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## The Nature of Community Armed Groups in Northern Kenya: a framework of Territoriality and Ethnicity

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### Abstract

*In this article, we analyze the fluidity of territoriality—state control or influence of space, looking at how community-based armed groups (CBAGs) from the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana ethnic communities take advantage of semi-territoriality—spaces with limited state security personnel. We analyze the conflict belt—areas in north and west of Samburu County bordering Baringo north and Turkana east, giving an understanding of how the change of norms and development impact the dynamics of conflict and violence in Samburu. The article benefits from our research experiences and networks from the community policing ICT4COP—EU Horizon 2020<sup>1</sup> and the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 228 project on Future Rural Africa.<sup>2</sup> Our empirical evidence was gathered from 34 interviews with key informants, such as state representatives and civil society officials, and 11 focus group discussions with communities in Samburu and Turkana. The findings show that the fluidity of state-territoriality has an impact on human security, leading to community mistrust of the security forces. We recommend robust community-oriented policing (COP) as a devolved security strategy, strengthening a public-private partnership (PPP)—a hybrid of the private sectors and government in policing work and civil societies and communities in helping to monitor and evaluate the police. Additionally, mapping illegal arms and CBAGs through clan structures is a community-oriented strategy that helps strengthen territoriality and counter semi-territoriality.*

**Keywords:** Community-based Armed Groups, Land and Boundary Conflict, Territoriality, Semi-territoriality, and Kenya

## Introduction

Africa is facing rapid development through infrastructure, leading to imaginary development corridors (Dye, 2016; Enns, 2018). These developments have continuously attracted geographers, explaining the change in landscape value and how such changes create socio-political tension in the frontier (see for example, Enns, 2019; Kirshner & Power, 2015; Lesutis, 2019; Mosley & Watson, 2016). However, there is still little attention on how these changes impact the dynamics of conflict and violence, looking at the future of pastoralists from a human security perspective, how the changing of land-use value shapes territoriality—states control or influence of spaces or how organized violence—legitimization and monopoly of the use of force is taking shape in the frontier.

Territoriality can help to analyze the direct use of property such as land, and it can also help analyze state sovereignty—the control of political geography, including organizational structures (Sack, 1983). In this article, we use territoriality in the context of spatial analysis; the use of land among the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana pastoralists, and states sovereignty and control of its political geography, looking at how Community-based Armed Groups (hereafter CBAGs) impact human security in what we describe as the conflict belt—spaces which are underdeveloped, with limited presence of state security, and characterized by competition over resources such as pasture, and water.

CBAGs are militia groups, vigilantes, or gangs who gain legitimacy by protecting their ethnic communities from insecurity and crime. In the case of the pastoralists, they are the age-set of the male gender who are between 16 to 35-years, and they protect their communities, however, sometimes they take advantage of limited state presence and conduct criminal activities. These groups sometimes act as an instrument of political patrons and are an economic gain to organized criminals (Schuberth, 2019). The state sometimes legitimizes these groups for political gain, but they have no motive of overthrowing the government. They can have an international characteristic, especially when their ethnic communities live across international borders; however, they have no intention of attracting international attention like violent extremist groups (Okwany, 2023).

The Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu CBAGs take advantage of the terrain in areas bordering Suguta Valley, and we define these spaces as the conflict belt. The locations are Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, Charda, Mbukoi, Lokwanya and Moruakiring, Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, and Parkati in northern Samburu (See, Figure 1 below). Development and state security forces are limited in these spaces, giving the CBAGs a semi-territoriality advantage to exist. The areas are dominated by militarization—the youth protecting their communities and practicing warriorhood. However, the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu CBAGs do not only protect their communities but also take advantage of uncertainty and steal from their ethnic community, causing unrest and insecurity. Sometimes the groups practice roadside banditry, cattle theft, and stealing from town shops. We investigate such a scenario, adding to the body of knowledge on violence and territoriality literature, as much of the academic work focuses on traditional violence of cattle raids. However, there is a literature gap on how CBAGs take advantage of semi-territoriality and how the involvement of the state and development ventures are shaping such spaces to territoriality in the context of organized violence.

The fluidity of territoriality is a problem in the conflict belt; it leads to semi-territoriality—spaces where it is difficult to identify state institutions such as the police or, if they exist, the police have limited capacity seen in many ways, including small bases and lack of


adequate personal and security hardware; this scenario gives the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana CBAGs an advantage to exist, and there is limited research to understand the conflict belt, particularly with the framework of territoriality and the effect and dynamics of organized violence. In the past, government policy initiatives have not been effective, ordering disarmament initiatives and curfews and employing police reservists—community scouts to help with the security situation. However, such initiatives are limited due to the capacity, resources, and accessibility of the terrain. Thus, there is a need for robust policies such as public-private partnership (PPP) initiatives and community involvement through community-oriented policing (COP)—building trust, a proactive, reassuring, problem-oriented, and problem-solving initiative with the communities to manage security in these areas.

As such, the article draws empirical evidence from 34 interviews and 11 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) collected from April to December 2022, with a follow-up in January and February 2023 in Samburu County. These interviews are triangulated with the existing literature, demonstrating how the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana CBAGs impact human security in areas we define as the conflict belt. We show ethnic imagined boundaries, how government norms such as devolution change the dynamic of the conflict, and the CBAGs take advantage of semi-territoriality. The following research questions are the central theme of the article; 1) how does development impact the conflict belt area in Samburu? 2) how do the community-based armed groups take advantage of the fluid nature of territoriality? and 3) what are the existing strategies suitable to enhance development and security?

We begin with conceptualizing territoriality, giving an understanding and its relevance to the analysis of the CBAGs. In addition, we reveal the difference between state-territoriality and ethnic-territoriality. Thereafter, we show the fluidity nature of territoriality, shifting to semi-territoriality, showing how the CBAGs take advantage of such fluidity. Our analysis focuses on the boundary, ethnicity, land conflict, the fluid nature of territoriality, and COP as a strategy to strengthen state control.

## **Figure 1**

*Map of Samburu showing the conflict belt and the dominant areas by the three ethnic groups<sup>3</sup>*



## Theory: Territoriality and Semi-territoriality

Territoriality connotes control of space or influencing access, action, or interaction by means of applying the use of force or power. It implies spaces where the state controls and has a monopoly of violence. Sack (1983) points out that territoriality is commonly defined as defense and asserting dominance over space. It implies states' political and spatial control or influence of the socio-ecological landscape of an area (Brenner & Elden, 2009; Elden, 2010). It is what Hansen (2019) describes as a state control scenario, and such a scenario is not always suitable for areas with weak security personnel.

Territoriality can be asserted through cultural norms, state laws, or regulation of behavior. The concept does not connote a physical space but a behavior in the physical space; it implies an action-reaction relationship between the person asserting control and the one being controlled, encompassing the powerful assertion of rules and regulation that governs the relationship. Territoriality is socially constructed, while territory is not. The former does not exist unless there is a relationship of action-reaction, while the latter implies physical distance (Sack, 1973). However, distance affects territoriality. The high presence of law enforcers or regulations in space suggests more influence or control, while the distance between the controller and the controlled means weak territoriality (Okwany & Owino, 2022).

For this reason, treating distance as nonrelational risks exhausting the definition of territoriality (Sack, 1973). A psychological aspect validates that territoriality can exist even with the social distance, winning hearts and minds through the controller's behavior (Okwany, 2023). The social and psychological aspect of territoriality means the concept is more abstract than territory. Territoriality helps with the level of analysis, giving an understanding of the implication of security strategies, the existence of the CBAGs, and how these groups take advantage of the fluidity nature of state control.

## Ethnicity and territoriality

Ethnicity and territoriality can be understood from the concept organized violence—monopoly and legitimate use of force, which explains security of the state or national security; this definition is characterized by some Eurocentric biases which evolved with the concept nation-state, a politico-territorial unity with homogeneous culture and language which offer social cohesion and eases tension due to resource distribution. However, the concept state security ignores the ethnic territories within the African state leading to tension and challenges of social cohesion, particularly, when there is limited resource distribution and state capacity to govern spaces with ethnic boundary contestation (Thomas & Saravanamuttu, 1989). Schlee (2022) summarizes the nexus between territoriality and ethnicity, pointing at language and the social aspect of monopolizing control of space. The British colonial government created ethnic boundaries, which promoted ethnic-territoriality in Northern Kenya to date. They escalated ethnic boundaries by identifying ‘tribal grazing areas.’ Those found grazing in the wrong territory were fined 10% of their livestock. Schlee (2013) affirms that the pastoral communities did not understand such a fine but thought it was a sign of the survival of the British, who also needed to live and eat.

Ethnic-territoriality differs from state-territoriality; the former implies a subjective monopoly of control/influence among a particular tribe or ethnic group. It is what Moreno (1999, p. 63) describes as “conflict and political mobilizations” by “ethnic groups which possess a geographical underpinning” or what Cornell (2002, p. 6) loosely defines as “ethnicity linked to territorial control.” It is what Moore (2016) refers to as ethnic-territoriality. Thus, ethnicity subject outsiders or different tribes to the practices and culture of the dominant tribe. On the other hand, the state-territoriality concept implies a collective monopoly of control of a particular physical and social space. Citizens within the jurisdiction of the state should enjoy equal rights without being subjected to a group or tribe. In this article, we demonstrate how ethno-territoriality explains the manifestation of conflict and violence. We further give attention to state-territoriality, demonstrating how state initiatives such as community-oriented policing (COP) helps increase state influence, and how CBAGs from the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu ethnic groups take advantage of what we describe as semi-territoriality.

Semi-territoriality implies spaces where it is difficult to identify state institutions like the police force, or if they exist, they have small bases. The state sometimes has strong military patrols or campaigns; however, the campaigns are not maintained (Hansen, 2019). Sometimes semi-territoriality is characterized by the state ignoring some spaces due to limited security resources or state disinterest in such areas (Okwany, 2023). The Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu CBAGs take advantage of such limitation and neglect; thus, they sometimes relatively control these spaces (Okwany & Owino, 2022). Such a scenario is our focus, analyzing how the CBAGs take advantage of the fluidity of territoriality and giving existing strategies to enhance development and security.

Semi-territoriality is characterized by power vacuum, and politicians and influential individuals in such communities break power; they are the principal negotiators of the community, and support to the CBAGs is critical to the power brokers' survival. In this context, CBAGs' access to illegal arms is a powerful political weapon, and the support of cattle raids culture and boundary conflict proves advantageous to the patron who uses the CBAGs as their clients. Thus, violence in northern Kenya is fueled by the dynamics of ethno-territoriality politics. The local politicians form what Greiner (2013, p. 236) refers to as “unholy alliance”—coalitions among ethnic groups fighting each other and Resolve Network (2020) affirms that both the political class and CBAGs take advantage of the confluence of weak governance.

## **Land use and the changing dynamics of conflict and violence**

Economists measure land use by how the fixed area of land is affected by the demand for economic expansion and growth. They measure how land is used per individual/land ratio, per person km squared (Hardie, Parks, Gottleib, & Wear, 2000; Seeley, 1976). Northern Kenya demonstrates the increasing population, investors, and the use and privatization of land, which changes the value of land, boundaries, and its use, leading to more stress, conflict, and human insecurity. The pastoral communities in Samburu continue to receive government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) development interventions that shape these spaces from semi-territoriality to territoriality. As a result, there is increased security in these spaces, and the pastoral livelihood is shrinking due to new laws and environmental changes.

The heightened arms race between the Cold War rivalry—United States-led western alliance versus the Soviet Union, which lasted from 1947-1991, escalated the changes and dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa from the 1980-1990s, giving arms to their supporters and fueling proxy wars in the region, and the pastoralist accessed the guns due to the porous borders between Kenya and its neighbors (Mulugeta, 2017; Sharamo & Mesfin, 2011). As such, the Cold War effects of the arms race led to illegal arms and violence in northern Kenya (Branch, 2014), increasing cattle raids, violence over land, insecurity, and risk to human lives (van der Hoeven, 2021). In addition, the insecurity created by the community-based armed groups (CBAGs) taking advantage of the limited presence of state security existed but was exacerbated towards the 1990s (Kamungi, 2013; Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). These periods the beginning of the 1990s came with the multiparty democracy—the repealing of section 2(a) of the Kenyan constitution, introducing democratic elections in 1991, an advantage to the political class from northern Kenya to champion their dominance through political campaigns, and funding the CBAGs to protect their interests. Thus, multiparty escalated land conflict, ethnicity, and violence among the pastoralist communities.

Most of the CBAGs' increased attacks heighten during the electoral campaign period or after election results, and these periods escalate conflict among political rivals. For example, the Turkana CBAGs shot an airplane, killing 46 police and the district commissioner, James Nyandoro, after raiding Rendile and Samburu cattle in 1996 before the 1997 general election (Ltipalei, Kivuva, & Jonyo, 2020). The 2007 post-election violence gave an advantage to the CBAGs protecting their communities, escalating violence, and discriminating against other ethnic communities (Schuberth, 2019).

The November 10th, 2012, killings of the police in Suguta Valley affirms a repeat of the CBAGs action of 1996. The killings described Suguta Valley as the 'valley of death' after the massacre that led to the killing of 42 Kenyan policemen by Turkana CBAGs (Manga, 2012). Both 1996 and 2012 led to curfews, torture, and thousands fleeing their homes due to the security forces' reaction to the killings. Just after the August general election of 2022, the Pokot CBAGs took advantage of semi-territoriality, killing eight general service unit (GSU) police and two civilians in Namariat close to Kapedo, Napeitom ward in Turkana East; the newly elected William Kipchirchir Samoei Arap Ruto's regime retaliated similarly with multi-agency security to root out the CBAGs (Okwany & Owino, 2022).

The Kenya police inherited the traditional British colonial government of recruiting tribal police known as the administration police to help with the problem of semi-territoriality. They were voluntary police known as Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs), introduced in 1948 as home guards (Mutsotso, 2018). Such recruitment of voluntary police continued in the post-colonial

government with changes in their administration. In the 1980s, they were under the chiefs' jurisdiction and given guns to protect their communities and pastoral livelihood (Okumu, Bukari, Sow, & Onyiego, 2017). However, the KPRs were poorly vetted, and their remuneration was low, sometimes not paid, leading some of them to support cattle raids and banditry (Sharamo, 2014). The ineffectiveness led the government to reduce KPRs recruitment, which was advantageous to the CBAGs' operation (Okwany, 2023).

The introduction to the devolved government came with a similar policy of recruiting the KPRs, and the Samburu County government re-introduced the recruitment of voluntary tribal police—mostly warriors known as community rangers (Okumu, 2022). The policy initiative for recruiting the rangers is due to the lack of police personnel. Thus, rangers are states' supplementary security forces, helping with local and immediate insecurity issues. Still, their effectiveness is not different, and their remuneration is not better than the KPRs (Okwany, 2023); this illustrates how traditional violence continues to occur/operate in northern Kenya. However, there is limited empirical evidence on the fluidity of state-territoriality and how CBAGs operate within such fluidity and take control of ungoverned spaces. The general lack of empirical data requires further research but also highlights the importance of our contribution to the field.

The competition and contestation over land has been a driver of violence at the national level. For example, the introduction of multiparty in 1992 and the electoral violence of 2007 prove the land conflict, the importance of the CBAGs as protectors of the community, and the powerful renegotiating and protecting of boundaries. However, such protection promotes ethnic territoriality, which is different from state-territoriality—promoting state influence through organized violence. In addition, development such as the large-scale infrastructure—the Lamu Port South Sudan Transport Corridor (LAPSSSET) and its component, such as the Isiolo airport is creating contestation and competition over land and justifying the CBAGs involvement in ethnic violence (Owino & Okwany, n.d.), mining and discoveries such as geothermal energy, and conservancies are creating new conflicts and violence. These developments lead the political class/elites to negotiate their interests carefully and take advantage of the CBAGs whenever their interests are in question (Okwany, 2023).

Development is projected from a human perspective, pushing the agenda of people-centered to it and the sustainability of such action (UNDP, 1994). However, the reality points to different outcomes. Sustainable development is costly because it involves growth through exploitation but also taking care of the environment, continually stressed by scarce resources, the changing environmental conditions, and the involvement of new actors, shapes, and shrinks pastoral land. The 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) focus on the following agendas; 1) People—pushing for empowerment and equality 2) Prosperity—sustainable economic growth 3) Peace and social justice—working towards an inclusive world society 4) Planet—urgent action on climate justice, and lastly 5) Partnership at the global, national and local level (Carlsen & Bruggemann, 2022; Fritz et al., 2019). Thus, SDGs connect security and peace to the development agenda. However, international interventions on security have proven to miscalculate the security of civilians, and equally, state application of hard power—military control influences the security of civilians negatively (Okwany, 2020b).

Development is imagined through 'modernity,'<sup>4</sup> valuing some lives over others, and it is pushed through the extractive accumulation of capital and pushing for territoriality by a complex integration of state and private interests (Lesutis, 2020). Such integration continuously increases global capital expansion, stressing pastoral livelihood. Samburu demonstrates an assemblage of

state and private actors, Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT), an NGO with a conservation agenda—protecting pastoral land and wildlife through community-oriented policing (COP) initiatives, dominating in Samburu east since 1995 to date, and is today cooperating with the County and national government to create the conservancies (NRT, 2020). The dominance of NRT in the north is questionable and a challenge to state-territoriality.

Schetter, Mkutu, and Müller-Koné (2022) prove that it is not clear whether the NRT is an agent of peace or escalating violence and land conflict. However, Mkutu (2020) earlier revealed that the NGO is an agent of violence, he affirmed that the NRT security agents—rangers guarding the conservancies are involved in criminal activities. Such development shapes land use, shrinks pastoral grazing areas, and changes their livelihood through territoriality. Essentially, COP is a better strategy that includes a public-private partnership (PPP)—a hybrid security that creates a collaboration between private entities such as NRT and the government security fraternity to counter the semi-territoriality scenario in northern Kenya. However, Samburu County affirms that the PPP strategy is applied through monopolizing and legitimizing the use of force.

The National Police Service (NPS) Act 2011 (amended in 2012) stipulates such PPP through the leadership and coordination of the NPS to enhance security. However, COP in Kenya is politicized (Lid & Okwany, 2019). In addition, it is an instrument government uses for surveillance rather than being a philosophy to create trust among the community (Okwany, 2020a, 2023), and it fails to be a strategic instrument for proactive, reassuring, partnering, problem-oriented, and problem-solving (Lid & Okwany, 2020). Thus, the Kenyan government and the NRT apply COP as a strategy for territoriality, used through organized violence—legitimizing and monopolizing the use of force.

Greiner (2013) pointed to territoriality in Northern Kenya, demonstrating boundary re-making, sedentarization—the communal use of spaces for long and claim ownership, and the spread of conservation and agriculture, which does not consider or compensate pastoral livelihood, causing pressure over boundaries. All these elements are components of increasing the land use value through increasing privatization and state security presence. Such privatization, re-making of boundaries, and developments are our focus on explaining territoriality. We shall demonstrate later in this article the element of ethnic territoriality as the behavior of the government increasing control in northern Kenya due to development and the increase of land use value, and CBAGs taking advantage of spaces with limited state security control and push for dominance and survival through, selling illegal weapons and using them for highway banditry, livestock theft for commercialization, and cattle rustling practices.

The presence of CBAGs in Sub Sahara Africa affirms the complexity of security on the continent. They take advantage of the limited presence of state security or resources. These groups have various goals, from protecting community land to promoting the ideology and identity of their ethnic group, but they also safeguard resources and territory. Evidence-based information concerning hybrid security to control and limit the CBAGs' behavior and their internal and external drivers is challenging and constructive because some groups can gain support from the government, others from external sources, while most get support from their ethnic community and the political class (Resolve Network, 2020; Schubert, 2019), and Okwany (2023) affirms that such challenges affect policy interventions to fight the CBAGs.

The presence of CBAGs is not new in Kenya; political parties and leaders have funded CBAGs to threaten their opponents or supporters. These CBAGs have been active during Kenyan election periods, which are typically tense, and have been used by politicians to instigate

ethnic clashes. While presumably unofficially funded by political elites, CBAGs are not legally established and thus not formally recognized as state security organs. However, they can be used by these political elites. For instance, in Kenya's 2007, 2013, and 2017 elections, politicians instrumentalized CBAGs such as the Mungiki. The Mungiki participated in post-election violence, offering security to the Kikuyu ethnic community, targeted by other united communities opposing the election results (Lid & Okwany, 2020).<sup>5</sup> The 2017 electoral dispute protests affirmed the Mungiki's pro-Jubilee government stance, as the group was also part of the police abuse of the protestors. Human Rights Watch recorded both the Mungiki and the police killing 37 people between September and November 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2018), an illustrative example of the connection between CBAGs and the political class, targeting the opposing side, thus challenging the implementation of security policies, and the conflict belt in Samburu which we exhaustively discuss below, reveals such scenario.

### **Result and analysis: Imagined boundaries, ethnicity, and land conflict**

The conflict and violence among the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu ethnic communities have escalated over the years due to externally imposed 'artificial' boundaries by the historical colonial government, separating ethnic groups and disturbing their way of life. The three ethnic communities have co-existed for generations with conflict and violence triggered by the fight for pasture, water, and cattle raids.<sup>6</sup> The colonial government escalated the conflict by demarcating the ethnic boundaries, favoring some ethnic communities over others, leading to historical injustices such as the exclusion of the Turkana and Pokot communities living in Samburu.<sup>7</sup> As such, historical injustices escalated the pastoral conflicts over land use.

The promulgation of the 2010 constitution created county government structures, allocating resources in Northern Kenya, giving access to roads, and expanding territoriality through devolved government. Such changes have also escalated imagined boundaries, ethnic conflict, and violence. Our observations proved that county resource allocation is skewed towards the Samburu population, which has better schools and built water points. At the same time, areas occupied by the Turkana and Pokot ethnic community are less developed, stressed with water, and has poor roads.<sup>8</sup> Baragoi town exemplifies the demarcation of imagined boundaries. The main road divides Baragoi into Turkana-dominated areas towards the west and the Samburu-dominated regions towards the east. Most state security forces, water points, schools, and hospitals are on the Samburu imagined boundary. As a result, the town is disposed to conflict and violence between the Turkana and Samburu. The Samburu bandits killing a teacher 200 meters outside the gate of Baragoi Boys secondary school demonstrate such violence. Bandits' bullets sprayed Cyrus Kirukura, a Turkana teacher at Baragoi boys, in July before the August 2022 general elections.<sup>9</sup>

In reducing this increased violence and friction between the indigenous communities created by the new changes, the state has created buffer zones, demarcating huge pastoral land as protected conservancies, infrastructure project areas, and the Kenya defense forces occupying vast pastoral land for military training.<sup>10</sup> These state initiatives and development increase state-territoriality in marginalized spaces. Samburu exemplifies such facts, and the County leads with community conservancies—vast protected land by the state to neutralize conflict and violence among Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana. For example, Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) has partnered with the Samburu County government to manage conservancies in the east and west of Samburu. The county government has created conservancies in the northern aiming for further collaboration with NRT in managing the north, Baragoi (see figure one above); however, the

lack of flourishing flora and fauna in the north delays such partnership since NRT has an economic focus as opposed to the NGOs hyped concentration on conservation.<sup>11</sup> Military occupation in the Kawaap location, northern Samburu, confirms the creation of a buffer zone to stop violence in the conflict belt along Tuum and Kawaap territories. Such infrastructure developments that come with the occupation help to access the terrain and maintain order.<sup>12</sup>

Developments such as devolution, conservation, and infrastructures such as roads are shaping the dynamics of conflict and violence in Samburu. For example, conservation is shrinking pastoral land and increasing militarization in the conservancies; NRT is employing rangers to guard the investments with the aim of natural resource management, an increase of territoriality through organized violence in the conservancies, which is shrinking grazing land. The access to roads is expanding state control of these spaces but also giving the CBAGs access to illegal markets, leading to the commercialization of meat and cattle theft. The main roads are easily accessible but with limited security forces, and extreme weather patterns and droughts create stress for food, giving the CBAGs an advantage to rob *M-Pesa*—mobile money automated teller machine (ATMS) and other retail shops.<sup>13</sup>

Locations such as Marti, Nachola, and Kawaap, stretching towards Suguta Valley and bordering Baragoi town in Samburu north, are rich in pasture. The same applies to the land along Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, west of Samburu. In comparison, areas such as Tuum location are favored by water from mount Nyiro but with less pasture.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, these areas have a limited presence of state security with poor road access, giving the CBAGs an advantage in the fight over pasture and water. In addition, the increased presence of illegal arms in the region has led to road hijackings, cattle theft, and stealing from retail shops.<sup>15</sup>

The Pokot ethnic group dominates the Amaiya triangle—an area bordering north of Baringo County, southeast of Turkana County, and Samburu west, neighboring Longewan and Pura in Samburu County. The Turkana occupies Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, Parkati, and the lower part of Samburu north in Moruakiring towards Suguta Valley (see figure 1 above), which Samburu claim as part of their land, leading to contestation over the pasture. These Turkana-dominated areas are neighboring Samburu ethnic communities in Masikita, Baragoi, and Tuum, respectively (see figure one showing Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu-dominated regions). Consequently, the areas are predisposed to ethnic conflict, road hijacking, and banditry. Suguta Valley runs along the borders of Samburu and Turkana and ends in the northern part of Baringo. Although the areas occupied by the Pokot and Turkana characterize semi-territoriality, it is underdeveloped and has harsh terrains with poor road access, giving the CBAGs an advantage to operate.<sup>16</sup> However, the increase in development and access to illegal weapons, mobile phones, and access to roads is reshaping the dynamics of conflict and violence in these areas.

Devolution—transfer of functions, services, and power to the counties increases local resource allocation but also encourages imagined boundaries, borderland contestation—Samburu claiming county resources and discriminating the minority Turkana and Pokot in Samburu County, escalating tribal domination in political offices and resource allocation.<sup>17</sup> The conflict belt—Longewan and Pura areas in Suguta Marmar central Samburu bordering Baringo and Turkana east, and northern Samburu; locations such as Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, and Parkati (see figure 1 above) has triggered such political boundary demarcation, and land contestation, leading to further conflict and violence.<sup>18</sup>

Ethnic tension can be observed in the areas mentioned above, where Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu co-exist and have created imaginary boundaries. However, the conflict is not just tribal; different clans from the same ethnic groups steal from each other. Such stealing promotes

banditry among the CBAGs.<sup>19</sup> The Pokot ethnic community invades Suguta Valley as a rescue for their pastoral livelihood, while Samburu communities claim Suguta Valley as their ancestral land invaded by the Turkana.<sup>20</sup> Equally, the Turkana claim Suguta Valley and the bordering locations such as Parkati, Kawaap, Nachola, and Marti as their ancestral land.<sup>21</sup> Such claims prove ethnic division, which creates imaginary boundaries and conflict. The rivers, mountains, and grasslands demarcate the pastoral communities' imaginary borders. However, the development of ethnic boundaries through devolution, the discovery of minerals, the envisioned geothermal in the Suguta trough, and the anticipation of conservancies and large-scale infrastructure such as the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport corridor (LAPSSET) in Samburu north are creating boundary tension among these three ethnic groups.<sup>22</sup>

The 2010 constitution gave more powers to the elected county officials than the president-appointed administrators, and the Samburu ethnic group dominated the elected offices; these changes undermined the appointed chiefs in the Pokot and Turkana-dominated areas.<sup>23</sup> The majority Samburu ethnic group occupies Samburu County leadership, putting the smaller ethnic groups, such as Turkana and Pokot ethnic communities, into the sideline regarding resource allocation and conflict resolution. As per the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission outcome of 2017, Samburu County had 26 Members of the County Assembly (MCAs), with only four from the Turkana ethnic group and non from the Pokot ethnic group who voted in Tiaty constituency, Baringo County, despite the Pokot living and getting support from Samburu County.<sup>24</sup> The 2022 election resulted in only one elected and one nominated Turkana MCAs.<sup>25</sup> Such county leadership domination by the Samburu escalates further conflict due to the structural nature of Kenya's politics of patron-client relationship. Thus, the dominant tribe benefits from resource allocation more than the minority tribe.<sup>26</sup> The minority Pokot Turkana in Samburu County believe that the state subjects them because the Samburu tribe dominates the leadership in the County; they tend to be in opposition to the government policies, leading to a confrontation with state security policies and initiatives, thus, further increasing the level of conflict and violence in the southwest and northwest of Samburu County.<sup>27</sup>

Despite developments and resource allocation through devolution to Samburu County, ethnic tension has escalated among the Turkana and Samburu tribes. It has strengthened ethnic boundaries leading to more conflict. The pastoral communities existed with imaginary boundaries, but devolved resources escalate ethnic benefits, tension, and marginalization.<sup>28</sup> For example, Samburu County boundaries stretch to Suguta Valley and Amaiya triangle (see the map above). However, regarding resource allocation, the county leadership discriminates against the Turkana in Marti, Nachola, Parkati, and Suguta Valley, including the Pokot in the Amaiya triangle.<sup>29</sup> As such, discrimination and skewed resource allocation promotes conflict and justifies the existence of CBAGs to protect their respective communities.

### **The fluid nature of territoriality and the CBAGs' existence in the conflict belt.**

Territoriality offers a framework for understanding the existence of CBAGs. However, the fluid nature of the concept shifts it to semi-territoriality. There are spaces where the state has firm control, but such power is sometimes limited, giving the CBAGs an advantage to exist. However, despite the limitation, the state sometimes strengthens its operation to destabilize the existence of these groups.<sup>30</sup> Northern and western Samburu areas towards Suguta Valley confirm the fluid nature of state control —semi-territoriality.<sup>31</sup>

Locations such as Marti, Nachola, Suguta Valley, Parkati, Tuum, Kawaap, Baragoi, and Masikita in Samburu north, and Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, Samburu west are

underdeveloped compared to Maralal, Central Samburu and Wamba and Archers Post in Samburu east (see, figure 1 above). However, increased development leads to state security forces and control of these spaces. NRT is trying to introduce conservation management in the north, but the communities are skeptical of the NGO managing their conservancy as it does in the east.<sup>32</sup> Thus, insecurity in the north is more rampant compared to the east and central part of Samburu, which has a concentration of NGOs, mining, and wildlife for tourist attraction.<sup>33</sup>

The conflict belt along Suguta Valley, bordering Turkana County from the east, Samburu County from the west, and Baringo County from the north, characterizes semi-territoriality. There is a weak presence of the state, the terrain is difficult to access, and the mobile network is a challenge.<sup>34</sup> The police stations are a distance apart, 35 to 40 km<sup>2</sup> away from each other. In some cases, the CBAGs have better arms than the police, and they understand the terrain better than the security forces who are not familiar with these terrains. Sometimes the nearby police have limited personnel, about 8 to 10 in a station. The poor roads make it difficult for a quick response, and Suguta Valley demonstrates such a scenario.<sup>35</sup> The Pokot ethnic communities are closer to Marti location, about 25 to 30km away, an area Samburu County is reluctant to develop due to ethnic divisions between Pokot and Turkana tribes. Conflict, poor roads, and rampant cattle rustling characterize the area.<sup>36</sup> This area covers Charda, Mbukoi, Lokwanya, and Moruakiring, bordering Suguta valley, a conflict corridor in Samburu, Baringo, and Turkana, respectively (see figure 1 above). There is competition over pasture and water, and the terrain is challenging in these areas, making it difficult for the police to access, thus, giving the CBAGs a relative advantage.<sup>37</sup>

The Samburu and Pokot conflict is concentrated in Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, bordering Baringo and Turkana Counties. The nearest police station to these areas is Maralal town, about 35 to 40km away; these areas are advantageous to the Pokot CBAGs.<sup>38</sup> The areas experienced tension during the 2022 election because Samburu communities had different political alignments to their neighboring Pokot communities.<sup>39</sup>

The political class took advantage of the election, using the CBAGs to create tension and dis-organize their opponents' campaigns. The cattle raid on the 25<sup>th</sup> near Kapedo affirmed election tension; Pokot CBAGs from Tiaty took advantage of the situation, raided Turkana, stole cows, killed eight general service unit (GSU) police, and took their arms.<sup>40</sup> Many of our interviews pointed to politicians from Tiaty and Samburu north funding such CBAGs. As such, some of the parliament and county assembly members have a hand in cattle raids, and the CBAGs act as a political tool; thus, the County and national governments are reluctant to address illegal arms and insecurity escalated by the CBAGs.

The state's security operation in these areas is minimal; however, when there is an insecurity issue, the fluidity nature of territoriality can be experienced. The disarmament and hunting of the CBAGs is always by means of hard power—strong and forceful operations.<sup>41</sup> The CBAGs cannot confront the security forces in an open battle. However, these groups take advantage of the police's limited resources.<sup>42</sup> For example, there are cases they block the police station before raiding the community.<sup>43</sup> Our interaction with the communities and security forces in Marti indicated that the station has one patrol car shared by the police and rangers. If reinforcement is needed, the closest assistance is the GSU camp in Baragoi, which is about 36.4km from the police station in Marti. The location, a conflict belt, shows the exhaustive security work and the limitation of police personnel; they cover the significant zone which stretches from Suiyian to Baragoi, a distance of 39.5 kilometers, and almost the same distance from Suiyian to Suyani, stretching towards Suguta valley.<sup>44</sup> Such security resource limitation

proves the semi-territoriality scenario, which is advantageous to the CBAGs who possess illegal weapons through political patronage.

The local rangers are recruited to assist with security due to their experience with the terrain and understanding the operation of the CBAGs.<sup>45</sup> These rangers are volunteers who get a stipend from the county government, but the salary is delayed, sometimes six months before pay.<sup>46</sup> The delay in the remuneration demotivates the rangers, leading to a security challenge. In some cases, the rangers and police commercialize cattle rustling; they secretly organize cattle raids with the CBAGs and give access to the market from police roadblocks. They work with the CBAGs through intelligence and identifying better strategies for cattle raids and theft.<sup>47</sup> This partisan aspect of the rangers and police is very blurred; some are involved in cattle rustling and stealing.<sup>48</sup> Both rangers and police have a network with some of the CBAGs, but such facts can only be identified from their effects.<sup>49</sup>

There is a social order of Moranism—warriorhood culture; their existence has been supported by traditional militarization of ethnic groups—protection of the community, herding, and restocking through cattle raiding.<sup>50</sup> These groups are expected to protect the community. They are engaged in herding and protecting community wealth. Moranism is encouraged through culture, praised by the women, and approved by the elders.<sup>51</sup> The brave Morans receive praise and are likely to be heroes and remembered through their 10 to 15 years of Moranism, and bravery and restocking and cattle raiding other communities earn them a respective position in their society.<sup>52</sup> Thus, community militarization—arming the community youth and giving them the responsibility to protect their ethnic tribes promotes banditry and warriorhood. The CBAGs emerge from these warriors, mainly young boys who have undergone the initiation of circumcision; usually, their ages range from 15 to 30, and they are expected to be brave, protect and create wealth for the community.<sup>53</sup>

Criminals also take advantage of the ‘moran tag,’ and the behavior makes it difficult to isolate the community warriors from the bandits/CBAGs because they protect their ethnic communities, gain support from their political leaders, and they subject their neighboring ethnic communities. Thus, identifying what they call good warriors from bad ones is blurred.<sup>54</sup> The communities support the cattle raids because it is a pastoral cultural practice. However, the commercialization—raiding, stealing, and selling of cattle raids are increasing due to easy access to the market, and businesses are developing with the road infrastructure, thus, promoting settlements and eroding migration and it also increases roadside banditry, car hijacking, stealing from *M-Pesa* shops—mobile phone-based cash transfer shops/booths, and cattle theft.<sup>55</sup>

Illegal arms are evident in Samburu north; both Turkana and Pokot acquired arms much earlier than the Samburu. However, these communities raid each other and steal arms.<sup>56</sup> The arms are also bought and transported across Kenya’s neighboring borders. The Turkana and Pokot purchase the arms and illegally transport them from Uganda and South Sudan-Kenyan porous borders. The Samburu’s started acquiring guns later from the Rendile, Borana, and Somalia through the porous borders of Kenya-Ethiopia and Somalia-Kenyan borders.<sup>57</sup> Despite acquiring guns later than their counterparts, Samburu seems to have more illegal arms than their Turkana counterparts in Samburu County. Our interviews from Samburu and Turkana communities affirm that Samburu got arms from politicians who used Constituency Development Funds (CDF) money to buy arms and protect their communities through the Samburu CBAGs. The illegal arms cost between \$2500 to \$3000, and one bullet costs about \$2 to \$3. However, the cost depends on the type of gun.<sup>58</sup>

Conflict in Samburu is seasonal, elections trigger the conflict, and the CBAGs become more active in the election period due to support from the political class. For example, the August 2022 electoral period created tension leading to the fear of electoral violence. Thus, many retail shops hesitated to restock due to insecurity.<sup>59</sup> The pastoral communities' limited development and minimal education are also drivers of conflict.<sup>60</sup> Lack of education encourages the youth, mainly males, to engage in herding and restocking through cattle raids. However, the increased development, state-territoriality, and privatization of land shrink the pastoral land, shifting the dynamics of conflict and violence.

Conflict among the three ethnic communities, Samburu, Turkana, and Pokot, is ethnic-based and caused by the fight for pasture and water. Still, the changing weather patterns also promote cattle rustling for restocking purposes. Environmental stress that comes with drought and excess rains creates different conflicts. Livestock theft increases in good rainfall seasons, and the CBAGs are active in these periods because the animals are healthy and can run faster. However, during drought seasons, there is a reduced level of cattle raids and theft due to the poor health of the livestock,<sup>61</sup> and some police posts cease from operating in some areas because the communities migrate in search of better grazing conditions, leading to large territory with no inhabitants; the police post in Kom, a region bordering Isiolo from Samburu East exemplifies such scenario.<sup>62</sup>

## **Community-Oriented Policing Initiatives**

Community-oriented policing (COP) is a better strategy for security in the conflict belt. In some instance, particularly, where there is limited security capacity,<sup>63</sup> police are forced to work with the community, building relationships with the communities through rangers and the chiefs.<sup>64</sup> In some cases, the communities have more sophisticated arms than the police.<sup>65</sup> Thus, policing with the community makes police work easier, and trust is enhanced through such a relationship. The rangers are community scouts recruited to work with the police and guard the conservancies, and also help the police maintain law and order. Recruiting them from the community creates trust between the community and the police, which is not new. However, the government tactics of applying the use of force when there is insecurity incidence, and neglect to these spaces create community mistrust. The communities in the conflict belt are secretive<sup>66</sup> and do not share intelligence to the security forces<sup>67</sup> because of the government neglect of the psychological aspect that validates territoriality, influence by winning hearts and minds, which can exist even with the social distance if there is continuous assurance and trust building from the government.

The government used to recruit Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs)—tribal voluntary police from the Turkana and Samburu CBAGs to help in police work. Such personnel was claimed to be effective since they knew the business of cattle raids. However, after the government stopped recruiting more KPRs due to the challenge of remuneration and maintaining the recruitment policy, some joined the criminal activities of cattle raiding since there is an accessible market for meat.<sup>68</sup> More so, the government reduced the KPRs' recruitment because they misused the firearms and ammunition, shifting from their responsibility of protecting their communities to engaging in cattle raids and highway banditry.<sup>69</sup>

The political class in Samburu County demands the KPRs back because these tribal and voluntary police were trusted and seen as community guards.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, such KPRs were being hired by private contractors to guard private properties because they gained money from

these private contractors and supported cattle raiding due to the increased accessibility of the black market for the meat business.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, the recruitment of the KPRs increased crime and violence due to the lack of remuneration from the government, yet they were armed to fight the criminals and raiders. Thus, the national government reduced the initiative to recruit the KPRs in Samburu.

The Issues of KPRs created ethnic rivalry; for example, the West Pokot warriors claimed that the Marakwet had more armed KPRs than the Pokot side. Such biases are attributed to the past Inspector Generals, David Kimaiyo and Joseph Kipchirchir Boinet, both from Marakwet Ethnic communities who supported the KPRs from Marakwet. These preferences for some ethnic groups triggered insecurity in West Pokot and Baringo counties, spreading to the Amayia triangle. Pokot ethnic tribes claimed that the past police leadership subjected them to the advantage of their neighboring rivals in Baringo and Marakwet.<sup>72</sup> They felt that the disarmament by the government was biased because the police leadership from Kimaiyo to Boinet favored the Marakwet tribe.<sup>73</sup>

The county government of Samburu revived the initiative of community guards, employing community rangers/scouts—security personnel within the tourism department to protect the wildlife, and such county security structure is unclear because they are supposed to coordinate with the national police, but our fieldwork experience proved limited coordination with the police; this is despite the rangers being supplied with arms by the national government and paid a stipend through the county government funds. They operate the way KPRs used to work but aim to secure the conservancies such as Kalomudang community conservancy, Nyiro, and Ndoto, and the rangers also protect group ranches in the north of Samburu.<sup>74</sup> Essentially, it should be noted that land in Samburu County is managed under community conservancies<sup>75</sup> and group ranches,<sup>76</sup> and these scouts are deployed to guard the conservancies. However, similar to the security personnel, the scouts are sometimes involved in the cattle raid business, thus, fueling more violence in Samburu County. For example, the case of Kilepoi village demonstrates that county rangers being used as raiders is evidence of the worsening of the violence.<sup>77</sup>

The county government policy on the community rangers is a good COP initiative. However, proper remuneration and monitoring of these rangers is a challenge. The rangers in Turkana-dominated areas claim to have fewer resources than their Samburu counterparts.<sup>78</sup> Our observation verified that the Rangers in Tuum, Bendera, and Masikita have better housing than those in Marti and Nachola. However, they claim to have poor conditions that demotivate their policing work.<sup>79</sup> All the rangers claim the stipend of 10,000 Kenya shillings they get from the county government, which sometimes delays for about six months.<sup>80</sup> In addition, the Turkana rangers claim that the Samburu counterparts are well-armed, while they have fewer arms and lack the resources needed to enhance effective policing.<sup>81</sup>

Samburu East demonstrates a joint initiative between the government and NGOs in COP initiatives. The NRT helps the county government in policing the conservancies, monitoring the scouts, and paying their monthly stipend. Such an initiative is not present in the north of Samburu, where rangers' stipend is delayed.<sup>82</sup> The collaboration between the Samburu County government and NGOs demonstrates a hybrid security assemblage. However, the support NRT gets from donors is questionable, and if such funding seizes, then the management of these rangers/scouts can be challenging.<sup>83</sup> NRT also dominates in the conservancy agenda controlling the conservancies with well-equipped rangers and scouts. Such control limits the communities from owning their land, creating skepticism and shrinking grazing areas.<sup>84</sup>

Despite such skeptics, the interviews demonstrate the effectiveness of NGOs' role in Community-Oriented Policing (COP). However, suppose the private sector's involvement in security is not checked by other stakeholders such as civil society, community, and government, it might lead to the dominance of the private sector in the pastoral area. Therefore, some civil societies have created communities shift to shift forums used to spread intelligence in the Amaiya triangle, covering Baringo, Suguta Valley, and Suguta Marmar. Information is shared through mobile technology, tracking the stolen cows, working with the rangers to identify potential Bandits among the warriors and Morans, and such intelligence is shared with the chiefs and the police. The forums comprise retired chiefs, elders, and rangers who network as community ambassadors, and they are voluntary. Still, they get stipends from the NGOs working on security issues in the Amaiya triangle. These forums are community driven as opposed to policing the community through surveillance. The NGOs have 10 to 15 peace ambassadors in every village in Suguta Marmar, Suguta Valley, Marti, Parkati, Nachola, and Baragoi, helping with security research, intelligence gathering, and community engagement.<sup>85</sup> They also engage the community in safety initiatives, engaging the community in policing, and conflict reconciliation efforts.<sup>86</sup> Thus, public-private partnership (PPP) efforts are a hybrid security initiative that promotes policing and fighting the CBAGs' existence.

## Discussion

Territoriality gives the intellectual space to understand the relationship between power and society. Thus, it is not an ethical theory that shows a better way to control the populace; it does not establish a malevolent, neutral, or benign relationship, but it describes a relationship between the one asserting influence and the one being influenced (Sack, 1973). In other words, territoriality is a strategy for control and influence; thus, human territoriality implies influencing, affecting, or controlling people's actions and interactions (Sack, 1983). Samburu north has the Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) in Tuum location, the General Service Unit (GSU) from the Kenya Police Service in Baragoi town and Nachola location, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) camps in Kawaap location, and police station in Baragoi town and Marti location. However, these security forces are a distance apart, and the terrain between them is difficult to access.<sup>87</sup> For example, the distance between Nachola to Suguta Valley has terrains that are difficult to administer, making it easier for the CBAGs to access, steal cattle and hide in the mountains.<sup>88</sup> The road along Marti to Baragoi is an imaginary boundary, this area is occupied by the Turkana neighboring Samburu community, and the limited state's resources to access the area is advantageous to the CBAGs<sup>89</sup>

New norms such as devolution and anticipation of infrastructure and conservation agenda create development initiatives and increase the state's presence in the conflict belt. However, such devolution has also escalated ethnic tension, shaping imagined boundaries and borderland contestation—Samburu claiming county resources and discriminating against the minority Turkana through elected county offices dominated by the Samburu tribe.<sup>90</sup> As such, the domination and control create skewed resource allocation to the advantage of the dominant tribe, leading to different dynamics of conflict and violence.<sup>91</sup>

Territoriality is not fixed like geographical space —territory, but it is dynamic; control can be asserted in space. However, there is constant change due to the controller's ability (available resources) to maintain order in the territory. The unavailability or limited resources to control leads to a semi-territoriality scenario —spaces where the state has relative control (Hansen, 2019). The dynamics aspect creates fluidity, and the CBAGs can exist and take advantage of the weak state security (Okwany, 2023). For example, the Kawaap location in the Samburu north demonstrates a semi-territoriality scenario to the Turkana and Samburu CBAGs. However, the occupation by the Kenya defense forces to create a buffer zone between these communities shifts Kawaap to a territoriality scenario. Though the military is not engaged in domestic security, infrastructure development that emerges with the military occupation changes conflict dynamics in such spaces.<sup>92</sup>

Analysis of territoriality gives the lens to understand the change created by developments such as infrastructure, indicating how such action impacts the increase of state control in frontier areas such as northern Kenya. For the controlled (pastoral communities) not to feel excluded and oppressed, there is a need for a good-natured relationship to exist. Therefore, asserting control or influence needs the controller's (state's) efforts to build trust towards the controlled (pastoral communities), and the philosophy of COP is a good security strategy. However, territoriality is not an ethical theory, demonstrating a benign relationship but only a descriptive nature of the association between the controller and the controlled. Development mainly focuses on the people and is connected to peace and security (UNDP, 1994). Yet, the challenge to territoriality exists when the controller benefits at the expense of the controlled. Thus, a hybrid of the private sector, government, and communities is essential in development and policing (Okwany & Owino, 2022).

Security is personal and political, and initiative such as COP is highly politicized. Policing in Kenya is greatly influenced by the political class despite the constitutional framework stipulating the independence of the police institution. For example, the constitutional framework on COP was short-changed by the executive in 2013 to undermine the local policing mechanism, such as the County Policing Authority (CPA), and apply surveillance of the counties through the *Nyumba Kumi*<sup>93</sup> initiative—a security cluster for collecting intelligence (Lid & Okwany, 2020); this undermined the county government initiative of CPA.<sup>94</sup> However, Samburu County has embarked on such initiatives through the conservancy agenda.

A hybrid security strategy involving the community, civil society, private sector, and state's security fraternity promotes such connection. The County policing initiative of employing community rangers, supported by the Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT), is an excellent hybrid security strategy of public-private partnership.<sup>95</sup> However, the dominance of NRT in the conservancies, and their engagement in security is questionable because their push for conservancy agenda shrinks pastoral grazing land and is not community-oriented, but a hard power strategy which entails policing the community.<sup>96</sup> In addition, NRT depends on external funding, and if such funding seizes, it can be challenging to police the conservancies.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, security should be community-oriented, and NRT's dominance and push to manage Samburu conservancies should be monitored.<sup>98</sup> Community rangers/scouts supported by NRT and the county government offer a better strategy for policing with the community and mapping these groups, equipping them with better policing needs. Furthermore, proper remuneration will enhance their work and promote trust between the community and police and sustainable policing initiatives.

## Conclusion

Africa has become the new frontier of development. Many external actors focus on mega projects such as infrastructure, mining, and oil in the continent, particularly spaces that have been historically neglected, impacting territoriality and the dynamics of conflict and violence. Northern Kenya, Samburu, in this case, is facing new land use structures such as conservation and envisioned large-scale infrastructures such as roads and geothermal energy. The changes are creating development corridors and escalating imaginary ethnic boundaries. Pastoral communities have existed in these areas for generations, fighting each other over pasture, water, and grazing land. State security forces are also increasing in these development corridors, shifting these areas from semi-territoriality—limited state presence, to territoriality—firm state control or influence. The military occupation and anticipation of conservation in Samburu north as a buffer zone will help reduce ethnic politics between the Samburu and Turkana communities, creating roads and investments as it has been in the Samburu east. However, these land use strategies shrink pastoral grazing land leading to different dynamics of conflicts.

The conflict belt, areas covering Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, Samburu west, and Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, Parkati, Tuum, Bendera, and Masikita locations, including Suguta Valley and Baragoi town have historically been neglected areas, giving advantage to the community-based armed groups (CBAGs) to exist. Samburu east has a concentration of development ventures and the state's security forces, and policing the conservation has relatively improved the east as compared to the west and north of the County. However, the developments are changing the pastoral livelihood, leading to new dynamics of conflicts and violence. Despite the increase of state security, these areas are still dominated by cattle rustling, and developments such as access to roads and mobile network technology are an advantage to the CBAGs because the terrains are difficult to access, and limited state security leads to roadside hijackings, thefts and stealing from retail shops.

Devolution has allocated resources to the counties, leading to the development of roads, water points, schools, and healthcare. However, it has also escalated ethnic boundaries; the Turkana and Pokot in Samburu are marginalized regarding resource allocation. The Samburu ethnic community dominates Samburu County government offices, and the County's political leadership subjects the minority Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities. Thus, the locations occupied by these minority ethnic communities are underdeveloped, with poor roads, water, and state security forces being limited, giving an advantage for the Pokot and Turkana CBAGs to exist.

Development should be inclusive, people-centered, and sustainable development in Samburu should focus on social justice and urgent action against climate change affecting pastoral livelihood. Partnerships should involve the local communities for development to be connected to peace and security. COP is a better strategy for building trust between the security forces and the pastoral community. It promotes reassurance, problem-solving, and partnership among stakeholders such as police, civil society, the private sector, and the community, leading to a hybrid security assemblage. Samburu county revived the national government policing strategy of community scouts or rangers, a better strategy for partnership. However, the rangers must be equipped with proper policing tools, and their remuneration should be harmonized for better policing and countering bandits, cattle theft, and highway hijackings, and they must coordinate with the National police in COP initiatives.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.communitypolicing.eu/about-the-project/researchers/clifford-okwany/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.crc228.de/>

<sup>3</sup> The map was developed by C.C.O Okwany and J. Mwikwabe, 2023.

<sup>4</sup> the replacement of old traditions with the rise of new socio-cultural attitudes, practices, norms and development.

<sup>5</sup> The electoral violence of 2007-2008 was as a result of election fraud, historical land grievances and lack of police reforms, leading to ethnic violence. The uncertainty, and limited state security resources, overwhelmed the police; thus, CBAGs with the help of politicians took advantage of the violence and protected their ethnic communities.

<sup>6</sup> Most FDGs with elders in Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, Parkati, Tuum, Bendera, and Masikita demonstrated such historical conflict over pasture, water and cattle raiding.

<sup>7</sup> Interviews with Samburu County commissioner, 8<sup>th</sup> April 2022.

<sup>8</sup> Our field work observation. April 2022 to March 2023.

<sup>9</sup> Interviews with teachers in at both Baragoi Boys, and Girls secondary school, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>10</sup> Fieldwork observation in Kawaap location, Samburu north and Losesia group ranch in Samburu east.

<sup>11</sup> Interviews with Samburu County officials, 7<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> February 2023.

<sup>12</sup> Empirical evidence from field work observation

<sup>13</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>14</sup> Fieldwork observation in from March to December 2022.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with the county commissioner 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location 11<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>17</sup> Interviews with Samburu County commissioner, 8<sup>th</sup> April 2022, nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub- County, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022, and a Turkana Ranger in Marti location 11<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with the district education officer in South Horr, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Community Safety Initiative (CSI) in Maralal, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>20</sup> Most FDGs with the Samburu elders affirmed that Turkana invaded Samburu County.

<sup>21</sup> Most FDGs with the Turkana elders also affirmed that conflict belt as an ancestral land of the Turkana.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with LAPSSSET development Authority (LCDA) officials, and a Samburu Land Administrator in Nairobi, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2021 and 13<sup>th</sup> June 2022 respectively.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub- County, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022

<sup>24</sup> FDG with Pokot elders in Amaiya center, 7<sup>th</sup> February 2023.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with a a chief in Nachola, and a Turkana County village administrator, 15<sup>th</sup> November 2022.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub- County, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022

<sup>27</sup> FGD with the Turkana elder and warriors in Kanamuge village Nachola sub-location, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2022, and FGD with Pokot Elders, 7<sup>th</sup> February 2023.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with leaders of SIKOM peace network for development, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2022.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub- County, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022; and FGD with Pokot Elders in Amaiya center, 7<sup>th</sup> February 2023

<sup>30</sup> Most interviews with security forces and chiefs in Samburu proved the fluidity nature of territoriality.

<sup>31</sup> Fieldwork Observation.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location 11<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>33</sup> Interviews at Maralal police headquarters and Archers Post police station, 9<sup>th</sup> October and 16<sup>th</sup> November 2022 respectively.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>35</sup> Interviews at Maralal police headquarters on the 9<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with police at Maralal police headquarters on the 9<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers and two Chiefs in Marti location, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2022.

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- <sup>38</sup> Interview at Maralal Police Headquarters on the 9th October 2022.
- <sup>39</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10th October 2022.
- <sup>40</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>41</sup> Interview with leaders of SIKOM peace network for development, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2022.
- <sup>42</sup> Interviews with police in Baragoi Police station 14<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>43</sup> Interview with GSU in Marti, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2022
- <sup>44</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers and two Chiefs in Marti location, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>45</sup> FGDs with Elders, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022, and interviews with chiefs and security forces in in Marti, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>46</sup> Interviews with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location, and FGD with Rangers in Tuum on the 11th October 2022 and 15th October 2022 respectively.
- <sup>47</sup> Interviews with a Chief and police in Marti location, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>48</sup> Interview with NGOs in Maralal, 11<sup>th</sup> September 2022.
- <sup>49</sup> Engagement with the security forces and Rangers in Baragoi, Tuum, Marti and Nachola in October 2022.
- <sup>50</sup> Interview with leaders of SIKOM peace network for development, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2022.
- <sup>51</sup> Interview with Community Safety Initiative (CSI) in Maralal, 10th October 2022.
- <sup>52</sup> FGD with warriors in Marti, and Morans in Tuum on the 12th October 2022 and 17th October 2022 respectively.
- <sup>53</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>54</sup> Interview with police in Baragoi on the 20<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>55</sup> Interview with leaders of SIKOM peace network for development, and Police in Marti, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2022 and 12<sup>th</sup> October 2022 respectively.
- <sup>56</sup> Most FGDs with Turkana elders in Suguta Valley, Marti, Nachola, and Parkati affirmed Samburu stealing and buying arms from the Turkana. Similarly, the Samburu elders in Tuum, Bendera, Baragoi and Masikita demonstrated that the Turkana steal arms from the Samburu.
- <sup>57</sup> FGDs with the Samburu elders in Tuum, Bendera, and Masikita in October and November 2022.
- <sup>58</sup> Most FGDs and interviews confirmed these prices.
- <sup>59</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>60</sup> Fieldwork observation 2 March, September, November and December 2022.
- <sup>61</sup> Most interviews from the elders and police proved such changes of weather patterns shaping the dynamics of violence.
- <sup>62</sup> Interview in Kom police post on 4<sup>th</sup> November 2022.
- <sup>63</sup> Interviews with a Chief and police in Marti location, on 12<sup>th</sup> October 2022 affirmed the limited capacity of the government security in these areas, forcing the police to work with the community in building trust due to the number of illegal arms possessed by the CBAGs.
- <sup>64</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10th October 2022.
- <sup>65</sup> Interview with the security forces in Marti and Baragoi, 12<sup>th</sup> October and 14<sup>th</sup> October 2022 respectively.
- <sup>66</sup> Interview with the assistant county commissioner in Baragoi, October 21, 2022.
- <sup>67</sup> Interview with ATSU Commander Tuum Branch, October 15, 2022.
- <sup>68</sup> FDG with Samburu elders in Ngila village.
- <sup>69</sup> Most of our interviews with the police and Rangers in October and November 2022 indicated some KPRs involvement in banditry and being used by politicians particularly during electioneering period.
- <sup>70</sup> Interview with assistant commissioner in Baragoi—the political class claim that the KPRs in Samburu were protecting them from the Turkana’s who are advantaged to access firearms from across the porous border in Uganda and South Sudan, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>71</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>72</sup> Most of the interviews in March and April from security leadership and community in west Pokot proved, the subjective policing and arming of the KPRs in Marakwet and subjecting the Pokot KPRs.

- <sup>73</sup> Interview with leaders of SIKOM peace network for development, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2022.
- <sup>74</sup> Interview with nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub- County, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022
- <sup>75</sup> Land in Samburu East is mostly under conservancies.
- <sup>76</sup> Land in Samburu North is mostly under group ranches.
- <sup>77</sup> Interview with the district officer South Horr, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2022.
- <sup>78</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location 11th October 2022.
- <sup>79</sup> FGDs with Samburu rangers in Tuum, 15<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>80</sup> Interviews with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location, and FGDs with rangers in Tuum on the 11th October 2022 and 15th October 2022 respectively.
- <sup>81</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location 11th October 2022.
- <sup>82</sup> Interview with at the NRT office in Lewa conservancy, 18th November 2022.
- <sup>83</sup> FGDs with Samburu rangers in Westgate conservancies, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2022, and interview with the leadership of Namumnyak conservancy, 17<sup>th</sup> November 2022
- <sup>84</sup> Interview with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location 11th October 2022.
- <sup>85</sup> Interview with a Samburu County Peace and disaster officer, 10th October 2022.
- <sup>86</sup> Interview with Community Safety Initiative (CSI) in Maralal, 10th October 2022.
- <sup>87</sup> Empirical evidence from field work observation
- <sup>88</sup> Interviews with a Turkana Rangers in Marti location, and FGD with Rangers in Tuum on the 11th October 2022 and 15th October 2022 respectively.
- <sup>89</sup> Interviews with police in Baragoi Police station 14<sup>th</sup> October 2022.
- <sup>90</sup> Interviews with nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub- County, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022, and a Turkana Ranger in Marti location 11th October 2022.
- <sup>91</sup> FGD with the Turkana elder and warriors in Kanamuge village Nachola sub-location.
- <sup>92</sup> Empirical evidence from field work observation
- <sup>93</sup> A policing effort through surveillance, clustering houses/villages in groups of ten as a surveillance unit.
- <sup>94</sup> See, article 244 of the Kenyan constitution and article 41 and 96 of the National Police Service Act.
- <sup>95</sup> Interview with at the NRT office in Lewa conservancy, 18th November 2022.
- <sup>96</sup> Most of the interviews with Elders in Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, Masikita, Bendera and Baragoi proved the push by NRT to manage conservancies in northern Samburu.
- <sup>97</sup> Interviews with the district officer South Horr, and a nominated MCA in Baragoi Samburu North Sub-County, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2022 and 10<sup>th</sup> April 2022 respectively.
- <sup>94</sup> FGDs with Samburu rangers in Westgate conservancies, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2022, and interview with the leadership of Namumnyak conservancy, 17<sup>th</sup> November 2022.

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