the face of such threats; and the

adequate coordination of response initiatives through full-utilization of available capabilities across all participating national security agencies.

- iv. **Organization of training and preparedness efforts** to help enhance the competence of all participants in MAC setups. Development of operational readiness and capacity within MAC frameworks would improve the uniformity of capabilities among participant agencies. That is, training and capacity development would help ensure uniform mission-readiness among agents and officers from the security agencies and services involved in MAC workings within Kenya. Efforts to such end would therefore include the participation of team leaders and supervisors in leadership seminars to enhance their operational leadership abilities. Overall, the conduct of joint trainings and exercises would improve the mission-readiness and capability of Kenya's MAC frameworks.

To aid the achievement of the aforementioned objectives, the study lobbies for the establishment of a Multi-Agency Steering Committee (MASC) to be domiciled under the NSC. This would make it easier for any agency/NSO to tap into the competencies of MAC setups within Kenya. The MASC would comprise of Senior Liaison Officers drawn from the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Police Service, The National Treasury, The National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Immigration, AG's Chambers and the Executive Office of the President. Liaison officers from other services of the disciplined forces could be co-opted into the committee, as and when need arises. Effectively, the creation of the MASC would herald a permanent modality of cooperation amongst NSOs within Kenya. Permanence of cooperation, as would be guaranteed by the committee, would go a long way in institutionalizing collaboration amongst participant agencies (Phillips, 2021). Additionally, the establishment of such a permanent committee would aid in the development of institutional memory. The proposed Multi-Agency Steering Committee (MASC), being under the auspices of the NSC (as detailed in Fig. 4.1 below),

would be funded from the Office of the President. This would enhance the collective operations of national security agencies. The committee would also have the leeway of co-opting experts from diverse fields whenever the need arises. This would be useful in hastening responses to emergent threats within Kenya's security landscape.




Figure 5-1. An Organogram of the NSC – detailing the proposed establishment of a MASC

Considering the absence of a unitary framework within the Kenyan security landscape to guide the collaborative operations of state and non-state actors in pursuing national safety and security goals, it would be best to adopt a novel approach to collaborative working amongst multiple security agencies within the country. This study therefore proposes the adoption of the BOIT model, an approach to MAC which involves the blending of outsider insights and techniques into team efforts. The model calls for the involvement of different levels of government (at the county, regional, and finally national levels), consulting with experts within the local populace, and inclusion of community civil/society leaders in a bid to ensure better outcomes for security

undertakings. Thus, the model would rope in the participation of both government and non-governmental agencies, working together to enhance safety and security outcomes for the republic. The cooperative operations of NSOs and non- NSOs within Kenya have effectively addressed such safety and security concerns as large-scale or widespread disasters in the past. Past instances of application in Kenya include the 2013 Westgate Terror Attacks, the 2015 Garissa University Attacks, and the 2017 Dusit-D2 Terrorist Attacks (Lusiola, 2021). Further application of this collaborative model was in response to widespread adverse occurrences such as the flooding in 2020 that affected more than 29 counties in different parts of Kenya (Jones, 2020). Evidently, this perspective of MAC offers a collective framework that infuses the unique competencies and capabilities of both NSOs and non-NSOs. However, the collective efforts of such multiple-agency frameworks tend to lapse with the completion of mission objectives. Herein lies the chance at a more-permanent, better-working solution to MAC in Kenya, hence the BOIT model - as would be applicable in the operations of the proposed MASC.

Blending of outsider insights and techniques into security operations involves the infusion of multiple agencies in safety and security operations. The nature of present-day safety and security threats calls for the rethinking of response efforts from a wider angle than ever before (Kitts, 2022). The BOIT model would enhance interagency collaboration in Kenya by expanding the width of perspectives within MAC frameworks. For instance, it would allow MAC teams to incorporate traditionally non-security perspectives including:

- **Psychological Approaches** to security which would infuse perspectives on how people think and behave, and would be crucial in the pursuit of offenders. The approaches would also aid in the preemption and prevention of crime within Kenya.
- **Social Work and Religious Education.** As part of its reach, the BOIT model of MAC working would also allow security operatives in Kenya to win over the hearts and

minds of communities in an attempt to dissipate threats to the Republic. Instances of such approach have been used in CVE efforts before in different parts of Kenya to implement preventive efforts within grassroots communities.

- **Forensic Accounting.** Some of the most potent threats to Kenya's safety and security are enabled by the illicit flow of money within the global financial system. In order to intercept such threat effectively, MAC setups would need the right expertise (Botha, 2020). The inclusion of forensic accounting competence within MAC setups, as championed by the BOIT model, would thus help in preventing money laundering and terrorism financing.

Taking into account the skill/expertise gaps, and the resource constraints facing the operations of many security sector agencies and services, the BOIT model would enhance resource utilization. In championing the whole-of-government approach (WoGA) to security management, the BOIT model would incorporate the workings of both NSOs and non-NSOs within government, into the pursuit of national safety and security (Franke, 2022). In this way, the model would place at the disposal of MAC teams, varying expertise in the operations of government; a fact that would ensure greater efficiency in the utilization of public resources. Further, by championing WoGA, the model would root MAC efforts in government bureaucracy, thereby enhancing the permanence of cooperative efforts. In this manner, the model would ensure longer-lasting operational frameworks, thereby realizing the perpetuity of collective operations, and the creation of institutional memory to aid similar future pursuits. Summarily, the BOIT model would enhance operational effectiveness and outcomes of MAC frameworks within Kenya's vast and dynamic security landscape

Finally, the BOIT Model would also improve the Tactical Resourcefulness Under Stress (TARUS) among participating agencies and services. That is, the model would allow for the

creation of frameworks under which security agencies and services can collectively craft, practice, and perfect different tactics and strategies of operation. For example, unconventional or asymmetric warfare - such as that against terrorism, requires operations in small amorphous teams or units. The blending of outsider insights and techniques into team operations as would be enabled by the creation of the proposed MASC would enhance the possibility of successful outcomes. The model, by widening security and safety perspectives, would enable agents and officers within the collective frameworks to craft ingenious ways of overcoming problems. Such would enhance the resourcefulness of operatives within Kenya's security landscape, allowing them to apply both hard skills - like combat-readiness, and soft skills - like negotiation and persuasion.

Already, the BOIT model has been used in the Kenya's security sector, though its guiding frameworks are yet to be reduced into a single approach. Going forward, it will be necessary for Kenya's national security and safety chiefs to spearhead the development a unitary framework for improving future engagements. The most effective format to such end would involve the cooperative and collaborative workings of both NSOs and non-NSOs in government, along with the general populace in a bid to improve operational outcomes. This study therefore proposes the regularization and codification of the BOIT model of MAC into security and safety undertakings within the Republic. The cooperative expenditure of effort and resources both within and outside the control of NSOs, as advanced under the model, would be instrumental in improving the probability of success - particularly on preemptive and preventive national security operations. In essence, for Kenya to achieve its safety and security goals, the research proposes the development of the BOIT model as an approach to enhancing multi-agency cooperation/collaboration, as to be realized through the operations of the proposed MASC. The recommendations are proposed to be actualized in a MAC concept spearheaded by the HoPS and thereafter be handed over to the MASC once set up.

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Appendix I: Research Questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INFLUENCE OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION ON KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

I am a Masters of National Security and Strategy student at the National Defence University, carrying out a research study on **“INFLUENCE OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION ON KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY, 2002 - 2022 ”**

As an important facilitator, I request for your assistance by way of inputting responses to the questions raised in this questionnaire. The information that you will provide will be kept in strict confidence and utilized for academic purposes only. You have the option not to indicate your names. Thank you.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

- 1. Full Name (optional)
- 2. Gender: Male ().....Female ()....
- 3. Age: 20 - 30 () 31 - 40 () 41 – 50 () 51- 60 ()
- 4. Which security agency/department do you work for?

KDF.....

NIS.....

NPS.....

DEPT.....

Others.....

5. Have you ever worked with professionals from other security and allied agencies during Multi-Agency Cooperation/Operations? Yes () No ()

6. If your answer to Q5 is Yes, which one(s)...

.....
.....

SECTION B: DETERMINANTS OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION IN KENYA

7. What reasons would you say made your agency/organization/department seek the support of the other security and allied agencies

.....

8. How did working with other agencies/organizations/departments help achieve your operational objectives?

SECTION C: THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION IN KENYA

9. Which of the following structures would you say your previous engagements with other agencies/organizations/institutions has ever adopted? Please tick where appropriate.

() Cabinet Level (Coordinated by a CS/Minister or Ministry/Cabinet officer.

() Peer-to-Peer (as in the case with heads of departments consulting or sharing intelligence or resources.

() In-group-Approach (Involving only state agencies within the country's security network.

10. Apart from structure in question 9, which any other structures would you say your previous engagements with other agencies/organizations/institutions adopted?

.....

11. How would you rank the type that your previous engagement with other security agencies took? Please tick where appropriate.

a. **Capacity Building (through Training, Drills)**

() Strongly Agree

() Agree

() Neutral

() Disagree

() Strongly Disagree

b. **Intelligence sharing**

() Strongly Agree

() Agree

() Neutral

() Disagree

() Strongly Disagree

c. **Resources Sharing**

- () Strongly Agree
- () Agree
- () Neutral
- () Disagree
- () Strongly Disagree

d. **Coordinated Interventions and responses (Command unification, goal creation and pursuit)**

- () Strongly Agree
- () Agree
- () Neutral
- () Disagree
- () Strongly Disagree

SECTION D: FRAMEWORKS OF MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATION IN KENYA

12. Did you face any difficulties in the process of operating with other agencies?

Yes () No ()

13. If your answer to question 12 is YES, what were the possible reasons for the difficulties?

.....
.....

14. Did you achieve the mission/objectives set for the multiagency collaboration effort?

Yes () No ()

15. If your response to question 14 above is YES or NO, what factors do you believe were most helpful in your effort to attain those goals?

.....

16. Did you encounter any of legal, policy and institutional framework challenges while undertaking multiagency cooperation?

17. If your response to question 16 above is YES, what were the notable challenges faced and what possible mitigation measures do you suggest.

18. What in your view can be done to help agencies/organizations/depts such as the one you work with achieve their mission/operational objectives more effectively and efficiently when working in a multiagency cooperation/collaboration setting in the future?

.....
.....

19. Is there anything else that you think can help in ensuring Multi-agency Cooperation function seamlessly?

.....
.....
Thank you so much for your participation. Much appreciated.

Appendix II: NDC Introduction Letter

RESTRICTED

Telephone: 254-2-3884036
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E-Mail: info@ndc.go.ke



National Defence College
71 Warai North Road
P.O Box 24381-00502
Karen – Nairobi

Ref: NDC/A/141

09 November 2022

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

FACILITATION FOR MR. CHRISTOPHER TARUS BOIT ADMN No. ND601/0009/2022

The above Senior Officer is a course participant at the National Defence College and has been admitted for Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategy, under the National Defence University- Kenya Programme.

As part of academic requirements, Mr. Christopher Tarus Boit is required to undertake a research project in partial fulfillment of MA degree programme he is enrolled in. Her approved research topic is " Influence of Multi-Agency Cooperation on Kenya's National Security, 2002-2022 ".

The purpose of this letter is to kindly request your office to facilitate the Officer as he conducts her research project.

Submitted for your kind consideration and facilitation.



Mr FM MABEYA

Head of Programme
for Commandant

CHRISTOPHER TARUS BOIT

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