

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY-KENYA



NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA SECURITY

LANDSCAPE: A CASE OF KENYA BETWEEN 2002 AND 2022

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AWARD OF DEGREE OF MASTER IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY,
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JULY 2023

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research study is my original work and has not been presented to any university for academic award.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research study to my lovely wife and children, for their love, support and understanding, which was a source of great motivation and inspiration throughout the course of this study.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank God for blessing me with good health and strength to undertake this study. I wish to also register my deepest gratitude to the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces and the Commander Kenya Army for nominating me to attend this prestigious course. In a very special way I wish to, most sincerely, thank the Commandant, Faculty and the Staff of the National Defence College - Kenya (NDC-K), for their support and for providing a conducive environment to conduct this study. Additionally, I acknowledge and appreciate the unwavering support and valuable guidance from my supervisor, Col (Dr) Charles O. Imbiakha, whose wide experience was very instrumental to the topic selection, conduct and completion of this study. Many thanks also go to my Research Assistant, Ms Ann G. Kimaita, whose tireless efforts and dedication in secondary data collection was critical in the conduct of this study. Finally, and with much gratitude, I appreciate my colleagues in KDF, the respondents from the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Affairs, and the Chinese Embassy personnel, for their willingness to participate in this study. Their input was vital to the successful completion of this project.

ABSTRACT

China is lauded for the exponential growth it has achieved over the last four decades. For this reason, it gained the status of a global superpower and gradually it is emerging as a global security actor, a position long-held by the USA. For many years, it has been a bilateral partner to many African nations, particularly in trade and investment. China has an influence on the security landscape of the Greater Horn of Africa. This is a region of geostrategic importance, but it faces multiple security challenges that threaten its stability and that of the wider African continent. To determine whether China should take up greater security role of this region, this study undertook to establish the influence China has on the security landscape of this region. Generally, this research investigated China's influence on the Greater Horn of Africa security landscape using the case study of Kenya from 2002 and 2022. Specifically, the study assessed: reasons for China's interests in the Greater Horn of Africa security; China's interests and their influence on the Kenya-China security relations from 2002-2022; and challenges and opportunities that exist for greater Kenya-China cooperation on security. The study was guided by Realism and Constructivism theories. A case study design was utilized and relevant data collected. Analysis was conducted on both the secondary and primary data from questionnaires and interview guide. It was established that China wants to play a bigger role in the security of the Greater Horn of Africa because of its interest in the region's natural resources. These include the oil and gas resources. It was also determined that China wants to safeguard its present and prospective investments and trading engagements in the Greater Horn of Africa. China however is not seeking to exert dominance in the region but to establish a win-win situation with its partners in the region. The study also found out that China's impact in the military and economic security of Kenya between 2000 and 2022 was significant. Several challenges were also identified from this relationship including persistent balance of trade deficit, adverse impact of Chinese goods on Kenya's manufacturing sector, and the competition posed by Chinese SMEs against the Kenyan-owned SMEs. These can be overcome using systemic solutions. The study also established that China offers diverse opportunities that Kenya could exploit to enhance its military and economic security. These included opportunities for increased trade, technology transfer, greater security cooperation, and tourism. Overall, China's influence on Kenya's security landscape is vividly clear through the trading relations between the two nations, China FDI inflows in Kenya, supplies of Chinese military hardware, provision of training opportunities to Kenya's military, and military exchanges between the two states.

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Horn of Africa- This is the eastmost region of African whose land formation resembles a horn. The countries in this region includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.

Greater Horn of Africa- Is the broader definition of the Horn of Africa that is comprised of eight countries; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.

Security-The state of being militarily and economically secure.

Influence- It is the ability or capacity to affect something or someone.

Look East Policy- It is the effort by the government to cultivate strategic and extensive relations with China.

Boda boda- Motorcycle commonly used as a mode of transport across Kenya.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
B3W	Build Back Better World
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
ETRI	Economic and Technology Research Institute
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EXIM	Export-Import
FDI	Foreign Direct investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICT	Information, Communication and Technology
ICC	International Criminal Court
JKIA	Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KPS	Kenya Police Service
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRC	People's Republic of China
RCA	Relative Competitive Advantage
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
ZTE	Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

In the book, *People, States, and Fear*, by Barry Buzan, he provides a holistic approach to security to encompass political, military, economic, societal and environmental sectors of security.¹ The United Nations (UN) has also acquired a broader dimension to the concept of security that goes beyond military protection to include economic, food, personal, environmental, health, community, and political security areas.² China has responded to this expanded security perspective in many ways. The economy of China has been growing exponentially over the last four decades. According to the World Bank, its gross domestic product (GDP) growth since 1978 has averaged over 9% per year. It is because of this exponential growth that it gained the global superpower status.³ After many decades of international restraint, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has aggressively expanded presence as a global security actor, and now claims a major share in designing the global security order of the 21st threatening the sole role of the United States (US).

The US attained the super power status when the Soviet Union dissolved. Over the years, because of this status, it has influenced the security environment of various regions including the Middle East. The US has been this region's dominant outside super power majorly because of the region's significance in the oil market. For decades, the US has been supporting its partners and allies in the Middle East. It has also spent huge amounts of resources in loans and grants to the region, and it being one of the heavily armed regions, Middle East

¹ Stone, M. *Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis*. New York: Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, 2009. http://geest.msh-paris.fr/IMG/pdf/Security_for_Buzan.mp3.pdf.

² Osisanya, Segun. "National Security Versus Global Security." United Nations. n.d. <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/national-security-versus-global-security>.

³ World Bank. "Overview." World Bank. Last modified September 29, 2022. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.

has been a large market for US military equipment. Statistics show that between 2000 and 2019, 45% of all its arms imports were from the US. The US has also carried out military operations in the region, such as the Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Operation Enduring Freedom, which was meant to exterminate the al Qaeda terrorist networks. Additionally, it has established military bases in the region with thousands of soldiers who continue to support the local security forces against insurgencies.

The US recognizes China's growing influence across the world both economically and militarily. The US rallied the G7 members and urged them to organize an alternative to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which so far has spread to Latin America, Africa, and Europe itself. The partners agreed to launch Build Back Better World (B3W) as an initiative for supporting infrastructure development across the world, especially in low-income countries. This shows that the global power dynamics have entered a new era. The perceived rivalry between China and US is an indication that the two states are in competition for global influence, power and wealth. Each side aims to maximize the position it occupies in the world order, drawing support and alignment from across the globe.

Challenging China rising influence is central to US foreign policy of building up democracies, to counter the spread of China's authoritarianism. Also, to salvage its waning influence in Africa, the Biden's administration revealed a strategy focused on increased economic cooperation with Africa. Biden's Africa strategy is expecting to make a paradigm shift from Trump's administration relations with Africa. It has also criticized China's mercantilist approach and announced that instead, its strategy to this continent will be built on delivering democratic dividends, fostering openness, supporting climate adaptation and advancing economic opportunity.

China is now in a position where it has begun to shake and shape the course of global

security affairs. Globally, China has expanded relations to Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, among other regions. Its relations in Europe have become more relevant. Economic issues dominate China's engagements in Europe, through which avenues for security cooperation have emerged. Central Asia is also a core element in China's security strategy. China has been growing the security presence in the region as a partner in development, trade, and military exercises. Military engagement has also become an important element in China's involvement with Latin America and the Caribbean. China's Defence Strategy White Paper of 2015 defines security and military activities as the core aspects of its engagements. The White Paper outlines China's military strategies, and one of them is to enhance security cooperation by developing military-military relations, and to further exchanges and cooperation with other states' militaries.

PRC's economic operations in Latin America, are far much greater than the military activities in terms of the attention given through government officials interactions. China has shown that it is seeking to forge stronger military ties with Latin American countries through development of training programmes, military exchanges, and arms sale. Venezuela is one of the top buyers of China's military hardware. Weapons sold to this country between 2009 and 2019 were worth over USD\$ 615 million.⁴ Ecuador and Bolivia have also purchased military equipment from China worth millions of dollars. They have acquired assault rifles, military aircrafts, air defence raiders, and ground vehicles.

China has deepened its economic and strategic engagements in Africa as well, especially in the Greater Horn of Africa. It has made significant investments in African economies, which has allowed it to compete for influence in the continent against Western actors, like the United States, which for many years has retained African security roles. The Greater Horn of Africa, which includes, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South

⁴ Roy, Diana. "China's Growing Influence in Latin America." CFR, April 6, 2022.

Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda is of great strategic importance on the global stage mainly because of its proximity to Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is the strait that connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea as shown by Figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1. Map of the Greater Horn of African Depicting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Source: PLP.org (2016)

The narrow strait as shown by the Figure 1.1 separates the Greater Horn of Africa region and the Arabian Peninsula. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a critical chokepoint for global oil

trade.⁵ Approximately 21,000 super tankers from nations in the Arabian Gulf cross the strait every year. In 2017, the amount of oil transported through this strait accounted for about 9 percent of all transoceanic oil.⁶ US Energy Information Administration reported that every day about 3.6 million barrels of oil head to the US and Europe and 2.6 million barrels to India, China, and Singapore. In 2018, about 6 million barrels of refined and crude oil flowed through this area daily toward US, Europe, and Asia.

China is one of the countries that have actively pursued interests in the region. Its role in the Greater Horn of Africa security is clearly expanding, evident through its contribution in the peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, establishment of the military base in Djibouti, development aid to the Greater Horn of Africa countries, and trade engagements. Given the significance of the region, it is not surprising that Kenya-China relations have grown within the last two decades. Therefore, this study takes on a broad scope of security in exploring how China has influenced the region's security landscape.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Greater Horn of Africa is of geo-strategic importance with its abundance in natural resources. For these reasons, there is a lot of concern about China's meteoric rise as a key partner to many nations in the region. It is apparent that China has transformed its non-involvement strategy to incremental engagement in peace and security affairs of its African partners. During the China-Horn of African Conference on Security, Governance and Development that took place in Addis Ababa in June, 2022, China expressed its resolve to continue helping the Greater Horn of Africa nations to achieve security and development.⁷

⁵ Alexandre, António G. "The Strait of Bab El-Mandeb: stage of geopolitical disputes." *JANUS NET e-journal of International Relation* 12, no. 2 (2021). doi:10.26619/1647-7251.12.2.5.

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. "China Commits to Peace Mediation in Horn of Africa." Last modified June 2022.

China is seeking an even greater role in African security. So far China is the region's major bilateral trading partner, investor and lender. For instance, exports from South Sudan to China in 2020 was \$766 million. The military base in Djibouti is also an indication of growing military engagement in the region. The influence China has had so far on the security of the region should inform the Greater Horn of Africa states' response to China's desire to play an even bigger role on this region's matters of security. With the increasing presence of China in the Horn of Africa, one wonders the attraction it has, and if this presence poses any challenges or provides opportunities.

Therefore, this study was conceived to investigate China's influence in the Greater Horn of Africa, with Kenya's security landscape between 2002 and 2022 being the main focus. Specifically, the study focused on evaluating China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa, analysed how these interests influenced Kenya-China security relations between 2002 and 2022, and lastly assessed the challenges and also discussed the opportunities Kenya could exploit in the engagement between the two states.

1.3 Research Questions

- i. What are the reasons for China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa's security?
- ii. How has China's interests influenced Kenya-China security relations from 2002-2022?
- iii. What challenges and opportunities exist in greater Kenya-China cooperation on security?

1.4 Study Objective

This part of the study presents the general and specific objectives which inform the basis of the study.

1.4.1 General Objective

The general objective was to evaluate China's influence on the Greater Horn of African security landscape, with specific reference to Kenya between 2002 and 2022.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

This research was guided by the following objectives:

- i. Evaluate the reasons for China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa's security.
- ii. Analyse how China's interests influenced Kenya-China Security relations from 2002-2022.
- iii. Assess the challenges and opportunities that exist for greater Kenya-China cooperation on security.

1.5 Literature Review

This is a critical section of the study that reviews relevant literature in line with the three objectives namely: To evaluate reasons for China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa's security; analyse how China's interests have influenced Kenya-China security relations from 2002-2022; assess the challenges and opportunities that exist for greater Kenya-China cooperation.

1.5.1 Reasons for China's Interest in the Greater Horn of Africa's Security

According to Large, China was once a non-interventionist in its economic pursuits, but today peace is a core feature in its involvement in the Greater Horn of Africa, and its engagements in this region's peace and security has become a focus of the policy makers in Beijing.⁸ The phenomena of powerful countries showing interest in the security of less

⁸ Large, D. (2008). *China's role in the mediation and resolution of conflict in Africa*. The OSLO forum Network of Mediators.

powerful states is observed across the globe. For instance, Russia has been greatly interested in the security environment of South Caucasus. South Caucasus is a region between the Caspian Sea and Black Sea and is comprised of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Russia's policy to this region has seen it devote treasure of generations to it. It has also intruded on South Caucasus security in various ways. Russia's interest is an example reflective of China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa.

According to Remler, Russia's power moves in South Caucasus was meant to reassert its dominance and influence in the region.⁹ Its power had webbed significantly after the Soviet era ended, and its position as a decisive force in the region was threatened. It has been keen to ensure that the post-Soviet republics remain in its camp by forming multinational institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).¹⁰ CSTO is comprised of Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Georgia and Azerbaijan did not join. These integration initiatives are being used by Russia to signify its dominance over the post-Soviet republics. Its closest relation in South Caucasus is with Armenia. It has established a military base in this country, which has served to enhance its prominence in this country against the threat of Turkey, which is seeking to undermine its dominance in the region. Russia also wants to prevent the US and Europe's influence in the region. It was interesting to understand how such influence plays out in the Greater Horn of Africa.

It is also heavily invested in the security of the region because of South Caucasus capacity to influence the security of the Russian Federation both militarily and in term of economic security. German expresses that the South Caucasus is critical to Russia's national

⁹ Remler, Philip. "Russia's Stony Path in the South Caucasus." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Last modified October 20, 2020..

¹⁰ German, Tracey. "Russia and the South Caucasus: The China Challenge." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2022, 1-20. doi:10.1080/09668136.2022.2071843.

security.¹¹ This is because the security issues that arise in this region have an impact on the national security of Russia. Sushentsov and Neklyudov describe South Caucasus as an archaic periphery with several unresolved conflicts.¹² Therefore, Moscow interests in the security of this region is to ensure its own stability and security. It also benefits economically considering that several Russian public and private enterprises in the energy and mobile telephone communication have established locations in South Caucasus. Russian oil companies have made huge investments in this region, especially in Armenia and Georgia. Natural gas is the bedrock of Armenian economy, and Russia is its principal supplier. The issue of investments and protection of economic interests was a factor in the Greater Horn of Africa.

For the longest time, security of the Middle East region has been of great interest to the US. After the Cold War, the US started expanding its security to this region, but its involvement intensified after the 9/11 attacks. Suri and Benjamin posit that the reason for US involvement in the security of the Middle East can be broken down into promotion of democratization, fighting terrorism, prevention of nuclear proliferation, and ensuring the flow of oil.¹³ Oil is the most important interest that the US has in the Middle East. The countries in the Persian Gulf produce more oil than they can consume, and the US is one of the recipients of this oil. The stability or instability of this region affects the ability to meet the energy needs, not only for the US, but also for the world. Discovery of oil and other minerals has therefore remained a key factor of interest in the Greater Horn of Africa.

The US acknowledges that stability of the oil price is also of importance. A hostile environment can create very disruptive effects in the oil market, such as price spikes.¹⁴ The US

¹¹ German. "Russia and the South Caucasus."

¹² Sushentsov, Neklyudov, and Andrey. "The Caucasus in Russian foreign policy strategy." *Caucasus Survey* 8, no. 2 (2020), 127-141. doi:10.1080/23761199.2020.1759888.

¹³ Suri, Jeremi, and Valentino. *Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹⁴ Suri and Benjamin. "Valentino. *Sustainable Security*."

has also highly invested in the security of this region to counter terrorist groups and curb spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Preventing nuclear weapons in the Middle East is a means of preventing any state in this region from gunning more power than the US, which in turn would put its interests in oil at risk.¹⁵ Also, if more countries access nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of accident and war, which would threaten US national security. China has also been involved in counter terrorism efforts in countries such as India. For instance, in 2016, China donated fast boats, small arms, and other equipment worth over USD\$ 14 million to help India in the fight against terrorism.¹⁶ Whether this kind of involvement in the Horn of Africa was the case was a matter of investigation in this study.

1.5.2 China's Interests Influence on Kenya-China Security Relations from 2002 to 2022

Central Asia, has for the longest time been China's region of interest. The Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan presented an opportunity for China to widen its market for its export. The other reason for its interest in this region is because insecurity and instability in Central Asia can easily spill over to its land. Its economic engagements with Central Asian states have borne positive benefits. It has helped to boost the economic security of this region.

According to Melnikovova, China is the largest trading partner in Central Asia, particularly with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.¹⁷ For instance, it is Turkmenistan's largest buyer of natural gas, which means that China is a big source of revenue for this country. China's trading engagements with Kyrgyzstan have also skyrocketed in recent years. Their trade volumes in 2019 were at US\$6.37 billion. Kyrgyzstan exports to China include mineral oil, mineral fuels, rawhide and leather, ore, fruit, wool and other animal hair.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Reuters. "China offers \$14 million arms package to the Philippines: Manila's defense minister." Last modified December 20, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china-arms-idUSKBN1490HN>.

¹⁷ Melnikovová. "China's interests in Central Asian economies."

The issue of trade is also a factor in the relations between China and the Greater Horn of Africa countries.

The economic security benefits enjoyed by Central Asian states because of their relations with China also comes in the form of infrastructure developments. According to Mariani, today, a substantial network of oil and gas pipelines, railways, roads, air flights and communication connects Central Asia to China.¹⁸ China's BRI has been instrumental in building the Central Asia-China relations. The infrastructure developments have aided the bilateral trade relations between the Central Asian states and China. China has also made large-scale investment in Asia, and these investments are in form of foreign direct investment (FDI) in energy, transport, and commodity producing industries. Other investment are in form of loans. China's FDIs, especially in terms of infrastructure development in the Greater Horn of Africa, was also a key area of interest in this study.

PRC's interest in Central Asia has also led to its involvement in this region's national security. As earlier mentioned, one of the reasons for its interest in this region is because the security instability in Central Asia poses a threat to security in China. Therefore, the promotion of national security is a key element in China relations with Central Asia. According to Yua, China engages in the security matters of this region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which operates as a multilateral security initiative.¹⁹ China participates in discussions on the resolution of border issues and through SCO, its military exercises in this region have increased. China collaborates with Russia when conducting the peace missions in Central Asia. So far, it has also participated in several bilateral and multilateral anti-terror exercises within Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.²⁰ Beyond SCO, in 2020, China and

¹⁸ Mariani, Bernado. *China's role and interests in Central Asia*. Saferworld, 2013.

¹⁹ Yau, Niva. *China's Security Management Towards Central Asia*. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022.

²⁰ Niva. "China's Security Management."

Central Asia established China+Central Asia Foreign Mechanism, a multilateral initiative that allow greater cooperation between PRC and the Central Asian states in matters security and politics, without involving Russia. As a rising military ally to Central Asia, China has also been supplying the region with weapons. According to Standish, the volume of weapon sales to Central Asia has been increasing steadily over the years. In 2010, China's weapon sales to Central Asia accounted for only 1.5 percent of the total weapons received in the region and in 2014 it had increased to 18 percent.²¹ The weapons supplied range from arms, high-tech hardware, to transport vehicles. China's involvement in weapons sale in the Horn of Africa was a matter of concern of this study.

Since the West African countries gained independence in the early 1960s, for many of them, their relation with China has deepened over the years. Several West African countries benefit from PRC economically in form of FDI, trade, and development loans. Initially, China's objective in this region was purely economic as its relations with the countries in this region were driven by the need for their natural resources. West Africa is China's geostrategic location in terms of access to rare earth minerals, oil, and fish. These interests have also led to China's involvement in military security of this region. Peace and stability are paramount for China to achieve its interests in West Africa, and that is why in recent years, it has been involved in security matters in Ghana.²²

According to Asante, China has invested in Ghana's security by building offices and other essential facilities for security agencies and providing security equipment.²³ The equipment it has sold to Ghana's military are expected to enhance its military's capacity to

²¹ Niva. "China's Security Management."

²² Asante, Richard. "China's Security and Economic Engagement in West Africa: Constructive or Destructive?" *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 03, no. 04 (2017), 575-596. doi:10.1142/s2377740017500257.

²³ Asante. "China's Security and Economic Engagement in West Africa."

engage in peacekeeping efforts. It has invested in residential accommodation in effort to provide the security force with better living conditions, which in turn will enhance their service to the nation. Further, the two nations have been collaborating to enhance Ghana's maritime security. These two countries are also engaged in discussions on how China can support this country's counter terrorism operations.²⁴ Such interests would be of interest in the Greater Horn of Africa, which was the concern of this study.

1.5.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Greater Kenya-China Cooperation on Security

The deepening relations between Africa and China are not without their risks. China's goal is to become Africa's largest trading partner. Its effort of building trade relations with African countries saw the African exports to China reach a record high of \$106 billion in 2021. Although the growth in trade volumes enhances the economic security of African states, Regissahui points out that there is need to diversify the market for exports. He expresses that it is important for the African states that are highly dependent on the Chinese exports to diversify and avoid the possible negative effects if the demand declines.²⁵ A perfect example is Angola, an African country whose 60.6 percent of exports in 2020 were to China. Countries reaching over 50 percent of their exports should consider diversification through intra-African trade. Whether this is the case with the Horn of Africa countries, and more so Kenya, was an issue of great concern.

The asymmetries of the Africa-China trade relationship are issues of concern. Although Beijing has been emphasizing of mutually beneficial trading relations in Africa, the relationship is characterised by serious imbalances of trade that might affect the long-term development goals of African countries. The composition of African exports against Chinese imports is a

²⁴ Asante. "China's Security and Economic Engagement in West Africa."

²⁵ Regissahui, M. "Overview on the China-Africa Trade Relationship." *Open Journal of Social Sciences* 7, no. 7 (2019). DOI: 10.4236/jss.2019.77032.

cause for trade deficit. This is because African states export raw materials or unprocessed agriculture products and natural resources to China, and then import cheap finished goods from China. Ibrahim, Sari, and Handoyo confirmed this through their study, which determined that Nigeria is one of the African states whose trade imbalance with China has gotten worse each year.²⁶ For several decades now, its exports to China have been trailing behind goods imported from China. The issue of imbalance in trade in the Greater Horn of Africa was a subject of investigation in this study.

Yeebo expressed that the Chinese imports are a significant threat to the textile industry in Africa.²⁷ For example, in Ghana, wax-printed fabrics have been a source of national pride for many decades, but because of the increased Chinese imports, Ghana's textile industry has collapsed. An industry that three decades ago employed over 30,000 workers can only sustain 3,000 employees today. Yeebo explains that this has happened because 60% of all the textiles sold in Ghana are imports from China.²⁸ Additionally, the imported fabrics are considered "fakes" compared to those that are produced locally because of their visibly lower quality. They are also cheaper than the authentic products. Therefore, the impact of China imports on the local manufacturing sector was a subject of interest in this study.

Akahara says that, "African countries have the agency to use relations with China to their own advantage."²⁹ As the East and West struggle for world dominance, the Horn of Africa is at the centre of this whirlwind war for supremacy. There has been concerns about China's neo-colonial interests, where the African countries sell their natural resources cheaply.

²⁶ Ibrahim, Kabiru H., Dyah W. Sari, and Rossanto D. Handoyo. "Nigeria-China Bilateral Trade Relations: Is There Market Opportunities in China?" *Intermestic: Journal of International Studies* 4, no. 2 (2020), 139. doi:10.24198/intermestic.v4n2.3.

²⁷ Yeebo, Y. "Chinese counterfeits leave Ghanaian textiles hanging by a thread." *The Christian Science Monitor*. Last modified May 31, 2015.

²⁸ Yeebo, Y. "Chinese counterfeits leave Ghanaian textiles hanging by a thread."

²⁹ Akahara, Ndidi. "African Opportunities in China-Africa Relations." *The Diplomat*, February 11, 2022. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/african-opportunities-in-china-africa-relations/>.

However, these relations are different from colonial era, considering that the Horn of Africa countries are not being coerced and China has also taken interests in countries like Kenya and Ethiopia that have no raw materials to offer.³⁰ It can be argued that projects in these countries are geared towards trade with China. These circumstances have created an opportunity for the Greater Horn of Africa leaders to put the socio-economic needs of the people first. Effective development strategies are critical to ensuring all countries in this region of Africa benefit from the new international order. The leaders have to make firm and forward decisions to enhance both military and economic security.

Djibouti is one of the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa that has the potential to benefit from China militarily. China's military facilities in this country could help to support various security operations in this country. According Downs, Erica, & DeGategno, China can support counterterrorism, intelligence collection, and protection of strategic sea-lanes of operations in Djibouti.³¹ In 2015, China passed a law that allows its armed police force to carry out counterterrorism operations abroad. If it introduces counterterrorism operations in Djibouti, it will not be for the benefit of the people of this country alone, but it will also assure security to the Chinese citizens who are in the Greater Horn of Africa countries like Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. Also, given the proximity of the countries, China's counterterrorism operations would also enhance the stability of the region, which is necessary for its present and future ventures.³² There is also another opportunity for intelligence collection operations by China in Djibouti. Chinese military presence in Djibouti could help in intelligence collection on other African countries and its partners in the West. The Chinese military force in Djibouti could also help in peace operations in the region.

³⁰ Ndid. "African Opportunities in China-Africa Relations."

³¹ Downs, Erica, and DeGategno. "China's Military Support Facility in Djibouti."

³² Ibid

The massive demand for resources in China is a great opportunity for sustained economic growth in the Greater Horn of Africa countries. Madavo explains that securing natural resources is one of China's priorities in Africa.³³ The Greater Horn of Africa is richly endowed with petroleum, natural gas, gold, huge fish stocks, and high agricultural potential. China's quest for these resources brings clear opportunities the region can exploit. It has presented itself as an alternative to West, but its lack of conditionality on matters of trade, compared to Western countries, makes it an attractive and formidable trading partner for the Greater Horn of Africa countries. It is offering real economic benefits and can fill the void in investment and trade, which are critical for economic security. The growing demand for raw materials and energy resources in China is an opportunity for the region to increase its export trade to the region. This will create many benefits for each party.

Gathii mentions that while countries with minerals and oil, such as Djibouti and Sudan are benefiting economically from selling these resources to China, this resources-induced growth is usually not shared equitably because of governance issues.³⁴ Further commodity booms are temporary, and that is why China has restrictions on the export of its own rare earth minerals. The Horn of Africa Countries have been missing out on the opportunity for sustained growth through science, technology, and engineering capabilities transfers from China. China's involvement in this region gives an opportunity to the countries to advance technologically. China's support can enhance the innovative capacity of local industries. They should take advantage of China's resource needs to accumulate domestic technological capabilities.

Technology transfers from China could go beyond road construction and manufacturing sectors, to ports and dams building, information, communication, and

³³ Callisto. "China and Africa: Opportunities"

³⁴ Elu, Juliet U., and Gregory N. Price. "Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing Technology to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms*." *African Development Review* 22 (2010), 587-598. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8268.2010.00260x.

technology, agriculture, and biotechnology. There is overwhelming evidence that the advanced equipment that have been the base of China's investments in the Greater Horn of Africa have remained with China. One of these is the railway projects in the region that have not led to the development of a heavy equipment manufacturing for the region to meet transport requirements locally in the future.³⁵ However, it should be noted that Greater Horn of Africa states have to achieve a certain threshold in terms of local technological capabilities, skills attainment, and viable industrial development before they can capture the socio-economic benefits of technological transfers from China.³⁶

According to Bavier, African nations are also yet to recognize the opportunity of the boom in Asian tourism.³⁷ In this report, Bavier described that at least 97 million Chinese travelled abroad in 2017 and this number is expected to reach 259 million by 2030 as the household incomes in China continue to increase.³⁸ This means that China has the potential to surpass the US as the largest tourist market in the world. Ryder and Wigmore concur that Chinese tourists are worth targeting for tourist-oriented nations. A major advantage of this market is that their expenditure is higher than tourists from other countries, including the US tourists according to the World Trade Organization estimates.³⁹ Also, China's large population and the growing number of the middle-class population in this country show that it is a ripe market for tourism. Therefore, it is about time that tourist-oriented African economies prioritize implementing strategies to attract Chinese tourists. It is an area of concern that was addressed in this study.

³⁵ Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute. *Cooperation between China and the Horn of Africa: in the context of FOCAC and Belt & Road Initiative*. HESPI, 2020.

³⁶ Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute. "Cooperation between China and the Horn of Africa."

³⁷ Bavier, Joe. "Africa Missing out on Boom in Chinese Tourism." U.S. Last modified November 23, 2018..

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ryder, H., and R. Wigmore. "African.business." African.business. Last modified April 28, 2021.

1.5.4 Literature Gaps

The literature reviewed has shown that scholars have not paid much attention to the security implication of China relations that are specific to Kenya or the opportunities that exist for greater Kenya-China cooperation in security. However, there is much on this about Djibouti because China military base in this country sparked lots of attention across the globe. Also, some authors have taken a regional stand point, and there is a lot to be answered about Kenya. China has been a key partner to Kenya over the last two decades, and considering the increased scrutiny about China's growing influence in the Greater Horn of Africa, and Kenya's diverse security needs, it was necessary to investigate whether China has had a positive influence on Kenya's security, and to determine whether there are opportunities that Kenya can leverage from its association with China to enhance the security of the country.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This subsection describes the two theories that explain the research objectives under study. These are realism and constructivism theories. The study used these two theories because they complement each other in explaining the behaviours of Kenya and China, and their relationship. Realism theory would best explain the relationship between Kenya and China, but the assumption of the imbalances between the two states leaves it with limitations which another theory needs to fill; so, the choice of constructivism theory.

1.6.1 Realism Theory

Thucydides, a Greek historian and Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher, are considered the fathers of realism. They had considerable influence on the works of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, among other modern proponents of realism. The realism theory explains that states within the international system are continually in pursuit of self-

interests.⁴⁰ They are inherently selfish entities and they aim to amass power, which offers an advantage within the international system. Power can help a state survive within the international system and even defend itself when necessary. Realism theory acknowledges the various elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic power), and any material capacity of state that influences its international engagements. This theory assumes that states are unitary rational actors, and so are likely to take advantage of the opportunities present in the international system.⁴¹

The theory is therefore sufficient in analysing China's influence in the Greater Horn of Africa, especially its relations with Kenya. Using the realism theory assumption, then the decision-makers in the two states are rational actors, and so their decisions to cooperate is for the purpose of achieving the interests of each party. Kenya being a developing country, its improvement of security is a priority. This would motivate it to take up any opportunity that would lead to improvement of the state's security, whether economic or military security. Conversely, Kenya presents a geostrategic advantage for China to achieve its interest of exercising the greatest influence in the Greater Horn of Africa than any other state.

The theory is criticized for its state centeredness and overlooking other forces and actors within the state. These are parties that also influence a state's international engagements, and so their consideration is critical. The assumption that states are rational actors has also been widely contested by non-realists on the grounds that they do not see Russia as rational for invading Ukraine, but as a multifaceted and complex entity.⁴² With this limitation in the use of realism as the only suitable theory, constructivism is a second theory chosen in this study.

⁴⁰ Morgenthau, Hans J., and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985.

⁴¹ Morgenthau et al. "*Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace*."

⁴² Smith, Nicholas R., and Grant Dawson. "Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War." *Analyse & Kritik* 0, no. 0 (2022). doi:10.1515/auk-2022-2023.

1.6.2 Constructivism Theory

This study will adopt constructivism theory to discuss how China has influenced the Greater Horn of Africa security landscape. Nicholas Onuf (1989) formulated the term constructivism.⁴³ This theory was established to explain the end of the Cold War because none of the existing theories was found suitable to explain this phenomenon. The dominant focus of this theory is the agency of individuals.⁴⁴ The Cold War ended by the actions of individuals and not the actions of state or international organisations. Therefore, this theory explains that actors, such as leaders can shape and reshape international relations through their interactions and actions. So, the behaviour of states is constructed by individuals. The central elements of this theory are identities and interests. In this case, states have multiple identities, which are developed through interaction with other states.

Constructivists argue that these identities determine its interests and actions. For instance, a small state is likely to be more concerned about survival, while a powerful state's major focus is dominating military, economic and political affairs.⁴⁵ This is important in the study because it informs on the behaviour China as it is trying to establish itself as a dominant external power in the Greater Horn of Africa. It should be noted that a state cannot act outside this identity. Constructivists argue that leaders have the power to shape and reshape relations, and in a sense, this explains how things have played out in Kenya, whereby Kenya's political leaders from 2002 have reshaped the relations with China. They actively pursued greater interactions between the state and China compared to past leaders. This lays foundation for the researcher to explain both the positive and negative security effects that have arisen from the intensified relations between the two states.

⁴³ Jackson, Robert, and Georg Sørensen. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2012.

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Jackson and Sørensen. "Introduction to International Relation."

Constructivism theory explains that a state acts according to its identity. Therefore, with China being a nation that is seeking global influence, the researcher will be able to establish why security in the Greater Horn of Africa is critical for it to achieve this goal. On the other hand, Kenya being a developing country, it is obvious that it experiences various security challenges that threaten the survival of the state and its people, and so its interaction with China is from this point of need because China presents an opportunity through which Kenya can overcome some of these challenges. In this case, both countries behaviour would be according to their identities as the theory claims. This theory was highly criticised at the outset for not providing substantive knowledge on behaviour of states but the works of other international relations theorists in the 1990s helped in developing it as a prominent theory of international behaviour.

1.7 Justification of the Study

Existing studies have policy and academic inadequacies and underpinnings that justify the need for this study.

1.7.1 Academic Justification

China's growing presence in the Greater Horn of Africa has increased international attention to this region. It also appears that scholars and academicians hold divergent opinions about the influence that China has on the Greater Horn of Africa. For example, Schiere, R., Ndikumana & Walkenhorst believe that China is a necessary ally to Africa.⁴⁶ Others like Karlsson, believe that its engagements in this continent is a form of neo-colonialism.⁴⁷ Much analysis has been on the economic impact, and so the full extent of security implication and security opportunities for the Greater Horn of Africa countries from China requires

⁴⁶ Schiere, R., Ndikumana, L., & Walkenhorst, P. (2011). *China and Africa: an Emerging Partnership for Development?* African Development Bank Group.

⁴⁷ Karlsson, P. (2020). *China in Africa: An act of Neo-colonialism or a win-win relationship?* [Master's thesis].

considerable assessment and study. Therefore, this study will fill the knowledge gap on the broader security effects of China on the Greater Horn of Africa, and also bring clarity to academia on China's influence on the region. It will also contribute to existing literature on China's influence on the Greater Horn of Africa economic and military security.

1.7.2 Policy Justification

China's rising profile in the Greater Horn of Africa is an indication of its gradual rise as a super power. Its involvement in this region has threatened the long-standing dominance of the Western countries, especially the United States of America. So far, it has concentrated on providing development aid to the Horn of Africa countries and building trade relations. However, things took a different turn with the establishment of its military base in Djibouti. Additionally, it has been vocal about its interest in this region's security issues. By examining the security implications of their relationship so far, it will be easier for states to determine if China can make a good security partner to the benefit of the states and their citizenry. It is also important to establish opportunities that are available for greater integration with China on security promotion. Therefore, the results of this study will help the heads of state and government, state advisors, cabinet secretaries, and other interest groups in individual states determine whether China is a worthwhile security partner or not. This information will also be of importance to military/defence leaders on matters relating to military diplomacy initiatives with China and other defence industry decisions.

1.8 Methodology

This section deals with the research methodology of the study. It includes research design, research area, target and sample population, data collection procedures, and techniques of data analysis.

1.8.1 Research Design

This was a qualitative study that employed case study design. This design offers detailed information on the research topic. According to Simmons, case study is an in-depth approach of exploring the complexities of a particular thing. This study focused on China's influence on the Greater Horn of Africa security landscape and chose Kenya as a case study. This allowed the researcher to carry out in-depth research on the study subject. Every phenomenon that is of interest was explored, and this intensive study offered a complete picture of China's influence on the Greater Horn of Africa. Kenya's security landscape was used as a representation of other states of the Greater Horn of Africa.

1.8.2 Study Location

This study was conducted in Nairobi, Kenya. Kenya is part of the Greater Horn of Africa that is bordered by Somalia to the East, Uganda to the West, Ethiopia to the North, Tanzania to the South, the Indian Ocean to the Southeast, and South Sudan to the Northeast. Kenya measures about 580,367 sq km. Kenya is considered the East African financial hub and economic giant, with a population of 54.9 million as at 2021.⁴⁸ The country has small mineral deposits, but expansive highlands suitable for agriculture. Kenya is enough to represent the Greater Horn of African region because of its connection with China in diverse areas of development, aid, and trade. It is a powerful nation in Africa based on budget, range of weaponry, and manpower. Kenya is also considered an economic powerhouse in the Greater Horn of Africa and the wider Sub-Saharan Africa because it is one of the largest economies in the region.

⁴⁸ World Bank. "Population, Total - Kenya." World Bank Open Data | Data. Last modified 2022.



Figure 1.2: Map of the Study Location

Source: www.nationsonline.org, n.d.

1.8.3 Target Population

The determination of the target population considers the participants that are best placed to share their thoughts, experiences, and to help address the study objectives. Although things like education level can be considered, the element that is of highest importance is the participant’s ability to offer the needed information. The target population of the study was 161

respondents. They included senior officers in the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), Senior officers in the Ministry of Trade, Department of International Trade, senior officers in the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Department of Peace and Security, and China Embassy officials in Kenya. The target population size was 161.

1.8.4 Sample Population

A sample population of 115 respondents were selected to provide the primary data and this sample size was determined using Yamene’s formula as shown below. ⁴⁹

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where: n= Sample Size, N= Population Size e= Level of Precision (0.05).

$$n=161/1+161(0.05)^2$$

$$n= 115$$

The breakdown of the sample size was as shown in the Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. Sample Size and Respondent Categories

Category	Target Population	Sample size
Senior KDF Officers	150	105
Ministry of Trade Officials	5	5
Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Officials	3	3
Chinese Embassy Officials	3	2
Total	161	115

⁴⁹ Yamane, Taro. *Statistics: An Introductory Analysis*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1973.

This sample population was comprised of professionals well versed on Kenya-China relations in Greater Horn of Africa. The sample included 105 senior officers in KDF, 5 senior officers from the Ministry of Trade, Department of International Trade, 3 senior officers from the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Department of Peace and Security, and 2 officials from the Chinese Embassy.

1.8.5 Data Collection Method

The researcher gathered both primary and secondary data and used both questionnaires and a key informant interview guide to obtain primary data. A structured questionnaire comprising of both open and close-ended questions was administered to the KDF officers, and respondents from the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs. The interview guide was used to collect data from key informants. In this study, these were the Chinese Embassy officials. They were identified as the key informants for this study because they were considered to have first-hand information concerning China's engagements in the Greater Horn of Africa in general, and its relationship with Kenya. A face-to-face interview was preferred in this study in order to get detailed response. Secondary data was sourced from published government reports and documents posted on government websites, journals, conference reports, academic books, newspapers, magazines, and periodicals.

1.8.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

The qualitative data from secondary sources, interview, and questionnaires was analysed through documentary analysis, which entails dissecting the documents and coding the data based on the various themes. The themes were then presented in textual method. The quantitative data derived from secondary sources and questionnaires was presented through tables and charts.

1.8.7 Study Limitations

Time factor was the biggest limitation for this study, and considering that data collection can be time consuming, the researcher had to maintain a manageable number of respondents for this study. There were also challenges in accessing the required number of respondents from the Department of Peace and Security in the Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs. The researcher had to wait for almost a month for this institution to assign the questionnaires to the relevant senior officers.

1.9 Ethical Considerations

The researcher ensured to put ethical codes into consideration. Among the ethical practices observed included ensuring to get the consent of the respondents. The researcher showed them the letter of introduction from National Defence College and the permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), and also explained what the research was about. The respondents were then requested to give consent to participate in the study. The researcher also made an assurance to protect the confidentiality of the consenting respondents by observing non-disclosure of their private information, such as names. Instead of using their names, this study refers to them as ‘respondent’, ‘respondents, or ‘interviewee.’ The researcher confirmed the validity and reliability of the research tools by sharing it with the supervisors who made comments that helped to shape the questionnaire and the interview guide. The researcher also ensured that the information was used strictly for academic purposes only. Transparency was also observed in the dissemination of the research findings. The results were reported accurately and no information was withheld for personal gain.

1.10 Chapter Outline

The chapter outline of this study is as follows;

Chapter one is the introductory part of this study. It has the background of the study, statement of the problem, literature review, study justification, theoretical framework, and research methodology. Chapter two presents information on the reasons China is interested in the Horn of Africa security.

The third chapter established the security implication of Kenya-China relations. Chapter four examined the challenges and opportunities that China presents to the Greater Horn of Africa to enhance both military and economic security. The last chapter included the summary of the study findings, conclusion, and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

REASONS FOR CHINA'S INTEREST IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA SECURITY

2.0 Introduction

The Greater Horn of Africa is one of the most important geo-strategic regions in the world and is gradually emerging as one of the main theatres of Sino-African relations. Its location is at an important artery of world's maritime trade that offers access to emerging markets. Some of the nations in the Greater Horn of Africa are also endowed with natural resources and hold great development potential.

It is also a hotspot of insecurity with conflicts and confrontations arising in several countries in this region. It has been the focus of international mediation efforts due to the ongoing instability, and China has been at the forefront of championing for peaceful coexistence. For instance, it has deployed peacekeepers in South Sudan. Its presence in this country helps to prevent conflicts from spilling over to other Horn of Africa countries neighbouring South Sudan, like Kenya and Ethiopia. This region is caught in a cycle of insecurity brought forth by diverse issues including Sudan's tainted power and border disputes, constant terrorist threats and attacks in Somalia, and the ongoing ethnic and political tensions in Ethiopia.

In January 2022, PRC officially expressed that it is willing to establish a peace development initiative in the Horn of Africa.⁵⁰ This it hoped to achieve through increased participation in matters of security, development, and governance in the region.⁵¹ It expressed that the peace initiative will target these three key areas in the Greater Horn of Africa. First, it

⁵⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. "Wang Yi Talks about the "Initiative of Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa"." Last modified 2022.

⁵¹ "Ibid."

will help in strengthening the intra-regional dialogue in strategizing how to overcome security challenges that bedevil this region. Second, China will accelerate the revitalization of the Greater Horn of Africa to help it overcome development challenges and improve its development capacity. The third aspect of the initiative is to support the countries in the region in strengthening governance and administration, and overcome governance bottlenecks.⁵² In light of this, the researcher undertook to explore reasons for China's increased interest in the security landscape of this region. However, before delving into the reasons, it first explored the respondents' demographic characteristics.

2.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This includes their occupation, gender, age, and education level. This information is critical because it proves that the participants represent the targeted population, and therefore sufficient for a conclusive analysis on the first objective of the study, on reasons for China interests in the security of the Greater Horn of Africa. The demographic characteristics of the respondents has a bearing on the kind of responses and therefore the overall findings of the study.

2.1.1 Occupation of the Respondents

Table 2.1 shows the occupation of the respondents. Out of the 115 persons that were targeted for this study, the researcher received responses from 76 respondents, which is 66% of the sample population. The senior officers in Kenya Defence Forces represented majority (93%) of respondents in this study as shown by Table 2.1.

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Wang Yi Talks about the "

Table 2.1. Occupation of the Respondents

	No of Respondents	Frequency (%)
Senior KDF Officers	71	93%
Ministry of Trade Officials	3	4%
Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Officials	2	2%
Chinese Embassy Officials	1	1%
Total	76	100%

Source: Field Data, 2023.

The Senior KDF officers were the majority because they made the largest proportion of this study's sample size. Other respondents included senior officials in the Ministry of Trade, Department of International Trade, Ministry of Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Department of Peace and Security and the Chinese defence attaché in Kenya. It was determined that majority had over 15 years of experience in their area of work, an indication that they are well knowledgeable concerning the subject of study.

2.1.2 Gender of Respondents

This subsection considers the male and female genders representation during this study. The study had 76 respondents, and out of these, 88% were male and 12% female as illustrated by Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1. Gender of the Respondents

Source: Field Data, 2023

Figure 2.1 shows that men made up the majority of the respondents in this study majorly because KDF is a male dominated institution and because majority of top offices in government agencies are held by men. The gender imbalance in this case is a non-issue because the data needed in this study was factual information concerning Kenya-China security relations, and so the responses cannot be influenced by the gender factor.

2.1.3 Age of the Respondents

The distribution of their ages is as illustrated by Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2. Age of Respondents

Source: Field Data, 2023

The Figure 2.2 shows that majority (96%) of the respondents fell into the 51 and above years age category. 3% were 41-45 years, and 1% of the respondents were 46-50 years.

2.1.4 Level of Education of Respondents

The respondent's education level is illustrated by Figure 2.3. The study categorised the level of education into primary, secondary, college, and university levels. The Figure 2.3 shows that 56% of the respondents have attained university level education, 35% college level, and 9% secondary level.




Figure 2.3. Education Level of the Respondents

Source: Field Data, 2023

2.2 China’s Interests in the Horn of Africa

The matter on China’s presence in the Greater Horn of Africa is well known to the respondents, but to confirm its increasing interest in the region, the respondents were presented with the following statement: China’s interest in the greater Horn of Africa region has increased in the last two decades.” The findings are presented by the Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.4. Response about China’s Interest in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Source: Field Data, 2023

Figure 2.4 shows that 84% strongly agreed that in the last two decades, China has shown growing interest in the Greater Horn of Africa. As its presence in this region has continued to grow in recent years, its deepening security engagements have become apparent. This is why it was important for this study to question why security has taken a prominent role in its foreign policy towards the Greater Horn of Africa. In this regard, the respondents were asked about the reasons for China’s growing interest in the security of this region. Several interests that could be influencing its increasing prominence in this region were outlined, and findings are presented by Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5 Reasons for China’s Interest in the Greater Horn of Africa Security
Source: Field Data, 2023

2.2.1 Access to Natural Resources

From Figure 2.5, 74% of the respondents expressed that China’s interest in the Greater Horn of Africa security landscape is growing because it is interested in benefiting from the resources in this region. By participating in the elimination of instability and conflict in the region, it is assured of uninterrupted flow of natural resources. Africa is endowed with diverse natural resources, but in some countries, they remain untapped because of insecurity, poor investment, lack of proper infrastructure, or political instability. China has shown great appetite

for natural resources, which is fuelled by the continually expanding economic boom. Energy security in particular is China's greatest concern because it has quickly risen in the ranks of the nations with the highest energy demand. Statistics reveal it is currently the second largest consumer of oil globally. The growing demand, saw this country, which up to early 1990 was the largest oil exporter in Asia, become the second largest importer of petroleum products and crude oil in 2009.⁵³ Figure 2.6 depicts trend between 1993 and 2016.




Figure 2.6 China Oil Production and Consumption, 1993-2016

Source: Energy Information Administration

Figure 2.6 shows that oil consumption in China has risen exponentially over the last two decades compared to the country's production levels. As a result of the high demand and the urgency to improve its energy security, in 2013, China surpassed the US as the largest importer of petroleum in the world. In recent research by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) Economic and Technology Research Institute (ETRI), it determined that

⁵³ EIA. "China is Now the World's Largest Net Importer of Petroleum and Other Liquid Fuels." U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Last modified March 24, 2014.

by 2030, oil consumption in China would reach its peak of 730 million tons annually. The rapidly growing demand and the insecurity in the Middle East, which threatens the consistent supply of crude oil to China has necessitated the diversification of her strategy, and placed the Greater Horn of Africa countries in the list of her important oil suppliers.

Undeniably, the Greater Horn of Africa region has become an important supplier of oil to China. Its relations with South Sudan in particular have grown deep. Since late 1990s, China has had a leading stake in Sudan's budding oil industry. As noted by Luke Patey, between 1999 and 2011, the oil supply from the old Sudan accounted for about 5.5% of China's energy needs.⁵⁴ After South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011, its ties with China evolved. Since it had stripped Sudan of almost three quarters of oil resource, it emerged one of the countries with the largest oil reserves in the Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Xinhua, South Sudan produces about 175,000 barrels per day, but since only 30 percent of its land has been explored, its potential is estimated at 500,000 barrels per day.⁵⁵ Today China is the biggest investor of oil in South Sudan, and its interest in the flow of energy from South Sudan has witnessed it participate in security operations in this country. For instance, in 2014, it sent 700 soldiers to South Sudan as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force.⁵⁶ Additionally, it has on several occasions pushed for talks between rival leaders in this country, to create an environment of peace. This is proof that the vast oil resources in this country are the reason that CNPC has been expanding its participation in the security of this country.

China is also targeting Ethiopia's extensive gas deposits, which led to the development and signing of a production deal between the two countries in 2013. Ethiopia is also unstable

⁵⁴ Patey, Luke. "Learning in Africa: China's Overseas Oil Investments in Sudan and South Sudan." *Journal of Contemporary China* 26, no. 107 (2017), 756-768.

⁵⁵ Xinhua. "South Sudan Offers 14 Oil Blocks to Increase Output." *The East African*. Last modified September 16, 2022.

⁵⁶ Reuters. "China Deploys Troops to U.N. Force to Protect South Sudan Oilfields - WSJ." *U.S.* Last modified 2014.

because of conflicts. Therefore, it appears that as China ventures in the Greater Horn of Africa increase, the more it stumbles on security challenges in the region. China understands that security issues can interrupt its operations of exploiting the oil and the non-oil minerals from the Greater Horn of Africa countries. For instance, there is an incident that occurred in Ethiopia in 2007 where rebels attacked a Chinese-led oil exploration site, killing 70 people, including Chinese workers.⁵⁷ The prevalence of communal conflicts in this country is also a problem. Therefore, by participating in security efforts, China will be safeguarding its interests for natural resources in the Greater Horn of Africa.

2.2.2 Investments in the Greater Horn of Africa

From the figure 2.5, 32% percent support that China is interested in the security of the Greater Horn of Africa because it seeks to safeguard its investments in the region. One of the respondents expressed that China has made significant investments in Africa that have improved the living standards of people and because the Greater Horn of Africa is of geostrategic importance, insecurity in this region could easily spill over to the wider African continent, and this could cause much of China's investments to go down the drain. China's investment efforts align with the "Go Global" strategy, which it launched in 2001 through which many Chinese firms have entered Africa and other regions.⁵⁸ To this end, Chinese firms have invested heavily in the Greater Horn of Africa. Firstly, China has financed numerous ambitious infrastructure projects in the region. Its infrastructure footprint includes dams, railroad, hydroelectric systems, ports, roads, and Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) equipment supply.⁵⁹ China's total funding endeavours in the Greater Horn of Africa from

⁵⁷ Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Nytimes.com." The New York Times - Breaking News, US News, World News and Videos. Last modified April 25, 2007.

⁵⁸ Toma, S., and D. Tohanian. "China's "Go Global" Strategy: An Overview." 2013.

⁵⁹ Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute. "Cooperation between China and the Horn of Africa: in the context of FOCAC and Belt & Road Initiative." 2020.

2000 to 2019 are as shown by Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Total Chinese Loans to Greater Horn of Africa Countries from 2000-2019 in Millions USD

Country	Millions USD	% Share in the Horn
Djibouti	1,414	4.08%
Eritrea	632	1.82%
Ethiopia	13729	39.62%
Kenya	9175	26.48%
Somalia	0	0.00%
South Sudan	407	1.17%
Sudan	6169	17.80%
Uganda	3125	9.02%
Total Greater Horn of Africa Loan	34651	

Source: Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies

The table shows that the total funding from China to this region from 2000-2019 was US\$34.65 billion. According to Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the total funding to African governments between 2000 and 2019 was US\$153 billion.⁶⁰ In a continent of 54 countries, the Chinese funding to the eight countries in the Greater Horn of Africa from 2000-2019 made up about 22.6% of the total China's investments in Africa within the period. This is proof that the Greater Horn of Africa is a base for huge amounts of Chinese investments, therefore the stakes are high for China if this region plunges into chaos. This has necessitated China to get involved in the security matters of the region. Its huge investments in the Greater Horn of Africa states cover a wide range of sectors and from the statistics shown, Ethiopia and Kenya are the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese loans ahead

⁶⁰ Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. "Loan Data." n.d. <http://www.sais-cari.org/data#>.

of other countries in the region. The Chinese model, among other things, involves infrastructure development, which creates overseas job opportunities for Chinese construction firms, making the Greater Horn of Africa a perfect ground for the model to thrive. Regional peace and stability in the long-run stands to benefit China, as more opportunities and industries will be explored. The interviewee expressed that China considers Greater Horn of Africa as a region that holds great potential for development. Therefore, its participation in the security issues of the region is not only to protect its existing investments, but also to create a conducive environment for greater investments in the region in the future.

The US government has openly expressed its disapproval of China's investments in Africa in general. It believes that although Africa is in need of investments, particularly infrastructural investments, they are sliding into indebtedness to China, and the burden is growing beyond their capacity.⁶¹ The US also claims that the Chinese-built roads are meant to give easy access to mineral resources, which are then shipped to China, ultimately helping it project power. Another reason that the US gives for its disapproval of China's investments is that the grand construction projects usually employ labour from China instead of using African workers.⁶² Vidija reported that the recently completed Nairobi Expressway created jobs for over 2,000 Kenyans when it was being constructed.⁶³ This information appears to contradict the US government claims.

2.2.3 Trading Interests

From the Figure 2.5, 42% of the respondents answered that China is forging stronger security relations with the Greater Horn of Africa to safeguard its trading interests with nations in this region. It is a region that boasts of a pre-eminent strategic location as it lies along a

⁶¹ Committee on Foreign Affairs. "China in African: The New Colonialism?" Last modified 2018..

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Vidija, P. "JKIA-Westlands Expressway Has Employed 2,000 People - PDU." The Star. Last modified January 21, 2021..

strategic sea route that connects Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. This means that this region directly affects China's trade. Additionally, the region's proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb makes it important in global trade. Approximately twelve percent of world trade passes through Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This chokepoint borders Djibouti and Yemen and has been associated with insecurities such as the Middle East tensions, terrorism, and piracy threats that challenge its position as one of the most popular transit routes in global trade, especially for oil and gas from some of the largest producers in the Gulf nations to Asia, Europe and US. Gaining control of security measures in the Greater Horn of Africa is an indication that China is positioning itself firmly at the heartbeat of global trade.

Djibouti's strategic location close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is the reason that this country has become a critical asset to China trading interests in the Greater Horn of Africa and with the world at large. For instance, a significant percentage of its trade with Europe passes through this route every day.⁶⁴ Additionally, 40% its oil imports from the Gulf of Aden pass through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the location of Djibouti makes it an ideal location as a trans-shipment hub for Chinese cargo. Ethiopia-China economic relations have also gained pace in recent years and the bilateral trade relations have paved way for China to export its products to the relatively large market of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia has a huge population of over 117 million, and so China has positioned itself to exploit this market opportunity. This explains the Chinese-built Eastern Industrial Park in Ethiopia where over 20 Chinese companies engaging in the production of items such as steel, electrical materials, food, leather products, shoes, garments among other items, have established base. Although bilateral trade engagements are critical to the growth of Ethiopia's economy, the balance of its trading relations with China is of central concern. According to

⁶⁴ Chaziza, M. "China Consolidates Its Commercial Foothold in Djibouti." *The Diplomat*. Last modified January 26, 2021.

Vecantaraman and Solomon, from 2006 to 2012, Ethiopia recorded trade balance deficit, which can be blamed on the composition of its exports to China.⁶⁵ Ethiopia has concentrated on exporting agricultural and raw materials while importing finished commodities from China.

Beijing also holds a dominant position in Kenya's economy. In 2021, Kenya's imports from China hit a new record high of Ksh 441 billion, which was a 22 percent jump from the 2020 figures.⁶⁶ The figures underpin its growing trading importance in the country. The cheap Chinese products have largely edged out costlier imports from other countries, and the locally manufactured products. Similar to Ethiopia, the high import bill of Chinese products has resulted in trade imbalance, which is in favour of China. In 2021, 60 percent of Kenya's export earnings were spent on Chinese goods, which means that for every Ksh100 the country earned from coffee, tea, flowers and other agricultural exports, Ksh 60 was spent on purchasing Chinese-made goods.⁶⁷ Generally, the Greater Horn of Africa provides an explosive market for Chinese manufactured products. Protecting the region means protecting a developing economic block that China is gaining from.

The interviewee emphasized that although trade is important to China, it is also highly interested in creating a win-win situation in all its engagements including trade, with countries in the Greater Horn of Africa, but the persistent trade deficit of the countries it shares trading relations with in this region means that so far China is enjoying greater benefits of trade than the partners. However, it is possible to change this trend if the Greater Horn of Africa countries would focus on value addition in order to export goods of high value to China, instead of raw materials. It is noteworthy that as China's trading engagements with the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa increase, the more powerful the Yuan currency gets. Beijing has expressed that

⁶⁵ Chaziza, M. "China Consolidates Its Commercial Foothold in Djibouti."

⁶⁶Mwaniki, Charles. "60pc of Kenya's Exports used to Buy China Goods." Business Daily. Last modified February 23, 2022.

⁶⁷ Ibid

it does not seek to replace the US Dollar dominance and dethrone it in the global system. Instead, it is looking to increase the use of Yuan in this country's cross-border trades and reduce dependency on the dollar.⁶⁸ Considering this, one can conclude that this ultimately increases the probability of de-dollarization in regions that are closely engaged with China, such as the Greater Horn Africa. However, by increasing the value of its imports, the Greater Horn of Africa would possess greater bargaining power on various aspects of its trading engagements with China.

2.2.4 Political Legitimacy

There are concerns that China's is interested in the greater Horn of Africa to gain political legitimacy over some of the long-standing players, especially the US. In Djibouti, China's presence has become a paradigmatic example of a geopolitical strategy that strives to capture the regional shifts in security and balance of power that may result from global trends. The Horn of Africa has developed into an international arena for competition, best described by Alex de Waal as a "political marketplace," one in which China has emerged the largest 'trader.'⁶⁹ Such a "marketplace" has buyers and sellers trading loyalty for resources, and each buyer is also a seller. Relative to its size, Djibouti hosts considerable number of foreign soldiers. It hosts military bases belonging to China, Japan, US, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy.

The presence of China and the US military in Djibouti shows that as the entryway to the Greater Horn of Africa region, this country could be a point of the power competition that has been growing between China and the US. China is seen to be strengthening its economic position in this region by funding development infrastructures through BRI. So far, it has

⁶⁸ Liu, Zongyuan Z. "China Is Quietly Trying to Dethrone the Dollar." *Foreign Policy*. Last modified September 21, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/21/china-yuan-us-dollar-sco-currency/>.

⁶⁹ De Waal, Alex. "The Political Marketplace" *WPF* (n.d.). https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2014/10/Political-Marketplace_de-Waal.pdf.

overtaken the US in terms of infrastructure investments in the Greater Horn of Africa, and the gap is likely to continue widening in the future. The Economist reported that China's share of infrastructure investments in African as of 2020 stood at 31%, while that of Western firms was at just 12%. The establishment of China's first overseas military base in Djibouti is a clear indicator that China is also competing with the US as a security power in the Greater Horn of Africa and in the African continent at large.

It has been observed that China's decision for an overseas military base was a decisive break from its decades-long disavowal that it would not take such a path. For a long time, China was against having an overseas military base majorly because it was focused on growing its own economy, and so, the Djibouti base is a stark break from this policy line. The PRC officials have however categorically denied that the base is intended for the projection of military power. It is clear that the interviewee also held a similar sentiment that China is not seeking to become a dominant power. Also, among the other respondents, the figure 2.5, shows that only a few (26%) of them answered that China is interested in gaining more power in the region than the US.

The official state news agency, Xinhua News Agency, released a report that has explained clearly China's intention of establishing the base in Djibouti. The report explained that it would ensure China participation in missions such as humanitarian aid, peace keeping and escorting in Africa. Further, Xinhua reported that the base was conducive for joint exercises, military cooperation, protecting and evacuating Chinese overseas, and for joint maintenance of security in strategic international seaways.⁷⁰ China's military presence in Djibouti has great potential in the region, which is known for various insecurities. The troops could help mediate the conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa. Instability is an impediment to

⁷⁰ Ben. "China Sends Troops to Open First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti."

this region’s development, and so it is highly likely that her military exercises and deployment will increase significantly over time.

The interviewee explained that the narrative that China is engaging in a power struggle against the US for dominance in the Greater Horn of Africa is a flawed Western narrative, because China does not view this region as an “arena for major power games.” The interviewee explained that this inaccurate opinion has also been propagated by Western media. They went further to say that China’s honest dealings in the Greater Horn of Africa are evidenced by the fact that it has never tried to impose its ideas on the nations, because China believes that each country has its right to do what they see fit. Concerning the issue of China and US presence in the Greater Horn of Africa, the respondents were presented with the following question: How has China’s presence in the Greater Horn of Africa Affected US influence in the region? The findings are presented in the Figure 2.7.




Figure 2.7. Responses on China’s Effect on the US Influence in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Source: Field Data, 2023

The Figure 2.7 shows that 53% of the respondents were of the opinion that the US

influence in the region has declined significantly, as China’s presence increases. Negatu has explained that although the US has for many decades been involved with the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa, but the crises of this region in recent years have exposed its lack of a coherent framework for the region. This explains why its influence is declining while that of China is increasing. The respondents were also asked if its more advantageous for the Greater Horn of Africa to forge closer ties with China than the US. The findings are presented by the Figure 2.8.




Figure 2.8: Response on Whether Forging Closer Ties with China is More Advantageous than with the US

Source: Field Data, 2023

Figure 2.8 shows that the respondents were divided on the issue in question. However, a slightly higher number (58%) were of the opinion that it is more advantageous for the Greater Horn of Africa to forge closer ties with China than the US, while 42% had a contrary opinion. Those who were for closer ties between China and the Greater Horn of Africa expressed several reasons for their opinion: China offers opportunities for better investments than the US; the US has not been a steady partner to the Greater Horn of Africa as seen during Trump’s presidency; the US is only interested in safeguarding her interest in the region while China pursues her

interests but at the same time offers opportunities for the region to improve; China is an good alternative to being tied to the US stringent measures; the US imposes negative values on the nations while China does not. Among the 42% of the respondents who were against the Greater Horn of African forging closer ties with China than the US, their stand was based on the opinion that engagements with China comes with hidden conditions.

2.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter intended to find out the reasons that China is focused on strengthening its security ties with the Greater Horn of Africa. The study established that China's growing security interest in this region is driven by Beijing's goal to safeguard its interests, which include access to natural resources and economic interests of investments and trade. Peace and stability in this region will assure China of uninterrupted flow of energy resources, such as oil from South Sudan and natural gas from Ethiopia. It is also seeking to protect the region as an expansive market for its commodities and safeguard the huge investments it has made in the region. As the realism theory explains, countries tend to pursue their self-interests, and China has confirmed this to be true. There have been speculations that China is interested in expanding its political influence, especially with the establishment of the military base in Djibouti. This study however determined that China does not view the Greater Horn of Africa as an arena for power battles with the US. However, the Chinese military base established in Djibouti in 2016 is a means by which it can participate in peace promotion and humanitarian efforts in the region. Kenya is one of the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa that has had close relations with China, thus, it is important to assess the influence China has had so far on its security environment. This is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

CHINA'S INTERESTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON KENYA-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS FROM 2002-2022

3.0 Introduction

The traditional view on security of states focused more on the protection of their territories. In the contemporary world, however, security has taken much broader view to encompass more aspects than protection of its territory and now includes economic, personal, and environmental security. In this study the concept of security is confined to military and economic security. In view of this, and in order to determine China's influence on the Greater Horn of Africa security landscape using the case study of Kenya. This chapter explores how China's relations with the last two ruling regimes influenced Kenya's security environment.

3.1 Kenya-China Relations from 2002-2022

Kenya has had five administrative regimes since independence. Its third President, Mwai Kibaki held the office from 2002-2012 and President Uhuru Kenyatta from 2012-2022. The respondents were presented with the statement: "Both the Kibaki and Uhuru regimes forged stronger relations with China than the past administrations." All the respondents concurred with this statement. President Kibaki had a goal of resuscitating the economy, which had been crippled by decades-long of poor governance. This goal influenced the establishment of the 'Look-East Policy' that saw Kenya establish close links with China. President Uhuru's administration also took the same foreign policy direction. Therefore, the last two decades have been characterised by strong Sino-Kenya relations. For the two decades, China was a willing partner to Kenya, and undertook various activities that impacted Kenya's security militarily and economically.

3.1.1 Kenya-China Foreign Policy under President Mwai Kibaki from 2002-2012

Mwai Kibaki took over the presidency from Moi in 2002, and from then on, Kenya-China relations intensified. The Late President Kibaki ascended to power in an era when Kenya's economy was performing poorly compared to the first administration post-independence. The average GDP growth rate during President Kenyatta's era was over 6 percent and in Moi's regime it had declined to less than 3 percent. In fact, many Kenyans would pause that the President was sworn into office on a wheelchair because the country's 'economy was on a wheelchair.' The late President Kibaki's expertise in economic issues informed his policy decision to look to the East for development partners and reduce the power that the West held over African countries through conditional development aid programmes. President Mwai Kibaki had the vision of instituting a quick economic recovery plan to achieve accelerated economic growth per annum. In 2002, Kenya's annual economic growth was estimated at 2.9 percent. By the end of President Kibaki's first 5-year term, Kenya's annual economic growth was estimated at 7.1 percent, a testament to the economic benefits that the Look East policy helped achieve despite the concerns that Kenya's relations with the West would deteriorate.⁷¹ Kibaki understood the need for empathetic partners with a track record of accelerated development compared to the West which had increasingly adopted a strict policy in an attempt to arm-twist African governments. The friendly relations stance adopted by President Kibaki towards China kick-started increased financial and economic ties between the two countries. Additionally, China also listed Kenya among its approved Tourist Destination Status by 2004.⁷²

During his early years in office, President Kibaki planned state visits to China accompanied by high-level state officials which laid the foundation for economic development

⁷¹ Kiganka, Sheila M. "Critical Analysis Of Bilateral Relations Between Kenya And Britain From 1963 To 2017." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2018.

⁷² Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya. "Kenyan President Invites Chinese Investors." 2005.

aid to finance ground-breaking investment in infrastructure.⁷³ China provided Kibaki's government with the necessary technical expertise to improve various sectors such as the manufacturing through standardization and the media industry through modern equipment. By the year 2006, an additional 50 Chinese firms had already spent over Ksh 4 billion in various projects and garnered more presence in the annual Nairobi Trade Fair. By the year 2010, President Kibaki had established positive relations with China to the extent of signing over the management of key governmental communication systems to China's Huawei Technology Company.

The extent of Chinese economic aid extended to the energy sector, infrastructure development, education, and the health sector. For instance, Chinese multinational corporations, such as Shengli Engineering Construction and Syno-Hydro Corporation were commissioned to undertake key state projects such as building the Moi International Sports Complex, Kasarani and improving the capacity of Eldoret Hospital and the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA). Under President Kibaki's regime, Kenya introduced direct flights from Kenya to China using the national carrier, Kenya Airways.⁷⁴ This move was meant to facilitate increased collaboration between Chinese investors and Kenyan counterparts.

The improving relations between Kenya and China saw the latter gain more access to Kenya's key national security apparatus such as the communications equipment in government offices. The high-level state officials involved in the state visits from the two countries also included representatives from the military.⁷⁵ For instance, China's General Fu Quanyou visited Kenya in 2006 leading to arms trade between the two countries. The Chinese government through its defence minister promised to help modernize Kenya's army to effectively deal with

⁷³ Ndegwa, Stephen. "How Kibaki shaped Kenya-China Relationship."
<https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/04/how-kibaki-shaped-kenya-china-relationship/>

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Ndegwa. "How Kibaki shaped Kenya-China Relationship."

the security threats posed by terrorists.

3.1.2 Kenya-China Foreign Policy under President Uhuru Kenyatta from 2012-2022

Similar to President Mwai Kibaki, President Uhuru Kenyatta's ascendancy to the highest state office came at a time when he was facing diplomatic tensions with the West due to the predicament that he and his deputy, William Ruto, were facing at the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was evident that President Kenyatta would proceed with the 'Look East' diplomatic policy considering that the Chinese flag was the only foreign flag raised on a flagstaff during his inauguration ceremony. In addition, President Uhuru Kenyatta's first official state visit to a foreign country outside of Africa was to China in an attempt to woo Chinese investors to increase bilateral trade between the two countries. In 2014, Kenya and China signed several trade agreements when the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang paid a state visit to Kenya.⁷⁶ These agreements targeted various sectors, with the most renowned agreement being the multi-billion investment to build a Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) from Mombasa to Nairobi. The Chinese would finance a majority of the project and recover the investment by managing the SGR after its eventual completion.⁷⁷ To do this, the two states agreed that China would set up its China-Africa Development Bank in Nairobi, and utilize the bank to invest more than 170 billion within Africa. President Uhuru Kenyatta was instrumental in signing agreements that would finance key development goals such as setting up a Ksh 860 million kitty for wildlife conservation, 5.1 billion for the development of China-Africa Research Centre, and another 5 billion for developing a modern laboratory to conduct biological and agricultural tests.

The other milestone in Sino-Kenya relations during President Uhuru Kenyatta's term

⁷⁶ Kioko, Patrick Mutua. "A study on Chinese's economic relations with AFRICA: Case Study Kenya." *Available at SSRN 1998050* (2011).

⁷⁷ Kiganka, Sheila M. "Critical Analysis Of Bilateral Relations Between Kenya And Britain From 1963 To 2017." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2018.

came in 2017 when the President attended the Belt and Road Initiative Forum where he met with China's president and premier. President Kenyatta followed up the visit with subsequent visits in 2018 and 2019 to attend the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit and extend Kenya's diplomatic relations with China. President Kenyatta was keen to see China open up its market to Kenyan businesses in what he termed as a people-centred development policy. The results from the meetings included an increase in Kenya's exportation of avocados and horticultural products to China, an agreement to undertake Kenya's first expressway by the China Road and Bridge Cooperation, and an agreement that China's Export-Import (EXIM) Bank would finance the development of Konza Technopolis Data Center to the tune of Ksh 17 billion.⁷⁸

During Uhuru Kenyatta's presidency, criticism of Kenya's and other African states' relations with China increased citing the use of debt to undermine the sovereignty of African nations. The extent of the use of Chinese telecommunications services in Africa is said to provide China with unprecedented access to data and information that could undermine the national security of African nations, Kenya included. There is a risk of the country being exposed to Chinese surveillance, which could expose sensitive information that puts the country at risk. On the other hand, the improving relations between China and Kenya is viewed as part of a larger ongoing fight between the East and the West to gain control over key resources in Africa, especially the Greater Horn of Africa. Despite these concerns, President Uhuru led talks that would see Ksh 7.9 billion worth of arms being bought from China.⁷⁹ The military equipment included armoured vehicles, military equipment spare parts, and battle tanks. The decision to source this worth of military equipment would position China within the largest sources of military equipment to the Kenyan Defence Forces alongside countries such

⁷⁸ Reuters. "Kenya secures \$666 million from China for tech city, highway." (2019). <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-china-idUSKCN1S21KG>

⁷⁹ Business Daily. "Kenya boosts China ties with Sh 7.9 bn arms purchase deal."

as Russia and the USA.

3.2 China's Influence on the Kenya Military from 2002-2022

Kenya like other states in the Greater Horn of Africa integrated military component in their relations with China, thus this study sought to understand the influence that China has had on the Kenyan military from 2002 to 2022. In this regard, using a closed-ended questionnaire, the respondents were asked to provide feedback about how the Kenya military has benefited from China in the last two decades. The findings are presented by Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1. Military Benefits from Kenya-China Relations

Source: Field Data, 2023

The majority (68%) of the respondents reported that between 2002 and 2022, China supplied the Kenyan military with security equipment. 53% agreed that the military received armoured vehicles from China. 37% agreed that China supplied Kenya with arms, and a few respondents (5%) expressed that China supplied Kenya with ammunition within the period under study. Not all the respondents were able to respond to this because of the secrecy surrounding military purchases. During the early years of China's relations with Kenya under the Presidency of Mwai Kibaki, secrecy and mystery surrounded any form of military

agreement with the exception of broad statements from both governments to insinuate the Chinese were helping the Kenyan military to enhance its capacity to fight security threats from the Al-Shabaab and participate in peacekeeping missions. The agreement by President Kibaki and Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangcuan was designed to help Kenya secure its territorial borders, which by extension, was designed to secure a stable and peaceful environment for continued trade between Africa (Kenya) and China.

Some of the respondents added that China also provided opportunities for military training during President Kibaki and President Uhuru administrations. This was also confirmed by the interviewee who disclosed that every year since the two countries established diplomatic relations, China has been offering Kenya slots for military training for senior officers and service members. According to the interviewee, other ways that China impacted Kenya's military is through military exchanges, supply of arms, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), cargo aircraft, helicopters, and intelligence exchange between the two countries. Between 2002 and 2022, China also made donations to the Kenyan military. He mentioned that in 2022, China donated military logistics vehicles and engineering vehicles worth over US \$7 million, and computers valued over US\$20,000 to the Kenyan military.

According to Munyi, arms exports is a foreign policy tool and between 2002 and 2022 China emerged as a preeminent arms supplier in Kenya.⁸⁰ Business Daily reported that Ksh 7.9 billion worth of arms were imported from China in 2015, an indication of Kenya's appetite for Chinese arms.⁸¹ Other military hardware it ordered in the same year included armoured vehicles, military equipment, spare parts, and battle tanks. In 2021, the estimated worth of

⁸⁰ Munyi, Elijah. "The Growing Preference for Chinese Arms in Africa: A Case Study of Uganda and Kenya." Policy Brief, No. 49/2020, China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, <http://www.sais-cari.org/publications-policy-briefs>

⁸¹ Business Daily. "Kenya Boosts China Ties with Sh7.9bn Arms Purchase Deal." Business Daily. Last modified February 14, 2016.

military equipment Kenya bought from China was US \$15.47 million.⁸² The detailed description of military equipment bought during this period was as follows:

Table 3.1. Kenya Military Equipment Imports from China in 2021

Kenya Military Equipment Imports from China	Value	Year
Revolvers and Pistols	\$8.75M	2021
Bombs, Grenades, Torpedoes, and Similar Munitions	\$6.85M	2021
Military Weapons (Muzzlers, Cutlasses, Knives)	50.13K	2021

Source: Trading Economics and United Nations Comtrade

According to David Shinn, the interactions between China and Kenya’s military in the early 2000 was governed by the need to protect PRC’s investments and Chinese foreigners.⁸³ There was no desire within the Chinese to establish military bases in Africa because they wanted to avoid the imperialist tag that had led to troubled relations between African nations and the Western countries such as France, United Kingdom, and U.S.A.⁸⁴ In doing so, the Chinese security-related efforts in Africa and Kenya prioritized strengthening the national security stability because it aligned with the economic interests of China. This means China was willing to overlook the political ideology or state misgivings to offer military assistance and training. This was apparent in Kenya during Kibaki’s regime when top government officials were being accused corruption and during Uhuru Kenyatta’s regime when the elected executive officials were facing court cases at the ICC.

However, with the growing influence of China in global politics, the country has since reconsidered its security policies and has slowly increased the military presence in Africa. it

⁸² Trading Economics. “Kenya Imports from China of Arms and ammunition, parts, and accessories.” 2022.

⁸³ Shinn, D. H. "China’s security policy in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean." In *International Affairs Forum*. 2016.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 2018.

has illustrated this through the opening of military base in Djibouti, and is considering setting up four other bases in Angola, Kenya, Seychelles, and Tanzania.⁸⁵ China is also now recognized as the largest troop-contributing nation among the UN Security Council members, and 80% of the China's peacekeepers are deployed in Africa. The change in China's stance about getting involved in peace and security issues in Africa was necessary because its expanding economic relations with African nations, including Kenya, would not thrive without significant security backing. As such, China has over the years increased its military engagements with Kenya through supply of various military hardware

The objective of China's military exports is to provide countries such as Kenya with the capacity to withstand any attempts of external influence and to strengthen the peace, security and stability within the country and the Greater Horn of Africa region in general.⁸⁶ China rose as a preferred supplier of military hardware in Kenya in the last two decades because China took steps to ensure that the military arms that they sell to Kenya are relatively cheaper, unattached to ulterior motives or monitoring, and it also provided superior trade terms such as customization and interoperability capabilities.⁸⁷ The researcher also tried to establish whether the military benefits from China differ from those provided by the US by presenting the following question to the respondents: "Do the military benefits from China differ from the military benefits from the US?" 89% of the respondents indicated that the benefits from China differ from those of US. One of the respondents pointed out that military supplies from China were cost effective and condition free unlike those from the US. Almost half the respondents pointed the variation in quality of the supplies from China and the US. They expressed that the military supplies from China are of lower quality compared to what is imported from the US. Others also indicated that the US offers after sale services while China does not. These are

⁸⁵ Ombati, Cyrus. "China to establish military base in Kenya." *The Standard*, 2021.

⁸⁶ Munyi. "The Growing Preference for Chinese Arms in Africa."

⁸⁷ Ibid

important considerations for Kenya because they can significantly impact the capacity of its military to promote peace and security within its borders and beyond,

3.3 The Impact of China on Kenya’s Economic Security from 2002-2022

Since President Mwai Kibaki introduced the Look East policy to improve relations between Kenya and China, Kenya’s economy has experienced upturns and downturns, and so it is critical to establish the apparent impact that China created on Kenya’s economic security from 2002 to 2022. Within this period, Kenya was a recipient of significant Chinese investments and the trade relations between the two nations grew exponentially. The respondents were presented with a set of statements concerning the impact that China has had on the economy of Kenya in the two decades of study. From a scale of 1-5 they were expected to pick the number that accurately expresses their opinion about each statement: 1-Strongly Agree, 2-Agree, 3-Neutral, 4-Disagree, 5-Strongly Disagree. The findings are presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. China’s Impact on the Kenyan Economy

China’s Impact on the Kenyan Economy	1 (%)	2 (%)	3 (%)	4 (%)	5 (%)
i. There has been significant growth in the trade volumes between Kenya and China in the last two decades.	79	21	0	0	0
ii. China’s foreign direct investment in Kenya has increased in the last two decades.	53	42	5	0	0
iii. China’s development aid in the last two decades has had positive impact on Kenya’s economy.	21	58	0	16	5
iv. Overall, China has played a critical role to the improvement of Kenya’s economy in the last two decades.	32	42	21	0	5

Source: Field data, 2023

3.3.1 China's FDI in Kenya

Table 3.2 shows that 53 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 45% agreed that China's FDI in Kenya has increased over the last two decades. This is because, during President Kibaki and President Uhuru administrations, many Chinese companies positioned themselves in the Kenyan market to take advantage of the strengthened relations between the two governments. In 2010 Kenya Investment Authority cited that more than 10,000 Kenyans were beneficiaries of employment from Chinese-related commercial activities in Kenya valued at more than USD 970 million.⁸⁸ This number increased significantly during Uhuru's administration because Kenya-China investment relations grew stronger during his administration. One economic sector that received the most FDI from China between 2002 and 2022 is infrastructure development. This was in accordance with President Kibaki's Vision 2030 that was designated to improve the country's development status. Therefore, over the two decades, the Vision 2030 received immense support from China's through the BRI, a global infrastructure development strategy. It is noteworthy that these FDIs were in the form of concessionary loans awarded to Chinese companies that undertook the implementation of diverse projects.⁸⁹ The major Chinese companies that have been involved in the infrastructure development projects in Kenya include Wu Yi Company, China Road and Bridge Construction Company, Sichuan, to mention a few.

China also helped in the building of the railways, port, expansion of roads, industries, dams, healthcare and education institutions, among other infrastructures. Examples of projects completed during Kibaki's tenure include the Thika Super-Highway, Nairobi-Mombasa Road, UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to JKIA road, and Kipsigak-Shamakhokho road.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Central Bank of Kenya, 2010 Report (Nairobi).

⁹⁰ Mugendi, Florence K. "Kenya-Sino Economic relations: the impact of Chinese Investment in Kenya's transport sector." PhD diss., University of Nairobi, Kenya, 2011.

There were FDIs from China during Kibaki's tenure related to projects at the coastal towns; key to international trade. China undertook the development of three berths at the Lamu Port to a tune of US\$1.5 billion. The Chinese also improved the railway network from Lamu-South Sudan. During Uhuru's presidency, Kenya generated FDIs from China that included a \$5 billion investment for constructing a railroad, undisclosed energy project, and wildlife conservation efforts.⁹¹ In 2019, Kenya received FDIs of \$666 million for construction of the Nairobi Expressway and Konza Technopolis.⁹² During Uhuru's tenure, China was also used to modernize other state infrastructures such as airports and hospitals.

Table 3.2 shows the respondents' opinion on whether, in overall, China's development aid to Kenya has had a positive impact on the economy. The Table shows that 21% strongly agreed and 58% agreed that the economy of the country has benefited significantly from these investments. 16% of them held a contrary opinion. These are among Kenyans who were concerned that since most of development projects in Kenya were carried by Chinese firms, the profits from such developments find their way back to China, denying local business key investment opportunities. One of the respondents who believed Chinese infrastructural aid was not beneficial to Kenya's economy intimated that the Chinese firms import labour instead of hiring Kenyans at all levels of operation. Some scholars also expressed their opinion against China's FDI. For instance, scholars at Somali Institute for Development Research and Analysis explain that the Chinese investment in infrastructures reel African countries in vicious cycle of fiscal debt, long-term indebtedness, and politico-economic dependence on China.⁹³

These concerns are noteworthy, but the economic benefits of these infrastructural projects also cannot be ignored. A case in point is the Thika Super-Highway, one of President

⁹¹ Obala, Roselyn. "Uhuru secures billions from China through public private investment." (2018).

⁹² Reuters. "Kenya secures \$666 million from China for tech city, highway." (2019).

⁹³ SIDRA Institute. *The Benefits and Burden of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in East Africa*. 2019.

Kibaki's administration's most ambitious projects. Completed in 2012, this project was partly funded by EXIM Bank of China. Significant economic benefits have emerged from this project over the last 10 years, including the growth of the real estate industry along the highway and promotion of trade. It is also a regional corridor that contributes to regional integration by linking Kenya to Ethiopia and Tanzania.⁹⁴ Generally, the roads, railways, and ports infrastructures have enhanced Kenya's bilateral economic and trade development. The full economic impact of China's investment in infrastructure on Kenya's economic security however will be determined by decisions that will be made regarding the payment criteria for the debts accrued to finance the key infrastructures that Chinese have built to accelerate economic growth within the country.

Chinese companies have invested in other diverse sectors within in Kenya. Horizon Ivato Company and Greatland Pharmaceutical Limited spent more than Kshs 11 billion in generating wholesale and retail market for household products and pharmaceutical products in Kenya. FDIs in the agricultural sector encompassed investments from Chinese companies such as Beinparts Limited and Chang Sheng International Limited. The interests of these Chinese companies are related to coffee growing, mushrooms, and other agricultural products slated for export to Chinese markets. Chinese companies have also significantly invested in the transfer of modern technologies to help the sustainability of the Kenyan economy. For instance, Sun Yu and Africa-China International Limited have invested in the extraction of petroleum from plastic waste to advance Kenya's capacity in waste recycling. Additionally, China's Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) Corporation invested Ksh 4 billion in a collaboration with Kenya's telecommunications provider, Telkom Kenya, to establish 4G network coverage in Kenya.

⁹⁴ SIDRA. *"The Benefits and Burden of Chinese."*

3.3.2 Kenya-China Trade

Table 3.2 shows that 71% of the respondents strongly agree and 21% agree that trade volume between Kenya and China has grown significantly over the last two decades. The interviewee pointed out that the trade volumes between Kenya and China increased from US\$ 0.2 billion in 2002 to US\$8.5 billion in 2022. Trade engagements have a positive impact on the incomes and livelihood of the local producers. For instance, China has emerged as a large market for Kenyan exports of avocado. In 2022, the exporters earned Kshs7 billion within a span of 3 months, which was a significant boost to the economic situation of local farmers and their households and also created jobs for many people in the agricultural sector.⁹⁵ The China Global Television Network (CGTN) Africa reported that the opening up of the Chinese market to avocado exports from Kenya spurred an avocado boom in many Kenyan villages.⁹⁶

Apart from the exports, some of the Chinese imports have also had a positive impact on the quality of life of many Kenyans. For instance, Kenyans can now afford mobile phones that are imported from China. By improving communication among Kenyans, the affordable Chinese phones have also boosted local businesses. Many Kenyans have established online businesses that they run on their mobile phones. Chinese cars also dominate Kenya's transport sector, which has boosted entrepreneurship, such as the taxi business. In towns and market places across the country, affordable motorcycles from various Chinese brands are a common feature. In 2011, the Business Daily reported that the 'boda boda' sector has created over 1.2 million jobs in the country, and they make a daily income of about Kshs1 billion.⁹⁷ They also contribute about Kshs163 million to the government each day in form of fuel taxes, levies and

⁹⁵ Andae, Gerald. "Avocado Exports to China Earn Kenya Sh7bn in Three Months." Business Daily. Last modified November 9, 2022.

⁹⁶ "Kenyan avocado farmers earn more from exports to China." Directed by CGTN Africa. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K2BAGDxagzQ>, 2023.

⁹⁷ Mwaniki, Charles. "How Boda Boda Riders make Sh1bn Every Day." Business Daily. Last modified March 11, 2022.

other charges.⁹⁸

Constant Munda of the *Business Daily* reported that although significant growth has been observed in the trade value between the two nations in the last two decades, the Kenya-China trade has a significant deficit that favours China. The author cites data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics which shows that the gap has widened to more than Ksh 425.17 billion and Ksh 370.58 billion in 2022 and 2021 respectively.⁹⁹ Kenya's attempts to reduce the gap saw the launch of the Integrated National Exports Development and Promotion Strategy that is designated to tap into the country's underexploited export potential of produce such as tea, coffee, fruits, and vegetables. To reduce the trade deficit, in January 2022, Kenya and China signed six memoranda of understanding to address the barriers of trade.¹⁰⁰ One of the agreements was the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Protocol, to help Kenyan producers comprehend the desired quality standards of commodities such as avocado, to enable them easily penetrate the Chinese market. Therefore, there is a huge potential for Kenya to increase its export volumes to China.

3.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter focused on analysing how China's interests have influenced Kenya-China security relations between 2002 and 2022. It was determined that the two regimes that ruled Kenya during this period strengthened the Kenya-China relations. President's Kibaki's administration unveiled the Look East Policy after taking the reins of power in 2002 as a plan that would help Kenya achieve accelerated economic growth after many years of economic retrogression. The relations between the two states grew even stronger when President Uhuru came to power in 2012. It was established that China's influence on Kenya's military and

⁹⁸ Ibid

⁹⁹ Munda, Constant. "Kenya-China trade deficit widens despite campaign." *Business Daily*.

¹⁰⁰ Mwago, S. "China, Kenya Sign 6 MOUs And Agreements on Trade, Investment." Kenya Investment Authority. Last modified January 7, 2022.

economic security during this time was significant. This was evidenced by the military relations between the two states in terms of supply of diverse military hardware from China, military exchanges, training opportunities, and intelligence exchange. Kenya was also a beneficiary of huge FDI inflows from China and the trade engagements between the two nations also increased. The constructivism theory posits that leaders can shape relations between countries, and indeed, Kenya's last two presidents built the relations between the two states. Also, the two states are seen to behave according to their identity as the theory explains. Kenyans wanted China's help to advance militarily and economically, while China interest was to expand its influence in Kenya. In light of the findings in this chapter, it was vital to also establish the security threats to Kenya's continued strong relations with China and to determine the available opportunities for greater cooperation to enhance Kenya's military and economic security, which the next chapter addresses.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST FOR GREATER KENYA- CHINA COOPERATION IN SECURITY

4.0 Introduction

China-Kenya relations date back over 600 years ago when China's greatest navigator of the Ming Dynasty, Zeng He, arrived in Malindi with his treasure fleet. China was also among the first countries to recognize Kenya's independence in 1963.¹⁰¹ As it has been established in the preceding chapter, Kenya-China relations have intensified in the last two decades. The two countries' major interest has always been to develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership through which the two parties benefit equally. So far, China is a key contributor in Kenya's security environment, both economically and militarily. Given its rising profile in Kenya, it is reasonable to expect that it could play even greater roles in the future. This is why it is important for Kenya to assess its friendship with China to identify the existing threats that are hindering the relationship from being mutually beneficial to both parties. It is against this backdrop that this chapter undertakes to assess the challenges and opportunities that should inform the continuity of the relationship between the two countries

4.1 Challenges that Threaten Greater Kenya-China Security Relations

This subsection discusses the diverse issues that have emerged from Kenya-China relations that could hinder the two nations from pursuing greater mutually beneficial security relations like unfavourable trading patterns, impact on manufacturing, issues related to the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).

¹⁰¹ Farooq, M. S., Y. Tongkai, Z. Jiangang, and N. Feroze. "China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies." *Kenya and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road* 4, no. 3 (2018), 401-418. DOI: 10.1142/S2377740018500136.

4.1.1 Unfavourable Trading Patterns

Trade is critical to Kenya’s economic security. Significant growth has been observed in trade between Kenya and China. The respondents were asked about the trend in the trade balances between the two countries within the last two decades, and 84% of them responded that the balances were heavily skewed in favour of China. This is confirmed by the study conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on the annual value of goods traded between Kenya and China from 2015 to 2019. Figure 4.1 illustrates the total amount of exported and imported goods within the period.




Figure 4.1: Kenya-China Trade, 2015-2019

Source: Raga, Mendez-Parra, and D. Willem te Velde, 2021

From Figure 4.1, it is clear that Kenya has been importing more goods from China than it has been exporting. For instance, in 2019, imports were 24 times more than the exports to China. Trade deficit in 2015 was at \$3.1 billion and by 2019 had increased to \$3.4 billion. In between the two periods, fluctuations in the level of goods traded between the two countries was observed. A study also revealed that on average, Kenya’s imports from China from 2015-

2019 represented 0.006% of China's total world imports.¹⁰² This is proof that China is a world trade giant. Almost half of the imports from China during this period were electrical equipment and machinery. Other imports included plastics, iron and steel, mechanical appliances and parts, among others.

Umidha reported that the huge balance of trade deficit has raised concerns among experts because it indicates trade relations between the two states are heavily in favour of China even though it has continually expressed the need for a win-win situation with its African partners.¹⁰³ This means that there is need for measures to help the two countries trade more favourably. The current situation is not favourable for local producers, as the widening trade deficit has the potential to decimate local firms and industries, which in turn affects the economy negatively. The trade balance favours China mainly because Kenya has focused on commodity and agricultural exports, while China imports are manufactured goods.

4.1.2 Chinese Imports Impact on Kenya's Manufacturing Sector

The respondents were asked whether the Chinese manufactured goods were a risk factor to de-industrialization and loss of employment in Kenya. 89% of the respondents agreed that Chinese manufactured goods are a risk factor to deindustrialization in Kenya and is a contributor to unemployment. One of the respondents explained that the cheap imports from China have flooded the Kenyan market to the detriment of the local manufacturers. Another respondent gave examples of Kenyan manufacturers that have succumbed to the competition from Chinese imports. They include Eveready and Sameer Africa formerly Firestone. Dry-cell battery was one of the major products produced by Eveready, but it was unable to compete

¹⁰² Raga, S., M. Mendez-Parra, and D. Willem te Velde. *Overview of Kenya–China bilateral trade*. Overseas Development Institute, 2021. http://cdn-odi-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/Overview_of_Kenya-China_bilateral_trade_ZYpLGy1.pdf.

¹⁰³ Umidha, S. "Kenya's Trade Balance with China Worries Economists." *People Daily*. Last modified March 9, 2022.

against the cheap electric operated flash lights imported from China. The respondent went ahead to explain that, Sameer Africa was also forced to close down its tyre production business that had operated for over 50 years because of the increased competition from Chinese imports. He mentioned that approximately 95% of the tyres sold in Kenya are imported from China, making it impossible for local manufacturers to stay in business. The respondent mentioned that Bata is another manufacturer that though is still in business, performance has been greatly affected by the cheap shoes from China that have flooded the market.

Kenya's textile industry also has been affected. According to Yusuf, the importation of cheap textile products from China have been a threat to their businesses, and as a result, they have reduced the number of manufacturing jobs available to Kenyans. The African Cotton and Textile Industries Federation reported that at least 30,000 containers of clothes are imported by Kenya annually from China and other parts of the world.¹⁰⁴ The high energy cost in Kenya increases manufacturing cost, making it impossible for local textile industries to compete against the cheap clothes imported from China. The local manufacturers have even called on the government to increase the taxes levied on such imports to help rid the market of the unfair price competition.¹⁰⁵

In 2016, the Business Daily reported that Kenya is at risk of premature decline in industrialization because of the flooding of the Kenyan market with cheap Chinese manufactured goods coupled with poor domestic conditions.¹⁰⁶ The growth of this sector declined from 5.6% in 2013 to 3.4% in 2014.¹⁰⁷ This was majorly attributed to the low level of development in Kenya's manufacturing sector. Kenya Association of Manufacturers also

¹⁰⁴ VOA. "Chinese Imports Threaten Kenya's Textile Industry." VOA. Last modified July 12, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Business Daily. "Chinese Imports Threaten Manufacturing Goals in Kenya." Business Daily. Last modified April 3, 2016. <https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/chinese-imports-threaten-manufacturing-goals-in-kenya-2112398>.

¹⁰⁷ Business Daily. "Chinese Imports Threaten Manufacturing Goals in Kenya."

proved the negative repercussions of China's goods on local manufacturing by reporting that this sector's share of the Gross Domestic Product has been stagnant for many years now. Limited increases were recorded only from 1990 to 2007 when it was averaging at 13.6%.¹⁰⁸ In recent years, however, the numbers have remained below 10%, and that is why Kenya is unable to compete against China's well-developed manufacturing sector.

Because of its under-developed infrastructure, which translates to high cost of production, investors in Kenya have evaded this sector for the performing sectors, such as construction and real estate. The high cost of doing business in this under-developed sector in the final product price making locally produced goods expensive compared to Chinese imports. China's manufacturing sector is well developed, and there is availability of cheap labour, which is another factor that contributes in making their products affordable. Newcomb study confirmed Yeebo's assertion that Chinese imports have affected the manufacturing sector in Africa. He carried out a study that showed that Chinese manufacturers are known for copying the designs of local products, which they then produce cheaply and introduce in the local market at lower prices.¹⁰⁹ Kenyan manufacturers are therefore unable to compete against such and they end up losing buyers because consumers prefer to purchase the cheap products from China.

Scholars like Onjala who are optimistic about the impact that China imports have had on Kenya's manufacturing sector and economic security of the country in general.¹¹⁰ According to Githaiga, the optimists argue that this trade partnership has created gains for the country because it has opened up a way for Kenya to grow its exports to China, and has also offered

¹⁰⁸ Kenya Association of Manufacturers. *Manufacturing in Kenya under the 'Big 4 Agenda*. 2018. <https://kam.co.ke/kam/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/KAM-Manufacturing-Deep-Dive-Report-2018.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Newcomb, C. "The Impact of Chinese Investments on the Kenyan Economy." Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2020.

https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=international_studies_theses.

¹¹⁰ Onjala, J. (2008). *A Scoping Study on China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Kenya*. African Economic Research Consortium.

consumer welfare gains in the form of cheap manufactured goods.¹¹¹ Buying cheaper goods means more disposable income. The imports also give manufacturers access to inexpensive inputs and other intermediate goods necessary in production of final goods. Although imports from China are cheap, they do not displace the local products entirely. Additionally, China produces cheap goods to meet Africa's growing demand for such commodities.¹¹²

4.1.3 Impact of China Investments on Kenya's SMEs

The respondents were presented with the following question: Do the Chinese SMEs present a threat, in terms of competition to the Kenyan-owned SMEs? 95% percent responded that Chinese SMEs are a threat to the locally owned SMEs. 5% did not view China as a threat. Kenya's economy is comprised of both the formal and informal sectors. Majority of the unemployed persons have found themselves trying to make a living in the informal sector. SMEs are part of this sector, which comprises of almost 98 percent of all the businesses in the country. Their role in stimulating this country's economy cannot be over-emphasized. The notable features of Kenya's SMEs are low costs of entry, labour intensive, and small-scale operations. The growing Chinese FDIs in Kenya have seen several of Chinese SMEs infiltrate the economy. The challenges that these businesses pose to the locally owned SMEs are compounded by the obstacles that exist in this sector.

One of the respondents explained that China's SMEs are a threat because even after they have established base in Kenya, they do not supply much of the locally produced products, but instead stock up on products from China. One example that he gave is the newly established China Square. The locally owned enterprises face diverse challenges that limit their ability to compete against Chinese establishment. The major impediments are lack of working capital,

¹¹¹ Githaiga, Nancy M. "Kenya-China Trade in Manufactured Goods: A Competitive or Complementary Relationship?" *Open Journal of Social Sciences* 09, no. 03 (2021), 96-117. doi:10.4236/jss.2021.93007.

¹¹² Ibid

limited access to market information, and technological challenges. It is common for the business owners to use informal sources of funding like small lending companies which charge exorbitant interests or contributions from close associates or family members.¹¹³ Local entrepreneurs also lack the skills that are needed to success in such ventures, including managerial and economic skills, because there are no opportunities available for formal training. On the other hand, Chinese SMEs have a competitive advantage in these areas, and also in pricing. This has forced the local enterprises to engage in unsustainable price competition, which often results in losses, or closure of businesses altogether. Additionally, Chinese owned SMEs have unique network arrangements that makes it easy for them to conduct business in the host country, which is also another source of competitive advantage. Although these challenges exist, it is notable that the Chinese-owned enterprises in Kenya provide numerous job opportunities for the locals and earns the government revenue through taxes

4.2 Opportunities for Greater Kenya China Cooperation on Security

Kenya and China can build a mutually beneficial relationship. This means that Kenya must leverage the opportunities that China presents to gain more economically and to improve the capacity of its security forces. In this regard, the respondents were asked their opinion on ways that China can help enhance Kenya's national security. The findings are presented by Figure 4.2, which shows that the respondents mentioned four areas of opportunity that China presents. Kenya could leverage these opportunities to enhance its economic and military security. There are opportunities for trade, technology transfer, security cooperation and tourism.

¹¹³ Gadzala, Aleksandra. "Survival of the fittest?"




Figure 4.2. Opportunities for Kenya to Enhance National Security

Source: Field data, 2023

4.2.1 Trade

The Figure 4.2 shows that 53% of the respondents believe that Kenya should continue to leverage available trading opportunities with China. According to Figure 4.1, its exports to China in 2019 was US\$ 149 million. World Bank data shows that Kenya's exports to US in 2019 was US\$5.8 billion.¹¹⁴ The Kenya-US trade figures illustrate Kenya's potential in trade. Kenya is not rich in mineral resources like many other African countries, but as an agricultural country, it could take advantage of the demand in China as it has done in the USA. ODI investigated the Relative Competitive Advantage (RCA) of diverse Kenyan exports in Chinese market against their demand over a five-year period. The analysis is presented by Table 4.1. Category A are exports that could be promoted further in the Chinese market, category B need more improvement to meet China's demand, and Kenya can move away from category C and D products.

¹¹⁴ World Bank. "Kenya Trade Summary 2019." World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) | Data on Export, Import, Tariff, NTM. n.d. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KEN/Year/2019/Summarytext#>:

Table 4.1: A matrix of Kenya’s Exports to China, 2015-2019

	Increasing RCA	Decreasing RCA
Increasing Chinese demand	<p>Category A products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Plants and fresh cut flowers. ● Black tea. ● Coffee. ● Macadamia. ● Pineapples. ● Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits. ● Gelatin. ● Cigarettes. ● Vegetable and bast textile fibres. ● Hides of bovine or equine (in dry state) and sheep (in wet state). ● Natural gums, gum-resins and oleoresins. ● Ores and concentrates of iron, manganese, copper, titanium, zirconium. ● Metals (e.g. brass, copper, aluminium scrap). 	<p>Category B products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hides and skins of goats, in wet state. ● Meat of horses, asses, mules or hinnies. ● Plastic in primary form. ● Chemical products and preparations. ● Iron or steel cast articles.
Decreasing Chinese demand	<p>Category D products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Sinking machinery. ● Plastic scrap. ● Prefabricated buildings. ● Hides of bovine or equine, wet-salted or preserved. ● Processed livers, roes and milt of fish. ● Live mammals other than selected primates. ● Herbicides. ● Garments of synthetic fibres. ● Precious (other than diamonds) and semi-precious stones. 	<p>Category C products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Sesamum seeds. ● Cashew nuts. ● Lobsters. ● Hides and skins of bovine or equine and other animals other than ovine, bovine, goats, swine and reptiles, in wet state. ● Petroleum oils, not light oils and preparations. ● Iron or steel articles. ● Monumental or building stone.

Source: Raga, Mendez-Parra, and D. Willem te Velde, 2021

Category A products shown in Table 4.1 are the products whose demand has been increasing in China. Therefore, there is a great opportunity for Kenya to increase the volumes of exports of many of these goods to China. Another advantage is that Kenya holds huge potential in the productions of Category A products. For instance, Kenya is ranked the 3rd largest producer of flowers in the world. The interviewee also explained that, “Due to the increased pursuit for a better life, the demand for agricultural products in China is growing.” He confirmed that the demand for coffee, black tea and flowers from Kenya is especially increasing because of their great quality. This means that Kenya has no excuse why the balance of trade should continue being in favour of China year after year when such huge market

opportunities exist. There is also increasing demand for the category B products. Kenya, therefore, has to improve its manufacturing sector in order to take advantage of this demand. As earlier mentioned, Kenya's manufacturing sector is largely under-developed and more investments are needed to improve it so that it can leverage the opportunity for manufactured goods in China.

4.2.2 Technology Transfer

According to Figure 4.2, 63% of the respondents agreed that technology transfer is a great opportunity that exists for Kenya from its continued relations with China. Some of the respondents explained that there is a need for technology transfer to improve military industrialization, especially in arm manufacturing to boost self-reliance. The Kenyan military could also benefit from other defence technologies from China. The respondents also recommended greater technology transfer in infrastructure development. One respondent expressed that China should establish science and technology centres for diverse sectors in the country. China is a manufacturing powerhouse and so it presents Kenya with diverse opportunities to improve its manufacturing capacity, which will affect the nation's economic security positively. In 2015, during China-Africa Summit, China promised to engage in capacity building in Africa.¹¹⁵

The interviewee stated that already China has made significant efforts of technology transfer in Kenya. He said that China recognizes that upgrading the local technical and training institutions is an important step for efficient technology transfer, to equip Kenyans with advanced skills and knowledge. In this regard, China established Luban Workshop in Machakos University, a training programme for technological skills development. He also expressed that the Chinese companies in charge of various infrastructure development projects

¹¹⁵ Sanghi and Johnson. "Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya?"

in the country, such as the SGR and roads, ensure to conduct technical skills transfer to enable Kenyans take over the projects after completion. He explained that China has also established several factories in Kenya, including an automobile repair factory, ceramic factory (KEDA), and a textile factory, as part of its efforts of technical skills transfer in Kenya. Considering China's potential in industrialization, there is more that it could do to help Kenya transform into highly industrialized nation.

4.2.3 Security Cooperation

Looking at the Figure 4.2, 42% percent of the respondents opined that there is an opportunity for greater security cooperation between Kenya's security forces and China. Opportunities exist for Kenya to strengthen its relationship with China in matters defence. The areas suggested by the respondents for greater cooperation are military training, provision of support programmes for training on use of military hardware acquired from China, and exchange programmes for military technicians. Kenya should leverage these opportunities to enhance the capacity of its security forces, which in turn will make the country more secure. China's most visible security profile is the sale of arms, but it has also diversified to artillery systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), missiles, tanks, maritime patrol craft, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), among others.¹¹⁶ China has been engaging in building institutional capabilities of various countries, including the development of defence industries and sharing of defence technologies. Engaging China in this area will help in boosting the level of innovation in the defence industries. This is a critical area of need for Kenya to advance its military capabilities.

The growing number of Chinese personnel in the country, its investments in foreign nations are some of the factors that have contributed significantly in making China more

¹¹⁶ McDonald, S., and M. Burgoyne. *China in Africa: Opportunities, Challenges, and Options*. 2019. https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/7-China_in_Africa-Carter-Gilpin-Paul_Nantulya1.pdf.

inclined to participate in building the security capacity of its strategic partners like Kenya. The interviewee expressed that China is open to cooperative opportunities with Kenya to enhance security locally, regionally, and continentally. He expressed that China is willing to provide more training slots for both the military and the police and can also customise the training according to the needs of the Kenya's security forces. He also said that China is ready to provide Kenya with equipment that they need to enhance the capacity of its military and police force. He also mentioned that China is ready to carry out joint exercises such as joint naval exercises with Kenya's security forces. The exploitation of these opportunities would alter Kenya's military security landscape significantly and make the country more secure. It would enhance the capacity of Kenya's security forces to protect the nation against external threats, such as terrorism and to also counter the internal security threats, including ethnic conflicts.

4.2.4 Tourism

The interviewee mentioned tourism is a key area of opportunity that Kenya could leverage to improve its economy. He explained that Chinese are highly interested in touring Kenya to explore various attraction sites in the country. Chinese people are adventurous and willing to pay for adventurous experiences, and Kenya is capable of meeting this demand. The interviewee went further to say that before the COVID-19 pandemic, Kenya was receiving thousands of Chinese tourists annually. Biegon citing data from the Kenya Bureau of Statistics shows that 131,000, 192,000 and 230,000 Chinese nationals visited Kenya in 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively, and were hosted in various hotels across the country.¹¹⁷ For many years, the West, especially the US has been Kenya's largest tourist market, but now China is also showing great potential. The growth in the numbers of tourists in the years that followed was interrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic, but now China has re-opened its borders and is allowing outbound

¹¹⁷ Biegon, Eric. "Tourism Boost as Chartered Flight from China Lands in Kenya." KBC. February 11, 2023.

travel. This is a great opportunity for Kenya that will boost economic security of the nation through creation of job opportunities and revenue for the government.

4.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter assessed the challenges and opportunities that exist for greater Kenya-China cooperation in security. Now that the two nations have established a comprehensive and cooperative partnership, then their interactions ought to be mutually beneficial. It was established that challenges of unfavourable trading patterns and the competition posed by China to the local manufacturing sector and small and medium enterprises are hindering the achievement of a win-win situation. On the other hand, it was determined that their relations offer various opportunities for Kenya to advance militarily and economically through increased trading engagements, technology transfer, greater cooperation in defence, and the opportunity that China presents of a large tourism market. As explained by realists, states are rational actors, and the rational decision in this situation would be for Kenya to utilize the opportunities that China presents. All these can be brought out vividly in the summary and conclusion with possible recommendations, and this is the purpose of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This focuses on presenting a summary of the study findings, conclusions and recommendations. The summary is presented based on the three specific study objectives. From it, the researcher draws a conclusion about China's influence on the Greater Horn of Africa's security landscape, using the case study of Kenya. Thereafter, the researcher presents the recommendations of the study.

5.1 Summary of Findings

This section provides a summary of the research findings based on three specific objectives: Reasons for China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa security; China's interests and their influence on the Kenya-China security relations from 2002 to 2022; challenges and opportunities that exist for greater Kenya-China cooperation on security. The summary is drawn from the in-depth analysis that was conducted in line with the three objectives. The data used in the analysis was collected from credible secondary sources and from primary sources using questionnaires and key informant interview. The study had a 66% response rate, which was sufficient to inform about the influence that China has had on Kenya's security landscape between 2002 and 2022.

5.1.1 Reasons for China's Interest in the Greater Horn of Africa Security

The focus of the first objective was on the reasons why China, which previously had been non-interventionist, changed its stand and is now interested in playing a greater role in the security of the Greater Horn of Africa region. This is a region that is confronted with diverse security challenges, and China has showed great interest in helping it overcome the security issues that it faces. The study established that access to natural resources is a key driver to

China's growing interest in the stability of the region. 74% of the respondents expressed that China is interested in benefiting from the natural resources in the Greater Horn of Africa. It was determined that energy demand in China has skyrocketed in the last three decades, and China has emerged the largest importer of crude oil in the world to help it meet the rising energy demand. This interest has seen China become the largest investor in oil in South Sudan and is also eyeing the gas deposits in Ethiopia. For this reason, maintaining a peaceful and secure region is of utmost importance because then China is assured of uninterrupted flow of these resources. China understands that conflict and other insecurities can hinder its natural resources exploration operations in the Greater Horn of African region.

The study also established that the second reason that China has shown keen interest in the security of this region is to safeguard its current investments. 32% of the respondents agreed on this. The Greater Horn of Africa also holds great investment potential. China, therefore, wants to maintain a conducive environment for its future investments in the region. It was determined that between 2000 and 2019, 22.6% of the total China funding went to seven of the Greater Horn of Africa countries. This is almost a quarter of its total funding globally in the period, which makes it highly necessary to safeguard such huge investments. The security efforts also aim at safeguarding China's trading interests in the region. The Greater Horn of African lies along a strategic sea route and, because of its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a popular transit route for oil and gas from the Gulf nations to Asia, Europe and US. This means that the Greater Horn of Africa has a direct impact on China's global trading engagements.

Additionally, the countries in the Greater Horn of Africa region, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, are huge markets for China-produced goods. 42% of the respondents expressed that by getting involved in the security matters of the region, China is positioning itself to gain more

control of its trading operation in the Greater Horn of Africa states. The study established that as China continues to gain a more dominant position in trade in the greater Horn of Africa, the Chinese Yuan is likely to gain more strength in this region, and there is a possibility of de-dollarization. However, if this region focuses on increasing the value of its imports to China, it will have more bargaining power over important trade decisions with China. It was also determined that contrary to the West's belief, China does not seek to be more powerful than the US in the Greater Horn of Africa region. This is a narrative that has been developed and propagated by the West and is proven by the fact that unlike the US, China does not seek to impose its ideas on the nations in this region. 58% of the respondents even affirmed that it is more advantageous for the Greater Horn of Africa to forge closer ties with China than with the US. According to realism theory, nations are continually in pursuit of their interests, which explains the reason the Greater Horn of Africa states are associating more with China than with the West.

5.1.2 China's Interests and their Influence on Kenya-China Security Relations from 2002-2022

The second objective focused on establishing the influence that China has had on the military and economic security of Kenya between 2002 and 2022. The study established that the two administrations that ruled Kenya in these two decades were instrumental in forging close ties between Kenya and China. It began with President Kibaki, when he introduced the Look East Policy after taking over leadership of the nation in 2002. It was the most viable solution to help the nation achieve accelerated growth after many years of economic decline. President Uhuru strengthened these relations further during his term between 2012 and 2022.

Concerning the impact that China has had on the military in the two decades, this study established that China has played a key role in enhancing the capacity of the defence forces to

help Kenya secure its territorial borders and maintain a stable and peaceful internal environment. Among the military benefits that Kenya gained from China include opportunities for military training, military exchanges, supply of arms, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), cargo aircraft, helicopters, intelligence exchange, and donations of various military hardware. The study determined that China rose gradually as a preferred supplier of military hardware to Kenya in the two decades because it took steps to ensure that the military arms that they sell to Kenya are relatively cheaper, unattached to ulterior motives or monitoring, and it also provided superior trade terms such as customization and interoperability capabilities. Some downsides to the military hardware supplies from China were also noted. Some respondents expressed quality concerns and that China did not offer after-sales services as it was with supplies of military hardware from the USA.

On economic security, this study analysed the impact that Chinese FDI inflows has had on the country and the benefits from Kenya-China trade relations. It was determined that there was notable increase in Chinese FDI inflow to Kenya within the two decades, especially in the infrastructure development sector. On different occasions, Kibaki and Uhuru administrations were awarded huge amounts of concessionary loans from China that facilitated several development projects in the country such as roads, ports, railways, dams, among other infrastructures. Majority of the respondents agreed that these investments had a positive impact on economy, but a substantial number held a contrary viewpoint majorly because of the issue of Kenya's rising debt to China. These are concerns that have also been aired by other scholars. The study established that the concerns are worth the state's attention, but the diverse economic benefits that have emerged through development projects cannot be ignored. These range from growth of the real estate sector because of improved roads, increased regional connectivity, to mention but a few. Chinese firms have also invested in pharmaceutical, agriculture and technical industries in Kenya.

The study also established that the economy has benefited greatly from the trade relations with China. For instance, exports of agricultural commodities, such as avocado to China has created employment in the North Rift region, which is one of the leading regions in Kenya in the production of avocados.¹¹⁸ Chinese imports, such as affordable cars, mobile phones, and ‘boda bodas’ have also transformed Kenya’s business landscape and improved the quality of life of millions of people. It was also determined that the trade volumes between the two countries have increased despite a trade balance deficit that has persisted over the two decades. President Uhuru administration showed effort to reduce the gap by developing the Integrated National Exports Development and Promotion Strategy in 2018 and through the signing of six memoranda of understanding with China in early 2022 that address trade barriers. Their objective was to grow the value of Kenyan exports to China.

5.1.3 Challenges and Opportunities that Exist for Greater Kenya-China Cooperation in Security

The last objective of the study assessed the challenges that exist in Kenya-China relations and the opportunities that Kenya could leverage from this relationship to enhance its military and economic security. The study established that the greatest challenge was the unfavourable trade patterns between the two states. Trade balance has been in favour of China and Kenya’s trade deficit has widened over time. It was determined that although China is benefiting more, it is interested in the establishment of a win-win situation where both countries will benefit.

Another challenge identified is that Chinese products are adversely affecting Kenya’s manufacturing sector. This sector is largely under-developed compared to that of China, and

¹¹⁸ Kimuge, Stanley. "North Rift Farmers Make Sh100m from Avocados." Business Daily. Last modified October 10, 2022. <https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/north-rift-farmers-make-sh100m-from-avocados-3979116>.

its performance appears to have deteriorated further because of the availability of cheap goods from China. The closure of operations of manufacturers such as Eveready and Sameer Africa formerly Firestone tyre manufacturing business, are a clear indication that this sector has been greatly affected. Bata and the textile industries are also struggling because Chinese products have flooded the Kenyan market. Kenyan SMEs are also facing stiff competition from Chinese enterprises that have established base in Kenya. The unfavourable circumstances surrounding the establishment and running of SMEs in Kenya affect their competitiveness against Chinese FDIs. These circumstances include challenges in accessing capital, limited access to technology, lack of access to market information, and lack of skills. Additionally, the Chinese SMEs end up stocking cheaper Chinese products more than locally produced goods.

Concerning the opportunities that exist for Kenya from its relations with China, the study established that trade presents unlimited opportunities for Kenya. From the interviews, it was determined that the Chinese market already has a high demand for Kenyan products such as black tea, flowers, and coffee. An analysis of the relative competitive advantage of other Kenyan exports presented by Table 4.1 revealed that the demand of other commodities, such as oil seeds, nuts, pineapples, vegetables, meat, and hide among others was also increasing. Therefore, Kenya has an opportunity to concentrate on growing its export volumes and value addition of these products.

Another opportunity exists in technology transfer to enhance military industrialization for the Kenyan military to achieve self-reliance through local production of a variety of military hardware. Other areas of technology transfer identified were infrastructure development and manufacturing. It was determined that so far China has made various efforts of technology transfer. These include ensuring skills transfer to Kenyans during infrastructure development, establishment of Luban workshop for technological skills development, establishment of automobile repair factory, ceramic factory, and a textile factory in Kenya.

The study determined that there is an opportunity for increased security cooperation between Kenya and China. Among the opportunities that Kenya's security forces could exploit are the military training opportunities in China, exchange programmes for military technicians, and also asking China to offer support programmes that provide training on the use of military hardware acquired from this country. Greater security cooperation will be beneficial to help Kenya advance the military capabilities of its troops.

During the study, it was determined that China is ready to increase the number of military training slots that it offers to Kenya's security forces annually and that it can tailor-make them according to their needs. It is also ready to supply the military hardware that the country needs, and to engage in joint military exercises such as joint naval exercises.

Tourism was the other opportunity identified. Because of the growth in the relations between the two states, China has gradually emerged as a large tourist market that Kenya should exploit to improve the country's economy. For many decades, Kenya's tourism sector focused on West, but it should now diversify to China.

5.1.4 Overall Summary

This study established that China's influence on the Greater Horn of African security landscape is significant. The study also confirmed that the security of this region is of great interest to China because of the prevailing benefits derived from this region. Therefore, by participating in the security efforts in this region, it is guaranteed of uninterrupted flow of these resources. The study established that securing this region is also important to China because it is the largest beneficiary of Chinese investments compared to other regions in Africa, and it is also a huge market for Chinese manufactured goods.

5.2 Conclusions

In conclusion, China has played a significant role in the Greater Horn of Africa security

landscape. The region has grown in importance to China as a source of energy, a market for its manufactured goods and as a region where a substantial portion of China's total global investments are held. By promoting peace and stability of this region, China not only safeguards its interests, but most importantly, it is creating a conducive environment through which the development potential of the Greater Horn of Africa can be realized. Therefore, contrary to the narrative that China is seeking to gain more control in the region than the US, China has proven that it does not view the Greater Horn of Africa as an arena for power competition with the US.

Concerning the influence that China interests have had on Kenya-China security relations between 2002 and 2022, it can be concluded that its impact on the military and economic security of Kenya in the two decades was significant. China has proven itself to be a necessary ally who has a solid plan of making Kenya more secure militarily and economically prosperous for the benefit of all. China has been instrumental in enhancing the capacity of Kenya's security forces through supply of military hardware. Its investments in the country, particularly in the sector of infrastructure development have also created significant economic benefits, and the trade engagements have transformed the lives of millions of Kenyans.

Concerning the challenges that characterise the relationship between Kenya and China, diverse challenges were identified that require urgent solutions for the two states to enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship. The challenges identified included, persistent trade deficit, the adverse impact of Chinese imports on the local manufacturing sector, and the negative effect of Chinese investments on local SMEs.

On the other hand, China presents Kenya with great opportunities that when exploited, will bring even greater positive transformation to military and economic security. These opportunities lie in trade, security cooperation, technology transfer, and tourism.

5.3 Recommendations

In light of the study findings, the researcher makes the following recommendations:

The first research objective on reasons for China's interest in the Greater Horn of Africa security established that China views the Greater Horn of Africa as a region that holds significant development potential. Therefore, to help Kenya realize its development potential, the government must focus on fostering stronger ties with China.

The objective on the challenges and opportunities that exists for greater Kenya-China cooperation established that many opportunities exist that Kenya can leverage to maintain mutually beneficial relations with China. Firstly, the Ministry of Agriculture should cooperate with the State Department for Industry to promote greater industrialization in the agricultural sector for value addition of its agricultural exports. This will also motivate increased production among farmers, shield Kenya against unfavourable trade balance with China and from other possible adverse trade shocks. Further, the State Department for Trade must promote export-led growth of the agricultural sector to boost production of commodities that have recorded high demand in the Chinese market and which Kenya has comparative advantage to grow, such as coffee, black tea, flowers, macadamia, pineapples, to mention but a few.

The State Department of Industrialization must drive the growth of the manufacturing sector to transform Kenya into African's manufacturing hub by attracting Chinese investors to establish more plants for production of goods for the global market and at the same time engaging local players to ensure significant technology transfer.

The Ministry of Co-operatives and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development must develop policies to create a favourable environment for the SMEs by creating specific loans or grants, and organizing training conferences and networking events. These efforts will enhance the competitiveness of local SMEs in the market.

Lastly, KDF and the Kenya Police Service (KPS) must plan to exploit the opportunities for training that China is ready to offer Kenya that will improve the capacity of these institutions to promote peace and security in the nation, region, and Africa in general. The security forces should develop agreements with China to supply high-quality military hardware and to avail the necessary support programs to facilitate training on their use. This will help to eliminate complaints about quality of the supplies from China among Kenya's security personnel. They should also leverage the opportunities that China presents of technology transfer through collaborations to enhance military industrialization, to enable Kenya produce military hardware locally and minimize the high dependency on Chinese military imports in the long-run.

5.4 Further Areas of Study

Having examined the influence that China has had on the Greater Horn of Africa security landscape, there is need for an in-depth analysis into how this compares to the impact that the US has had on the security of the region before China's emergence as a key strategic partner to the region.

This study also recommends for a detailed study to determine whether the presence of the Chinese military forces in Djibouti has had any significant impact on the security of the country.

Another area of study that could be explored is China's influence on the Kenya security landscape post-2020.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE



NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY- KENYA

Dear Sir/Madam

My name is Col. Victor N. Mburu. I am pursuing a Master Degree in National Security and Strategy at the National Defence College, Kenya (NDU-K). The topic for my research is China’s Influence on the Greater Horn of Africa Security Landscape: A Case Study of Kenya from 2002-2020. Kindly assist to complete the attached questionnaire to the best of your knowledge, understanding and experience. This information will be kept in strict confidence and utilized for academic purposes only

PART A: RESPONDENT INFORMATION

1. What is your designation.....
2. Work experience/Duration of service.....
3. Your gender.....
4. Your age
5. Highest Level of Education.....

PART B: CHINA'S INTEREST IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA'S SECURITY

1. China’s interest in the greater Horn of Africa region has increased in the last two decades. Do you agree?
 - i. Strongly agree []
 - ii. Agree []

- iii. Disagree []
- iv. Strongly Disagree []

2. Explain you answer

3. Why do you think China is interested in forging strong security relations with the Greater Horn of Africa? Tick more than one.

- i. To garner more power in the region than US []
- ii. To protect its investments in the region []
- iii. To benefit from the resources in the Greater Horn of Africa []
- iv. To safeguard it trading engagements []
- v. Other.....

4. Are China’s interests in the Greater Horn of Africa similar to those of the US?
 Yes [] No []

If no, explain your answer.....

5. How has China’s presence in the Horn of African affected US influence in the region?

- i. US influence in the region has reduced []
- ii. US influence has increased []
- iii. No change has been observed on US influence in the region []

6. Is it more advantageous for the Greater Horn of Africa to forge closer ties with China than with the US?

Yes [] No []

If yes, explain your answer

PART C: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF KENYA-CHINA RELATIONS FROM 2002-2022.

1. Did the Kibaki regime and Uhuru regime forge stronger relations with China than the previous administrations?

Yes [] No []

2. In what ways has Kenya benefited militarily from China in the last two decades? Please tick in the box.

- i. China has supplied Kenya with arms []
- ii. China has supplied Kenya with armoured vehicles []
- iii. China has supplied Kenya with security equipment []
- iv. List other benefits.....

3. Do the military benefits from China differ from the military benefits from the US?

Yes [] No []

Explain your answer.....

4. On a scale of 1-5 indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about Kenya-China relations and its impact on Kenya’s economic security between 2002 and 2022. 1=Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Neutral; 4=Disagree; 5=Strongly Disagree (Tick in the boxes).

	1	2	3	4	5
v. There has been significant growth in the trade volumes between Kenya and China in the last two decades.					
vi. China’s foreign direct investment in Kenya has increased in the last two decades.					

vii. China's development aid in the last two decades has had positive impact on Kenya's economy.					
viii. Overall, China has played a critical role to the improvement of Kenya's economy in the last two decades.					

PART D: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT EXIST FOR GREATER KENYA-CHINA COOPERATION IN SECURITY.

1. What has been the trend in the trade balances of Kenya and China in the last two decades?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

2. Is the flow of Chinese manufactured goods a risk factor to de-industrialization in Kenya and loss of employment?

Yes [] No []

Please explain your answer.....

3. Do the Chinese SMEs present a threat, in term of competition, to the Kenyan-owned SMEs?

Yes [] No []

Please explain your answer.....

4. In what ways can China help to enhance Kenya's national security?

.....

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

5. Can technology transfer from China help boost industrialization in Kenya?

Yes [] No []

Please explain.....

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Country of Origin.....

What is your Designation?

Work experience/Duration of service.....

1. In your opinion, what attracted China to the Greater Horn of Africa?
2. In what way does China benefit from having a bigger role in the Greater Horn of Africa Security?
3. Is gaining more influence than US in the Greater Horn of Africa a priority for China?
4. What kind of relations has China shared with Kenya's military over the last two decades?
5. In what ways has China participated in Kenya's economy between 2002 and 2022?
6. What type of goods does China import from Kenya?
7. In what ways can China help to improve Kenya's national security landscape?
8. What opportunities exist in China to further Kenya's economic growth?
9. How can China help Kenya boost its industrialization capacity?
10. What are your final comments on Kenya-China security relations?

APPENDIX III: INTRODUCTORY LETTER

Telephone: 254-2-884036
Fax: 254-2-884036
E-mail: ndc@ndc.go.ke



National Defence College
Warai North Road
P.O Box 24381
Karen - Nairobi
Kenya

When replying please quote:

Ref: NDC/A/141

13 March 2023

The Principal Secretary
State Department of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign & Diaspora Affairs
P O Box 30551-00100
NAIROBI

FACILITATION FOR COL VICTOR N MBURU ADMN No. ND601/0005/2022

The above Senior Officer is a course participant at the National Defence College and has been admitted for Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategy, under the National Defence University- Kenya Programme.

As part of academic requirements, Col Victor MBURU is required to undertake a research project in partial fulfillment of MA degree programme he is enrolled in. His approved research topic is "China's Influence on the Greater Horn of Africa's Security Landscape: A Case Study of Kenya from 2002 to 2022".

The purpose of this letter is to kindly request your office to facilitate the Officer as he conducts his research project.

Submitted for your kind consideration and facilitation.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'L. EPETET'.

L. EPETET
Lieutenant Colonel
College Coordinator
for Commandant

