



NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY - KENYA

**THE ROLE OF DEFENCE DIPLOMACY IN ENHANCING NATIONAL SECURITY:
A CASE STUDY OF KENYA (2012 - 2022)**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Joseph Edet Adu, hereby certify that the study I have conducted is entirely original and has not been submitted to or accepted by any other institution.

Signature.....Date.....

EDET ADU JOSEPH

As the Supervisor, I have given my approval for this project to be examined.

Signature.....Date.....

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DEDICATION

I dedicate my MA thesis to several members of my wider family, and I wrote short personal notes about their contributions in my heart. To my Wife Lily Harufa Yassel, my sons and daughters I say ‘kudos, for the support and understanding during my absence.

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ABSTRACT

Defense diplomacy has grown in importance as a means of encouraging international cooperation in the development of diplomatic competence. Since achieving its independence from the United Kingdom in 1963, Kenya has been actively involved in defense diplomacy both inside and outside of the greater Eastern African region. This research study's main objective was to determine how defense diplomacy promoted security in Kenya from 2012 to 2022. The study's three main goals were to analyse the role of defence diplomacy in advancing Kenya's national security, assess the influence of regional and international organizations to which Kenya is a signatory, and finally, investigate potential obstacles Kenya may face in the future in its pursuit of defense diplomacy. This study adopted the application of the Social Constructivism theory of IR to explain causal relationship between Diplomacy and National Security. The theory was considered ideal for the study because of its belief that reality is socially constructed. In the sense that constructivists place a larger emphasis on norm creation, identity, and ideational power than the other major theoretical paradigms, defense diplomacy has played a crucial role in both physical and human security. Because of the study's emphasis on the nature of conflict in relation to state power structures, these theories were thought to be ideal for the situation. The research technique adopted was a mixed-methods approach, with a predetermined questionnaire being used to collect the data. Professional high level public officials who had all completed graduate-level education made up 78.3% of the sampled population. 34% of this group have experience working at Kenya's diplomatic missions abroad. According to the report, joint military exercises and operations to impose peace were the most common defense diplomacy initiatives, followed by peacekeeping operations, joint regional drills, and military secondment in international and regional organizations. The study also discovered that Kenya's defense diplomacy strategy is significantly shaped by its membership in regional and global organizations. According to study data, 72% of respondents agreed that Kenya's defense diplomacy is crucial in preventing regional interstate wars. According to the study's data, 73.9% of respondents believed that defense diplomacy was essential to Kenya's peace-building initiatives, but 64% of the same respondents did not express confidence in the ability of defense diplomacy to adequately address all Kenya's national security issues. The study uncovered a number of difficulties. According to 87% of respondents, key obstacles to defense diplomacy

operations and programs include corruption and bad government. The survey suggests improved legal and policy frameworks as relevant approaches to strengthen Kenya's defense diplomacy, which is endorsed by 84% of respondents. This is in addition to the established frameworks outlined in the Kenya Defence Forces Act and the nation's 2010 constitution.

Key words: **Defence Diplomacy, National Security, Policy Formulation.**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and United States
AS	Al-Shabaab
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CDF	Chief of Defence Forces Kenya
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTC	Counter Terrorism Committee
EAC	East African Community
EACR	East African Community Region
EU	European Union
IR	International Relations
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
START	Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism
UN	United Nations
UNCS	United Nations Counter-terrorism Strategy
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

UK United Kingdom

USA United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.0 The Promotion of National Security in Kenya's Defence Diplomacy

Defence diplomacy has increasingly become an important avenue that supports engagement across countries in the area of enhancing diplomatic capacity. Kenya, since its independence from Great Britain in 1963 has been engaged in defence diplomacy within the larger Eastern Africa region and beyond. This chapter provides the structure of the study that is focuses on Kenya's activities initiated by Kenya in her defence diplomacy approach within the East Africa region between 2012 to 2022.

Although historians note that the phrase 'Defence Diplomacy' can be linked to concepts surrounding state cooperation at the age of globalization, Defense diplomacy is not a new idea, especially following the conclusion of the Cold War in the early 1990s. (Capier, 2013). The term is frequently linked, in the minds of certain academics, to concerns about national security strategies only which might not be the case in practical application diplomacy in general and defence diplomacy

in particular.

Soft skills such as social intelligence and attentive listening, have been pointed out as very necessary skills in executing successful diplomatic negotiations. The process of diplomacy is predicated on some form of dialogue that are aimed at reaching agreement on a platter of competing interests.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Traditionally, Kenya has relied upon powerful friends like the United States of America or her former colonial master United Kingdom for their support in boosting her defense diplomacy missions within the wider EACR. Such support has enabled the country to be by far the biggest military spender in the region competing amongst some of the best in terms of military hardware and trained personnel in Africa.

With intensifying security uncertainty in the Horn of Africa, Kenya had to increase her defence diplomacy activities in addition to an increase in her military expenditure on hardware and personnel to address the emerging security threats. This study is interested in establishing the role that defence diplomacy has played in responding to some of the threats to national security posed and responses adopted in promoting overall security in Kenya. National security in this context refers to "hard security," which includes the military's function in defending the nation's sovereignty and maintaining territorial integrity. However national security is not only limited to 'hard security. According to this paper, national security also entails human security as prescribed by the UNDP to the effect that it entails protection of human lives, facilitating human freedoms and self-actualization among other rights and freedoms (UNDP Human Development Report of 1994). The UNDP also recommends seven essential concerns for human security, including political, economic, and food security. Other concerns include environmental and personal security, health and safety, and environmental security.

It has been generally observed that hard security on its own cannot be a solution to most of the crises facing the world today, globalization for example brought in a number of dynamics that have posed a threat to national security, these include terrorism, cyber-crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Notably also is the reality that there are more reports of intrastate conflicts especially after the Cold War than ever before. For instance, in Somalia, internal threats to national security may not be addressed by hard security measures alone. To put it another way, the military cannot be occupied defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state when the real problems lie within, including issues such as terrorism, political segregation of certain segments of society, marginalization, poverty, and health concerns.

In light of the aforementioned, how has Kenya has been wooing new trading and diplomatic allies in the military sphere? Based on these emerging new military diplomatic ties between Kenya and other countries, it is prudent to evaluate Kenya's long-standing military cooperation with her neighbours in East Africa to ascertain whether there have been any gains for both parties 2012 to 2022.

1.2 Research Questions

1. In what ways has Kenya's defense diplomacy promoted national security in Kenya?

2. What role does Kenya's membership in regional and international organizations play in shaping its defense diplomacy policy?
3. What challenges can Kenya anticipate in its defense diplomacy?

1.3 Study Objectives

The main objective of the research is to determine the contribution that defense diplomacy makes to enhancing security in Kenya.

1.4 Specific Objectives

1. To evaluate the contribution of defense diplomacy to Kenya's national security.
2. To determine the influence of Kenya's membership to international and regional bodies to its defence diplomacy and security policy framework.
3. To establish challenges facing Kenya in its pursuit of defence diplomacy.

1.5.0 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

This section places the literature on the subject of defense diplomacy's contribution to the advancement of security into context by drawing on the opinions and arguments put forth on the subject by various academics. In a nutshell, the study tries to determine how defense diplomacy contributes to Kenyan security. The study primarily intends to analyze how defense diplomacy supports Kenya's national security and identify potential obstacles Kenya may encounter in the future as it pursues defense diplomacy.

One of the tools of foreign policy is defense diplomacy, Dereck Craxton asserts that the Westphalian Treaty of 1648, which established diplomatic practices among nation states, is the origin of defense diplomacy. The military became an important role in diplomacy since it was given the duty of defending the geographical integrity and sovereign of the state. (Daniel H. Katz, 2020)

It became clear after the First and Second World Wars that the military should play a bigger part in boosting national security. Indeed, a number of European nations have worked to develop defense diplomacy. For instance, after World War I, alliances like SEATO of 1954, ANZUS treaty and NATO of May 9, 1955, were formed. It had been proven, in other words, that defense diplomacy was a crucial enabler of national security.

These American and European countries promoted bilateral and multilateral collaboration in the areas of military relations, security, and defense through the use of military diplomacy. De-escalating tension that might have been exacerbated by ignorance of the intentions of other states that might have been mistakenly perceived as hostile was made possible by posting defense attachés in the capitals of friendly and equally hostile states. This allowed for the sharing of information and the understanding of the social, political, economic, and security position of the host state.

The military is able to negotiate and finalize contracts and agreements in the sphere of defense through bilateral and international defense cooperation. The USA surpasses all other countries in the number of military agreements inked; this has significantly improved the nation's security. With the exception of a handful, the USA's neighbors and many other countries don't pose any threats to its territorial integrity. This is due to its strategically sound defense diplomacy. (Daniel H. Katz, 2020)

Military consultations, the provision of military supplies and equipment, the planning, organization, and execution of bilateral and multilateral military exercises, the assistance of partners in the security sector reform and the development of weaker states' capacities to take part in military operations, as well as the provision of training and education in schools and academies, are the main focuses of military cooperation.

According to the United Nations, ongoing wars, largely between governments, pose severe dangers to security and prosperity for Africa's over one billion people, or about 17% of the world's population. The number of internal conflicts in Africa increased after the fall of the Berlin Wall (UN, 2017). But violent conflict doesn't just happen in Africa; it has also caused substantial violence and turmoil in other regions of the world. The confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar are a few instances.

According to observations, the bulk of conflicts occur in Asia and Africa, with civil wars and territorial disputes being the most common types. Only three of the current conflicts in the globe are attributable to terrorism, despite the fact that it frequently causes fear in people (Council for Foreign Relations, 2021). Given the size, diversity, and complexity of Africa, conflicts there share some traits but also vary in a number of ways (Morusoi, 2017).

A number of East African countries have experienced crises that have led to a considerable rise in the number of refugees and internally displaced people, according to the UNHCR's 2017 Global Trends Forced Displacement Report. There will be approximately 32.5 million refugees globally by the end of 2022. Kenya reportedly has 553,900 refugees living there, ranking it as the nation with the seventh-highest number of refugees worldwide (UNHCR Report, 2022).

1.5.2 Contribution of Defense Diplomacy to National Security

The phrase "defense diplomacy," which emerged following the end of the Cold War, was driven by the political necessity to identify the growing responsibilities of organizations under the purview of national defense ministries and to highlight their objectives in the newly "demilitarized" global arena, according to the "Security and Defence Quarterly SDQ." Its lineage originates not from science but from the realm of politics. Though the phrase "defense diplomacy" is widely used in both diplomatic practice and the "scientific circuit," attempts to scientifically validate this terminology proposal have not resulted in a definition that is accepted by everybody. Scientists in the UK, Spain, France, Indonesia, South Africa, and other nations are attempting to define defense diplomacy in light of the unique circumstances or security state of their respective nations. These definitions don't include every aspect of defense diplomacy, or even those without such goals, even when they directly reflect national needs. (SDQ Journal, 2020)

Today's world presents nation-states with a growing number of new challenges and hazards, necessitating the development of an integrated strategy that takes interdependence into account. It may be argued that in the twenty-first century, the pursuit of security, prosperity, and justice transcends national boundaries. Actually, they are the responsibility of the entire world community. Nation-states have arranged their resources through defense diplomacy in order to be

able to react to global crises in a coordinated way. Kenya is among the nations that have carried out this action.

Since ancient times, nation-states have utilized defense diplomacy to expand their influence on the national and/or regional levels in order to accomplish their strategic objectives. The ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu asserted that combat was vital to the state, the source of life and death, and the only way to avoid extinction, and that it needed to be carefully considered and analyzed (Sun Tzu 1994: 167). One could claim that Sun Tzu's thesis influenced the rationalization of nations' use of force as a last resort to achieve social and political objectives.

In 1998, British scholars presented the concept of "Defence Diplomacy" for the first time in a report for the UK's Strategic Defense Review. All acts carried out by the British Armed Forces and other Ministry of Defence agencies in support of global peace and stability are collectively referred to as "defence diplomacy". The phrase applied to actions that directly benefited the Commonwealth and had to do with defense and security in Europe and other parts of the world. The phrase became well-known among other strong nations (those with significant military, economic, and cultural influence), and many now consider it to be an essential instrument for preserving international peace and security (Ministerio De Defensa, 2018).

As an idea, defense diplomacy has alternatively been called "strategic communication," "soft power," and on occasion "military public diplomacy." It enables the military to directly impact foreign policy through other means. Even if they aren't strictly speaking considered diplomacy in the traditional sense of a state department mission, military connections between governments establish the foundation for future ties between countries (Ebitz, 2019). Therefore, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of military diplomacy in international affairs. It seeks to start discussions that can promote more dialogue and shield cultural misunderstandings during emergency situations.

There has been an increase in military collaboration between the United States and Africa, which is said to have contributed to a decrease in conflict. The development and reconciliation of the general definition of defense diplomacy are thus further complicated, according to scholars, by issues such as excessive utilitarianism, the emergence of new areas of cooperation within defense

diplomacy, a complex and varied security situation in various regions, the implementation of tasks within regional organizations, and cultural considerations. (Floyd, 2010)

Nor is there any attempt to come to a consensus on such a definition in the literature on the subject. Conversely, everyone agrees that defense diplomacy has a direct role in bolstering trust and comprehension in international relations. On the general goal of defense diplomacy, however, as a tool to support the realization of national interests and its foreign and security policy, there is, still, broad consensus. Defense diplomacy is widely acknowledged to have improved security in the following domains:

- . Reducing animosity and fostering confidence among nations (this way, it is "anchored" in the overall goals of diplomacy). The goal of the "peaceful use of military personnel to prevent conflicts" in the context of states' regional and global involvement is to foster stable, enduring cooperation and transparency in the defense sector.

- . The implementation of common supranational goals aims to influence partners' changing positions.

- . Encourage the enactment of laws pertaining to general security matters.

- . Keeps up a conversation with partners, which could be the intention of state action, and serves as a means of achieving its particular goals. Consequently, it has a direct impact on enhancing mutual respect and comprehension in global affairs.

- . Encouraging collaboration between nations on a bilateral or international level concerning military affairs, security, and defense. This is accomplished through the appointment and acceptance of defense attachés in state capitals, military and civilian envoys in the armed forces and defense ministries, commanders' "personal diplomacy," defense department administrators, and a variety of ad hoc missions.

- . Contract and agreement preparation, negotiation, and signing in the defense sector.

- . Meetings at different levels, both bilateral and international, including important military advice.

- . Assisting allies in transforming the security domain and enhancing their ability to engage in combat missions.
- . Providing instruction and training to both military and civilian Ministry of Defence staff in schools and military academies.
- . Providing resources and equipment for the military.
- . Counseling for military personnel abroad.
- . The process of organizing, arranging, and carrying out military drills on a bilateral and multinational level.
- . Arranging visits, ships, planes, and other military hardware in nations that are friendly.
- . Support for humanitarian efforts and crisis management in the aftermath of natural disasters.
- . Encouraging the construction of the military infrastructure required to organize collaboration and mutual defense.
- . Encouragement of civilian democratic governance over the military forces.
- . Assistance in adhering to accords concerning disarmament and armaments control, actions aimed at fostering confidence, and management of specific facilities (Floyd 2010).

Defense diplomacy is a permanent fixture in the framework of international cooperation between nations and organizations, and its operational purview extends beyond the "niche" sectors of diplomacy and the specialized "industry" knowledge of those handling associated tasks. It may be used to formulate and carry out state policy in concert with other states, as well as in times of crisis and peaceful collaboration. It is the area of diplomacy that include support for foreign armed forces as well as tangible and intangible assets through conducting so-called defense and strategic dialogue, consulting, training, or transferring military hardware and weapons, technical cooperation and the defense industry, cooperating in military education, engaging in military

resource exercises, and carrying out peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and operations. Therefore, it is impossible to disagree with Australian Nicholas Floyd's opinion that "international policy planning and implementation should be closely integrated with defense diplomacy" (SDQ Journal, 2020).

National security has benefited from defense diplomacy's subcategory of conflict prevention. A "common thread which holds the (international) system together as it shows how interests and ideals can be yoked to each other," according to Christopher Hill, is conflict prevention (C.Hill 2001). Remarkably, however, there is much disagreement over how to interpret conflict prevention. As Michael Lund points out, a clear description is necessary to evaluate its "promise and limitations" and to give direction for workable, logical policy recommendations. The definition of conflict prevention as "the prevention of an escalation to violent (i.e. involving the use of military force) confrontation" is used in this article. As a result, it has a very specialized place in the larger scheme of conflict resolution.

It is not assumed that dispute can be resolved completely. Conflict is, after all, a common and inevitable aspect of human existence. Chadwick Alger points out that the difficulty lies in creating protocols for differentiating between disruptive (violent) and constructive conflict. An early warning system is therefore necessary to detect conflicts that have the potential to turn violent or to assess if a specific dispute is approaching a violent phase. The timing and location of relevant activities are crucial. Understanding the life cycle of conflict is crucial for making timely and opportunity-based decisions in proactive conflict management, or conflict prevention. (Alger, CF, 2009).

Numerous research on the composition of conflict have been conducted, presenting varying accounts of its phases of development. Lund's "life history of a conflict" and the "hourglass model," which Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall employ to contextualize "conflict transformation, settlement, and containment," are two examples of these. The Conflict Development Model outlines the three distinct stages that conflict progresses through: latent, apparent, and incipient. Because it offers a purposeful structure that enables the synchronization of the conflict stages with the related NCDD actions, this model is especially helpful. Goal

incompatibility is a major theme in Mitchell's approach, as it is in conflict studies in general. (T Miall & Woodhouse, 2011).

Conflict may eventually result from differing ideals and a lack of resources; Ramsbotham refers to the early stages of this process as "incipient conflict." Ramsbotham et al. refer to this phase as "the emergence of differences." This stage may be challenging to identify without the benefit of hindsight, and even those involved in the conflict may fail to recognize it as it occurs. As a result, early-stage conflicts are frequently overlooked until they escalate into significant tragedies or extensive killings. When the parties deliberately acknowledge their aim incompatibilities and start to explore other options, an initial disagreement might escalate. This stage, which Mitchell refers to as "latent conflict," need not always be clearly stated or articulated.²⁴⁸ On the other hand, the parties are polarized and there is friction and mistrust between them. (2011, Ramsbotham).

Parties usually assure deterrent military capabilities at this stage, as they view each other as foes, and sporadic violence may occur. Mitchell refers to "manifest conflict" as the third stage in the life cycle of conflict. This happens when one side makes observable progress toward attaining its objectives and the other is compelled to give up or alter its behavior. Violence is more common in this later stage of the conflict and calls for a new kind of mitigation, namely conflict management. This entails stopping the escalation of tensions and preventing more violence. The major, though not exclusive, loci and foci of conflict prevention for the purposes of this essay are the first two stages of conflict, namely incipient and latent conflict. (Wallensteen, 2012)

According to Ramsbotham et al., if preventive action is not taken, the latitude for political and other options will shrink; for this reason, conflict prevention should be positioned and aligned with these developmental stages. Mitchell makes the assumption that pre-manifest corrective measures represent conflict avoidance during incipient conflict and conflict prevention during latent conflict, based on and consistent with his conflict development model. According to him, the latter is discovered when conflict attitudes and views of acknowledged aim mismatch are dealt with. Conflict prevention by implication focuses on the goal incompatibility that underlying the conflict scenario and is therefore linked to incipient conflict, even if it is explicitly focused towards latent conflict. One way that international conflict avoidance has preventative effects is by impeding the growth of broadly accepted, comprehensive or "super-ordinate" objectives.

These objectives not only prevent vested interests but also foster greater cooperation between opponents by bringing them together around a shared objective. (2011, Ramsbotham).

In addition, conflict is not limited to an early stage by conflict prevention procedures; rather, it is encompassed within the realm of latent conflict. It is at this time crucial to recognize that what is currently commonly known as "negative peace" includes both latent and emerging conflict. Johann Galtung is credited for introducing the more complex definition of peace, pointing out that it cannot be reduced to the mere absence of violent conflict.

It is a convincing idea that stable (positive) peace needs to be cultivated or "built" because even in the absence of overt violence, so-called "peace" could be unstable (negative). The UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report from June 2015 emphasized this requirement by stating that "peace processes do not end with a cease-fire, a peace agreement, or an election." These kinds of things are only the beginning of a peace process, not its end. United Nations (UN). combining our three greatest assets for peace: people, partnerships, and politics. (UN Report, HIPPO, 2015).

According to the UN HIPPO study, "In fact, they may be times of great vulnerability." Among the numerous instances of unfavorable peace that have persisted in Africa are the outbreaks of violent violence following peace deals in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mozambique. It is implied that conflict does not always follow a straight line. It might follow (perhaps self-reinforcing) cyclical patterns, go dormant, spread into other proxy battles, or intersect with other conflicts. When parties "mirror-image" one another's behavior, conflict behavior—a complex interplay of action and reaction—tends to become more damaging and coercive. Another thing to keep in mind is that conflict, even though it tends to get worse does not necessarily progress through each of the stages that have been defined in order. In the early or latent phases, it might stay repressed; as Mitchell notes, the extreme coercive power of an opponent can even prevent apparent conflict from occurring for all time.

Here, it's important to remember Hill's caution that resolving conflict at an early stage could actually exacerbate it. However, keeping conflict in the pre-manifest phase could stop it from spiraling out of control and turning into a never-ending cycle of violence. additional concerns

and the engagement of additional parties have an impact on how a dispute develops, and these dynamics increase the difficulty of resolving conflicts. Moreover, as Ramsbotham et al. note, conflict formations are connected. Due to the "communicable" character of conflict, unless they are promptly and thoroughly handled, local and regional disputes nearly always gain international attention. The reality that conflicts do not always evolve linearly and that they might originate in any stage of conflict, elucidate the rationale behind including conflict prevention in post-conflict tactics. (2011, Ramsbotham).

"The concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy which aims to avoid a crisis, while post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence," stated Boutros-Ghali in his groundbreaking Agenda for Peace. Thus, after the "end" of public conflict and following apparent peace agreements, if the peace that has been reached is unfavorable, then implicit conflict may resurface. Boutros-Ghali made it abundantly evident that building confidence is necessary for any decrease in the probability of violence between states. In circumstances when there isn't a common understanding of the issue, this calls for intentional confidence-building. The foundation of conflict prevention is identifying the sources of tension and mistrust and putting suitable replies that advance shared interests. According to Peter Jakobsen and Alexander George, positive incentives are crucial to preventive diplomacy. This means that methods aimed at fostering confidence between conflicting parties must be used in order to create a sense of certainty and trust. (Herbert, S. 2014)

L. Nathan claims that this keeps intra- or interstate conflicts from turning violent, and in the event that they do, CBMs may be able to contain the bloodshed. CBMs are intended to change behavior explicitly. They are predicated on openness and comprise observable actions that set a pattern of behavior for managing and preventing situations that could turn violent. According to S. Wolff, the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe, for instance, uses CBMs extensively. The objective is to prevent misunderstandings between governments that could lead to an unintended or deliberate escalation of hostilities. Formal and informal, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral, military and political, state-to-state as well as non-governmental activities are all possible forms of related activity. Siân Herbert makes a distinction between

There are two categories of CBMs that stop conflict from getting worse: security and military and humanitarian, social, and cultural. (CSIS Report, 2018,).

According to the OSCE, both kinds can be applied at any stage of a conflict's life cycle. However, Stefan Wolff issues a warning, pointing out that the application of CBMs depends on and changes depending on the time frame. They are intended to prevent disagreement from turning violent in the short term, to foster trust through more interaction in the middle term, and to open the door for substantive and long-term dispute resolution in the long run. The crucial significance of prevention has been shown by several decades of conflict resolution theory development, without question. (2018 CSIS Report). However, the HIPPO report notes that despite the fact that "preventing armed conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the state," it "has not been sufficiently invested in worldwide community. This is a shortcoming shared by both individual state defense diplomacy and multilateral organizations. We will now shift our attention to the latter. (UN Report, HIPPO, 2015).

In the instance of Kenya, defense diplomacy is truly flexible to the situation at hand, evolving somewhat simultaneously with the paradigm shift in contemporary international relations, its spectrum of impacts, and their fundamental forms. Its main goals are to lessen hostility and promote interstate confidence. In contrast to conventional military diplomacy, it presents as many demands and opportunities as is practical, backed by the achievements of civilizations that facilitate human engagement and communication. The associations of enemies are severed, while the inactivity of potentially aggressive powers is preserved. It plans the conclusion of combat and establishes, maintains, and strengthens the peace that follows war.

Scholars assert that a number of essential tasks are performed by defense diplomacy, including the collection and analysis of information about the armed forces and the security environment in the receiving state, the promotion of mutual relations, cooperation, and communication between the armed forces of the sending and receiving states, the organization of working trips for defense authority representatives, and the orderly deployment of military units. In addition, it calls for the sending state's armed forces to be represented at formal ceremonies and other events in the receiving state, as well as the backing of economic agreements pertaining to the transfer of weapons and other military hardware between the sending and receiving states.

Over the past twelve years, Kenya has effectively carried out several military cooperation training exercises at the regional and sub-regional levels. These training sessions were designed to help regional forces become more cohesive and establish standard operating procedures, enabling them to respond appropriately in the event of an emergency.

The Chinese scholar Tzu was arguably one of the first military philosophers to understand the importance of and link between diplomacy and the military. He argued that a balance between diplomacy and military action was necessary. The importance of diplomacy and intelligence, even during times of conflict, was made evident by Tzu's work on defensive strategy. He realized that strengthening state ties was essential to selling diplomatic power.

The term "peaceful (non-confrontational) use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defense ministries) as a foreign policy and security tool" has been added to the concept of defense diplomacy by researchers Cottey and Forster (2004) (p. 6). This approach to the subject greatly broadens its scope by taking into account the use of military force for peaceful purposes, the Ministry of Defense's role, and the employment of professionals such as defense attachés to avert wars. Defense diplomacy focuses on the following areas:

- . Cooperation. There has been a great deal of ongoing cooperation between states throughout the world. Many nations made the military decision to work together after World War 2 in an effort to prevent wars by intimidating or deterring potential aggressors. NATO and SEATO were formed in Europe as a result of these agreements, and since then, there haven't been any major conflicts worldwide.

- . Instruction. Conflicts are lessened when militaries from all over the world train together because it helps them forge connections that make communication simple and objective. Military attachés can quickly mediate conflicts in the case of hostilities.

- . Military Exercises. Integration is facilitated via cooperative exercises, particularly those held by NATO and the African Union Command Post Exercises, especially for individuals from a single region or sub-region. Together, these forces will be able to exercise influence and develop policies that will strengthen the overall peaceful coexistence.

- . Missions for Peace. UN peacekeeping operations have been effective in fostering unity and collaboration among the armed forces. This has made it possible for the political leadership

to brainstorm the danger to security in terms of interstate conferences while also following suit in terms of cooperation and integration.

- . Intelligence that works together. Countries have been able to eradicate dangers posed by terrorist organizations and dissidents thanks to intelligence sharing. Such collaboration has decreased acts of terrorism in Africa.

- . Cooperation Between International Security Partnerships and Institutions. This could include financial and technological support, training, cooperative planning and operation, and the exchange of intelligence. Other methods include arms control, steps to increase confidence, and disarmament initiatives.

- . The legislative and the law work together.

- . Cooperation within the defense sector.

- . Support and military aid for the armed forces of other countries.

- . Instruction in patriotism and past military cooperation.

The nonviolent application of military force to further a nation's foreign policy through initiatives such as maritime visits, officer exchanges, integrated training programs, cultural exchanges, and other programs is known as defense diplomacy. Initiating and facilitating strategic agreements, treaties, and conventions; advancing trade, business, and information; forging amicable relationships; and advancing technology are just a few of the responsibilities of diplomats. They also protect and uphold the rights of sending state residents. Defense attachés, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations all contribute to the early warning system and resolution of possible interstate conflict.

Defense diplomacy is widely recognized to prioritize the reduction of hostilities and promotion of confidence among states. The use of military personnel in a non-combatant role to avert conflicts is emphasized in the context of states' involvement on the regional and international levels. It also encourages transparency in the defense sector and steady, long-term cooperation.

Another important way that defence diplomacy contributes to national security is through deterrence. Deterrence is a strategy that is widely employed in defense diplomacy. The deterrence theory remains a fundamental theoretical foundation for most criminal law and criminal justice

systems, and deterrence as a tactic has a long history of use in maintaining law and order. During the Cold War, it was a cornerstone of world security due to the presence of nuclear weapons (Kaldow, 2013). Additionally, it's being employed in "new wars." The use of threats by one state to compel another state to refrain from acting in a particular way is known as deterrence. When a threat convinces its target not to, it works as an effective deterrent.

In strategic and security studies, a policy of deterrence is commonly understood to be the threat of military retribution by the leaders of one nation against the leaders of another, with the aim of discouraging the latter from employing force or threatening to use it in order to accomplish its own foreign policy goals. To prevent other states from pursuing both military and non-military action, deterrence programs in international politics usually combine both military and non-military threats. When employed as a tactic, deterrence usually seeks to increase the cost or decrease the potential offender's gain. As per Robert Jervis, the plan's operations may be carried out in a direct or indirect manner.

A nation can employ its policy of deterrence in one of two ways to prevent an armed attack on its own territory: either through direct deterrence or extended deterrence. Furthermore, threats intended to discourage can be used as part of a deterrent strategy to stop the creation of such short-term crises and military conflict, or in response to an urgent threat of short-term attack (immediate deterrence) (universal deterrence). States may employ deterrence under the following four scenarios: Direct-immediate deterrence; direct-general deterrence; extended immediate deterrence, and extended-general deterrence.

The concept of deterrence has been further split by academics into two distinct practices with different subparts: central and protracted deterrence and general and quick deterrence (Wilner, 2015). This goes beyond understanding deterrence's theoretical foundations. General deterrence is the process of anticipating future adversaries and seeking to rebalance power through coercion, whereas immediate deterrence is the more well-known strategy of using threats of assault to head off potential conflict escalation.

Central deterrence, in a bipolar world, is the process by which superpowers attempt to prevent one another from attacking by establishing a balance of strength. Examples of this are hostilities that occurred between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, like the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Conversely, prolonged deterrence means employing both a greater "distance-is-comfort" protective policy—as was the case in the Vietnam War—and threats to shield proxies from conflict (Thranert 2015).

Most deterrence studies carried out during the Cold War looked at the factors that affect successful deterrence in addition to the efficacy of conventional deterrence. This area of deterrence research is referred to as "Classical Deterrence Theory". Previous classical scholars have classified the effectiveness of conventional deterrence into four categories: a clearly defined behavior that is considered unacceptable; communication to the adversary of a commitment to punish violations; possession of the capability to defend this commitment; and demonstration of resolve to carry out the retaliation if the adversary does not comply.

Although they emphasize the importance of defenders' capacity to fulfill their pledge, almost all of them agree that the effectiveness of psychology against the aggressor is of utmost importance. If all four requirements are satisfied, the expected net costs of the threatened penalties should be more than the expected net benefits (Harvey, 1999). Put otherwise, these elements work as a formula to provide effective results for deterrent techniques.

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Since then, a few scholars with expertise in Neo-classical deterrence have expanded upon and reviewed it. They argue that if some variables are lacking while others are present, the deterrence formula will exacerbate conflict situations (Soloman, 2013). Frank Harvey provides an example, stating that in cases where defenders successfully communicate a threat of retaliation (A) along with a strong dedication to the topic (B), the likelihood of noncompliance is higher when there is no resolution (D) (Harvey, 1998). The war may escalate even further as a result of the deterrence formula, which was created to provide effective deterrent. Despite this, scholars maintain their

support for deterrence tactics and claim that employing an action-retaliation strategy would be advantageous for defending nations.

Having said that, it has been observed that the current use of conventional deterrence puts the realist/classical and post-structural schools of thought at a juncture. But the threat of force remains because militaries continue to modernize and bolster their forces globally. The old formula for deterrent success has been undermined by the open exchange of knowledge and rapid communication. (Rose 2004).

Experts claim that there have historically been three major waves of deterrence. In the first, which began immediately following World combat II, it was argued that the discovery of the atomic bomb had fundamentally altered the nature of combat. This is because, prior to this point, the parties engaged in conflict were more concerned with waging war than averting it. According to Brodie, this strategic revolution has resulted from the prospect of ultimate devastation that comes with using nuclear weapons, which means that conquering an opponent would be nearly meaningless. The obvious conclusion was that, in the face of a nuclear-armed foe, a state could no longer defend itself through military might. (Tunander, 1989; Sagan,1993).

The third wave of critique of deterrence theory as it had been evolved up to that point appeared in the 1960s and 1970s. Deterrence theorists contend that the second-wave deterrence theory failed to fully address the fundamental issues that led to a crisis and how it might have been avoided. Additionally, they felt that the process of compromising, which is how most conflicts are resolved when all sides agree to a compromise, was not given enough emphasis. The essential presumption of the second wave, that actors behave rationally, was contested by third-wave philosophers. They questioned whether or not leaders can maintain their composure under pressure (Kalgow, 2013).

Scholars have noted that strong nations are frequently involved in the use of extended deterrence. In a study of extended-immediate deterrence from 1885 to 1984, major powers defended themselves in 48 out of 58 examples of attempted deterrence (83%) (Huth and Russett, 1993). The crises that preceded the start of World Wars I and II, in which Great Britain failed to dissuade Germany, are examples of extended-immediate deterrence. In order to sustain a strategy of extended-general deterrence against the threat of another invasion by North Korea after the

Korean War ended, the United States developed an alliance and a military presence in South Korea.

Direct deterrence situations typically center on territorial disputes between adjacent states where major powers do not actively intervene. For instance, in the Middle East, Israel has depended on its own military forces to attempt deterrence against hostile Arab neighbors during the continuing Arab-Israeli war. For instance, Israel has largely been successful in its attempts to dissuade Syria from attempting to recapture the Golan Heights by force of arms since the end of the Six-Day War in 1967, during which Israel invaded the Golan Heights. However, in October 1973, Syria launched a significant attack on Israeli forces in the Golan Heights, failing Israeli doctrines of general and then immediate deterrence (Kaldo, 2013).

Additional research on Israel's deterrence tactics against Syria and Egypt (Lieberman, 1995; Bar-Joseph, 1998) suggests that attackers scaled back their territorial ambitions and created less ambitious operational plans for subsequent assaults in response to their relative military inadequacy. The difficulty of immediate deterrence for Israel then changed to preventing attacks in disputed demilitarized zones and occupied areas, despite the fact that Israel was able to thwart an Arab offensive that aimed to penetrate deeply into Israeli territory. In the long run, even while an Israeli advantage in the balance of power did not guarantee immediate deterrence success, it did serve to dramatically diminish Arab leaders' military aspirations and the intensity of follow-up attacks in the event that deterrence did not succeed. 2013).

The previous two decades demonstrate that despite Israel's severe threat of reprisal, its enemies have continued to attack it with rockets (with ever-greater ranges) and more recently, modern weapons like suicide drones. During the first intifada, which lasted from December 1987 to 1993, 1240 Palestinians and 421 Israelis died. During the second intifada, which lasted from September 2000 until the end of 2005, 3300 Palestinians died whereas only 1000 Israelis did. Following the targeted murder of the head of Hamas' military wing on November 14, 2012, 1,500 Israeli airstrikes resulted in the deaths of 174 Palestinians and 1,225 wounded, while just six Israelis were also killed.

Then there was the so-called "51-day war" in 2014, during which, according to a UN estimate, Israel carried out 6000 airstrikes and fired 50,000 tank and artillery shells, killing 1462 Palestinians and displacing 100,000 people. Six Israelis were killed and 1600 were injured as the

Palestinians fired 1753 mortars. High-rise structures were brought down using specialized weaponry during the conflict in May 2021, and 160 aircraft were used in the widely publicized attack on Hamas's underground tube system, or "metro." At the time of the cease-fire, there had been 243 deaths in Gaza and 12 in Israel, respectively, along with numerous injuries.

One could contend that the principle of proportionality serves as a norm for the use of force in conflict, both legally and ethically. Israel's cumulative deterrence strategy appears to have broken the proportionality principle, and as a result, it has obliged Israel to employ increasing amounts of force against its neighbors.

On the other side, several academics have noted that Israel's security strategy has given constructing an effective deterrence a high priority (Ross, 2004). They contend that Israel's deterrence strategy has helped Israel's neighbors attack it less frequently, highlighting Israel's unique connections to the US, which is currently in charge of world hegemony.

Both political and military considerations must be taken into account for a deterrent strategy to be effective. In the context of international territorial conflicts, deterrent policies have frequently been tried. This reflects the fact that conflicts and battles between governments have frequently been sparked by territorial disputes. Deterrence is frequently used against state leaders who have specific territorial objectives they want to achieve, either by taking disputed territory after a major military victory over an adversary or by seizing it in a limited military assault. In both scenarios, potential attackers' strategic orientation is typically short-term and motivated by worries about the financial and operational efficiency of the military. As a result, aggressor governments prefer to employ military force swiftly to accomplish military-territorial goals without suffering significant equipment and manpower losses.

A defending state needs to have the military capability to react swiftly and forcefully to a variety of military contingencies in order to be able to deny the aggressor its military objectives at the outset or very early stages of an armed offensive, according to Mearsheimer (1983), Huth (1993), and Glaser & Kaufmann (1998).

These academics contend that when defending forces are unable to effectively stop an attack at or close to its starting point, the attacking state's chances of quickly advancing into enemy territory and overwhelming resistance greatly boost political and military leaders' confidence that military

costs will be minimal and that military victories can result in tangible territorial gains. In conclusion, attacking states' advantages in the factors affecting the short- and immediate-term balance of forces can persuade leaders that an aggressive military strategy can be effective at a minimal cost.

According to Kaldor (2013), a war is a violent act between two or more organized organizations that is defined in political terms. Useful in our current discussion on the function of deterrence in the security environment, Kaldor makes the observation that, in contrast to earlier wars, where it was necessary to crush and dominate the enemy to show the extreme violence of war, modern wars require cooperation between the protagonists in order to carry out the enterprise of war, leading to wars that are protracted and ineffective. According to Kaldor, most new conflicts are typically joint undertakings in which both sides are more interested in sustaining their political identities and advancing their economic interests than in winning or losing.

In intellectual as well as policy circles, there is ongoing discussion over how the wars of the 20th century differed significantly from the organized violence of the 21st century. These modern conflicts have been labeled with a variety of conceptual labels, including "new wars," "post-modern wars," "wars among people," and "privatize wars" (Kaldor 2013: 1). Many of the characteristics associated with these new wars were present in the early modern era, and phenomena like banditry, mass rape, forced population displacement, or atrocities against civilians all have a long history, according to critics of the new wars concept (Kalyvas 2001).

Others believe that modern wars are primarily forms of criminal or privatized violence and should not be classified as war. Another complaint is that there aren't as many actual fights in today's violence and that there aren't enough fighting deaths to count as wars (Kaldor 2013). In contrast to past wars, which are seen as ideological, political, collective, and even noble, analysts of new wars characterize them as criminal, depoliticized, privatized, and predatory. The conclusion of the cold war marks the transition between the old and new civil conflicts (Kalyvas 2001).

New wars are financed and sustained through predatory financial methods such as loot, pillage, taxation of humanitarian and diaspora support, ransom, smuggling of oil, diamonds, drugs, human trafficking, and other illegal avenues. Old wars were largely funded by states through taxation or sponsorship from external patrons. It is stated that although ancient war economies were often centralized, autocratic, and mobilized the populace, current war economies are driven

by economic gain. On the other hand, emerging conflicts involved a decentralized, open global economy that relied on ongoing violence for its income (Kaldor 2013).

Kalyvas (2001) further argues that while interstate wars have decreased after the conclusion of the cold war, civil wars appear to be occurring more frequently than before. The civil wars of the post-cold war era have been linked to ethnic rivalry and are fundamentally distinct from those of the past. People have described the modern civil wars as criminal rather than political phenomena. By examining the origins, motivations, support, and violence, Kalyvas (2001) further differentiates between old and contemporary civil wars. He finds that the former were political in nature and were fought for broadly conceived, even good purposes like societal progress.

While political actors in new civil wars lack any popular support, old civil wars at least had one protagonist who had public support. Furthermore, acts of violence were controlled and disciplined, especially when committed by rebels (winning the hearts and minds of the people), but in new civil wars gratuitous and senseless violence is meted out indiscriminately.

New wars typically contribute to the breakdown of the state, in contrast to ancient conflicts that help construct the state by expanding its tax base and power (Kaldor 2013). A few people or small groups of people benefit from new wars' globalized, decentralized, criminalized, and extremely low employment economies (Kaldor 2009). According to Kaldor (2009), new wars are more challenging to conclude and demonstrate intractable tendencies, whereas past wars frequently had decisive conclusions.

The fighting parties have a common goal in continuing the conflict, whether for political or economic reasons, or to further entrench identity polarization by using violence to sow fear and hatred. It is still difficult to tell who is engaging in criminal activity to fund political causes from who is using a political cause as a front for criminal activity (Ibid.). Additionally, new wars show to be unwinnable. They were spread by the "virus" of identity politics as well as by the connections created between international criminal organizations during the conflict. There are several places in the world where there are such concentrations of conflict, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans and Caucasus, Central Asia, and Central and East Africa (Ibid).

Deterrence has generally been effective in enhancing national security, given the multitude of variables that might affect a conflict at once and the ensuing defense diplomacy strategy, it can be difficult to comprehend the sheer complexity of conventional deterrence. The majority of scholarly study on the subject has a common theme since nearly every factor that affects whether deterrence is successful or unsuccessful is interconnected and dependent on one another (Huth 1988). According to Wilner (Huth and Gelpi 1993; Wilner 2015), cost and benefit analysis refers to both the challenger and the defender's threat and contemplation of utilizing military force.

Deterrence has emerged as an important strategy of defence diplomacy, one thing clear from the onset is that scholars are divided on how to approach deterrence's success and failures. According to some, fails if the threatener had to use force, while other scholars consider deterrence to have failed if the threatener either had to use substantial force or did not attain its strategic policy goals.

In light of the aforementioned, I believe that despite their significance in the cycle of public policy, theories of conflict and conflict resolution do not go as far as to engage the essential components of human connections and understanding. The origins of defense diplomacy lie in the requirement for a new political lexicon to characterize intergovernmental relations and state cooperation. Despite being used rather regularly in political and scientific debate, it lacks a generally agreed definition. Several countries have altered defense diplomacy to meet their unique security requirements. For instance, it has been noticed that state actors are increasingly implementing the state's foreign policy through defense diplomacy (Weisiger, 2013).

1.5.3 The Influence of International and Regional Bodies to Defence Diplomacy and Security Policy Framework.

The nature of defense diplomacy has compelled militaries all over the world to develop policies that would oversee collaboration, cooperative humanitarian operations, and cooperative peace enforcement efforts, such as the operations carried out by NATO in Bosnia, the IGAD in Somalia, and the East African Forces, among others. Therefore, one may claim that these regional organizations have influenced the formulation and application of security policy frameworks in some way. Alliances are centered on collective defense. In a world where peace and security cannot be taken for granted, NATO's primary duty, as stated in Article 5 of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is to safeguard and defend Allied territory and populations against attack. For this reason, guiding principles and policies are necessary.

NATO was created in the wake of World War II and was tasked with carrying out the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C. NATO is a system of collective security in which the sovereign members pledge to protect one another from outside threats. NATO served as a check on the Soviet Union's threat during the Cold War. The alliance continued to exist following the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and it has participated in military actions in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. In order for NATO to function properly, the secretariat needed to convene and create the policies that would direct the organization's operations. (Lorne (2017).

In accordance with its goals, NATO fosters democratic values and permits its members to confer and work together on matters pertaining to defense and security in order to resolve disputes, foster confidence, and ultimately avert conflict. Military: NATO is dedicated to resolving conflicts amicably. Over the last ten years, a variety of policies and guidelines have been developed in areas like Children and Armed Conflict, Women Peace and Security, and Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence. These policies and guidelines have served as a foundation for NATO's and its partner countries' commitment to protecting civilians during the planning and execution of operations and missions. Furthermore, the endeavor to reduce civilian casualties throughout the ISAF campaign has taught NATO and its military partners valuable lessons.

The necessity to combine these rules, recommendations, and lessons gained into a single comprehensive policy that would more cogently address the protection of civilians in pertinent NATO operations, missions, and activities has been recognized by allies and partner countries. In order to ensure that the NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) is ready for the Warsaw Summit, the Council assigned the Operations Policy Committee the duty of developing the policy in November 2015.

Whether the Alliance is defending its borders, enhancing security through partnerships and capacity building, or managing a crisis through operations, missions, or other Council-mandated

tasks, protecting civilians is an overarching principle. As a result, the three main objectives of NATO outlined in its Strategic Concept are pertinent to PoC. Furthermore, a good approach to PoC by NATO is crucial for its sustained legitimacy and credibility, as evidenced by the growing strategic and operational significance of the successful execution of PoC-related measures in operations and missions. (NATO Policy Report, July 2016)

The NATO nuclear deterrent policy had a significant impact on how member states in the EU region formulated their policies, and thus, it also had an impact on the former USSR members. The main goals of NATO's nuclear arsenal, according to the alliance, are to avoid coercion, deter aggression, and maintain peace. NATO pledged to stay a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons are in existence. NATO wants to establish the security conditions necessary for a world free of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate aim being a safer world for all people. "The NATO Strategic Concept (2022)."

The 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, two publicly available papers approved by all Allies, serve as the foundation for NATO's present nuclear policy.

Deterrence and defense are outlined as one of the main objectives and tenets of the Alliance in the 2022 Strategic Concept, which was approved by Allied Heads of State and Government at the 2022 Madrid Summit. It claims that a suitable combination of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities, along with space and cyber capabilities, form the foundation of NATO's deterrence and defense posture.

Additionally, as per the Strategic Concept, "NATO will take all necessary steps to ensure the safety, security, efficacy, and credibility of the nuclear deterrent mission." While reiterating the special and distinctive role of nuclear deterrent, the Alliance is dedicated to promoting better integration and coherence of capabilities and actions across all domains and the spectrum of conflict. NATO is committed to upholding credible deterrence, bolstering its strategic communications, optimizing exercise efficacy, and mitigating strategic risks.

In order to show the unity and resolve of the Alliance, the Alliance reiterates the necessity of ensuring the widest possible involvement by all relevant Allies in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.

The 2012 Chicago Summit saw the endorsement of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) by the heads of state and government of the Allies. The DDPR emphasized that deterrence basically a political function is the primary goal of Alliance nuclear capabilities. The Alliance will always maintain political control over nuclear weapons, and nuclear planning and consultation inside the Alliance will follow political directives, even as it prioritizes maintaining effective deterrence.

NATO is reiterating how crucial nuclear deterrence is in view of changing threats. Since 2014, allies have reaffirmed this idea at several summit gatherings (the Wales Summit in 2014, the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Brussels Summits in 2018 and 2021, and the Madrid Summit in 2022, when heads of state and Government agreed the Strategic Concept).

Each and every Head of State or Government within NATO sets the fundamental tenets of the alliance's nuclear strategy. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is in charge of creating and carrying out NATO's nuclear policy. The platform for consultation on all matters pertaining to NATO nuclear deterrence is provided by the NPG. Every ally is a member of the NPG, except for France, which has chosen not to take part.

In the instance of Kenya, defense diplomacy is a fundamental element and cornerstone of the nation's foreign policy. To advance the accomplishment of defense policy objectives in support of Kenya's foreign policy, the Ministry of Defense of Kenya engages in a range of bilateral international activities, mainly centered on conversation and collaboration, with its allies, partners, and other friendly states.

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Kenya still confronts significant problems from low- to medium-intensity conflicts that occur inside Kenya's area of influence in the greater Eastern Africa region, despite the fact that conventional wars are less frequent there now. The impact of these more asymmetric battles and the emergence of new threats extend beyond Kenya's borders. One could argue that Kenya's defense diplomacy was necessary because of these threats.

Nation-states may employ DIME, an acronym for defense diplomacy, military information, and economics, to safeguard their national strategic interests. The military's main responsibility is to safeguard territorial integrity and sovereignty in order to promote the achievement of important national goals. As one of the many complementing national tools of power, the military functions in concert with them all. The four instruments are coordinated and integrated at the highest echelon of national leadership, operating within a framework of established national policy.

Due to its ability to deploy lethal force while adhering to national policy, the military remains an indispensable facilitator of the other instruments while also serving as a complementing tool. Because of its specific position, the military is the most significant tool for safeguarding the nation's interests (Wario, 2014).

Other researchers claim that defense diplomacy accomplishes a number of essential tasks, including planning working visits and peaceful stays for representatives of the defense authorities, fostering cooperation, communication, and mutual relations between the armed forces of the sending and receiving states, and gathering and analyzing data on the armed forces and the security environment in the receiving state. Another crucial aspect of defense diplomacy is the sending state's and its armed services' representation in formal ceremonies and other events hosted by the receiving state. (Kanyinga, 2000).

African nations were required to develop their security policies using the framework provided by the African Union. In compliance with the January 2008 Assembly Decision and the June 2006 Executive Council adoption of the Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) strategy, the AU strategy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR) was created. Over a three-year period, the document was extensively discussed with Member States and pertinent security industry specialists. Building on the global normative frameworks created by the UN,

the AU Policy Framework on SSR serves as a guide for the AU, Member States, RECs, and partners in the implementation of SSR on the African continent.

Based on their independent evaluation of the nation's security and development requirements, Member States continue to have the last say and exercise leadership in the execution of national SSR initiatives. Only SSR processes that are owned and managed domestically are eligible for assistance from the AU and other partners. (AU Resolution “Assembly/AU/Dec.177(X)” of February, 2008)

This policy framework's specific goals are to: Give AU Member States and RECs the framework they need to develop, create, implement, oversee, and assess Security Sector Reform procedures; Give African people, groups, and institutions a platform for SSR orientation, training, and capacity-building to help them engage in SSR processes more successfully and to give them an African tool for SSR advocacy. As an African building block contribution to the UN's global SSR framework, direct the alliances and relationships of international organizations and other partners working with the AU, RECs, and Member States in SSR procedures.

This shows that international and regional bodies influence defence diplomacy and Security Policy Framework.

The 2010 constitution and other laws in a nation like Kenya specify the principles of cooperation with other state institutions, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and form specific structural solutions as well as assign roles and goals. Therefore, the legal framework of defense diplomacy in Kenya has been influenced by international and regional bodies. Defense diplomacy operates within the confines of both existing international law, regulations, and customs as well as national legislation, claim Drab and Sochan (2016). Initiatives aimed at advancing defense diplomacy are a tool for national security and foreign policy that strengthen military cooperation and foster goodwill amongst Kenya and other countries. It specifically uses resources from the Ministry of Defense (MoD), which is in charge of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) activities, in this regard. But it doesn't come up with an external defense policy on its own; instead, it serves as the defense minister's tool for accomplishing the political objectives set forth by the federal government.

1.5.4 Challenges to Defence Diplomacy

Defense diplomacy's "velvet fists" dilemma is that the nature of the relationships that already exist between states ultimately determines both the goals and outcomes of defense diplomacy. Defense diplomacy has the potential to strengthen current cooperative norms when governments are amicably oriented towards one another. (Chang Jun Yan and Jenne Nicole, 2020)

Military attachés have been actively involved in a wide range of defense-related operations supporting combatant commanders and national policymakers since the fall of the Soviet Union and concurrent with the war on terror. Over the past ten years, the political landscape has shifted, which has increased the significance of soldier-diplo-mats serving overseas. The number of sovereign states in the international system has increased from 51 to over 200 since 1945. The United States established new embassies in 14 former Soviet Union member states ten years ago. Congealing national and cultural identities have arisen in each of these newly independent Eurasian governments, including the rediscovery of local languages that had been long suppressed by Soviet policies.

Global security is at risk due to the disintegration of nation-states from the Cold War era and the rising number of failed governments. These factors also pose a challenge to diplomatic missions worldwide. As a result, embassies have closed and diplomats, particularly defense attachés, who are the cornerstone of defense diplomacy, have returned home. Similar to this, host countries' hostility against defense attaches as a result of allegations of espionage has made defense diplomacy efforts more difficult.

Radical movements aimed targeting embassies and diplomats from nations thought to be adversaries of particular ideologies. Because of this, it is impossible for diplomats to be sent abroad, much alone carry out their jobs without fear of being kidnapped or even assassinated by these agents of the opposing ideology.

Bureaucracy presents a significant obstacle to defense diplomacy since it deprives the military of official authority to interact with stakeholders and make decisions on its own without the ambassador's express consent. Defense attachés typically lack the official power to propose, negotiate, and carry out defense diplomacy initiatives and activities without first obtaining the embassy's approval. Defense diplomacy has significant obstacles due to the existence of

bureaucracy. For example, a defense attaché may have very objective defense diplomacy projects that seek to identify long-term solutions to security issues within a nation or region; however, the ambassador may choose to disregard such initiatives due to politics, ignorance, or disinterest, which would frustrate the defense attaché's efforts.

Sycamnias claims that a bureaucratic structure grants the legal authority to control to the business's owners or administrators. The legal document that created the organization is the source of the right. Through education and training, ability and skill, specialty and other means, the organization is further translated into different degrees of power relations inside the organization. Wahab et al.: Bureaucracy's Effects and Consequences The actors' professionalization and skill inside the organization (Sycamnias, 2007).

Until recently, Weber's bureaucratic model dominated organizational thought as the most widely accepted and well-established type of mass organization on a global scale (Onyeonuru, 2002). But today, various people in the workplace associate different connotations with bureaucracy. For example, the public perceives it as nothing more than rows of desks manned by essentially faceless individuals. Others find red tape to be annoying since things are not completed as quickly as they would have liked. These all paint bureaucracy as a disliked organization. According to Weber, one of the primary advantages of bureaucracy is the creation of rules and regulations.

This is to make it more likely that workers will receive fair treatment and that bias, discrimination, and favoritism will be eradicated from the company. Because it is perceived by many as a development that comes at the expense of personal liberties like choice, bureaucracy has also come to be associated with negativity in society (Sycamnias, 2007). It also explains rigidity and the propensity to confuse goals with means. The person internalizes the norms because of the emphasis on compliance and rigorous adherence to them. Organizations have adopted a collaborative approach to structuring in more recent times, fusing the adaptability of "adhocracy" with the robustness of bureaucracy. (Sycamnias, 2007)

Political polarization is becoming an issue and significantly affecting defense diplomacy in many nations worldwide. As political divides deepen, governments are finding it more difficult to agree on basic topics, which is impeding diplomats' ability to negotiate and resolve conflicts.

World or global politics: Some scholars prefer "world" or "global politics" over "international relations" insofar as they believe that new actors, such as extremists, issues, structures, and processes, have emerged in recent decades as a result of globalization, rendering the traditional state-focused agenda incomplete. According to Barnett and Sikkink (2008), this has led some academics to discuss a historic transition from "international relations" to "world politics" or "global society." Defense diplomacy faces unique challenges as a result of globalization. Globalization has led to the replacement of the customary approach of managing security matters in a despicable manner with a more transparent one.

Practitioners of defense diplomacy will need to learn how to process information quickly and utilize it effectively, or else the same material may end up in the hands of extremists or dissidents the following day, who may exploit it for their own ends. The rapid and easy flow of information has been made possible by globalization and technology. In this world of allies and foes, states cannot afford to place their security or faith in others, and power will always triumph over fairness when determining international relations. States are caught in a "security dilemma," whereby actions taken to improve security prompt countermeasures from others, such as extremists, which exacerbates distrust and insecurity.

The study also demonstrates that there is no single conceptualization of defense diplomacy, gaps in policies, difficulty integrating national laws into regional defense strategies, and an unclear relationship between the goals, means, and ends of defense diplomacy. These challenges impede the full operationalization of defense diplomacy. (Strategic Survey by DOI, 1999)

The economic tool's ability to facilitate defense diplomacy has not been effective in Africa. Because of this, it is challenging for dependent nations to express their security stances without worrying about being reprimanded or contravened by the world's superpowers.

For instance, Kenya and Somalia may be at odds over the maritime boundary. Nevertheless, any decisions taken, whether unilateral or bilateral, must be monitored by other interested parties to ensure that their interests are protected. Due to their competition, these powers are likely to choose a side, which puts the poor state in a difficult situation. Any decision made will undoubtedly have an impact on both the disadvantaged and favored global powers as well as other interested allies.

However, there are drawbacks to relying solely on aid from major world powers to finance defense diplomacy initiatives like military humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping missions, and multilateral security policy. It is challenging and complex to influence changes in foreign defense policy through the use of economic mechanisms, especially for weak and soft states—mostly those in the developing world—that have little authority and resources. This is due to the fact that various states have quite different political structures and infrastructure, levels of technical skill, and types of administration. Given the nature and scope of infrastructure, foreign defense policy strategists employing economic approaches differ greatly; donors would never choose to finance pricey, cutting-edge solutions. (Heywood, 2011).

How effective hard and soft power strategies, such as the employment of economic instruments, are in terms of military power depends on the availability of resources (Heywood, 2011). Wealthy countries with more economic clout, like the USA or Russia, are able to keep sizable armed forces and apply pressure to other countries. For smaller states, it is more difficult to obtain these traditional hard power instruments. Still, the availability of soft power supplies is much less dependent on a state's size.

Poorer nations like Burundi or Malawi, for instance, will find it much harder to use economic means to apply soft power than nations like South Africa, Nigeria, or even Kenya, which all possess significant economic and military might as well as the capacity to develop soft power.

States frequently use unilateral measures, or acting on their own initiative without the assistance of another state, to deploy economic tools in their foreign defense policy. They occasionally use bilateral economic techniques, which entail the involvement of another state. States will occasionally take a multilateral strategy, enlisting the aid of numerous other states in their project.

Every strategy has its drawbacks. For example, the unilateral strategy might be expensive because it involves just the concerned state acting. Additionally, both bilateral and multilateral approaches carry a diplomatic cost, especially when it comes to the concessions that the lead state must make.

1.5.5 Gaps in Literature

Many academics in East Africa have discussed the topic of ethnicity and politics in order to better understand community conflicts and subsequent peace-building initiatives (Murunga 2014; Karuri 2014; Nyongo 2010; and Simiyu 2008). Despite the importance of state-centric approaches like defense diplomacy, less research has been done in Kenya, either internationally or locally, to support national security, state-level peace-building capacities using defense diplomacy with the goal of restoring peace and averting future conflicts.

Given the deaths, displacement, and economic disruption that civil war and insurgency cause, the predominate focus on them is understandable. However, very little attention is paid to state-initiated peace-building initiatives like defense diplomacy, which has been shown to be effective in preventing wars between armed groups and the state (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007).

1.6 Scope, Limitation and Justification of the Study

1.6.1 Scope of the Study

The main objective of the study is to investigate the main objective of the research which is to determine the contribution that defense diplomacy makes to enhancing security in Kenya. The study will be carried out in Kenya and other parts of Africa and Asia targeting diplomats, military senior Officers, senior government officials and defence attaches. The researcher applied the Purposive sampling technique. This represents a group of different non-probability sampling techniques, it is also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling. Purposive sampling relies on the judgement of the researcher when it comes to selecting the units (e.g., people, cases/organisations, events, pieces of data) that are to be studied. For the case of this study, the researcher could not pick on anyone to respond to my research queries since this is a specialized areas with very few people having an opportunity to practice. Additionally, these practitioners would always be hesitant to share information on the subject because it is considered confidential.

1.6.3 Limitations of the Study

Since the study involves a population that is somehow discreet, some respondents may not be ready to participate in the study or give out their data for fear of being profiled by hostile groups or for confidentiality's sake. The researcher will overcome this by guaranteeing respondent's that the information will be held in confidence and that their identity will be protected. Further, the documents utilized there in will be secured under locks.

1.6.3 Justification of the Study

With rising insecurity in the East Africa region including threats of terrorism activities, defence diplomacy has become a necessary strategy for Kenya in order to quell off threats of violence and maintain peace in the country and the region.

1.6.3.1 Academic Justification

Defense diplomacy has received little scholarly attention in recent years, so this study aimed to generate much-needed interest and awareness by enhancing understanding of it as a crucial tool in strategic and international relations in the East African region.

1.6.3.2 Policy Justification

The 2010 constitution outlines the duties of the KDF, including its need to defend and preserve the nation's territorial integrity, in Article 241(3). The KDF is also permitted to carry out pertinent tasks, including as peace-building, in times of emergency, particularly in regions impacted by instability. This study helped policymakers in relevant fields develop public diplomacy policies focused on national security, and it also contributes to the literature on diplomacy and national security while highlighting potential areas for further study. It thus proved to be a useful avenue for informing the country's foreign and diplomatic policies.

1.7 Theoretical Framework: Social Constructivism Theory of IR

The Social Constructivism theory of IR was applied in this study to clarify the causal connection between diplomacy and national security. A school of thought in international relations (IR)

theory known as social constructivism was first introduced by Nicholas Onuf in his book "The World of our making" in 1989. In this book, Onuf made the argument that nation states, like people, lived in a reality that was primarily created by themselves rather than by external material entities. Because it holds that reality is socially produced, the theory was thought to be the best fit for the investigation. In the sense that constructivists place a larger emphasis on norm creation, identity, and idealization power than the other major theoretical paradigms, defense diplomacy has played a crucial role in both physical and human.

Norms, identity, and ideas are key factors in constructivist theory. Military diplomacy entails use of common norms, ideas and identity to construct cordial relationship among themselves, this has in many ways enhanced national security, unity, peaceful coexistence and cooperation among neighbouring nations. Kenya defence diplomacy revolves around military cooperation which is accomplished by way of joint training where participant from allied countries from Africa and other parts of the world attend courses in the country while own participants attend courses in other parts of Africa and the world.

Joint cooperation has been achieved by way of military exercises attended by allied forces from the region and other parts of the world. This creates a window for joint planning and execution of operation. As a result of joint planning and joint expresses, the East African Standby forces have successfully managed to respond to the Somalia crisis and the DRC crisis among others. Cooperation makes it easier to share intelligence, policies and strategies for combating terrorism, crime and natural calamities.

The concept that knowledge is generated through human action is one of several underlying assumptions or guiding principles of the social constructivism theory of IR. Collectively, the individuals of a society construct reality. Learning is a social, interactive activity. Through their relationships with others and their surroundings, people produce meaning. The military forces of the East African region, for example, have been able to form a bond through joint learning (diplomatic training), and it is now simpler for the regional forces to come together and mitigate insecurity situations within the region through diplomatic means. Kenya has used this strategy with positive results.

The theory further emphasizes on the importance of Inquiry-based Interaction (IBI), Problem based Interaction (PBL), Cooperative Interaction (CI) and Reciprocal Interaction (RI). These are important aspects in defence diplomacy, for defence diplomacy to thrive there has to be objective inquiry of the interaction, approached using the problem-based tenets, there has to be cooperation and reciprocity.

Data from the study shows that Kenya's defence diplomacy is made up of several different set of activities. Most respondents pointed out that joint military training and peace enforcement operations were the most prominent. They then expressed their views at 84% that peacekeeping operations and joint regional exercises as well as military secondment in international and regional bodies were the second most important defence diplomacy engagement. Diplomatic engagement came third. From this data, we affirm the study's first hypothesis that Kenya's defense diplomacy has promoted security in Kenya through defence cooperation, common training, sharing of information and joint operations to respond to common threats.

The study also finds that membership of regional and international organizations plays a significant role in shaping Kenya's defense diplomacy policy. These organizations provide a platform for Kenya to engage with other countries and to shape the direction of regional and international security policies. Data from the study shows that a significant majority of the respondents were in agreement that Kenya's defence diplomacy plays an important role in preventing regional interstate conflicts. Further, data drawn from the study shows overwhelming support by respondents at 100% for regional cooperation and enhanced national security as well as enhanced collaboration. At the same time, the data also shows that respondents looking at the benefits of defence diplomacy in the wider East African Community play a significant role of enhancing human security, military coalition establishment and the sharing of experiences on emerging issues.

At the same time, Kenya uses deterrence as one of the strategies of its defense diplomacy. As a method, deterrence has a long history in the context of maintaining not only the military and security landscapes but also in the law-and-order realm where the deterrence hypothesis remains a key intellectual foundation for most criminal law and criminal justice systems.

1.8 Methodology

The research employed methodology as a rational, methodical strategy to address the research issue. It involves "the role of defense diplomacy in enhancing national security" in this instance. The methodology describes the steps taken in the research process to guarantee accurate and legitimate findings that meet my goals and objectives. It includes what kind of data needs to be gathered, geographic location it needs to be gathered, and how it will be gathered and analyzed.

1.8.1 Target Population

Participants in the study included senior security officers, civil servants, defense attachés, and diplomats from Kenya and other African and Asian countries. Although a target of thirty responses was anticipated, twenty-three respondents in all participated. This is sufficiently representative, in Creswell's opinion (Creswell, 1998). The target population consists of government servants with at least a bachelor's degree who have all participated in diplomatic missions.

1.8.2 Method

In order to gather information for this research study and address the research subjects previously mentioned, a mixed-methods strategy was employed. To do this, it was necessary to integrate qualitative and quantitative research methods (Kothari, 2005). In a single research project, mixed methods research integrates and mixes qualitative and quantitative research approaches. In order to better comprehend a phenomenon and provide answers to the research questions, it entails gathering and evaluating both qualitative and quantitative data.

Utilizing mixed methods research is based on the fundamental idea that it maximizes each data type's advantages while mitigating its disadvantages. To increase the body of evidence, strengthen the validity of their conclusions, and compare the outcomes of two different ways. The research integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

In addition, exploratory sequential design was used, this is a kind of mixed methods research design, in which the researcher gathered and examined qualitative data before doing a quantitative phase to confirm my findings. The researcher was able to investigate the

phenomenon using a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies before determining which variables required quantitative measurement.

1.8.3 Sampling Techniques

The researcher applied the Purposive sampling technique. This represents a group of different non-probability sampling techniques, it is also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling. Purposive sampling relies on the judgement of the researcher when it comes to selecting the units (e.g., people, cases/organisations, events, pieces of data) that are to be studied. For the case of this study, the researcher could not pick on anyone to respond to my research queries since this is a specialized areas with very few people having an opportunity to practice. Additionally, these practitioners would always be hesitant to share information on the subject because it is considered confidential.

Typically, the sample size under investigation is rather small, particularly in contrast to probability sampling methods. This type of non-probability sampling involves the researcher selecting the participants for the sample based on a range of factors, such as the participant's willingness and ability to engage in the research or specialized knowledge of the research topic.

The process of choosing several groups of units so that, when combined, they produce as close to the same average or proportion as the totality with regard to those qualities that are already the subject of statistical information is known as a purposive selection. Purposive sampling differs from probability sampling in that it aims to construct a sample through purposeful selection rather than selecting units from a population at random with the objective of drawing generalizations. Examples of probability sampling techniques include simple random sampling, stratified random sampling, and others. Purposive sampling's primary objective is to concentrate on certain, interesting features of a population that will best help researchers address the study issues.

1.8.4 Data Collection and Data Instruments

Data was collected using interview methods among the selected respondents. Multi-stage sampling procedure was adopted in the administration of 30 well structured field questionnaires in the study area (Creswell, 2017). This figure was derived from Purposive sampling technique

and the study sample was representative enough. Survey design was adopted and primary data was collected from September, 2022 to May 2023.

1.8.5 Data Reliability and Validity

Data observability, also known as data dependability, is the extent to which information from data sources can be relied upon and applied to make sound decisions. Accuracy and consistency are the two essential components of data reliability. To make the data reliable the researcher selected a dependable research methodology as indicated above, ensured that all the members of the sample group are homogenous enough or at least uniform and used reliable technique of my choice to administer test. Additionally, the researcher conducted the test using the same sample group, and administered same testing procedure all the times.

1.8.6 Analysis

In terms of data analysis, the Quantitative and Qualitative analysis was applied (Kothari, 2005, Mugenda, 2003). Frequency distribution and simple percentile were also employed. This was further enabled by the engagement of the google scholar research assistance tools.

1.8.7 Ethical Consideration

I prioritized ethical considerations in my research method. A set of guidelines that direct research ideas and procedures are known as ethical considerations in research. Voluntary involvement, informed consent, anonymity, secrecy, risk of damage, and results communication are some of these guiding concepts. The researcher adhered to the aforementioned guidelines and further explained them to the respondents, assuring them that ethical issues will be taken into account during the research project.

In my research process, ethical consideration was given preference. Ethical considerations in research are a set of principles that guide your research designs and practices. These principles include voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality, potential for harm,

and results communication. The researcher abided by the above and further communicated same to the respondents and reassured them ethical considerations will be considered through out the period of the research.

1.9 Hypothesis

This study will be premised on the following hypothesis;

1. **H0:** Kenya's defense diplomacy has not promoted security in Kenya.
H1: Kenya's defense diplomacy has promoted security in Kenya.
2. **H0:** Kenya's defense diplomacy and security policy framework are not influenced by its membership in international and regional organizations.
H1: Kenya's defense diplomacy and security policy framework are greatly influenced by its membership in international and regional organizations.
3. **H0:** As a future challenge, Kenya defence budget is not expected to increase to accommodate its future defence diplomacy engagements.
H1: As a future challenge, Kenya defence budget is expected to increase to accommodate its future defence diplomacy engagements.

1.10 Demographics

Table 1: Age Group

The Table 1 below shows that 60.9 % of all those interviewed were above 50 years.

Age

23 responses





Table 2: Professional Background and Education Levels

Profession

23 responses



The above Table 2 shows that 78.3% participants were government officers at senior levels.

Furthermore, data revealed that all had attained graduate level of education.

1.11 Chapter Summary

Chapter one presents an introduction of the study together with its background and the methodology adopted by the study. The subject focus of this research study is an analysis of Kenya's defence diplomacy from 2012 to 2022 period. The chapter details out the research

questions as well as the study's general and specific objectives, its hypothesis and theoretical framework in addition to the study's justification and statement of the problem.

CHAPTER TWO

AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA'S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

2.0 Introduction

Defense diplomacy enables the military to influence foreign policy through alternative means. This type of collaboration between countries serves as a basis for future connections (Ebitz, 2019). The significance of military diplomacy in international partnerships is crucial. It can lead to the formation of conversations that can help prevent confusion arising between nations during a crisis.

The utilization of defense diplomacy as a way to augment a nation-state's national or regional might in order to meet their strategic objectives has roots stretching back to antiquity. As far back as 350 B.C, ancient Chinese Military strategist Sun Tzu maintained that warfare was of great importance to the state, noting that it determined life and death, as well as being a path leading either to survival or demise (Sun Tzu 1994: 167). This conviction of Sun Tzu's may possibly have had an impact on why nations have traditionally used their armies as the ultimate means of achieving political and social objectives.


The term 'Defense Diplomacy' was first coined in 1998 by British scholars in the UK's Strategic Defense Review paper. This concept was used to describe all activities conducted in pursuit of global peace and stability by Britain's Armed Forces, as well as other defense-related entities. It covered activities related to defense and security across Europe, as well as supporting the Commonwealth. The idea gained traction among leading countries, with many seeing it as an important tool for international peace and security (Ministerio De Defensa, 2012:18).

This chapter discusses the nature of defence diplomacy in the promotion of national security in Kenya. This section of the research focuses on critical literature on defense diplomacy by drawing on current discussions by various academics and military practitioners in order to gain further understanding of this study's first research question that is aimed at analyzing the country's defence diplomacy in relation to its national security concerns.

Table 3: Deployment to Diplomatic Missions

1. Have you personally been deployed in any diplomatic mission?

23 responses



Data captured in the above Table 3 shows that 34% of the respondents had been deployed to serve at Kenya's diplomatic missions.


2.1 Kenya's Defence Diplomacy

Economic development is listed as one of the foremost defence diplomacy activity by Kenya's Defence Forces. This is because it is considered one of the prime ways of promoting peace and preventing the escalation of conflicts within communities across the country. According to a recent White Paper by the Ministry of Defence, part of economic development activities involves road construction, shelters, the building of bridges between rivers as well as offering medical camps and services to the local communities the drilling or improving infrastructures that support water services to the local communities. All these services are aimed at improving the standards of living for the local communities and thereby reducing poverty rates that might persuade them to engage in criminal activities that lead to retaliatory conflicts such as cattle rustling (KDF, White Paper, 2019).

Table 4: Kenya's Defence Diplomacy Activities

3. What are the main activities involved in Defence Diplomacy. (Tick All Appropriate Options)

23 responses



The above Table 4 displays the activities identified by respondents as constituting the bulk of Kenya's defence diplomacy.

In Kenya, activities undertaken as part of defence diplomacy are specified in the KDF Act of 2012 as well as in the country's 2010 constitution. One of the most fundamental responsibilities assigned to the military in Kenya is to the protection of her citizens and all persons within it as well as the territorial integrity of the Kenyan state. This means that the military is obligated to take action that assists in restoring normality especially at challenging times such as the recent droughts that have battered parts of the country. That said, Kenya like other countries continue to face threats to her sovereignty from domestic as well as external sources that have necessitated the use of not just military force but also to engage in soft power defence diplomacy to thwart some the threats. Most of the participant agreed with the identified defence diplomacy activities. They made the following comments:

"Others could include liaison, protocol coordination duties, engagement with other TCCs and UN/AU staff, bilateral and multilateral military talks, military sports, defence cooperation". (Key Informant from MoD Kenya, Malawi)

Across the world, many states are increasingly faced with new risks and threats that have necessitated an integrated approach that takes a dimension that can be described as interdependence. In the 21st century, one may point out that the struggle for security; prosperity

and justice are no longer confined to any single country. It is fair to observe that the responsibility is shared across many countries that constitute the global comity of nations. In order to achieve this, countries such as Kenya have employed the use of defence diplomacy as a means of organizing its available means and mechanisms that enables it to provide a coordinated response in its foreign action.

Therefore, in the context of the nation, defense diplomacy is a fundamental element and pillar of Kenya's foreign policy. The Ministry of Defense cooperates and communicates with partners, allies, and other friendly countries in order to achieve defense policy goals, which supports Kenya's foreign policy.

While Kenya faces fewer conventional wars today, there are significant threats that the country continues to face that can be described as ranging between low to medium-intensity confrontations within Kenya's sphere of influence in the wider region. The consequences of the proliferation of these asymmetric conflicts and the appearances of new threats are beyond Kenya's borders. It can be argued that it is these threats that have in turn defined the need for Kenya's defence diplomacy.

Scholars have posited that defence diplomacy, information, military, and economy (DIME) are an important instrument for nation-states in terms of safeguarding its national strategic interests. The military functions as a key instrument of national power, designed to counter and deter external as well as internal threats against vital national interests. It works in tandem with other critical instruments of power, and all four are integrated into a unified strategic plan by the highest levels of leadership. The military stands apart from the other instruments in its capacity for employing lethal force in accordance with the strategy, making it the most essential tool for protecting our nation's interests (Wario, 2014:19-20).

Other researchers assert that defense diplomacy serves a number of critical functions, including gathering and analyzing data on armed forces and the security environment in the recipient country; promoting cooperation, communication, and relationships between the military forces of the sending and receiving countries; organizing working visits for defense officials and safe stays for the sending country's military units in the recipient country; and supporting commercial interests (Kanninga 2000).

2.2 Strategies in Kenya's Defence Diplomacy

Nation-states employ grand strategic theory or approach on how to safeguard their own security from military threats as part of their defence diplomacy. In history, the reasoning behind grand strategy evolved from the maritime strategic contemplation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, prior to which grand strategy was mainly restricted to the military. Scholars frequently associate grand strategist with certain official frameworks such as a centralized organization or methods of implementation like the military (Balzacq et al, 2019:3).

The classical tradition of grand strategy places a strong emphasis on how the military should be used to further a nation's objectives. Classicists use the idea in a periodic, militaristic manner from the eighteenth century. They have a comprehensive understanding of grand strategy, which outlines reasoning for planning and fighting battles as well as the substance of military capabilities and how they are used in conflict. Therefore, in reality, this approach incorporates a large portion of the study of modern military strategy (Balzacq et al., 2019:6). Scholars have named Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford as two of the top philosophers who enlarged grand strategy to include non-military tools (Milevski, 2019: 5).

Some scholars are of the view that the concept is still very much in vogue, and warn that what grand strategy actually means often remains unclear, and “discussions of the issue too often muddle or obscure more than they illuminate” (Brands, 2012: 1). However, scholars in political and social sciences define grand strategy, persuasively, as an effort to combine the capacities of a state with a social goal, Drezner for example defines it as a deliberate act of intellectual formation, guiding foreign entities, national security bureaucracies and external examiners in understanding what to anticipate from a country's foreign policy (Drezner, 2009).

According to Drezner (2019), there are three key elements in wealthier nations that have changed the market for foreign policy concepts, which has rendered discussions of grand strategic influence less important and more redundant. He emphasizes that the first has been the decline in confidence in knowledge in general and knowledge of foreign policy in particular, which has reduced the influence of foreign policy establishments. Second, he contends that the sharp increase in political polarization has had a significant impact on discussions on foreign policy,

making it harder for experts on foreign policy to persuade elites on the opposing side of the political spectrum.

Thirdly, Drezner has argued that, due to decades of disconnect and disregard, legislatures have yielded control of foreign policy matters to the executive branch. This diminishing of legislative control has weakened any potential for public discourse to shape choices in terms of national strategies (Drezner, 2009:2).

2.3 Economic Development Tools in Kenya's Defense Policy

Economic tools are critical pillars that support the infrastructure of a state's foreign defence diplomacy. Foreign defence policy can be described as a broader fusion of defence and foreign policies together with strategies aimed at protecting a particular state. In general terms, a foreign defence policy would be driven by the desire of a state to protect itself from external harm by engaging in careful and strategic planning and management as well as careful and calculated implementation and execution of the policy's action plans.

In his publication 'Peace and War', Raymond Aron (2002) pointed out that foreign and defence policies are somewhat complementary. The author observes that foreign policy is by and large determined by a combination of factors at play in the international relations arena, such as diplomacy, international law that includes treaties and so forth. Defence policy, on the other side, tends to be more concerned with strategies that are defensive or deterrent in character but aimed at advancing certain national interests. Both pillars combined as foreign defence policy cohabit during peacetime and also during times of conflict.

From the onset one may argue that nation-states are similar to human beings in that they also have a set of different identities, this means that states also respond or react to the actions of other states depending on the situation presented in the orbit of international affairs. As Alexander Wendt (1992) pointed out, states tend to react differently to other states that they perceive as their enemies and whose activities they deem as threatening. That state reaction is often different to states that they consider friendly, whose action they do not interpret as hostile.

Therefore, the trajectory of the human behavioral psychology bares similarity to how states also behave especially when faced with a challenging or hostile situation. In general, the human-state

correlation underlines the tensions that characterize societal and state institutional approaches through foreign defence policies as responses to towards everyday constraints, imperatives and opportunities that emerge in the discourse of global politics in the course of time.

From the end of 1945 when the Second World War ended, the world has seen several changes that have had an impact on most foreign defence and economic policies significant among these have been the Cold War crisis that ended in the early in 1990s following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The oil crisis of 1973 had huge implications globally, the recent financial crisis of 2008 caused by subprime mortgages in the United States and the recent Covid-19 global pandemic that has had serious economic ramification to societies across the world. All these phases have played a significant role in influencing societal contexts of statecraft and subsequently foreign defence policies which are aligned to the economic policies.

These events have affected how the ruling elites perceive their external environment and subsequent threats, their command structures in relation to the wider and evolving global setting. Indeed, some scholars have pointed out supportively that whilst it is prudent to acknowledge the limitation of societal context in determining foreign defence policy, it is equally important to also acknowledge the nature of its role in shaping a set of possible action by creating perceptual maps for foreign defence policy makers. More specifically, societal context shapes the local political culture as well as the notion of ‘national interests’ based on a state’s set of core national values (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1991) such as those gaudily pronounced in Kenya’s 2010 constitution.

Hard power, over the years has played a central role in military engagements. But complex challenges experienced in warfare during in the 21st century have necessitated a new approach using softer approach to warfare. The soft approach is connected to the scholarship of Joseph Nye (1990). He defined soft power as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2004: x). Nye later developed the soft power approach in foreign defence policy to include culture and economic tools. He argued that this approach gives the state the “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (2011: 21).

That said, military scholars are divided in terms of the two approaches as to which is the best in terms of deterrence given the nature of power. Some scholars think that behavior of states plays a big role in warfare psyches (Nye, 2011), whilst others think that capabilities outweigh every other consideration (Singer, 1968).

Many scholars' arguments are predicated on the effectiveness and usefulness of both soft and hard power features. Some have argued that soft power does not interfere with hard power and that in real sense soft power complements hard power, and that furthermore, soft power can be applied independent of hard power (Nye, 2011).

Those opposed to the soft power approach have presented arguments that support coercion as the most prominent feature of foreign defence policy. For instance, Gray in 2011 argued that the weakness of soft power approach is that it relies very much on the perception held by foreign countries. Others have compared soft power approach to an extension of imperialism. There are other scholars who acknowledge the benefits of both hard and soft military remedies arguing that they are both effective depending on the timing when they are applied in deterrence.

Economic tools and agreements are increasingly becoming important pillars employed in foreign defence policies. They have capability to promote a state's political and economic interests in addition to securing security and well being of the states. Economic tools can be thought of as a long-term set of choices or a game-plan adopted by a state to achieve its objectives and gain a competitive advantage (Ansoff, 1965) in a given environment. It is a combination of well thought intent and set of actions which propels foreign defence policy to its desired position.

The taxonomy of foreign defence policy tools can be recapitulated as, foreign economic assistance, economic sanctions, trade policy, political Intervention. These are economic tools designed and applied to achieve military objectives using the soft approach discussed earlier.

2.3.1 Foreign Economic Assistance

This tool is used in foreign defence policy to provide lending and foreign assistance it is aimed at advancing priorities identified in foreign defence policy. Countries contribute to other countries by giving out grants or loans with advantageous financial rates and terms to boost economic development. This has in a way watered down the ability of the weaker states to project their

paths in terms of defence diplomacy. This is basically because stronger states would always demand engagements that would favour their interests since they are the financiers of such initiatives. Ultimately smaller states end up formulating policies that favour the donor states to the detriment of the weaker states. The weaker states need to project their defence diplomatic agenda regardless the scolding by the bigger states, of essence is for these states to finance their own project since they have enough to support such projects, the problem is corruption and the tendency of having wrong priorities.

2.3.2 Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are important economic tool often imposed to states that violate certain international laws and regulations or treaties. A good example is the current subjection of Russia in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. Sanctions are economic measures applied indiscriminately to a particular country they tend to have collateral damage to communities across the violating country.

2.3.3 Trade Policy

Trade policies are also an important economic tool used in foreign defence policy to achieved set objectives. They can be used to advance national interests of states in military negotiations.

2.3.4 Arms Control

Kenya defence diplomacy is cognizant of agreements that the country has made to control the use and access to arms and other military technologies are a form of economic tools used to determine certain defence objectives in given political and military situations. These tools are helpful in subverting arms races especially those going to volatile regional neighbors such as Sudan, Eritrea or Somalia and the DRC. Peace-keeping missions such as one of Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia through AMISOM are also an important feature that enables a country to achieve its objectives through the use of peacekeeping and economic activities in a given foreign country.

2.3.5 Scenario and Risk Analysis

This type of analysis and the risk assessment framework is important features of ensuring that economic tools are effectively used in foreign defence policies. They help to identify policy priorities and strategies to be employed that will help to achieve identified priority defence objectives. Using both scenario and risk assessment framework as analytic tools enables assessment needs to be made as to whether the scenario stresses the available and planned force structure to an unacceptable level. This specifies whether the identified risk is too high or not. In an environment where resources are at times scant, risk assessment frameworks are helpful in identifying attendant risks of the foreign defence policy and strategy of using economic tools. The purpose of a risk assessment framework is to identify the areas of highest priority and to inform choices.

2.3.6 Challenges of Economic Tools in Foreign Defence Policy

Influencing foreign defence policy change through the strategy that features economic tools is difficult and complex, particularly for those with limited power and resources defined as weak and soft states largely found within the developing world. This is because many states differ considerably in terms of their technical expertise, the type of administration that they have as well as the political infrastructure and systems. Therefore, foreign defence policy strategist using economic tools vary considerably given the nature and infrastructural scope.

In regard to military power, resource accessibility determines how effective hard and soft power techniques like the use of economic instruments are (Heywood, 2011). Rich nations like the USA or Russia, who have stronger economic muscles, have the ability to maintain large armed forces and exert pressure on other nations. These classic instruments of hard power are harder to come by for smaller states. However, the size of a state has considerably less of an impact on the availability of soft power supplies.

For example, a poorer country such as Burundi or Malawi will have considerable difficulty in applying soft power using economic tools as opposed to a country like South Africa or Nigeria or even Kenya all of which have sizeable economic and military muscle and the ability to build soft power.

States tend to apply economic tools in their foreign defence policies using unilateral means, where they act alone and without the help of another state. They at times also apply economic tools bilaterally, in that they involve another state. Sometimes states use a multilateral approach in that they involve many other states in their endeavor. There are challenges to each of the approaches, for instance the unilateral approach can be costly in that the concerned state acts alone. Also, bilateral and multilateral approaches have its diplomatic burden particularly the compromises that the primary state has to make.

2.4 Kenya's Deterrence Strategy

Kenya uses deterrence as one of its defense diplomatic tactics. Deterrence has historically been utilized as a tactic to maintain law and order, with the deterrence hypothesis serving as the philosophical cornerstone of the majority of criminal law and criminal justice systems. This includes both the military and security environments. In response to the existence of nuclear weapons, it became a tenet of international security during the Cold War (Kaldow, 2013). It is also being used in what are known as "new wars." Deterrence, conceptually speaking, is when one country uses the prospect of unfavorable consequences to stop another country from acting in a certain way. The effectiveness of the threats is determined by their ability to deter the target from executing the targeted action because of the expenses and losses they would face if they did.

In the realms of security and strategies, the concept of deterrence normally implies warnings of military repercussions by leaders of one nation to their counterparts in another land, to discourage them from using military strength as a means for achieving their foreign policy aspirations. State's deterrence agendas in foreign affairs usually involve both military and nonmilitary deterrents that are designed to stop other nations from acting out with either military or non-military actions.

As a strategy, deterrence is useful in increasing the cost of the aggressor whilst at the same time reducing the cost of engagement for the defending state. According Robert Jervis, the measures undertaken in the strategy can either be direct or at times indirect (Jervis, 1979).

2.4.1 Deterrence Policy Structure

Both political and military considerations must be taken into account while developing a deterrent strategy. This frequently occurs when there are territorial disputes between states, which are a frequent source of conflict and war. Deterrence is typically directed at state leaders who want to conquer certain areas, either through a direct militant attack or following a successful military campaign by an adversary. Attackers are more likely to use force quickly with the intention of attaining their goals without suffering significant losses because of the short-term nature of such objectives and the repercussions of significant casualties and losses of equipment.

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2.4.2 Strategies by Weak States

In the developing world, where Kenya belongs, the majority of states can be described as weak or soft in terms of their military strength and influence. Weak states are nations that lack the essential ability and/or motivation to fulfill four key governmental duties: Building and maintaining ethical, accountable, and lawful political institutions, safeguarding their populace from armed conflict, managing their borders, and ensuring that their citizens have access to basic necessities are all examples of good governance (Rice and Stewart 2008). A weak state cannot ensure its own survival, especially in the face of a strong opponent or even another weak state backed by a strong one (Keohane, 1969). It's possible to see how this could change how a nation's grand plan is perceived.

2.4.3 Strategies by Soft States

In contrast to contemporary European states, Gunner Myrdal invented the term "soft state" to describe the lack of adequate regulation, law adherence, and enforcement in South Asia and, by extension, most of the developing world. According to his argument, these flaws frequently lead to public officials working together with powerful individuals and organizations that they ought to be overseeing (Myrdal 1970).

Since September 11, 2001, the US government and other governments have begun to acknowledge that some of the greatest threats to international peace and security come from "Soft States," which can result in transnational security issues like terrorism, the proliferation of weapons, organized crime, infectious diseases, environmental destruction, and civil unrest that crosses international borders. This has had a big impact on the big strategies that soft or weak states have started. (Kanyinga, 2014)

A study by Balzacq et al (2019) has pointed at examples where some weak countries have employed the use of grand strategies without actually knowing that they are engaging in the exercise. Balzacq and others argue further that some weak or soft states lack the conventional bureaucratic resources needed to form strategy. Some go so far as to confuse conceptions of grand strategy by employing political science-unrecognized strategies, such as the use of proxy groups, networks, or tribes in place of state components. In addition, they may use formal education or internet outreach to mobilize power from social sources, such as religious fanaticism, something that academics who focus on soft power strategies like markets and popular culture typically overlook.

2.5 Effectiveness of Deterrence Vide Kenya's Defence Diplomacy

Given the many variables that influence a conflict and the defense diplomacy tactic used, it is difficult to comprehend the intricacy of conventional deterrence. The majority of research studies on this subject have one thing in common (Huth 1988). Wilner's cost-benefit approach (Huth & Gelpi 1993; Wilner 2015) considers both the challenger and the defender's evaluation and contemplation of potential military action in an effort to understand how weak or 'soft' states

behave. Kenya has effectively managed to deter threats from its neighbours due to its military posture, show of force and professionalism.

2.5.1 The Rational Choice Framework

Consider Schelling (1960, 1966) and Zagare (1987) for examples of rational choice theory, which is a well-liked approach to deterrence theory. In this strategy, state authorities weigh the benefits of utilizing armed force vs remaining obedient and select the course with the greater predicted benefits. An assailant weighs the advantages of mounting a military challenge to the current quo along with the likelihood that these advantages will materialize. In an effort to decrease the expected value of employing force by attackers, rational deterrence emphasizes costs and the likelihood of an attack succeeding.

The two deterrent tactics known as general and immediate and central and extended have different sub-parts, according to scholars (Wilner, 2015). While immediate deterrence employs threats of attack to stop the escalation of conflict, general deterrence includes redistributing power through coercion to ward off possible foes in the future. Extended deterrence entails protecting proxy allies from war through threats and a "distance-is-comfort" approach (e.g., the Vietnam War) while central deterrence follows a traditional bipolar system between superpowers to protect one another (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War) (Thranert 2015).

2.5.2 Waves of Deterrence

There have historically been three main waves in deterrence, according to experts. The argument that the development of the atomic bomb had profoundly changed the essence of war was made in the first, which started right after the Second World War. This is due to the fact that before to this time, warring parties were more focused on waging war than preventing it. Brodie said that the development of nuclear weapons fundamentally altered military strategy because it was no longer necessary to defeat an enemy. As a result, states cannot rely solely on their military might to ensure their security in the face of adversaries who are armed with nuclear weapons (Tunander, 1989; Sagan, 1993).

Game theoretic tools and other techniques were used to advance the notion of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. War, according to Thomas Schelling (1966), is a form of negotiation in which parties try to sway each other's opinions and intentions through threats, promises, and deeds. He described the art of war as one of retreat, compulsion, and intimidation. In this situation, Schelling asserted that using nuclear weapons for punitive action is preferable to seizing control of an adversary's territory. Escalation management is the process of limiting any possible conflict to a specific level in order to ensure deterrent effectiveness. At the same time, these phases needed to be sufficiently vague to eliminate any possibility of a real conflict (Schelling 1966).

The earlier developed theories were questioned by the 'third wave' of deterrence theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Critics contended that neither the fundamental issues that led to a crisis nor the possibility of reaching a compromise were sufficiently addressed by these views. Furthermore, it was questioned if leaders could make sensible decisions under pressure (Kalgow, 2013).

The use of prolonged deterrence has frequently been employed by powerful nations; scholars have noted. Huth and Russett (1993) analyzed 58 incidents of deterrence over a 99-year period (1885 to 1984) and discovered that 83% of them featured significant powers acting as defenders. The conflicts leading up to World War I, in which Great Britain was unable to stop German aggression, and the time following the Korean War, when the US formed an alliance and stationed its military forces in South Korea in an effort to thwart any further invasions from North Korea, are two instances of this extended-immediate deterrence.

According to studies on Israeli deterrence tactics used against Syria and Egypt, for example (Lieberman, 1995; Bar-Joseph 1998), attackers altered their territorial goals and operational strategies to account for their relative military inferiority. Israel was able to stop a broad-based Arab offensive that was aimed at entering Israeli territory, but now it must defend against attacks in disputed demilitarized zones and areas it has taken control over. Israel's military edge eventually assisted in lowering attack levels and the aspirations of Arab leaders when deterrence failed, even though it didn't guarantee instant success in deterrence.

Despite Israel's threats of severe punishment over the past 20 years, its enemies have continued to use rockets (with ever-greater ranges) and more modern weaponry like suicide drones. For

instance, 1240 Palestinians and 421 Israelis perished during the first intifada (1987–1993); 3300 Palestinians and 1000 Israelis perished during the second intifada (2000–2005). After the assassination of the head of Hamas' military wing in 2012, 1,500 Israeli attacks resulted in 174 Palestinian deaths, 1,225 injuries, and 6 Israeli fatalities. In the so-called "51-day war" of 2014, Israel launched 6000 airstrikes and 50,000 tank and artillery shells, resulting in 1462 Palestinian dead and 100,000 homes destroyed. In retaliation, 1753 mortars were shot into Israel from Palestine, resulting in 6 fatalities and 1600 wounded. High-rise buildings were destroyed in May 2021 using specialized weapons, and an airstrike on Hamas' network of underground tunnels was also highly publicized. When the fighting in that conflict finally came to an end, there had been 243 deaths in Gaza and 12 in Israel, respectively, along with hundreds more injuries.

On the one hand, one could contend that the proportionality principle serves as a legal and moral framework for the use of force in war. Israel's cumulative deterrence approach has forced it to use increasingly more force with its neighbours because its expanding deterrence policy looks to have breached the proportionality principle.

On the other hand, several academics have noted that establishing an effective deterrence has been a key component of Israel's security doctrine (Ross, 2004). They contend that Israel's use of deterrence has helped to reduce attacks from its neighbours, highlighting Israel's unique relationships with the USA, which is currently in charge of global hegemony.

2.6 The Changing Nature of Wars and Resultant Effects to Kenya National Security

According to Kaldor (2013), a war is an act of violence in which two or more armed organizations are involved. This definition is helpful in our current debate on the function of deterrence in a security environment. According to Kaldor, modern conflicts are longer and more fruitless because the protagonists depend on one another to carry out the war's business, as opposed to earlier conflicts where the adversary had to be subdued and subjugated to demonstrate the severe ferocity of war. According to Kaldor, most new conflicts are typically joint undertakings in which both sides are more interested in sustaining their political identities and advancing their economic interests than in winning or losing.

Kenya continues to grapple with the changing nature of war which brought in dynamics such as terrorism, cyber crime, space warfare and natural calamities. Defence diplomacy comes in handy when dealing with these new threats. The military can respond bilaterally and multilaterally through enacting common policies, sharing intelligence and combined planning and combined warfare.

In both academic and political circles, there is ongoing discussion about the idea that warfare in the twenty-first century differs significantly from conflicts in the previous century. It has received a number of names, including "new wars," "post-modern wars," "privatize wars," and "wars among people" (Kaldor 2013: 1). Despite this, some have argued that nothing "new" about these new wars at all; rather, many of its traits, such as banditry, mass rape, forced population displacement, or atrocities against civilians, were evident during the early modern period (Kalyvas 2001).

Others believe that modern wars are primarily forms of criminal or privatized violence and should not be classified as war. Another complaint is that there aren't as many actual fights in today's violence and that there aren't enough fighting deaths to count as wars (Kaldor 2013). In contrast to past wars, which are seen as ideological, political, collective, and even noble, analysts of new wars characterize them as criminal, depoliticized, privatized, and predatory. The conclusion of the cold war marks the transition between the old and new civil conflicts (Kalyvas 2001: 100).

New wars are financed and sustained through predatory financial methods such as loot, pillage, taxation of humanitarian and diaspora support, ransom, smuggling of oil, diamonds, drugs, human trafficking, and other illegal avenues. Old wars were largely funded by states through taxation or sponsorship from external patrons. It is stated that although ancient war economies were often centralized, autocratic, and mobilized the populace, current war economies are driven by economic gain. On the other hand, modern wars involved an open, decentralized, globally connected economy that relied on ongoing violence for its income (Kaldor 2013).

Researchers contend further that while civil conflicts appear to be happening more frequently now than in the past, interstate wars have increased since the conclusion of the cold war tensions. The post-cold war era's civil wars are fundamentally different from those of the past and have been tied to ethnic strife. Modern civil wars have been referred to as criminal rather than political

affairs. Kalyvas (2001) further distinguishes between past and contemporary civil wars by evaluating the origins, motivations, support, and violence. The earlier, he discovers, were political in nature and were fought for widely conceived, even lofty purposes like social transformation.

New civil wars' political actors don't enjoy any popular support, while previous civil wars at least had one hero who did. Violence was also restrained and disciplined, particularly when rebels used it to win over the populace. However, in contemporary civil wars, needless and senseless violence is meted out to everybody without distinction.

New wars typically contribute to the demise of the state (Kaldor 2013), despite the fact that ongoing wars state-build by expanding the state's tax base and power. According to Scholars, more recent wars have a tendency to create economies that are globalized, decentralized, criminalized, and have very low employment rates, which only benefit a select few people or groups of people (Kaldor 2009). According to Kalidor (2009), new wars are more challenging to conclude and demonstrate intractable tendencies, whereas past wars frequently had decisive conclusions. The fighting parties have a shared interest in continuing the conflict, whether for political purposes, to further polarize society by using violence to sow fear and hatred, or for economic reasons. It is still difficult to tell who is engaging in criminal activity to fund political causes from who is using a political cause as a front for criminal activity (Ibid.). Additionally, new wars show to be unwinnable. They were spread by the "virus" of identity politics as well as by the connections created between international criminal organizations during the conflict. There are several places in the world where there are such concentrations of conflict, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans and Caucasus, Central Asia, and Central and East Africa (Ibid).

2.7 Conflicts Driven by Natural Resources and resultant Effects to Kenya National Security

According to Ross (2004), new research by a number of academics has revealed a strong correlation between natural resources and internal wars. Researchers have discovered that states that depend on the export of basic commodities are more likely to experience civil war than their

counterparts in resource-poor states. Civil wars are more likely to occur in countries that export oil (Ross 2004).

Fearson discovered that specific resources, such gemstones and drugs, tended to prolong battles. Doyle and Sambinis show that civil wars that break out in nations that depend heavily on the export of basic commodities are more challenging to put an end to.

Kenya has been challenged by resource conflicts pitting borderlands communities along the Kenya Somalia, Kenya Uganda, Kenya Ethiopia and Kenya Tanzania border. These have been the main sources of insecurity in these affected Counties; as a result, cases of death, injury and displacement of persons have been witnessed. On the other hand, Buhaug and Gates demonstrate that the availability of mineral resources in a conflict zone tends to extend the conflict more widely geographically (Ibid.). Civil wars and resources are linked by unknown mechanisms. However, the majority of academic research has been silent regarding the causes of and connections between civil conflicts and natural resources. Conflicts are frequently blamed on resources, although it is rarely explained how this happens.

2.8 Chapter Summary

The various theoretical underpinnings and practical considerations of Kenya's defense diplomacy interactions have been examined in this chapter. Depending on the significance of the area of action being pursued, defense diplomacy employs a variety of tools to accomplish its goals. Since the beginning of time, military forces have been used to bolster diplomatic efforts within a state. By displaying a state's military prowess in imposing its interests or will on another state as a deterrence to foreign ambition, this support was initially intended to strengthen national interests.

Deterrence has merged as an important strategy of defence diplomacy, one thing clear from the onset is that scholars are divided on how to approach deterrence's success and failures. According to some, fails if the threatener had to use force, while other scholars consider deterrence to have failed if the threatener either had to use substantial force or did not attain its strategic policy goals.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BODIES ON KENYA'S DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the extent that international and regional bodies influence Kenya's defence diplomacy. Membership of regional and international organizations plays a significant role in shaping Kenya's defense diplomacy policy. These organizations provide a platform for Kenya to engage with other countries and to shape the direction of regional and international security policies.

3.2 Infrastructural Development as a Strategy of Defence Diplomacy

As discussed in chapter two of our research looking at how Kenya's defence diplomacy utilizes economic development towards realizing its ends, infrastructure development and investment in conflict and post-conflict areas within the state such as the ongoing situations in Turkana and Baringo and West Pokot are an essential fabric of defence diplomacy. Additionally, they play a significant role in Kenya's national development plan, also known as the Kenya Vision 2030 Development Agenda. Many military diplomacy academics are not new to the interest in infrastructure. In areas that are unstable or have recently undergone violence, there is a large body of work that examines the potential development benefits from investing in infrastructure (World Bank 1994).

According to the macro literature, infrastructure upgrades could increase productivity, encourage private investment, and ease domestic and international trade (Bougheas et al. 1999), all of which would support sustainable growth (Serven 2010) and reduce the desire for conflict. In a recent article, Calderon et al. (2015) make the case that a long-term increase in infrastructure provision of 10% leads to a 1% gain in output per worker.

Developing sound defence strategic framework that meets the growing infrastructural needs for a country like Kenya and at the same redresses salient issues identified as necessary activities in

conflict and post conflict environments remains a key challenge for policymakers within the Ministry of Defence. To draw foreign direct investment, boost international trade, and achieve long-term investment and growth within Kenyan communities, it is essential to have an effective transportation system, dependable energy supply, safe drinking water, and cutting-edge telecommunications infrastructure. The developing world, which is home to 85% of the world's population and has far lower access to infrastructure services than the industrialized world, is likely to have the greatest future need for infrastructure globally.

Emerging donors like China have taken a significant role in providing developing nations with the infrastructure money they need to conduct defense diplomacy. Infrastructure receives a sizable portion of China's development funding. Under the "Belt and Road" program, an ambitious goal to enhance trade and global development while improving the ties between Asia, Europe, and Africa, China in particular devoted billions of dollars to infrastructure building. Infrastructural projects accounted for about 60% of Chinese-funded projects between 2000 and 2013, according to Aid Data's data on Chinese development assistance.

Approximately 20% of the foreign funding for infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa comes from China, with the majority of the funding coming from the EXIM Bank of China, according to Gutman et al. (2015). On the other hand, India is projected to have spent \$1.3 billion in 2014 on infrastructure development financing, with the majority of the funds going to neighboring countries, primarily for energy and transportation. The involvement of non-traditional donors has also increased with the creation of new multilateral institutions, particularly the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB). The NDB, on the other hand, has a more expansive development mandate for the BRICS and other emerging economies, whilst the AIIB focuses on aiding Asia's infrastructure needs.

3.2.1 Capital Flows for Infrastructural Development

External capital according to Ahn and Adjii (1998) refers to that source of funding that comes from outside the country that aims at conducting various development activities. It can be in form of government-to-government loans, from private sources, from multi-lateral organizations, from

international organizations or private individuals. Capital flows to developing countries for infrastructural development can be measured using the following indicators:

3.2.2 International Investment in Infrastructure

The total amount of capital raised internationally through bank loans, bonds, and equity offerings for the key economic infrastructure sectors of transportation, which includes all modes of transportation infrastructure and services, and telecommunications, which includes all forms of communication infrastructure and services, as well as transport companies, such as airline and shipping companies, can be referred to as the international investment infrastructure on which activities in Kenya's

3.2.3 Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)

An additional financial source is applied to defense diplomacy efforts. This effort directly draws information from the World Bank PPI Project Database, which keeps tabs on total infrastructure investment in developing nations with private participation. The database includes energy, telecommunications, transport, and water projects that are directly or indirectly used by the public and are owned or managed by private firms in developing nations. Only finished projects with completed finances are included.

Investments are typically reported in the year of financial closure on a commitment's basis; actual disbursements are not documented. This has significant funding potential, notably from international capital markets and pension funds, which is largely untapped (Collier 2014). The premise of the arguments in favor of PPI financing is the seeming abundance and accessibility of funds on global markets, as well as the extremely low long-term interest rates. The low use of private financing in infrastructure development is caused by a number of challenges, most notably the difficulty in aligning potential private sector funding providers with bankable, investable projects (Ehlers 2014). These are good places to look for funding for the infrastructure projects mentioned in defense diplomacy efforts.

3.2.4 Project Finance for Infrastructure (PFI)

Defense diplomacy projects can be funded in a different way by using infrastructure project funding. The transactions for non recourse and limited recourse project financing through foreign capital markets do not include the funding of export credit agency facilities, which is regarded as trade finance. According to Alfaro and Ozcan (2006), increased infrastructure availability increases the output of private investment and permits businesses to expand their potential markets and profit opportunities by lowering transaction costs and enabling them to get closer to their customers and suppliers.

For instance, a strong telecommunications network can help companies access cash through the financial markets. Businesses that lack access to modern telecommunication services, consistent power delivery, or well-developed transportation infrastructure invest less and have fewer profitable investments, whether they are domestic or foreign. When the provision of properly functional infrastructure fails, businesses are occasionally forced to bear the costs of providing infrastructure themselves, such as electricity through power generating units, in order to maintain their operations. This kind of infrastructure offering is generally more expensive.

For a country like Kenya, classified as middle-income in economic status, scholars such as Asiedu (2006) has pointed out that infrastructure investments have alluring benefits but also accompanied by daunting costs. These infrastructural projects can be in the transport sector, communication sector, power generation sector, roads sector, physical buildings and construction sector, industrial sector, health sector just to mention but a few. These are critical areas of a countries economy that cannot be wished away by any serious county which wishes to develop the major reasons that states in the South or developing countries rely mostly on external capital to finance their infrastructural development (Mukollah 2013). To reduce running cost, the military can be tasked to undertake some of the projects, these projects can be conducted within the region.

3.2.5 Need for External Capital for Activities in Defence Diplomacy

First, all commercially viable infrastructure initiatives listed under Kenya's defense diplomacy programs have the potential to be financed by the global capital markets due to their size, sophistication, depth, and variety of instruments. For instance, in 2003, international lending of

medium- and long-term bonds and bank loans totaled \$3.1 trillion, yet just 15% of these flows were on average allocated to infrastructure globally. Private capital flows to infrastructure in developing countries were far smaller at their peak in 1997, when they made up just 3.6% of all new global bond, loan, and equity offerings.

Given the size of the original investment and the lengthy amortization period, multilateral development banks (MDBs) are particularly well suited for infrastructure financing because they can offer the long-term financing necessary for infrastructure investment to become profitable. Furthermore, because MDBs have very high credit ratings that are frequently equal to or even better than those of their member states, they may provide financing at a comparatively low cost. As a result, they may borrow money relatively more affordably on global financial markets and pass those savings along to their loan recipients.

Secondly, countries like Kenya rely on external capital to finance their infrastructural developments because of the sophisticated technology that is needed to carry out the exercise. Most of the developing countries are technologically backward and they lack the necessary capital to acquire the appropriate technology in financing this infrastructural development. For instance, the construction of the standard gauge railway (SGR) in East Africa required a high level of technical expertise which Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania lacked. These countries therefore were forced to look for Chinese companies to come and carry out the projects on their behalf. Therefore, it will take quite some time before developing countries acquire appropriate technology in financing their infrastructural projects hence the need to look for external capital in order to finance these programs (Okoth 2017).

External capital is able to attract the necessary expertise and highly skilled human resource who are experienced in carrying out the said projects in an efficient manner. For instance, in the construction of the standard gauge railway in Ethiopia which uses electricity as a method of propulsion, the Chinese companies were able to provide more experts in engineering, construction, building, architects as well as machine operators more than what the Ethiopian government could get. The said experts from China and other developed countries were able to do quality work that would be of great benefit to the people of Ethiopia. It's for these reasons that

developing countries need to partner with developed nations so as to improve the skills of their labor force (Mukollah 2013).

According to Mayer (2007) developing countries rely on external capital for their infrastructure development because of the desire to attract foreign investors and foreign investments. It has never been easy to attract foreign investors and their investments, and one way of attracting these investors is through contracting their foreign companies to come and carry out infrastructural developments. Once these companies have set foot in developing countries, they come to discover many investment opportunities that are available for them to exploit, they therefore use that opportunity to invite their colleagues and friends from their home countries to come and invest in those relevant sectors. This has made developing countries to expand their levels of industrialization development and as a result of flocking in of the investors, many job opportunities have been created and expansion of their economies has also been realized.

The repayment period for such external capital is spread over long-term as opposed to domestic sources whose style of payment is mostly on a short-term basis. For instance, the discovery of oil in Uganda and South Sudan required huge source of finances that these developing countries could not afford. Secondly even if these countries were able to acquire the said capital from domestic sources, they were going to repay it within a very short period of time which they could also not manage. As a result of all these internal challenges these countries were forced to procure huge loans from the World Bank, IMF, European Reunion, African Development Bank, and Chinese Development Corporation among others to finance these expensive exercises. Some of these loans are to be replayed in a 20-year period, 30-year period as well as 50-year period.

Kenya, like other countries in the developing countries league has huge external debt obligations which are estimated to consume on upward of 65% of their total per capital. With this kind of situation, their capacity to address the recurrent expenditure or budgetary obligations on development needs is heavily reduced. Therefore, these countries have no option but to seek foreign capital to finance their infrastructural programs in order to address their development obligations. For instance, the World Bank report (2017) cited 48 African countries with huge budgetary deficits and the only way out is to seek foreign capital.

It should also be noted that the style of administration and management of public resources such as infrastructural facilities in developing countries are very weak and the systems that have been put in place are also under-developed. As a result of these, external capital will allow developing countries to improve on their management systems, levels of expertise and strategic focus. This is because most of these external capital from donors come with conditionality such as improvement of levels of accountability, public participation in the development process, transparency in all decisions that are made just to mention but a few. This conditionality is for the good of developing countries hence a great benefit.

The other reason as to why external capital is highly sought and relied upon by developing countries to finance their infrastructure development programs is because they play a great role in improving inter-state relations. This is because through such engagement's states are able to build lasting relationships and more interactions between their citizens. This is a good measure for improving international peace, harmony and security. This kind of benefit is good in addressing the contemporary challenges in international relations such as the fight against international terrorism, piracy, human and drug trafficking, money laundering as well as environmental challenges. Such threats are hard to deal with if there is no strong, posture and long-term inter-state relations therefore external capital plays a great role in enhancing these levels of inter-state relations.

The benefit of this kind of an arrangement is to allow citizens, especially for those who come from post-conflict regions or a conflict-ridden area of the country to access important infrastructural services quickly and later own acquire its ownership even when initiated through defence diplomacy activities by the military. This is an efficient way in which most African countries are able to realize vision 2063 which is their collective vision as explained by the African Union. Some of the important projects under this arrangement include the Northern corridor project which connects East African States, the Great North Road which connects all African States from North Africa, West Africa all the way to East Africa through central Africa, the road will end up in the far end of the South African States. This is a good strategy for realizing the vision 2063 quickly.

3.2.6 Disadvantages of Relying on External Capital to Finance Defence Diplomacy Programmes

There are a number of disadvantages for a country like Kenya to rely heavily on foreign funding for activities it has identified as strategic priority in defence diplomacy. First and foremost, over reliance of external sources of capital creates a culture of foreign dependency which is not good for the moral of the states in pursuit of its diplomacy mission. The republic of China for instance has loaned many African countries heavily to a level where these loans have become unsustainable by these countries. For instance, according to the World Bank Report (2017) the republic of Kenya owes China over Ksh. 2.8 trillion shillings which is high and above Kenya's annual GDP. Therefore, Kenya's economy becomes a user economy and dependent to Chinese economy. This greatly undermines Kenya's sovereignty.

Second, prior to the North Atlantic financial crisis, a sizable amount of infrastructure in emerging and developing countries was financed by private investors. Long-term loans were provided by banks and other private investors, who later refinance them on the capital markets with loans of shorter maturities. The maturity mismatch turned out to be one of the factors that contributed to the crisis spreading quickly because refinancing was no longer an option. Many "good projects" eventually ran into issues as well. Banks drastically decreased this maturity mismatch after the crisis, and new laws obliged them to do so even more.

This resulted in a decrease in the availability of long-term private finance for infrastructure projects, even though this is great for the stability of the economy, especially in the short to medium term. This emphasizes the "normal time" problems that infrastructure finance in developing countries faces, particularly in certain industries and low-income countries where risk is perceived to be high. These problems arise with big tickets and long tenors. This restriction on private lending as well as the enormous need for infrastructure development in the developing world as described by Bhattacharya and Holt (2013) strengthen the argument for more and better financing by MDBs as well as the establishment of new MDBs, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

External capital is heavily conditioned to the extent that they rarely sustain infrastructural development in the recipient economies of some developing countries. Conditions such as

liberalization of the economy ends up opening up markets in developing countries for cheap imports which may kill domestic industries. For instance, the textile industries in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were killed by these cheap imports that are popularly known as "mitumba" clothes. Foreign Industries and companies set up in developing countries repatriate their profits back to their home countries. For instance, the financial report (2016) cited Coca-Cola Company, Stanbic Bank, Barclays bank, Safaricom, MTN and Unilever companies to be the most profitable within the region however, 99% of their profits are repatriated back to their home countries, hence the infrastructural developments that they carry out in developing countries is largely counter-productive. These too have implications for defence diplomacy activities.

3.3 The East African Community (EAC)

Table 5: Defence Diplomacy in East Africa




Table 5 above shows the benefits of defence diplomacy in East Africa identified by respondents.

Kenya is a member EAC which also includes DRC, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. Participating in these organizations helps create the frameworks for regional security cooperation. Kenya works in conjunction with neighboring countries through a number of organizations to address regional security issues like terrorism, piracy, and international crime.

Kenya has additionally participated in peacekeeping operations overseen by the AU and UN, demonstrating its commitment to regional and international security. One of the participants expressed optimism *benefits of defence diplomacy*. The participant noted:

“Building blocs covering political, economic and social harmony that will lead to African Union eventual Platforms to cross-pollinate ideas on handling challenges and opportunities in the regional sphere. Defence diplomacy enhances integration. (Key Informant from MoD Uganda)

Table 6: The Prevention of Regional Interstate Conflict in East Africa

8. Defence Diplomacy has greatly averted potential interstate conflict within the sub-region. Use the following scale to respond: Strongly Disagree = 1 Disa...ree = 4 Strongly Agree = 5
23 responses




Chart 6 above shows that a significant majority of the respondents at 73.9% were in agreement that Kenya’s defence diplomacy pays an important role in preventing regional interstate conflicts.

Defence diplomacy has played a big role in preventing interstate conflict. A lot of covert defence engagements have taken place in many parts of Africa. When Kenya and Uganda were wrangling over ownership of Migingo island, a small rock measuring less than a rugby pitch deep inside Lake Victoria and whose value can not even compare to the cost of deploying a military battalion for one month, the military strategist, having estimated the cost of war vis the value of the disputed territory, clear on the way forward ‘defence diplomacy’. However, the local Politian’s made emotional sentiments that whipped up emotional reactions by Kenyans to the point of

demanding for war with Uganda else they threatened ‘to take up arms and defend their territory’. In one of the talks with a former Ugandan military spokes person he alluded the following:

“I made a call to my counterpart in Kenya and we agreed to meet my C-in-C the following day, and following a short meeting the matter was resolved”

This is how defence diplomacy works in averting interstate conflict. The political leadership at some point is torn between listening to the inner voices of truth, and the voices of the masses which most often than not are driven by frustrations, interests and emotions. One respondent pointed out the following:

“Defence Diplomacy has greatly averted potential interstate conflict within the sub-region. That is the reason there is a defence spokesperson to speak on behalf of defence, any person speaking on defence issues has to be ignored”. (Key Informant from MoD Uganda)

3.4 The African Union

Following the passage of its own Constitutive Act in 2001, the African Union was officially established in 2002. A majority of the 53 signatory member states signed the AU Act, which established the legal framework that governs the conduct and operations of the continental body. The institution might be thought of as a qualitative improvement over the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a pan-African mission established on May 25, 1963 by newly established African States (Gottschalk, 2012).

On the other hand, the Peace and Security Council is an organ of the AU that was also initiated at the same year in 2002 but became operational in May 2004 when it was officially launched. The PSC came into existence to replace what was then known as the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (Kahombo, 2018).

3.4.1 The AU’s Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council has been described by the African Union as the foremost institution within itself as far as decision-making concerning peace and security in Africa is concerned. Its main obligations are to oversee the prevention of conflicts as well as manage the resolution of conflicts when they arise. The broader mandate of the body includes undertaking peace-building and mediation activities aimed at resolving conflicts. The organization has also

the powers to authorize peace support missions in troubled areas of the continent. This is undertaken by the Council through early detection monitoring system as well as by engaging in preventive diplomacy.

The growth of good governance, democracy, and human rights among its member states across the continent is a crucial component of the Peace and Security Council's mission. To help with this, the PSCAU has the authority to censure a state that has undergone a government change that did not follow the nation's own constitution.

Additionally, the organization regularly evaluates how its member states are doing with regard to matters like the support of democracy, effective leadership, adherence to the rule of law, and the defense of basic liberties and human rights (Ouguergouz, 2003).

3.4.2 The Constitutive Act

The mandate and objectives of the Peace and Security Council are derived from the African Union's Constitutive Act. The Constitutive Act of the AU signifies a solemn commitment to the elevation and protection of human rights, in comparison to the former document, the OAU Charter, that gave guidance to the activities of the defunct continental body. Under that Charter, more preferences in terms of rights were given to the Member State as opposed to their African citizens. Human rights as scholars have observed, was not considered important as far as the OAU Charter was concerned (Mangu, 2005). This is because the document focused more on the right to independence of then colonized African states and priority was as such given to matters of self-determination as opposed to peace and security and citizen rights in general. Human rights were downplayed as matters of internal affairs for individual African states.

The legal framework embedded in the Constitutive Act has been instrumental in ensuring that the operations of the Peace and Security Council adheres to principles of international law especially in relation to human rights in not only conflict-ridden regions but across the continent in general. By and large, the Constitutive Act has brought forth the issue of human rights to the fore. This has meant that the predominant objective of the Act is to break away from the earlier perception that the continental body gave scant attention to human rights and by extension matters of peace and security affecting communities across the continent. Therefore, the Act has 14 objectives and

6 of its 16 guiding principles are pegged on concerns regarding human rights. Other concerns are on economic and social development as well as democratic principles and community protection.

In the course of time, the Constitutive Act has given birth to other institutions such as the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACH) as well as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJH). The Act as such ensures that the judicial body listens to cases brought forth by member states as well as individuals or groups and communities across the continent concerning conflicts and violations of their rights. Additionally, the Court also hears and gives interpretation of all legal matters pertaining to the Act itself and all that it has established within the context of the African Union (Konstantinos et al, 2006).

3.5 Global Defence Policy Dynamics

Processes of globalization, scholars affirm, continue to play an influential role in determining not only strategic policy frameworks by states such as Kenya in the developing world, but also global issues continue to exert pressure on the direction of Kenya's defence diplomacy. The world has undergone several important modifications since the end of 1945. These changes have included the Cold War Crisis between the USSR and the USA, although this eventually ended in the early 1990s when the USSR collapsed, African countries were forced to choose ideological positions with either of the two global super powers and this in turn had an effect on state security. The oil crisis of 1973 affected African economies and security as it did to other developing countries in in other regions. More recently, the 2008 global financial crisis as well as the Covid-19 pandemic have all played a role in influencing the nature and activities of defence diplomacy.

Therefore, it can be argued that pressures of globalization have manifested in various ways and these have affected and even exacerbated some of the challenges that Kenya in its defence diplomacy is aiming to address. For instance, the challenges of ongoing conflicts, issues of state fragility from its neighbor such as Somalia, the DRC or even to some extent Burundi, these have global dimensions.

Therefore, Kenya's bilateral and multilateral partnerships arrangements as well as its membership in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth of


Nations provides opportunities to exert her diplomatic influence whilst at the same time for her to accommodate certain aspects of defence diplomacy from other countries. These partnerships can include joint military exercises, training programs, and arms sales. For example, Kenya has received military aid from richer and developed countries including the USA, the UK and China, which has helped to build its defense capabilities. As a member of regional and international organizations, Kenya has a voice in shaping security policies at the regional and international levels. Kenya can use these platforms to advocate for policies that promote its security interests and to influence the direction of regional and international security initiatives.

3.6 Defense Diplomacy and National Peace-building

Table 7: Defence Diplomacy and National Security

6. Can Kenya's National Security be secured by defence diplomacy wholesomely?

23 responses



The data captured on Chart 7 above shows that 64 % of respondents did not express their confidence in defence diplomacy to wholesomely redress national security concerns.

According to the data captured on Table 7, one may argue that while defence diplomacy can certainly play an important role in enhancing Kenya's national security, it is unlikely to be the sole solution to securing the country's security needs. National security is a complex issue that involves many factors, including political stability, economic development, social cohesion, and effective governance. While defence diplomacy can certainly contribute to these broader goals, it cannot address all of them on its own. One of the participants in the study noted that:

“Defense diplomacy is just one aspect. There are a number of interactive security issue which needs more coordination. It needs to be supplemented by other instruments of national power.” (Key Informant from KRA)

Kenya faces a range of security challenges, including terrorism, border disputes, and organized crime, that require a multifaceted approach that involves not just defence diplomacy, but also law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and military operations when necessary.

Table 8: Defence Diplomacy and Peace-Building Activities in Kenya

9. Defence Diplomacy has played an important role in peace building activities in Kenya. Use the following scale to respond: Strongly Disagree = 1 Disagree = 2 Neutral = 3 Agree = 4 Strongly Agree = 5
23 responses




Chart 8 above shows that 79.2 % of those interviewed agreed that defence diplomacy was critical to Kenya’s peace-building programmes.

The need for the military to get involved in peace-building activities using paradigms drawn from defence diplomacy has increasingly gained momentum especially in states like Kenya that have been affected with low and at times high intensity conflicts within its communities. Inter and intra-community conflicts that have dented parts of Kenya since independence have left terrible social and economic and even political scars to various communities across the country. Some of these conflicts have escalated to very serious levels that have necessitated the military intervention from the Kenya Defence Forces aimed at suppressing the violence from militia groups such as the SLDF in the Western Kenya area or pockets of cattle rustlers in Turkana and

West Pokot or even home-grown terrorist cells franchised from the notorious Somali based Al-Shabaab insurgency. Consequently, some of the participants noted that:

“They can be actualized in areas of training, reconstruction and CIMIC. Case in point is handling of Oromiya issue between KDF and EPDF counterparts, SADC forces and EACRF in DRC.” (Key Informants from MOD Kenya and Rwanda)

Military scholarship in the past appears to have placed more focus on the effectiveness of military involvements without appropriately gauging the reasons why the military is important in such operations and why governments such as in Kenya are increasingly choosing to engage their defence forces like the KDF in such undertakings. The objective of this chapter is as such to examine the involvement of the Kenya’s Defence Forces in defence diplomacy and the peace-building activities across various conflict and post conflict regimes in Kenya.

American military historian Charles Walker (2000) has pointed out that it was in 1962 when the UN first recognized the importance of the defence diplomacy that more specifically the role that the military plays in peace-building activities particularly in conflict and post-conflict regimes. Since then, militaries across the world including Kenya, have adopted the use of their militaries in civil duties such as the construction of dams and bridges and other development-oriented initiatives aimed at improving the living standards of the communities affected by conflict that are still undergoing conflict. In Kenya, one may point out that the country’s defense diplomacy engagements have also shifted to reflect an adaptation of the general global change trajectory that has taken place in the military sector and its use of soft power approach in enhancing its strategic national security concerns.

In the contemporary warfare, one may point out that the struggle for peace and security has entailed that other means of approach be employed. In other words, the use of organized violence or military force alone cannot guarantee lasting peace and stability in the community. In order to achieve sustainable peace, the military such as the KDF in nation-states such as Kenya has to be involved in the peace-building process using paradigms crafted from defence diplomacy.

Scholars have posited that defence diplomacy, information military, and economy are an important instrument for nation-states in terms of safeguarding its national strategic interests (Wanda, 2008).

The military collaborates with all of the other complimentary national instruments of power as one of those instruments. At the highest level of national leadership, the instruments are coordinated and integrated into a national plan. The military continues to be a crucial facilitator of the other instruments despite being complementary in its deployment due to the potential use of fatal force within the parameters of national strategy. The military is the most crucial tool for defending national interests as a result of its special function (Wario, 2014:19–20).

Since their inception, the military has not been thought as the best unit to undertake operations of societal reconstruction, in fact, many a times community reconstruction in post conflict regimes were considered a civilian domain. The government in Kenya has placed the importance of the KDF's involvement to the same path as traditional warfare operations. This signifies a major shift in how the KDF engages itself in internal intra-community conflicts as well as their approach in post-conflict defence diplomacy and peace-building activities. The reasons as to why this is the case are many but mostly because, for instance in internal conflicts where the KDF was eventually called in to suppress or neutralize the conflict, the combatants or conflicting parties were not fighting the state per se or were a proper organized uniformed army such as the conflict in Mt Elgon involving the Saboat Land Defence Force was (Wanda, 2022).

The militia that made up the SLDF was mostly young men hat came from the local community population and as such were part and parcel of the social fabric of the local community. Therefore, these militia 'soldiers' would tactfully retract back into the community after violent terror activities in the community.

For these reasons, some scholars have argued that the military presence is important in post conflict remain critical in managing the former adversaries' expectations and also in carrying out the necessary reconstruction that was caused by the conflict and also delayed other much needed development in the community (Goodwin, 2005). Goodwin additional contends that, many current skirmishes have required continued military participation.

3.7 Objectives of Military Involvement in Peace-Building

According to Corum (2007), the main objective of military involvement in in post-conflict rebuilding is to re-examine peace-building as understood and practiced by the community as well as in building trust in the community that may have been lost as result of the conflict by warring

parties that may include the military itself. The idea is to reconsider the input of what the conflicting parties on the community thinks and also to accommodate them in forging the way forward in the interest of crafting a peaceful outcome, thereby creating sustainable and peaceful environment for all in the community.

Military scholars like Andrew Rigby (2006) have agreed in general that the military has a valid objective in its involvement in peace-building, especially in reconstruction efforts in post conflict societies where there much needed expertise in reconstruction of the infrastructure that was damaged as a result of the conflict in the first place. The reconstruction efforts carried out by the military is a necessary part of a continued ceasefire and sustainable peaceful environment where trade and economic and social business can take place. Rugby observes that there are sometimes challenges in involving the military in defence diplomacy and peace-building activities such as reconstruction in places where the military itself was involved in the conflict such as during the Operation Linda Nchi by the KDF. The argument here is that the military's legitimacy must be drawn from the community and this is at times of conflict difficult to expect from the concerned or affected community.

Other scholars disagree with the concept of defence diplomacy especially in the involvement of the military in peace-building activities such as reconstruction. Alexandra Gheciu (2011) has for instance argued that the reconstruction processes in post-conflict regimes were or ought to be a preserve for the non-governmental organizations and the private sector in general. Gheciu emphasizes that the military should stick to its traditional role based on its combat skills and training in warfare and not in peace-building activities where there is plenty of skills and expertise in social justice and peace-building in the non-governmental world, where the military is perceived as an intruder in the humanitarian space when it attempts to undertake reconstruction work in the community.

Some military academics have drawn examples from the Second World War and argue that it was the military that undertook the reconstruction efforts largely after the defeat of the Germans. For instance, James Corum (2007) has pointed out that between 1945 and 1954 in Germany and between 1945 and 1950 in Japan, the armies did well in re-engineering the much-devastated infrastructures of these countries. The militaries, Corum observed, received allot of support not only from the governments but also from the civilian populations in those countries. The military

managed to effectively renovate both countries from totalitarian and militaristic states into models of democracy, prosperity, and stable government.

During the Second World War, most military organs were deployed different war-torn countries to help them with various aspects of reconstruction. Cristen Oehring (2009) argues that even during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, similar arrangements to involve the military in reconstruction and peace-building activities were undertaken.

Relocating refugees and carrying out rural development initiatives were under the purview of specific teams affiliated to infantries. By reducing the allure of joining the Viet Cong, these rural development initiatives attempted to keep farmers working in their fields (Wario, 2014:19–20).

3.8 Kenya Defence Forces' Defence Diplomacy and Peace-Building Activities

Since the 1980s, as a country Kenya has been instrumental in engaging in peace-building activities that has been globally recognized. For instance, the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2010 praised Kenya for her effort in creating and maintaining peace not just in Kenya but throughout the region. Kenya's defence diplomacy was being recognized for its role in Sudan and Somalia and by hosting and brokering various peace talks and being party to several treaties under her diplomacy umbrella. Needless to say, Kenya's tactic to peace-building is premised firmly on a commitment to diplomacy, multilateralism, and soft-power approach that are aimed at nurturing sustainable peace across its communities internally as well as with its external neighbors.

Peace-building approached from a defence diplomacy platform plays a critical role in the gathering and analysis of data drawn by security officers concerning the security situation of the ground. This information is then used by senior officer to inform decision-making and strategic level input to the defence policy adopted as well as military strategy to redress the situation (Kanyinga, 2000).

The Kenya Defence Forces Act and the nation's 2010 constitution both specify the military actions done as part of Kenya's defense diplomacy, including programs for peace-building and rehabilitation. The defense of Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity as a republic is one of

the most essential duties entrusted to the military of Kenya. This means that in cases of emergency or disaster, like the recent droughts in some parts of the country, the military must offer assistance or, if required, work in conjunction with other civil authorities.

That said Kenya like other countries continue to face threats to her sovereignty from domestic as well as external sources that have necessitated the use of not just military force but also to engage in soft power defence diplomacy to thwart some the threats that sometimes emerge from internal sources such as intra-community violence that occurs as a result of activities such as cattle rustling banditry common in the Turkana, West-Pokot and Baringo regions in the Rift Valley.

3.8.1 Reconstructions Activities in Mt Elgon Area

The question what if anything has the KDF achieved in terms of defence diplomacy through peace-building activities and reconstruction programmes is perhaps more important especially when contextualized in the current conception of military practice of creating a climate of stability-security rather than change through sustainable peace.

On order to exterminate the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), which was abusing local villagers, President Mwai Kibaki proclaimed the state of military combat operations on Mt. Elgon in March 2008. The military stayed in the area after the operation, setting up the Kapkota Camp, and is currently trying to secure and reconstruct the area. The locals found the KDF useful military after they had accomplished their mission. The military began stabilization operations in the Mt. Elgon region, schools were rebuilt, roads opened and businesses resumed.

Therefore, enhancing the post-conflict transition procedure would directly enhance the military's long-term efficiency as a vehicle of national power in Kenya. This is at least partially attributable to the focus placed recently on Kenyan military involvement in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

3.8.2 Restorative Peace-Building Practices

Political scientist Ronald Elly Wanda proposed that the success of the peace-building effort and the following rehabilitation in the area hinged mainly on the participation of the community itself when looking at the conflict in Mt Elgon.

Wanda contended that a variety of factors, such as disputes over land ownership, flawed electoral procedures, political manipulation, unfair resource distribution, and other factors, led to the war in the Mt Elgon region. His research came to the conclusion that the community's transformation depended heavily on the traditional ways entrenched in the communities' usage of restorative and traditional or indigenous practices to settle local disputes using cultural practices (Wanda, 2022).

Therefore, we may point out that however much military defence diplomacy and its subsequent peace-building activities are important, it is far more important to engage the community throughout the process of peace-building and reconstruction in order to legitimize the process as having had public participation and as such the community's blessings.

3.8.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of Military Reconstruction

According to Williams, three conceptual pillars are the foundation for post-conflict rehabilitation. The first is that post-conflict reconstruction which is defined as the physical reconstruction and reform of economic, political, and security capacity after peace accords and post-conflict peace-building are commonly reduced to one another. It is crucial to recognize that maintaining peace and rebuilding after a conflict are crucial stages of establishing peace; yet, they do not automatically entail peace-building itself. Williams and other academics contend that while military rebuilding involves the transformational objective of peace-building, it does not go beyond the cultural rituals of purification and righting the wrongs committed during the fight.

The intellectual foundation of modern peace building and post-conflict reconstruction, according to Miall (2013), appears to be rooted in peace research and conflict resolution literature as well as writings by peace theorists, despite the military's importance in post-conflict reconstruction. Miall defines peace-building as an effort to resolve the relational, structural, and cultural inconsistencies that underlie conflict.

Although it is crucial to recognize that shuttle diplomacy, two-track diplomacy, and military peace enforcement are historical occurrences and parts of broader peace building, the conceptual basis of contemporary peace building is typically connected to rebuilding destroyed buildings. In this study, it will be determined whether Kenyans were successful in achieving peace by putting pacifist social transformation through economic recovery and development into practice.

3.9 Civil Military Cooperation

The KDF have been utilizing the civil military cooperation as a strategy to its peace-building programmes in the community. Stubbs (2004) argues that this is a useful way of minimizing interference from the community and at the same time maximizes support from the local community during times of military operations in order to achieve their set targets. The civil military cooperation involves not just combat missions but also involves other non-combatant actors who play a role in helping with the peace-building process such as the non-governmental organizations, the media and other local and cultural leaders. Some of the joint initiative by the different peace actors included negotiations through round-table talks, reconstruction of social amenities like roads, schools and water points and support to the local security and administrative units.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter has focused on the scope of soft power activities undertaken by the Kenya Defence Forces in their pursuit of defence diplomacy and peace-building among communities in Kenya. The Chapter has highlighted KDF peace keeping and peace building Operation within the region and the world and recapped Operation Okoa Nchi in relation to the conflict in the Mt Elgon area. Whilst it is clear from the study that peacekeeping in Africa in general is at a critical juncture, it is also equally clear that processes of peace-building are ever-more-complex and as such there is an acute need for defence diplomacy to accommodate the multifaceted and holistic peace-building responses including restorative justice practices suggested by scholars earlier in the chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

FUTURE CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO KENYA'S DEFENCE

DIPLOMACY

4.1 Introduction

The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the challenges that Kenya faces in its defence diplomacy engagements. The chapter further exploits possible remedial measures that can be undertaken to strengthen defence diplomacy in Kenya. As discussed in the previous chapter, although Kenya faces fewer threats of conventional wars today, the country has continued to experience a significant number of threats that can be described as ranging between low-to medium-intensity confrontations within itself mostly from militia groups including cattle rustling bandits. That said, defense diplomacy continues to be an important tool in military statecraft in efforts designed to go beyond the use of force (Tan and Singh, 2011).

4.2 The Political Economy of Warfare

4.2.1 Global Military Budgets

Defense budgets are important political economy factor that affects defence diplomacy in many ways. Defence budgets are the amount on money that is drawn from a country national budget and then allocated to the department or ministry of defence in a given state. It is usually used to cover expenses that include the purchase of arms and military equipment as well as in paying wagers for military officers, taking care of their health needs, in addition to funding for operations and training. The budget also covers the development of new technologies and a good portion is also dedicated to soft power engagements and defence diplomacy. Resources or lack of resources is a key determinant in ensuring the success of or for that matter the failure of a defence diplomacy strategy. Resources have been a problem or challenge for the military not just in Kenya but in many countries across the world.

Recently, the world over, military budgets have seen a sharp rise. Latest figures show that total global military outflow exceeded the 2 trillion USD mark (Oluoch, 2022). 38 % of this total was

spend by the United States of America, followed by China at 14%, the second biggest spender. They were followed by United Kingdom and France in third and fourth positions as the world biggest spenders in military defense budgets.

In Africa, recent military expenditure figures show that the sub-Saharan region spend a total of 20.1 billion USD. This figure drawn from 2011 represents a 4.1 % rise from the 2020 figures, but at the same time the figure is 14 % lower than what the sub-continent spends 2012. The increase in 2021 was the first in sub-Saharan Africa since 2014 and was mainly energized by Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa and also the major spender in the sub region.

The biggest military spender in the whole of Africa is Algeria which spends around 10 billion USD; this figure is half of the total continental military expenditure. Reports show that Nigeria raised its military budget by 56 % totaling 4.5 billion USD between 2020 2021. The increase in military budget in Nigeria came as a result of several defence challenges that the country continued to face such as the increase in attacks by Jihadist rebels and other separatist's militia groups within and outside the country. On the other hand, South Africa, which has the second largest defence budget in sub-Saharan Africa, reduced its military budget by 13 % or a cut of 3.3 % in 2021 alone. Kenya together with her neighbor Uganda occupies third and fourth positions respectively in the sub-continent military expenditures profiles followed by Angola as the fifth.

4.2.2 Defence Expenditure

In East Africa, the recent surge in insurgency activities and intra-community conflicts have seen governments within the region especially member states of the East African Community (EAC) to increase their national defence budgets to combat the threats from militia groups as well as other criminal and cattle rustling bandits. The last ten years have seen Kenya and Uganda face a rise in militia activities that have directly threatened the well-being of populations and the state itself. It is fair to argue that the defence budget of these countries have been directly increased to curb or contain the terrorism threats. Indeed, within the financial years 2012 and 2021, defence expenditure remained relatively stable in Kenya whilst records show that it rose by 203 percent in neighboring Uganda.

Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, all East African Community members, have all followed aggressive foreign policies and taken the initiative to develop military defense systems. In addition to using defense diplomacy in multilateral missions for peacekeeping and fostering peace, these nations have conducted interventionist operations all across the area. For instance, Kenya intervened in security operations in Somalia ten years ago as part of Operation Linda Nchi to counter the danger of the Al-Shabaab insurgency. The KDF subsequently joined the African Union operation in Somalia (AMISOM), an UN-backed peacekeeping mission, in 2012 to support the Mogadishu government against the militia.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Monusco), which Kenya is a part of, is now fighting the terrorist organization Isis Central African Republic in the eastern DRC. Other militaries from Tanzania, South Africa, and Nepal are also involved in the operation (UN, 2022).

4.2.3 Kenya Defence Budget

Table 9: Defence Budget, Defence Diplomacy and National Security

15. Increasing the defence budget will enhance defence diplomacy and by extension enhance Kenya national security. Use the following scale to respond: S...ree = 4 Strongly Agree = 5
23 responses




Chart 9 above shows that 76 % of respondents agreed that it was important to increase Kenya defence budget in order to achieve the objectives spelt out in the defence diplomacy policy and national security goals.

Kenya, when compared to her neighbours in East Africa, leads in terms of its military expenditure with a budget of 1.28 billion USD; this is in spite of recent slight reductions caused by the devastating effects of Covid-19 global pandemic. Uganda follows with a budget of 1.06 billion USD, Tanzania 742 million USD, then Rwanda at 164 million USD and finally Burundi with 68 million USD (Guguya, 2022). 79 % of respondents agreed that it was important to increase Kenya defence budget in order to achieve the objectives spelt out in the defence diplomacy policy and national security goals. *Some of the respondents endorsed the observation of increasing Kenya defence budget in order to achieve the objectives spelt out in the defence diplomacy policy and national security goals. They noted that:*

“Caveat, if well utilized and well accounted...Increase should be matched with proper utilization...Both should go hand in hand, defence posture and diplomacy as a force multiplier (Key Informant from MFA &MOD Kenya, MOD Malawi)

In the wider Eastern Africa region, Ethiopia is the only country that reduced its defence expenditure significant from 504.07 million USD to 487.8 million USD within the last two years; this is despite the fact that the country launched a civil war against Tigray forces during the two years that it had reduced its defence budget (Guguya, 2022).

4.3 Challenges Encountered in Kenya’s Defence Diplomacy

It is important to have a clear understanding of the nature and dynamics of insecurity affecting Kenya as well as the role that the KDF undertakes to mitigate challenges when it comes to strategies of defence diplomacy. Therefore, placing light or focus on the challenges that the KDF experiences are a useful avenue in comprehending the past and present conjuncture aimed at improving the future application of defence diplomacy.

As stated previously, safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Kenya is one of the most important duties entrusted to the military in Kenya. This means that in cases of emergency or disaster, like the recent droughts in some parts of the country, the military must offer assistance or, if required, work in conjunction with other civil authorities. Despite this, Kenya, like other nations, continues to face threats to its sovereignty from both internal and external sources. Some of these threats have required the use of diplomatic soft power in addition to the use of military force.

4.3.1 The Undercurrents of Security and Subjectivity

One of the biggest challenges that affect defence diplomacy is that the concept of security or the perception thereof. Very often national security is often cited as the most important aspect of a state survival. Whereas scholars have pointed out that defence diplomacy is one of the key forms of diplomacy that is applied to enhance national security. Nations or states survive based on how well they conduct their business of national security. National security is all about state relationship with its external environment. But more importantly national security is also about how the state relates with its own citizens and actors or those within it.

National interest is not static and nations operate in very dynamic and volatile, vulnerable, challenging and ambiguous internal environments. Given the contemporary challenges of insurgency and militia activities in countries such as Kenya, it is important to examine in-depth the internal dynamics of defence diplomacy strategies by looking at the weaknesses or challenges that are currently hampering successful execution of defence diplomacy.

States like Kenya invest a lot of time and money in the defense sector in order to guarantee that the military sector prevents the occurrence of espionage, terrorism, and sabotage actions by determined adversaries engaged in insurgency. The world has faced a variety of challenges over the past few years, ranging from traditional interstate wars to threats to democracy and good governance to the radicalization of racial and religious groups, which takes the form of both state-sponsored and non-state terrorism.

Kaldor has specifically described the threats posed by non-state actors as new wars that are fought by various combinations of state and non-state networks; use identity politics to fight in the name of a label as opposed to ideology; attempt to achieve political, rather than physical, control of the population through fear and terror; and are no longer financed through the state but through other predatory means that seek the continuation of violence (Kaldor, 2).

According to scholars, internal conflicts appear to be lasting longer than they once did. One of the factors is the regular self-financing and commercial integration of these internal disputes at the regional and international levels. An outstanding example of this is the Somalian terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which has participated in a number of brutal insurgent operations in Kenya. There have been suicide missions and targeted attacks in Kenya since Kenya entered Somalia in 2011 as part of Operation Linda Nchi and then joined AMISOM in 2012. One such attack was the Westgate Mall attack by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is a subset of the bigger terrorist group Al-Qaeda and conducts attacks in both West Africa and the Middle East (Bastung, 2018).

4.3.2 Command Control Problems

Another reason is that in an environment where there is scarcity in terms of resources for both militia or military forces a completion-like situation emerges in terms of proliferation of opportunities for personal enrichment over the course of the conflict. Examples have been cited in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where several non-actors and state actors have been accused with violence and theft of minerals and so forth. Also, the KDF has been wrongly accused of involvement of charcoal trade within the port of Kismayo area of Somalia during its operations.


Command climates are essential in cultivating the human spirit by creating effectiveness and endurance in the event of warfare by reducing harmful behaviors. In a word, command climate can be seen as ‘value proposition’. This assertion is supported by several studies of armed forces across the world. For instance, it was concluded in a research study by Murphy and Forgarty (2010) that the success of a country’s military is dependent on the quality of that army’s human workforce as well as the level of its motivation. Therefore, in order for a military unit to achieve its targets or objectives set by its commanders, its personnel or soldiers must not only be trained, they must also be gelled and equally motivated. This can only happen in a positive or conducive command climate. It is for these reasons that command climate is seen by military scholars such as Jones (2003) as an important prerequisite for a unit’s warfare readiness and effectiveness. When deficiencies arise at this stage, then arguably the effect is likely to trickle down and affect strategy at the defence diplomacy level.

Furthermore, KDF's military culture embeds a visible, moral, in addition to a vocational component. All of these contain aspects of discipline, teamwork, self-sacrifice, spirit, ethics and values that provide commanders of a unit with the implicit understanding of military challenges not just in Kenya but also in the wider East African region, the continent as well as a global outlook. This enables soldiers regardless of the commander rank to engage in external adaptation and internal integration in their command climate approaches. The challenge of not having common standing operation procedures (SOPs) have made joint operations unattainable in some cases.

4.3.3 Challenges in Military Procurement

Table 10: Effects of Corrupt Suppliers, Poor Governance on Defence Diplomacy

Bad governance and lack of transparency has contributed to threat to national Security. Use the following scale to respond: Strongly Disagree = 1 Disagree = 2 Neutral = 3 Agree = 4 Strongly Agree = 5
23 responses



The above data captured on table 10 shows that 87 % of respondents opined that corruption and poor governance were a serious impediment to defence diplomacy activities and programmes.

Roughly a fifth of Kenya's total defence expenditure is dedicated to arms acquisitions, with arms imports increasing significantly in 2019-20 as part of a drive to modernize military equipment. As the biggest defence spender in East Africa, Kenya's defence procurement programmes are substantial. One of the participants could not agree more. The respondent noted:

“Good governance and Transparency are key in the fight against corruption and other ills which enhance terrorism. The opposite leads to threatened national security. (Key Informant from MOD Kenya)

However, gaps in Kenya’s defence procurement processes considerably increase the risk of these funds being diverted through corrupt practices. Cases of corrupt suppliers who have been accused of increasing prices of equipment and commodities, to supply of low-quality equipment. While some cases have been prosecuted, there is no information publicly available regarding sanctions and prosecutions for some of the most egregious, including related to UPDF among others within the region (Olingo, 2020).

4.3.4 Lack of Government Will in Military Budgeting

Table 11: Legal and Policy Frameworks to Enhance Defence Diplomacy

16. Enhanced legal frameworks and policies are appropriate measure for enhancing defence diplomacy. Use the following scale to respond: Strongly ...ee = 4 Strongly Agree = 5
23 responses




Chart 11 above shows 84% of respondents enhanced legal and policy frameworks were appropriate measures to boost Kenya’s Defence diplomacy.

Activities undertaken as part of defence diplomacy are specified in the Kenya Defence Forces Act as well as in the country’s 2010 constitution. The 2010 constitution also gives power to the national parliament to monitor through its parliamentary committees the work undertaken by the KDF.

As a result, the Senate's National Security Committee, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), and the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee (DFAC) of parliament oversee the military. All three have official oversight rights, and DFAC has the authority to look into and report on any issues relating to the mission, operations, and management of defense institutions. It also has the authority to call witnesses and hold hearings (National Assembly, 2019). One of the respondents noted that:

“Legal and policy frameworks are essential in sealing loopholes. They should be matched with implementation frameworks” (MOD Kenya)

4.4 Paradigm Shift from National Security to Human Security

Defense diplomacy was impacted by a paradigm shift that occurred in the early 1990s as a result of the Cold War's end as the concept of national security started to gradually place more focus on human security. What motivates the transference to human security is the growth of the individual and society as a referent object of security. The democratic battles in Kenya that erupted into greater clamor in the 1990s (the so-called second liberation) can be understood using this perspective.

One may argue that this has enhanced the demand for a security system that meets the needs of both the government and its citizens. Human rights and progress have also increased the need for security. In the broader security context, important political, social, physiological, environmental, economic, and cultural issues are considered (Williams and Ebooks Corporation, 2013). Food security, health security, societal security, personal security, environmental security, and political security are all included in the UNDP's concept of human security (UNDP Report, 1994).

Crucial elements of human security include development, effective governance, and accountability and transparency. From a more liberal perspective of the human security paradigm, it is conceivable to argue that security is best understood holistically as opposed to the state-centric realism approach (Weber et al., 2009). A departure from the conventional state-centric security approach is necessary because of the shortcomings in the population's security provision.

4.4.1 State-Centric Security Policy Environment

Generally speaking, Kenya like most other countries in Africa have relied allot on the state itself to define and execute the response to security through policy. Kenya has seen a rise of terrorist related attacks within its border largely because of its involvement in Somalia. The volatile and changing nature of the security environment has made it difficult to achieve much within the defence diplomacy strategy. This combined with the notion that coercive methods, as traditionally used, have bone little fruits in counterinsurgency strategies.

4.5 Mitigation Measures in Defence Diplomacy

4.5.1 Demobilisation of Former Militia

Alongside disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers should be a top emphasis. Demobilization camps could have been helpful in reintegrating those involved in the conflict in order to serve an important purpose for a sustainable peace in situations like the one in Mount Elgon, where the KDF and the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) were at war as part of Operation Okoa Nchi. Reintegration initiatives, particularly for rank-and-file forces, have been demonstrated to dramatically lessen the incentives for ex-combatants to behave as spoilers and, as a result, merit greater assistance, according to studies (Wanda, 2016).

4.5.2 Economic Criminality

Economic crime could be problematic for peace-building and conflict resolution. Protecting illegal but lucrative operations might provide as an incentive for ongoing conflict, possibly resulting in spoilers. Once illegal activity has been entrenched in society, it can be challenging to eradicate it due to inadequate law enforcement and judicial systems as well as the possibility that it may serve important economic purposes.

4.5.3 Sustainable Peace-Building Programme

Effective post-conflict peace-building necessitates a change in donors' present priorities and timing for aid. In order to secure the post-conflict environment, develop trust among the various

parties, and promote a sense of social inclusion, the KDF can use this as part of its defense diplomacy strategy.

4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed the challenges facing defence diplomacy from a global, regional to national levels in order to comprehend the critical defence issues that Kenya faces in its defence diplomacy engagements. The chapter further looked at possible ways to mitigate the challenges of defence diplomacy in Kenya. One thing clear is unlike the period following the end of cold war in the 1990s where the changed strategic environment saw reduction in global military spending, recent figures show that states across the world including Kenya are actually increasingly in their defence expenditures and using these to buy more military hardware. This is not in any way an indication that soft power instruments such as dialogues and peace-building components of defence diplomacy are not effective. On the contrary, Kenya is engaging more and more on defence diplomacy strategies but it is doing so alongside other military measures.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

In this study's concluding chapter, a summary of the findings, a conclusion, and suggestions gleaned from the research are presented. This research study's main objective was to determine how defense diplomacy contributes to Kenyan security. The following three research goals served as its driving forces. The first was to examine how defense diplomacy promoted Kenya's national security in Kenya. The second sought to ascertain the impact of regional and global organizations, of which Kenya is a signatory member, and how this affected frameworks for national security policy and defense diplomacy. The final goal of the study was to identify potential difficulties Kenya might run into when it pursues defense diplomacy.

5.1 Theoretical Approach

This study applied the Social Constructivism theory of IR to explain the causal relationship between diplomacy and national security in order to elucidate the causal relationship between diplomacy and national security. A school of thought in international relations (IR) theory known as social constructivism was first introduced by Nicholas Onuf in his book "The World of our making" in 1989. In this book, Onuf made the argument that nation states, like people, lived in a reality that was primarily created by themselves rather than by external material entities. Because it holds that reality is socially produced, the theory was thought to be the best fit for the investigation.

5.1.2 Methodological approach

The research study used a mixed-methods strategy to get its data. To address the research topics outlined earlier in the study. This entailed combining qualitative and quantitative research approaches.

5.1.3 Data Collection

5.1.3.1 Demographic Data of the Sampled Population

Demographic data drawn from the study reveal that 69.9 percent of the respondents were above the age of 50 years. It also shows that 78.3 percent of the sampled population was made up of professional senior level civil servants all of who had attained graduate level of education. Out of this population, 34 percent had served in Kenya's diplomatic missions' abroad.

5.2 Findings

5.2.1 The Promotion of Security in Kenya's Defence Diplomacy

Data from the study shows that Kenya's defence diplomacy is made up of several different set of activities. At 100 percent, all respondent pointed out that joint military training and peace enforcement operations were the most prominent. They then expressed their views at 85 percent that peacekeeping operations and joint regional exercises as well as military secondment in international and regional bodies were the second most important defence diplomacy engagement. Diplomatic engagement came third at 79.2 percent. From this data, we affirm the study' first hypothesis that Kenya's defense diplomacy has promoted security in Kenya.

5.2.2 Kenya's Membership to International and Regional Bodies and its Influence in Defence Diplomacy and Security Policy Framework

The study finds that membership of regional and international organizations plays a significant role in shaping Kenya's defense diplomacy policy. These organizations provide a platform for Kenya to engage with other countries and to shape the direction of regional and international security policies. Data from the study shows that a significant majority of the respondents at 73.9 percent were in agreement that Kenya's defence diplomacy pays an important role in preventing regional interstate conflicts.

Further data drawn from the study shows overwhelming support by respondents at 100 percent for regional cooperation and enhanced national security as well as enhanced collaboration. At the

same time, the data also shows that respondents looking at the benefits of defence diplomacy in the wider East African Community communicated at 4.3 percent the role of enhanced human security, military coalition establishment and the sharing of experiences on emerging issues.

At the same time, Kenya uses deterrence as one of the strategies of its defense diplomacy. As a method, deterrence has a long history in the context of maintaining not only the military and security landscapes but also in the law-and-order realm where the deterrence hypothesis remains a key intellectual foundation for most criminal law and criminal justice systems.

5.2.3 Future Challenges Facing Kenya in its Pursuit of Defence Diplomacy.

Data from the study indicates that while 79.2 percent of respondents agreed that defence diplomacy was critical to Kenya's peace-building programmes, it also suggests that 64 percent the same respondents did not express their confidence in defence diplomacy to wholesomely redress Kenya's national security concerns. This is caused by several challenges identified by respondents.

One may therefore argue that while defence diplomacy can certainly play an important role in enhancing Kenya's national security, it is unlikely to be the sole solution to securing the country's security needs. National security is a complex issue that involves many factors, poverty eradication, personal security, community security, environmental security, health security, political stability, economic development, social cohesion, and effective governance. While defence diplomacy can certainly contribute to these broader goals, it cannot address all of them on its own. Kenya faces a range of security challenges, including terrorism, border disputes, and organized crime, that require a multifaceted approach that involves not just defence diplomacy, but also law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and military operations when necessary.

In the East African region, the recent surge in insurgency activities and intra-community conflicts have seen governments within the region especially member states of the East African Community (EAC) to increase their national defence budgets to combat the threats from militia groups as well as other criminal and cattle rustling bandits. The last ten years have seen Kenya and Uganda face a rise in terror activities that have directly threatened the well-being of populations and the state itself. It is fair to argue that the defence budget of these countries have

been directly increased to curb or contain the terrorism threats. Indeed, between 2012 and 2021, military expenditure rose by 203 percent in Uganda but remained relatively stable in Kenya.

5.2.3.1 Defence Budgetary Deficit

Data extracted from the research shows that 79 % of respondents agreed that it was important to increase Kenya defence budget in order to achieve the objectives spelt out in the defence diplomacy policy and national security goals. Kenya, when compared to her neighbours in East Africa, leads in terms of its military expenditure with a budget of 1.28 billion USD; this is in spite of recent slight reductions caused by the devastating effects of Covid-19 global pandemic. Respondents expressed their concerns that there was need to increase the defense budget to ensure defence diplomacy activities continue being expanded.

5.2.3.2 Challenges in Military Procurement

The countries of the region spend a considerable amount of money in modernization and military operations and yet it is considered to be way below the required funding that is requisite for the threats faced. Total defence expenditure is dedicated to arms acquisitions; with arms imports increasing significantly in 2019-20 as part of a drive to modernize military equipment in Kenya and Uganda. As the biggest defence spender in East Africa, Kenya and Uganda's defence procurement programmes are substantial. That said, data shows that 87 percent of respondents opined that either corruption by suppliers who blow up the prices far above normal market rates, poor procurement processes and poor governance in some African countries were a serious impediment to defence diplomacy activities and programmes.

5.2.3.3 Legal and Policy Frameworks

Data shows 84% of respondents were in agreement that there is need to have an enhanced legal and policy frameworks as appropriate measures to boost Kenya's Defence diplomacy. This is in addition to existing structures spelt out in the Kenya Defence Forces Act as well as in the country's 2010 constitution. The 2010 constitution also gives power to the national parliament to monitor through its parliamentary committees the work undertaken by the KDF which features defence diplomacy.

5.3 Conclusion

The primary purpose of this study has been to establish the role of defence diplomacy in promoting security in Kenya. It was driven by the three research objectives that focused on the role of defence diplomacy in promoting Kenya's national security in Kenya; whilst examining the influence of regional and international organizations on Kenya's defence diplomacy; and last but not least the study also explored future challenges and opportunities that defence diplomacy is likely to experience in the course of its activities.

The study concludes that Kenya has achieved significant progress in terms of its defense diplomacy. The figures drawn from fieldwork confirm the study's three hypotheses that; Kenya's defense diplomacy has promoted security in Kenya; and Kenya's membership in international and regional organizations plays a major role in shaping the country's defence diplomacy and security policy framework; as well as Kenya's defence budget is expected to increase to accommodate its future defence diplomacy engagements.

All respondent pointed out that joint military training and peace enforcement operations were Kenya's most prominent defence diplomacy activities. This was followed by peacekeeping operations and joint regional exercises as well as military secondments in international and regional bodies. Diplomatic engagement had the least support as an activity compared to the other sets of activities.

Overall data from the research suggests that there is overwhelming support for defense diplomacy and its activities. At the same time, statistics also suggests that Kenya cannot wholesomely rely on defence diplomacy for its national security. In other words, more needs to done to enhance defence diplomacy in relation to Kenya's national security goals. Procurement challenges, procurement processes as well as budgetary deficits, stronger legal and policy frameworks were cited as some of the reasons that hamper the progress of defence diplomacy.

Opportunities for Further Research

Other than the research questions and objectives, this study offers valuable insights into potential avenues for future investigation. Since the research focused on the role of defence diplomacy in enhancing national security in Kenya, there was a certain bias in the choice of situation and

possible responses. Kenya is relatively wealthy and has relative socio-economic and political stability as compared to some neighbouring countries within the IGAD and EAC regions. Further research therefore needs to be conducted to analyse the dynamics of some failed states within the regions in order to determine how they can embrace defence diplomacy amidst their socio-economic and political challenges. Second, the research did not delve much on the viability of extending diplomatic goodwill to other actors such as dissidents, terror organisations and even some global powers fighting proxy wars within the region; a study on the influence of other actors to defence diplomacy within the African region could add value to both the policy and academic bodies.

5.4 Recommendation

5.4.1 The Study Recommends Enhancement of Diplomatic Capacity. Kenya can enhance its diplomatic capacity by investing in training and resources for its diplomats. This can include training in negotiation, conflict resolution, and public diplomacy. With stronger diplomatic capacity, Kenya can more effectively communicate its defense and security objectives to other countries and build stronger partnerships.

5.4.2 The Study Recommends that Kenya Increases its Funding to Prevent Budgetary Shortages for Defence Diplomacy Activities. Data from the study has identified diplomatic engagements as receiving the least attention in defence diplomacy activities. This will prevent critical activities such as peace-building, peacekeeping and mediation in addition to other such as early identification monitoring to be actualized and not compromised upon based on budgetary constraints and dependency on external sources.

5.4.3 The Study Recommends that, in Order to Redress the Legal and Policy Infrastructure Problems Identified by the Research, Kenya Prioritises its Defense Diplomacy in its National Strategy. This should involve integrating defense diplomacy into broader national security objectives and ensuring that resources and personnel are allocated to support these objectives. By prioritizing defense diplomacy, Kenya can better position itself to address its security challenges and achieve its strategic goals.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Questionnaire

Research Questionnaire for Key Respondents ‘The Role of Defense Diplomacy in Enhancing National Security: A Case Study of Kenya (2012 – 2022)’

QUESTIONNAIRE

DATE: _____

QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER: _____ **LOCATION:** _____

POSITION OF INTERVIEWEE _____

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL WITHIN KENYA’S DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY COMMUNITIES

The researcher seeks to investigate the role of defence diplomacy in enhancing national security, by focusing at the case of Kenya between the years 2012 and 2022. The researcher is well aware of the sensitivities involved in national security matters in Kenya similar to other regional jurisdictions, and therefore great care will be undertaken to ensure that information provided in the course of this academic exercise remains treated with utmost sensitivity it deserves and will

only be used for this academic purpose. (Respondent will be primarily drawn from a pool of former or presently serving Kenyan ambassadors or Ministry of Defence's defense attaches or any other relevant persons).

Respondent (tick the one that applies): Ambassador () Defense attaché () Other (please specify)

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

1. What is your present position in the government.....
2. In which year(s) did you serve in that position?

SECTION B: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

3. Age in years ()
4. Sex: Male () Female ()
5. Level of education
 - a. Primary ()
 - b. Secondary ()
 - c. Vocational ()
 - d. Post-secondary ()
 - e. Other military (please specify).....
6. Marital status
 - a. Married ()
 - b. Divorced ()
 - c. Separated ()
 - d. Widowed ()
 - e. Never married ()

7. Have you personally been deployed on any defense diplomacy missions?

Yes () No ()

8. What type of assignment have you been deployed in?

.....

.....

.....

9. How has Kenya's defense diplomacy evolved over time?

.....

.....

10. Who (in terms of rank) in the military is involved in defense diplomacy?

.....

.....

11. What is the percentage of personnel in the Kenya Defence Force is involved in defense diplomacy?

.....

.....

12. What are the benefits of defense diplomacy in East Africa?

.....

.....

13. What future challenges can you envisage in Kenya's defense diplomacy?

.....
.....

14. What activities were you in engaged in that promoted defense diplomacy?

.....
.....

15. Based on your professional experience, which defense diplomacy activities are more critical or impactful in attaining national security?

.....
.....

16. What challenges have you experienced in the application of defense diplomacy strategies in Kenya?

.....
.....

17. Can Kenya's national security be secured by defense diplomacy wholesomely?

.....
.....

18. What future prospects are there for Kenya's defense diplomacy?

.....
.....

19. What lessons can we draw as strategies from Kenya's defense diplomacy?

.....
.....

20. How can Kenya improve her defense diplomacy approach?

.....

Appendix II: Research Permit

 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPUBLIC OF KENYA Ref No: 915691	 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION. Date of Issue: 06/December/2022
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Legal Notice No. 108: The Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, hereafter referred to as the Commission, was established under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act 2013 (Revised 2014) herein after referred to as the Act. The objective of the Commission shall be to regulate and assure quality in the science, technology and innovation sector and advise the Government in matters related thereto.

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2. The research and its related activities as well as outcomes shall be beneficial to the country and shall not in any way;
 - i. Endanger national security
 - ii. Adversely affect the lives of Kenyans
 - iii. Be in contravention of Kenya's international obligations including Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).
 - iv. Result in exploitation of intellectual property rights of communities in Kenya
 - v. Adversely affect the environment
 - vi. Adversely affect the rights of communities
 - vii. Endanger public safety and national cohesion
 - viii. Plagiarize someone else's work
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15. Relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee shall monitor and evaluate the research periodically, and make a report of its findings to the Commission for necessary action.

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