NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY-KENYA

CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN LAIKIPIA COUNTY, KENYA: CAUSES, IMPACTS, AND RESOLUTION STRATEGIES

BY

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RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

Sign: ……  …… Date: October 22, 2023

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Sign:  Date: … October 22, 2023

Dr. Peterlinus Ouma Odote

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dear loving wife and children.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I thank the Almighty God for bringing me this far. Special thanks to my research supervisor for his exemplary guidance, coaching and leadership towards the realization of this noble course. As my advisor, the supervisor provided detailed guidance and encouragement throughout the course and in conducting the research. His belief that it was, indeed, possible to finish kept me going. Thanks to the assistance of my fellow classmates for their invaluable advice. Finally, special thanks to my family for their good-natured forbearance with the process, and for their pride in this accomplishment. It has really been a team effort and without them, I could not have completed this research proposal. But most of all, my gratitude is to God, for carrying me through one of the most difficult undertakings of my life.

May God Bless you.

ABSTRACT

There have been several instances of low-intensity conflict (LIC) around the world, including in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. In Kenya several incidences of insurgencies, banditry and ethnic conflicts have occurred causing untold human suffering and loss of property. These conflicts have been persistent and intractable in nature. Many remedies and mitigating techniques have been tried, with some success. This study therefore aimed to examine causes and effects of insecurity in Laikipia County and proposes security strategies. The study was based on Edward Azar's Protracted Social Conflict Theory and Resource Scarcity Theory. The study used secondary data, reviewing existing literatures from other studies. The study findings indicated that political incitements, the proliferation of small arms, unequal land ownership and tenure, and marginalization were among the core causes of conflicts in Laikipia County. Conflicts in Laikipia County have a variety of effects, including decreased food production, property destruction, the loss of young, active males, school closures, disruptions in the delivery of medical care, and the spread of small guns and light weapons, among others. Attempted conflict management approaches in Laikipia County include dialogue, mediation, peace workshops, arbitration, peace meetings, psychosocial counselling, humanitarian assistance, disarmament and livestock control measures such as branding and embargoes. The study concluded that whereas some causes of conflicts in Laikipia County have been identified, the root causes have not been well highlighted and singled out and that there have been profound negative impacts on socio-economic aspects of the County. The study recommended that the Laikipia County administration creates a comprehensive framework for conflict resolution that combines formal and informal methods in order to address the main causes of conflict - land tenure and marginalization. The policy should blend formal and conventional dispute resolution techniques. The Ministry of Interior should set up long-term security agencies that are well-equipped, with a strong intelligence framework for early warning to stop the spread of small guns and lessen criminal activity. In order to improve compliance with Chapter 6 of the Kenyan Constitution 2010, the National government should create a permanent vetting board presided over by the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and Director National Intelligence Service (NIS).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCORD	- African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AIDS	- Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMISOM	- African Union Mission in Somalia
ASAL	- Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
CAR	- Central African Republic
COIN	- Counter Insurgency
CSO	- Civil Society Organization
DALY	- Disability Adjusted Life Years
DMI	- Director of Military Intelligence
DRC	- Democratic Republic of Congo
GoK	- Government of Kenya
HIV	- Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
IGP	- Income Generating Projects
IISS	- International Institute for Strategic Studies
KDF	- Kenya Defence Forces
KNBS	- Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KWS	- Kenya Wildlife Services
LIC	- Low Intensity Conflict
LTTE	- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MCA	- Member of County Assembly
MDG	- Millennium Development Goals
MP	- Member of Parliament
MRC	- Mombasa Republican Council
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	- National Intelligence Services
PSC	- Protracted Social Conflicts

SIPRI - Stockholm Institute of Peace Research

SLDF - Sabaot Land Defence Forces

US - United States

WHO - World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

There have been several instances of low-intensity conflict (LIC) around the world, including in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. In Kenya several incidences of insurgencies, banditry and ethnic conflicts have occurred causing untold human suffering and loss of property. These conflicts have been persistent and intractable in nature. Many remedies and mitigating techniques have been tried, with some success. The study on conflict dynamics in Laikipia County, Kenya: Causes, Impacts, and Resolution Strategies involves analysis of the intricate conflict dynamics in Laikipia County. It entails an examination of the causes, impacts and the resolution strategies that could be employed in the conflict. Overall, the study on conflict dynamics in Laikipia County, Kenya: Causes, Impacts, and Resolution Strategies is an important area of research that has significant implications for the country's peace and security. It provides insights into the rootcauses, impacts and possible interventions in promoting sustainable peace. This chapter covers the background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, and research questions, scope of the study, justification for the study, limitations of the study, theoretical framework and research methodology.

1.1 Background to the Study

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) is described by the US Army as a political-military conflict between opposing nations or organizations that is above ordinary, peaceful rivalry between states but below conventional war (US Army, 1990). It typically entails lengthy conflicts between opposing values and ideologies and can take many forms, from subversion to the use of force. The LIC is fought using a variety of tools, including political, economic, informational, and military ones. They frequently have limited effects, typically in the Third World, but have effects on both regional and global security (US Army, 1990). Therefore, LIC may be defined as a military confrontation between two or more state or non-state parties that is typically localized and lower intensity than conventional war. In order to ensure conformity with its goals or aims, the state employs armed forces that are employed judiciously and sparingly.

Since the end of the Second World War, LIC has dominated conflicts (Muni, 2012). It has occurred in several locations across the world, including Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Due to the assumption that the majority of significant conflicts have taken place in the region, South Asia has drawn the attention of researchers as an important area of emphasis in conflict studies. Additionally, several of its states have the distinction of being associated with the global terrorist epicenter, where no nation has been immune to insurrections and separatist movements.

The ethnic war in Sri Lanka and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal are two of the most difficult and lengthy domestic conflicts in South Asia. The Sri Lankan military destroyed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in that country in 2009. In 2006, with the help of India's and the international community's covert and unofficial good offices, the Nepalese Maoists joined forces with the mainstream political parties, paving the way for a peaceful, democratic transition of Nepal (Muni, 2012). Even if these long battles have come to an end, their underlying causes have not yet been entirely addressed and removed. Even after the war ended, Sri Lankans are still waiting for a political solution to the country's ethnic conflict. While the monarchy has been overthrown and a republican political system formed, the promise of creating a "New Nepal" that propelled the Maoists into the mainstream of national politics has yet to be realized and entrenched.

Latin American region has also witnessed protracted social conflicts that fall within the characterization of LIC (Weathers, 1988). Over 27 insurgencies have been witnessed in Latin American region in countries like Nicaragua, Chile, Peru, among others. In Nicaragua a political authoritarianism has been touted to be the main cause of LIC resulting in fighting between the Samosa dynasty and the Sandinista regime (Weathers, 1988). With the founding of the republic to the present, the people had little opportunity to guide their own destiny through popular participation in the political process. In Chile, socioeconomic downturns and ideological reasons were the cause of conflicts perpetrated by the Maxist-Lenist Socialists (Weathers, 1988). The same socio-economic and ideological reasons are attributable to the founding and aim of Sandero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. Although most of the insurgencies were defeated, some of them managed to seize power in countries like Cuba. Furthermore, Latin America continues to endure poverty and other economic hardships and therefore the root causes of the LIC have not been addressed.

Insurgencies and terrorist-style confrontations by non-state groups against the established state government have occurred in and are continuing to occur in several African countries. At least 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had ongoing armed conflicts in 2019, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Eight of the subnational armed conflicts were low intensity, while seven of them in Nigeria, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burkina Faso, Mali, South Sudan, and Cameroon—were high intensity (SIPRI, 2020). State actors, either directly or indirectly through proxies, played a part in almost all of the internationalization of armed conflicts. The dynamics of conflict, including racial and religious conflicts, were frequently fueled by a confluence of factors including state fragility, corruption, inefficient provision of basic services, rivalry for natural resources, inequality, and a sense of exclusion. The expanding globalization of counterterrorism efforts and the growing effects of climate change, with water shortage being a particularly critical burden, both continued to influence regional security (SIPRI, 2020). SIPRI also reports that in 2019, the armed conflicts in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria all got worse. This is related to the emergence of violent extremism and the spread of armed non-state organizations like Boko Haram, which originated in Nigeria and now controls most of the territory around Lake Chad. Inter-communal conflicts and the complaints of marginalized populations are used as a source of income for violent extremist organizations and rural insurgent groups, respectively (SIPRI, 2020).

In East Africa, it remains one of the most unstable regions in the globe due to trends in war and instability (USAID, 2012). The persistent instability in the area contrasts sharply with the considerable gains in conflict resolution that have been made in the majority of the rest of Africa (USAID, 2012). Local, state, and regional security are severely compromised by conflicts in South Sudan, southern Somalia, and Darfur as well as strongly armed inter-communal fighting in several other areas of the region. Borderlands that are isolated and poorly managed serve as a haven for transnational crime networks. In some parts of East Africa, border regions have a significant economic significance and are also the location of fisheries, watersheds, precious minerals, and dense people (USAID, 2012). Governments in zones may or may not be able to extend their influence into these border regions, but they clearly have a stake in the production and commerce that results from these priceless

resources. Contrarily, the majority of the Horn of Africa's border regions, especially those in Somalia and Ethiopia, have traditionally been thought of as distant, vast, unproductive, and sparsely inhabited. As a result, governments have allegedly made economically sound judgments by choosing not to spend limited public funds to maintain control over areas that have little chance of generating a profit (Herbst, 2002). Millions of locals in these borders have as a result lived mainly beyond the state's purview. Geographical and climatic factors have a significant role in causing community conflict in these areas, but they also complexly affect conflict. Growing resource scarcity, severe poverty, and underdevelopment in some areas of the region are undoubtedly escalating intercommunal violence.

Shifta wars (1963–1967), Sabaot Land Defense Forces Movement in Mt. Elgon, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in the coastal regions of Mombasa, and Al Shabaab invasions and attacks are only a few of the LIC that Kenya has seen (Willis & Gona, 2022). The Kenyan government has been determined in its reaction to these security concerns, which has resulted in clear insurgency setbacks. Because of complaints of unfair land tenure practices involving the Chepyuk community in the Mt. Elgon area, the Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF) was formed. Two Sabaot Clans were at odds with one another (Boone, 2012; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015; Simiyu, 2008). After the insurrection was put down in 2008 by the Kenya Defence Forces, the area has experienced peace. Based in Kenya's coastal regions, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) used violence to promote its causes (Mwongera, 2012; Willis & Gona, 2022). Due to the political and economic isolation of the coastal strip by previous Kenyan governments, the MRC in particular attracted economically underprivileged youngsters (Willis & Gona, 2022).

In Laikipia County, Pastoralists and farmers have engaged in lengthy, violent disputes over land disputes. Its northern, eastern, and western Sub-Counties are home to farmers, ranchers, and pastoralists. Conflicts recently occurred in parts of Ol Moran in Laikipia County (Mwangi, 2021). Human-wildlife conflict, resource and land grabbing, and political bickering are considered to be the causes of the conflicts in the area (IISS, 2019). Recent property disputes in Kenya's County have reignited discussions about the country's future with regard to minority land ownership. Laikipia has allegedly been the scene of land conflicts involving some of Kenya's most marginalized ethnic and racial groups as a result of climate change, foreign investment, and population expansion (Fox, 2018). Laikipia is home to other minority landowners whose political influence is underrated, even though major portions of the county are held by foreigners or Kenyans of European origin (Fox, 2018). Despite the fact that some

major ranch owners in Laikipia view the local pastoralists as liabilities, others view them as a source of political capital or partners in the fight to preserve their right to the land.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Laikipia County, situated in Kenya, is grappling with an enduring predicament of insecurity and disputes. These disputes have extensive repercussions that impact the well-being of the residents and possess broader ramifications for regional stability. Comprehending the fundamental causes, impacts, and approaches for conflict resolution is imperative to formulate efficacious interventions. This investigation seeks to analyse the root causes, impacts and possible interventions in promoting sustainable peace in Laikipia County.

Laikipia County has been plagued by recurrent disputes that originate from various elements. These disputes are intricate and multifaceted, necessitating the identification of primary catalysts. The essential query is: What are the principal instigators of disputes in Laikipia County? This encompasses issues pertaining to resource allocation, land ownership, proliferation of small arms, political provocations, and ethnic tensions.

Disputes in Laikipia County have had severe consequences on the societal, economic, and political dimensions of the region. It is vital to thoroughly explore the complete extent of these implications. The question is: What are the ramifications of insecurity and disputes in Laikipia County? This entails examining the impact on food production, loss of lives, and devastation of property, disruptions in education and healthcare services, and the exacerbation of ethnic hostilities.

Effective conflict management and resolution are crucial for attaining enduring peace in Laikipia County. The investigation will scrutinize the approaches employed to manage and resolve disputes in the region. The key question is: What conflict resolution approaches have been employed in Laikipia County, and to what degree have they achieved success? This involves examining both formal and informal methods, as well as the role of governance structures and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

By addressing these matters, this investigation aims to contribute to a more profound understanding of the dynamics of disputes in Laikipia County and offer valuable insights for policymakers, local authorities, and stakeholders to devise more effective strategies for conflict prevention and resolution in the region.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

To analyse causes, effect and potential resolution strategies of conflict in Laikipia County, Kenya.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

a. To examine root causes of conflicts in Laikipia County.

b. To assess implications of conflicts on insecurity in Laikipia County Kenya.

c. To examine the conflict management strategies that could be employed in resolving conflicts and improve security in Laikipia County.

1.4 Research Questions

a. What are root causes of conflicts in Laikipia County?

b. What are socio-economic and political implications of conflicts on insecurity in Laikipia County Kenya?

c. Which conflict management strategies that could be employed in resolving conflicts and improve insecurity in Laikipia County?

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study was justified on the basis of the need to find long lasting solutions to the root causes to Laikipia conflicts as well as conflicts in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) in general. Conflict in ASAL areas has exacerbated the already sorry state of socioeconomic conditions in these areas. Attempted solutions seem to be Band-Aid type and thus having short-term solutions. The recent attacks on schools in Ol Moran areas of Laikipia County as well as private property reinforced the need for urgent long-term solutions to restore stability and create conducive environment for development, education, and business in the area.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study was significant in terms of informing policy frameworks for conflict management in Laikipia County and ASAL areas. The study contributes to policy considerations by enriching the response perspectives from a protracted social conflicts (intractable conflicts) perspective; and therefore, supplementing measures that are already being implemented to curb insecurity in Laikipia County. Academically, the study contributes to the existing pool of knowledge on LIC as wells Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC). The study is therefore of use to national security agencies, humanitarian agencies and Non-Governmental

Organisations who are engaged in conflict management in Laikipia County. It also informs research on the area by forming a basis for further research and validation of the finding. In this way, the study is be interest to scholars, military officers and students of peace and conflict management.

1.7 Scope and Limitations

In terms of the scope, this study covered conflicts occurring within Laikipia County with focus on the causes, political, socioeconomic and security implications. This was in relation to the adversarial interactions between pastoralist communities on the one hand and between the pastoralists and ranchers on the other hand. The study also explored the conflictual relations between the pastoralists and the agriculturalist communities. Of interest to the study was the root causes of the conflict as framed within the context of protracted social conflicts with the aim of recommending practical solutions to the conflict. The study was anchored on Protracted Social Conflicts Theory (PSC) developed by Edward Azar (1978, 1979, and 1984) and the Resource Scarcity Theory.

A descriptive research approach also had an impact on the study because it can only give a picture of the present condition and may not be able to establish cause-and-effect linkages. Descriptive research relies on existing data, which may not always be comprehensive or accurate. This was mitigated by adopting a mixed-method approach in the study. This study was constrained by the time available to conduct in-depth research. This was overcome by conducting desktop research concurrently with the demanding course schedule. Reliance on internet sources might limit the accuracy and veracity of the information and data for the research. This was however overcome by using more than one source on a particular idea/concept in order to ensure credibility of the information. The library materials were also consulted to enhance credibility of the information.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Low Intensity Conflicts: Armed conflict or confrontation between security agencies and contending states or non-state actors, normally below conventional war.

Conflicts: Adversarial interaction between non-state actors (pastoralists) and other non-state actors or state actors and non-state actors arising from threats to group identity, unmet human needs as well as political incitement

Causes: Factors and conditions leading to conflictual interactions among ethnic groups or state and non-state actors.

Implications: Consequences of conflicts to include social, economic and political consequences.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

This study premised on two theories—the Protracted Social Conflicts Theory (PSC) developed by Edward Azar and the Resource Scarcity Theory. Through his scholarly writings, Azar (1978, 1979, 1984) developed the hypothesis. Many PSC academics have developed on the theoretical paradigm and basis offered by Azar's pioneering writings. According to Azar (Azar, 1984), social conflict is defined as antagonistic encounters between community groups that are motivated by ingrained racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural animosity and that last for extended periods of time with intermittent outbursts of violence. He continues by saying that all internal conflicts have at least one of the following traits. First off, due to the parties' "irrational reasons," they are usually drawn-out and ugly in character. Second, it's possible that long-standing resentments, religious zeal, or familial loyalty are to blame for why certain internal disputes continue long after they ought to have ceased. Third, compromise is very challenging due to the conflicting identities and values that are at the root of most internal conflicts. Fourth, there are structural obstacles that prevent communication and resolutions of disputes, such as numerous incentives for violence to continue and disincentives for compromise.

Researchers like Ramsbotham (2008) have expanded on the notion by pointing out that PSC is defined by communal groups' protracted and sometimes violent struggles for necessities like security, acceptability, and equitable access to political institutions. The communal groupings can be divided along racial, religious, cultural, or ethnic lines in a profound way. Ramsbotham (2008) adds that these divisions are brought about by the unmet demands of people for recognition, security, and distributive justice. These divisions are marked by ongoing animosity and intermittent violent outbursts. Such identity-driven rifts arise from a deep-seated dread of extinction that frequently develops within weak ethnic communities that have to contend with the memories or terror of persecution and genocide.

In multi-ethnic nations where one communal or identity group holds sway, discontent and division are bred when the dominant group (or coalition of organizations) disregards the needs of other communal groups. Conflict develops as a result of the close proximity of

several identity groups, according to Azar (1984). Their actions frequently represent the climax of pent-up resentment and wrath, with blatant psychological and emotional patterns of inculcated racism and hatred. Fighting cause the people to worry about their own survival, scapegoat others, and use other divisive political language, which furthers societal tensions. According to Rothman and Oslon (2001), disputes and the creation of a "we" vs. "them" dichotomy in a PSC environment are marked by ingrained animosity, paranoia, and excessive stereotyping along ethnic lines. Because PSC is founded on subjective impressions and sentiments drawn from actual experiences, it renders national and mechanical procedures and solutions aimed at conflict transformation worthless while also being harmful (Rothman & Olson, 2001). Since some of the main causes of ethnic violence in Kenya's Laikipia County include ethnic politics, resource competition, ethnic rivalries, and unfulfilled demands, the theory will be pertinent to the research.

Secondly, this study employed the Resource Scarcity Theory which acts as a fundamental and enlightening concept in our examination of the convoluted conflict dynamics within Laikipia County, Kenya, where competition for scarce resources has been a recurring issue. This theory provides valuable insights into the underlying causes of conflicts and emphasizes the pivotal role played by resource disparities in both the initiation and perpetuation of these conflicts. The core of resource scarcity theory lies in the notion that conflicts arise when a substantial discrepancy exists between the availability of vital resources and the growing demands placed upon them (Homer-Dixon, 1999). In Laikipia County, this incongruity has played a significant part in instigating conflicts over resources like land, water, and economic opportunities.

In Laikipia County, this theory is especially applicable as it resonates with the county's struggles over limited resources, particularly water, and grazing field among the pastoralist communities who are the majority residents. As essential resources become scarcer, the pressure to secure them through various means, be it through force, negotiations, or competition, intensifies, often acting as the underlying trigger for conflicts (Tibebe, 2014). The pervasive resource scarcity in the region is multifaceted, encompassing issues like limited access to arable land, water, and economic prospects (Bates, 2008). These resource disparities manifest at various levels, from local disputes between neighbouring communities to more extensive international conflicts, such as those related to access to grazing land, water resources, or territorial disputes.

Like in many other regions, several factors contribute to these resource disparities within Laikipia County. Environmental shifts, influenced by climate change, can disrupt the availability of resources, leading to scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Additionally, population growth intensifies the demand for these limited resources, further straining their availability. The governance structures in place are also pivotal; when they prove inefficient, corrupt, or fail to address the needs of the population, resource disparities tend to worsen (Bates, 2008). In this context, the application of resource scarcity theory assists in comprehending the convoluted conflict dynamics within Laikipia County, offering insights into the factors that contribute to resource scarcity and the resultant conflicts.

Resource scarcity theory has been invaluable in understanding conflicts across the globe, and its relevance extends to Laikipia County. It has been used to scrutinize conflicts over water resources in arid regions like Laikipia County, where water scarcity has been a persistent issue (Tibebe, 2014). Furthermore, it provides insight into disputes over land and agricultural resources in densely populated areas, mirroring Laikipia County's challenges (Bates, 2008). The theory's application extends even to international conflicts, such as those related to oil reserves or access to maritime resources, making it a versatile framework for comprehending resource-driven conflicts.

Resource scarcity theory stands as a foundational framework for understanding the multifaceted conflict dynamics arising from competition for limited resources within Laikipia County. It underscores the role of disparities between resource availability and demand by the local population and highlights the necessity of effective resource management, equitable distribution, and conflict resolution strategies to alleviate the potential for conflicts stemming from resource scarcity and political marginalization.

1.10 Research Methodology

1.10.1 Research Design

The research design used in the study was a descriptive survey. The study's descriptive survey research approach was advantageous since it entailed gathering information about variables or factors as they were seen at the study location. In order to give you accurate and pertinent information, descriptive survey research uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. Using a descriptive survey approach saves time and involves the subjects who are the focus of the study.

1.10.2 Research Site Description

The research site for this study is Laikipia County, which is County number 31 in the Republic of Kenya. The two largest urban centres in the County of Laikipia are Nyahururu to the southwest and Nanyuki to the southeast. Rumuruti serves as its capital. The County is located between longitudes 36° 11" and 37° 24' East and latitudes 0° 18" South and 0° 51" North. According to the Laikipia County Government (2018), it is bordered to the north by Samburu County, to the east by Isiolo County, to the north by Meru County, to the east by Nyeri County, to the south by Nyandarua County, to the south by Nakuru County, and to the west by Baringo County. Tourism, agriculture, pastoralism, ranching, and greenhouse horticulture make up the majority of the county's economic activities (Laikipia County Government, 2018).

Laikipia County has a total population of 518,560, of whom 259,440 are men, 259,102 are women, and 18 are intersex people (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). According to the 2019 KNBS, there are 149,271 households, with an average household size of 3.4 people and a population density of 54 people per square kilometres. Conflicts between pastoralists and ranchers, as well as pastoralists and farmers, have been prevalent in the county, particularly in area of Rumuruti.

1.10.3 Target Population

The target population in this study was the population of Laikipia County. The study targeted ordinary residents of Laikipia County (Farmers, Pastoralists, Ranchers, and Traders), the target population is individuals with identification documents from the area. The study also targets National and County Government officials (security officers, Land Officials, Water Department Officials), and community leaders. The study therefore employed purposive sampling technique to draw a sample size of 100 respondents from the target population. Targeting the entire county was not feasible since most parts of the county have not experienced any form of violence. Thus, the population of the study was confined to Laikipia West owing to the spate of violence that had taken place. The target population as described was important because they reside in the county and are better placed informant on security issues. For example, it is the residents of the area that can give the subjective experiences about security.

1.10.4 Sampling Procedure

The population targeted was clustered in different categories mainly, residents, government officials which was followed by purposive sampling to select participants. The purposive sampling technique is a non-probability sampling technique, which is applied when a cultural issue needs to be studied using the expertise and knowledge from and among the population. Purposive sampling was used for residents, key informants, and security personnel to enable adequate representation of population parameters in the selected sample. National and County government security officers, Land Ministry officials, Water Department officers, Ranch owners, farmers, pastoralists and traders formed part of the sample size. The researcher utilized purposive sampling to choose 100 respondents, where the main consideration were education, sex, and occupation of the respondents using expert judgment. Purposive sampling was applied since the sample frame was not readily availability. Thus, owing to the infinite study population to apply probability sampling techniques, purposive sampling was used to solicit data from subjects who were deemed to possess appropriate socio-demographic attributes.

1.10.5 Data Collection

Both primary and secondary data were employed in this study. Security personnel in Laikipia East provided the primary data through interviews that were gathered through interview schedules, while secondary data was compiled and categorized from published publications to address the study's specific goals. According to Panchenko and Samovilova (2020), secondary data includes quantitative, qualitative, or non-quantitative information. Data gathered second-hand via interviews, ethnographic reports, images, documents, discussions, and other sources constitute qualitative secondary data. The population census, government surveys, cohort and other longitudinal studies, administrative records and other routine or continuous surveys, university and college records, author websites and other sources of numerical or quantitative data would all be on the list of sources that lend themselves to secondary analysis. This study adopted data from Schilling, Opiyo, and Scheffran (2012), Leming'ani (2017), Omuse (2018), Mwenda (2018); Mutunga (2018) and Ameso et al., (2018).

1.10.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

In order to respond to the research questions, the data from the chosen prior studies were thematically evaluated. Secondary data analysis, as defined by Johnstone (2014), is the

utilization of data that was gathered for another reason. Data were analysed in accordance with the study's specific goals.

1.10.7 Ethical Considerations

Ethics relate to issues of academic integrity. The study was guided by ethical considerations in its conduct and presentation. The sources of information and data were adequately acknowledged through citations and referencing to minimize plagiarism.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICTS

2.0 Introduction

Inequality in the distribution of resources, marginalization, and the development of small guns, issues with land ownership and tenure, and political instigation are the usual causes of conflicts between communities. This chapter analyses research on the underlying causes of literature from a variety of journals, papers, periodicals, books, and articles. The primary reasons of disputes in Kenya's Laikipia County were connected to the literature that was studied. Conflicts typically don't have a single reason. They are complicated because of the nature of some of the arguments. They have a variety of causes. There are occasions when a dispute may have one cause for some of the participants, but a different cause for others. There are various factors that, to varying degrees, were significant in determining how war is fought.

2.1 Pastoralism

Pastoralism is a symbiotic relationship between people, domesticated livestock and the local ecology as major livelihood and social-economic activity within the pastoralist communities who occupy over 70% of the Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). These communities comprise a third of Kenya's population (Nori et al., 2005). Livestock production and sales on average contributes to 8% of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These communities have settled their nuclei families in satellite towns spread in the region. However, the men and young adults lead a nomadic life moving long distances from point to point in search of pasture and water for their livestock (Mkutu, 2003). These communities are minorities and lead a different way of life as depicted by their culture, values and languages. They have also been marginalized by the ruling communities since the colonial periods through little or limited development.

According to Lewis (2011) pastoralism is the main source of livelihood in the horn of Africa. The organization states that there are about 20 million pastoralists living in the pastoralist regions found in Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Among the 20 million populations, there are about 4 million children who form a very vulnerable population. Pastoralism is the main source of livelihood in these regions because the regions cannot support any other major

economic activity. The resources are thinly distributed while the climatic conditions keep deteriorating.

Similarly, the Guardian (2011) states that pastoralists in the Horn of Africa have become increasingly vulnerable as they lack the wealth, influence and status to take advantage of new opportunities which come up in their regions. The publication adds that state development agencies have not been able to address the real problems being experienced by pastoralists which have further compounded the problem. Since the numbers of economic activities which can be conducted in the pastoralist regions are limited, it is essential for the pastoralists to diversify their animal rearing practices and keep animals which bring them the greatest returns while utilizing minimal resources. For instance, the Guardian (2011) reports that there is an increasing demand for camels in Ethiopia. Pastoralism is a major income earner in the country and contributes to more than 16% of the GDP. Camels are also tolerant to harsh climatic conditions and therefore they can survive better in these arid and semi-arid regions.

2.1.1 Pastoralism as a Cause of Conflict

Communities living in these regions lack information on how they can diversify their income streams. They have been left to depend on the rearing of animals such as cattle, sheep and goats which are less tolerant to harsh climatic conditions. These animals force them to struggle for the limited resources among each other which cause a lot of conflicts. Educating these pastoralist communities on how they can diversify their income streams and develop other niche markets can help in the eradication of the constant conflicts experienced in the regions. Pastoralist communities practice a different kind of lifestyle. Their language is different and due to their remote location, they are not usually informed on the activities which take part in the greater part of the country. They are largely isolated and therefore their views are not usually considered during national planning.

Lewis (2011) supports these claims by stating that pastoralist communities have suffered years of neglect due to their different lifestyles. Pastoralists living in arid and semi-arid regions of Kenya cannot be ignored. These regions cover a majority of Kenya's total area. They support at least 25% of the total Kenyan population and domesticate more than 50% of all the livestock reared in the country. Pastoralism in Kenya contributes to approximately 10% of the country's GDP. Gulliver (1995) reports that Turkana County lacks any permanent river and the residents have been forced to depend on the seasonal rivers known as "lagas". Apart from the lagas, there are also boreholes which provide the communities with water.

However, the ratio of boreholes to the number of livestock reared is not balanced. Residents have to travel a distance of at least 25-40 kilometers before they can find a borehole. In such a situation, it is evident that the users of such resources are many compared to the number of resources available. In a majority of the counties found in the Northern region, the situation is similar to the one in Turkana County. These are the environments which beget violence over usage of resources. More than 80% of Kenya is arid and semi-arid. This implies that pastoralism is the economic activity that is suited to be practiced in most regions of the country.

The problem however, is that the administrators who wield the power to positively change the situation do not come from these arid and semi-arid areas and therefore the situation and grievances in these regions remain unaddressed. Leaders who come from non-arid regions form the majority of the parliament and therefore they can easily influence policy. The parliament and administration is mostly concerned with dealing with emerging issues affecting people in non-arid regions as compared to dealing with the perennial problem of conflicts among pastoral communities. A majority of studies indicate that the limited availability of natural resources and government neglect are the major causes of conflict in these regions. Pastoralism is an activity that is highly dependent on water.

Lewis (2011) reports that pastoralist communities use the short rains which occur during the months of October to December as times of restocking. These are usually periods when pastoralists are looking to make up for the losses incurred during the low seasons. These are the periods when cattle raids occur the most among these communities. Lewis further adds that it is during these times that most of the pastoralist communities conduct their various rites of passage. During such times, there is usually a high demand for livestock which are usually gifted and exchanged on occasions such as weddings. The non-investment of the government in pastoralism is evidenced by the few investment interventions in the northern regions. The government's response to disagreement issues in these regions is usually reactive, intrusive and coercive which only creates more resistance.

The major effect of lawlessness in these regions is that weapons easily exchange hands creating an atmosphere of suspicion and insecurity. The most common reactive intervention method used by the government is disarmament campaigns. This has proven to be ineffective as it only leads to the recovery of very few rifles. According to Kamenju, Mwachafi and Wairagu (2003), many of the communities feel like being disarmed would leave them

vulnerable to attacks from other communities. Pastoralists depend on their livestock to meet their subsistence needs. Over the past few decades, the pastoralist population has been on an increase yet the resources have remained limited. For instance, research indicated that a family of six to seven persons would require at least nine lactating cows in order to meet their daily subsistence needs.

In Laikipia, The growing hostility among them prevents some of them from living in harmony and sharing the resources they have access to. Other industries like education, transportation, and communication are then impacted by this. However, there hasn't been a single research done that ties the nomadic way of life. With their impressive military capability, the nomadic peoples were able to exercise their willpower on established communities, changing beliefs, practices, and societal structures. Muchiri (2015) adds that because of the importance of these groups in conflict resolution. The interaction between the traders and pastoralists was also more egalitarian at the period, encouraging commerce and contact between different groups of people for their mutual benefit. In the end, the effects will be felt both economically and culturally, setting the stage for the emergence of new social, political, and religious identities throughout the world.

2.2 Cultural Practices as Root Causes of Interethnic Clashes

Interethnic battles, which chiefly involve wandering communities, have become an incessant and vexing impediment in diverse regions. These clashes frequently originate from deep-seated sources and yield profound repercussions for the impacted communities. They are intricately tied to transnational and regional disputes, which have metamorphosed in their nature and intensity. This transformation can be ascribed to the widespread accessibility of lightweight firearms and small arms, as households within these communities endeavor to fortify their capabilities for self-protection, safeguarding, and, in some instances, domination in their ongoing pursuit of accumulating wealth from neighboring communities (Kimani, 2008).

The primary instigator for these conflicts remains the fierce competition for mastery over natural resources and access rights. In arid and semi-arid regions, where resources are inherently scarce, disputes can rapidly escalate into violent clashes. The yearning to secure land, water, and grazing areas for livestock frequently leads to confrontations, with each community striving to establish a more commanding position in these resource-rich zones.

These conflicts not only disrupt everyday life but also present significant trials to peace and stability in the impacted regions.

Furthermore, acts of banditry further exacerbate the situation. These activities are often propelled by opportunistic and well-connected individuals who exploit the dynamics of conflict. These so-called entrepreneurs profit from the illicit trade of smuggled weaponry, which is exchanged for stolen livestock. This illicit arms trade not only fuels the ongoing violence but also equips pastoralist communities with the means to intensify their clashes, perpetuating a cycle of conflict that exacerbates the already precarious situation (Goldsmith, 1997).

Many of these conflicts are closely tied to cultural practices deeply ingrained in these communities, such as cattle theft, which is sometimes conducted as a norm. The practice of raiding other communities for cattle is deeply entrenched in the traditions of these communities, making it challenging to devise effective intervention methods. The communities have come to anticipate periodic attacks from one another and have consequently implemented various security measures.

Conflicts over natural resources often occur during periods of low rainfall when multiple farmers rely on only a few boreholes and the few seasonal rivers available in the constituencies. No pastoralist desires their livestock to perish due to a lack of water, and as a result, they do everything in their power to ensure access to the available water sources.

2.3. Resources Competition as a Cause of Inter-Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnic, religious, or other group divisions frequently define current conflicts, but this is just half of the story, according to Sommers (2002). The fight for wealth and frequently the struggle for power and influence are the primary reasons. Many or maybe most of the regions of armed conflict in Africa have certain traits. These areas simultaneously suffer different types and intensities of violence, where armed conflict starts as a small local issue that quickly gets out of hand. This shows that there are inadequate government control measures in place to stop these confrontations. Therefore, a variety of elements including religion, politics, and cultural contexts all have a role in the causes.

Intergroup conflict, according to Yamano and Peininge (2005), involves or has an impact on two or more groups. Typical examples include the conflicts between locals and foreigners in South Africa in 2008, the ethnic conflicts between the Kalenjins and the Kikuyus in Njoro,

Molo, Kuresoi, and Nakuru in Kenya in 1992, and the land disputes between the Kikuyus as "foreigners" and the Maasai, the Kalenjin, and the Samburu as "natives" in Kenya. To reclaim what the Native Americans thought was theirs in the first place was at the heart of the disputes. This alone provided evidence that the several contradictory aims were governed by politics of hatred and insincerity.

The end of the cold war in 1990 marked a great paradigm shift in power politics around the globe. No longer were wars fought between states but wars were intrastate and this can be attributed to the need for governments and rebels to find sources of carrying out their military campaigns (Jean and Rufin, 1996). Movement from the common pillage and plunder diversified into the exploitation and trade in natural resources which brought the business factor and foreign corporations into the existing conflicts over the resources. Since then countries have increasingly battled over natural resources and taken an international perspective. Many experts have alluded that economic dependence and the scarcity of resources such as land or water are more likely to cause conflicts.

Conflicts involving natural resources are common in Latin America. Exports of commodities are very important to the region's economies. In contrast to the worldwide average of 22%, the exports of South and Central America in 2022 accounted for 40% of fuels and mining goods. The commodities boom during the previous ten years corresponded with an increase in disputes over natural resources in Latin America, some of which escalated to violence, according to Viyera et al. (2014). Peru is a country rich in minerals and hydrocarbons, these minerals have caused tension between the government who want to exploit the minerals and the local community whose main concern is environmental and social degradation on their land, (Viscidi, and Fargo, 2015). In a report in the Reporte de Conflictos Sociales (2015) it is acknowledged that protests hit Peru and resulted in violence over natural resources and over 200 conflicts in Peru were based on mining and energy projects.

2.3.1. Natural Resource Conflicts, and Socioeconomic Impacts

Natural resources in Africa have been demonstrated to be a significant factor in the hostilities that have afflicted a number of African nations over the past few decades, both inciting and igniting armed conflict. The income generated from the exploitation of natural resources is used by a variety of groups, including the ruling elite and associates like private sector companies and multinational corporations, for personal enrichment and gaining political support in addition to funding armies (United Nations Expert Group, 2006). As a result of the

leaders of the armed groups and other interested parties' refusal to cede control of these resources, this has turned into a barrier to peace. Due to Sudan's civil strife, the country's oil reserves have garnered attention internationally. The majority of oil reserves are discovered in the south, which has been at odds with the northern-dominated administration, despite the fact that the initial discovery was made in western Sudan.

Menkhaus (2005) said that the region's rising violence is partly a result of the people's declining economic chances. The primary source of revenue for pastoral communities is animal husbandry. According to Kumssa et al. (2009), violence among these tribes has been exacerbated by rivalry for and access to natural resources like pasture and water. Inappropriate borehole location, rising human and animal herd numbers, and severe overgrazing in some regions are all contributing factors to the environment's deterioration. Climate change and resource degradation have an impact on how pastoral nomadic cultures move in search of pasture for their animals. The resulting scarcity of resources such as waterholes, pasture has often caused conflict between neighboring communities. According to Okumu (2009) trans-border conflict among pastoralists are common along the Kenya-Ethiopia border, Kenya-Uganda border and Kenya-Sudan border. The porous borders have allowed the ease of access to illegal firearms thus worsening the conflict in each country.

The struggle for the available resources is to blame for the violent clashes between the pastoral groups of Turkana, Samburu, and Pokot. According to the research that is currently accessible, the resources in concern include the decreasing availability of pasture and water. The East African villages who raise cattle in competition for water and pastures have seen an increase in violence as a result. In times of drought, the herders are compelled to move to new locations in search of pastures for their sheep, where they must contend with rival herders for the same pastures. Shared grazing pastures like Lonyeki, Amaya, and Kurkur have been designated "no man's land" because of their propensity to become rifts and high conflict rates (Leff, 2009)

Conflicts occur when environmental management and conservation strategies are not developed holistically to combine conservation with human demands (Alida and Salome, 2009). As a result, environmental conflicts can vary from intrapersonal to inter-personal to inter-state conflicts and are indications of the interconnectedness among environmental components (Alida and Salome, 2009). Every living thing is tied to nature on all scales, small and large. Thus, disputes develop locally when environmental concerns are minimal or

nonexistent, posing a threat to local, regional, national, and worldwide security. Conflicts involving people and animals or any other part of biodiversity are among the major forms of conflict, according to Bob (2010) (White et al., 2009). Conflicts over the preservation of protected areas, patenting rights, and indigenous knowledge pertaining to natural resources are a few of them. Water and land (pasture) are two of the most important natural resources in the Tana Delta region. Conflicts typically occur from interactions between people and their environment, relationships (gender), and problems with wetland accessibility rules (Kok, 2009).

Whatever the reasons for the conflicts between farmers and herders, it is clear that the conflicts have had a significant detrimental impact on their ability to make a living. These range from physical (such as home/farm destruction, bodily injury, or death of family members) to socio-psychological (such as emotional exhaustion, job dissatisfaction), to ecological (such as land degradation, salinization of water, and habitat fragmentation) and economic (such as loss of income/resources/yield). The interplay of different stakeholders in resource-based consumption effects on their livelihood strategies is evident in the discussion that has just been presented. Conflicts have a direct effect on people's quality of life by causing deaths, injuries, and relocation. Homes, educational facilities, lands, crops, and cattle are important resources that can be damaged or stolen. The loss of access to jobs, markets, farms, or traditional grazing pastures as a result of restrictions on people's movement are only a few examples of the indirect effects on people's quality of life (Solagberu, 2012). Another is the devastation of fundamental services and governance systems.

Disrupting the socioeconomic existence of local human populations who are directly dependent on natural resources for survival is one noticeable impact of environmental degradation on social existence (Onuoha, 2008). Environmental deterioration raises the chance of violent conflicts by making it harder to get basic requirements like food and water (Onuoha, 2008). According to the Southern African Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, there is a bidirectional causal relationship between social conflict and ecological stress that may both cause and be caused by the latter (Biggs et al., 2004). The authors' arguments have demonstrated how institutional policies for resource utilization have an impact on how local communities live. The results of this study are crucial in demonstrating how Tana Delta local communities' quality of life has been impacted by institutional systems for resource management.

Over the past 50 years, freshwater impoundment and abstraction from river systems for use in power production and agricultural irrigation have generated significant economic advantages on a worldwide scale. According to the World Commission on Dams (2000), however, the environmental and social costs of major dams have been inadequately taken into account economically, making it difficult to do a comprehensive long-term cost/benefit analysis to ascertain the actual profitability of these plans. However, they frequently change seasonal flooding, which is essential to the survival of floodplain agriculture, fisheries, pastures, and forests, especially downstream. For instance, the construction of big dams has considerably decreased the threat of damage from catastrophic flood occurrences.

2.4. Political and Economic Marginalization

Since the end of colonialism, pastoralist groups in Kenya have been neglected. Through the creation of range lands and the fencing off of wildlife conservancies, they lost substantial portions of their communal territory to the white colonial immigrants. Political representation is built on complex connections and the political leadership balancing personal interests. Due to the challenging environmental circumstances, government assistance and presence have been pitiful. The repeated catastrophes and drought have drawn a lot of help from international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO's), which act on humanitarian grounds, to this depressing support (Raleigh, 2012). According to Ruto, Ongwenyi, and Mugo (2009), political marginalization problems in these constituencies date back to the colonial era, when the colonial authority ignored their problems since pastoralists were thought to be land-spreading wasteful people.

2.4.1 Political Marginalization

The pastoralist groups' periodic abandonment of vast swathes of land did not sit well with the British colonists. They shifted their assistance to the localities engaged in agricultural agriculture. Following independence, the new local authorities maintained the political structure that had been established by their former white overlords. This led to a pattern of neglect that has been hard to break. The majority of government initiatives are designed to address the requirements of sedentary communities. The government has made repeated attempts to encourage residents of these settlements to engage in agricultural farming, but it ignores the reality that these areas can only sustain livestock husbandry. Governmental marginalization of politics is not the main source of it. It has also been demonstrated that the practice is sustained by powerful pastoralist communities. Some groups' sense of entitlement,

when they believe they have a right to use certain natural resources exclusively, is a manifestation of marginalization.

Conflicts between the Turkana and the Pokot for land and other natural resources have been documented by Koskei and Netya (2014) in the region between Lodwar and Kainuk. The Turkel River, which runs through the region, provides ample grazing. The Turkana, according to the Pokot, allegedly unfairly annexed the territory with the assistance of its political leaders. The majority of conflicts that occur in these areas are the result of insufficient resource distribution as well as the weak borders and demarcations that were established during the colonial era. Marginalization may be both visible and actual. However, regardless of how it manifests, it has the potential to damage any society's sociocultural fabric. Communities in the north have frequently voiced their displeasure with how the central government manages its affairs.

The response of the government to these people's concerns has remained forceful and reactive. There is no substantial or genuine interest in their circumstance. For instance, the pastoralist communities have relatively low levels of schooling. This has been the situation ever since the colonial period. All the governments which have been in office have not made attempts of ensuring that the pastoralist communities have sustainable food produces. The communities have been forced to rely on aid from non-governmental organizations. The lack of various industries in the region has forced the communities to rely on products which come from regions as far as Nairobi. This has in turn made the costs of living to be extremely high.

According to Zupanov and his co-authors, politicians who seek to exploit and/or incite ethnic or national hatred are in charge of media production, which is overseen and directed by politicians with a history of promoting hatred. This, in turn, incites national intolerance and hatred among the populace, which then leads to violence (Zupanov et al. 1996). Therefore, the manipulation of ethnic sentiments by politicians results in certain behaviors like intolerance. According to Brunner, if political leaders, whether new or old, lack the necessary political responsibility and do not resist the temptation to divert attention from the serious socio-economic issues by inventing national concepts of enemies, the disposition towards national ethnic intolerance may be strengthened.(Brunner 1996).

The politicization of Hutu ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi, which began with an anti-Tutsi movement in the early 1950s and culminated in the so-called Hutu revolution of 1959, was

largely caused by the problem of bad governance as manifested in the colonial authorities' preferential treatment of the Tutsi. This revolution was preceded by extensive propaganda against the Tutsi, which was led by political elites who were positioning themselves to take power (Odinga 2007).

Ethnic conflicts also defined socio-political interactions in the adjacent Democratic Republic of the Congo, previously Zaire, particularly in the latter stages of colonialism. The goal of politicking ethnicity had already been attained by the time of independence. During the DRC's transition to independence, ethnicity was politicized. The politics of ethnicity would lead to the creation of ethnic political parties by the several ethnic groups (the Bakongo, the Luba-Kasai, etc.), some of which had been supported by the old colonial rulers on the cusp of independence. These political forms are what would bring strife into the Congo's political system (Crawford & Lipschutz 1998).

Kenyans fought for the goals of releasing the nation from colonial authority through their regional parties. The Kenya African Nation Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), two political parties in Kenya that advocated for independence, were established in opposition to the colonial practice of only recognizing district parties, the majority of which were ethnic coalitions. The majority of the time, an ethnic group and the district were congruent, leading to the development of ethnic parties between 1955 and 1959. These included organizations like the Maasai United Front, the Kalenjin Alliance, and the Abaluhya Political Union. District political organizations amalgamated and either joined KANU or KADU once the territorial associations' restriction was abolished. KADU focused around the minority ethnic groups, mostly headquartered in the Rift Valley (the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu), but also including the Luhya of Western Kenya and the Coastal ethnic groups, whilst KANU revolved around the majority ethnic groups (the Luo and Kikuyu) (Odinga 2007).

As a result, poisonous and unfavorable ethnic politics have emerged. In Kenya, politics is what drives conflict, with elections serving as a major catalyst. The most recent instance is the bloody ethnic violence in the Tana River Delta, which has claimed more than 140 lives since August 2012, most of them women and children. Incitement is alleged against MPs. According to a UNDP analysis that maps conflict in Kenya, many individuals believe that politics is the biggest cause of conflict (UNDP 2022).

Here, the term "historical economic injustice" is used in a narrower meaning to describe requests made by victims for the accused offenders to acknowledge their own conduct of grave injustices. Historical injustices are typically perceived as affecting entire people, be they foreign or oppressed minorities. They are distinct from individual incidents and go beyond them; they involve groups of people who have been murdered, left out, and the target of prejudice by others who have benefited from their oppression and privilege. Most often, rectifying such crimes has not been a political priority, leading ethnic communities to continuously call for reparations, restitutions, and apologies (Roht-Arriaza 1995). The majority of historical injustice accusations are related to abuses committed against indigenous peoples.

2.4.2 Economic Marginalization

Kenya's economic issues are centered on land disputes that date back to colonial land laws and practices that caused groups to lose their right to inherit their property. Upon achieving independence, these complaints were not resolved (KLA 2004). The squatter issue, which is a direct result of colonial land policy and legislation, is how the injustices appear. Injustices related to displacement brought on by politically motivated Land Clashes in the 1990s must also be addressed in order to decrease ethnic hostilities. Due to European settlers' property purchase, which resulted in the eviction of whole tribes from their ancestral lands, there are still certain communities that have lingering claims to certain pieces of land. After the country gained its independence, the disputed lands were either still owned by the original inhabitants or were bought by other populations.

Violence has been perpetrated in Laikipia by politicians and municipal authorities. They have used delicate subjects like the land dispute and the exclusion felt by some ethnic groups during the post-election unrest and other times of increased political tension to incite violence (Wepundi et al 2012). The analysis of political effect on ethnic conflicts at the local level, like Laikipia, is scarce in literature. In order to give practitioners at the national level particular lessons, this research will aim to provide an in-depth investigation of politics and ethnic conflicts at the grassroots level.

2.5 Land as a Cause of Conflict

Human activities has significantly changed a significant section of the planet's land area during the past several decades. Large-scale forest clearing, city growth, and agricultural development and intensification are all results of the increasing need for food, water, and

shelter from the planet's population. To meet the needs of the expanding population by 2050, a moderate scenario calls for a 30% to 80% increase in produce (Van der Esch et al., 2017). The biophysical parameters and geographic distribution of the land that is suitable for agricultural operations are also anticipated to change as a result of land degradation and climate change. Diverging land uses are therefore anticipated to fight more fiercely for the limited land in the future (Lambin & Meyfroidt 2011).

2.5.1 Global Perspective: Land as a Cause of Conflict

Due to the limited amount of land that is accessible, the rising demand for various land use types cannot always be satisfied. The potential of increased competition over land is causing global stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations, the United Nations (UN), and national governments, growing amounts of anxiety (United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2018). (Global Land Tool Network & Land and Conflict Coalition, 2017; Ide 2015; Kalabamu, 2019) Land is frequently shown to be a factor in conflict, ranging from land conflicts that cause a larger conflict to competition over land obstructing stabilization and recovery efforts following violent conflict (United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2018). The academic discussion on the connection between climate change, resource scarcity, and violent conflict has been expanded to include land degradation and the lack of arable land in the scientific literature (Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016). Academic studies have more recently concentrated on the impact of economic globalization and the involvement of multinational agribusinesses in significant land purchases (LSLAs) (Hunsberger et al., 2015).

Land conflicts are an issue that has been bewildering nations for centuries. “Countries and communities have been embroiled in land conflicts that are impacting on peaceful coexistence. In Columbia, LeGrand, Isschot, & Riaño-Alcalá., (2017) reported that Due to widespread practices of dispossession, conflicts between peasants and cattle ranchers, and, more recently, mining companies and agribusinesses, Colombians continue to endure great inequality in terms of their access to land and their level of financial stability. In its development plans and strategies, the central government has demonstrated a bias against small producers and in favor of large landowners. According to Southeast Asian researchers Almeida and Wassel (2016), dispossession and land-related violence are two slumbering giants that pose a danger to Timor-Leste's security and stability. Due to the tough post-colonial and post-conflict history of the nation, the new Timorese administration had a number of land-related difficulties to deal with when the country gained independence.

2.5.2 African Perspective: Land as a Cause of Conflict

Land conflict is not a new phenomenon in Sub Sahara Africa, where local land conflict can escalate into civil wars (Onguny & Taylor 2019). Land conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa has been attributed to poor historical land management, population increase, urbanization and agricultural commercialization (Takashi & Klaus, 2005). Top military leaders, governors, paramount chiefs, and village chiefs in South Sudan have been implicated in documented incidences of land snatching, according to Turyamureeba (2017). These individuals often collaborate and covertly sell community-owned land without the community's approval. This leads to ongoing land disputes between the community and the lessee, who is typically a multinational agricultural enterprise. Traditional authorities "no longer have the authority and influence that they used to exercise to resolve land disputes and hold land-grabbers accountable in Uganda," according to a research by Mwesigye and Matsumoto (2016).

Generally speaking, a land grab is a type of corruption that involves the erroneous distribution of public funds. Although the actual applications of this treaty have not yet been established, several African nations have been making greater attempts to alter their land laws and practices. For instance, over the past ten years, the land policies of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Nigeria have seen major changes (Boone 2017; Fenske 2011; Pritchard 2016). Also under pressure to rethink their land laws are southern African nations like Zimbabwe, South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. Some of these nations have adopted anti-settler narratives (Kalabamu 2019). In contrast, it is thought that most talks over land laws in several East African nations, like Kenya and Ethiopia, are motivated by political opportunism, "land grabs," and investor-led large-scale land purchase initiatives (Klaus, 2017).

Some people have cautioned against the dangers of not taking into account a context-specific approach to land governance regimes due to the growing contradictions connected with uniform land policies. Researchers like Deininger, Hilhorst, and Songwe (2014) conducted a comparative study in ten African countries using the Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF), demonstrating that "despite the importance of land governance for Africa's agricultural and broader development being long recognized, the extent to which it was reflected in country strategies, effectively addressed by specific programs, or monitored over time was limited." Other studies, however, have demonstrated that the existing systems of power have not been able to properly identify who is a member of, or who claims to be a member of, these regions (Rutherford 2017). This is especially true given that land

governance in Africa's peri-urban areas is "shaped by divergent or complementary roles of actors emanating from their authority, power, and interest which create a complex relationship affecting land governance process," as Nuhu (2019) points out. This is attributable to the increase of third-party entities challenging the state's monopoly on land control (Gwaleba and Masum 2018).

Potential causes for the land conflicts in Africa have been suggested along a number of different lines of investigation. One of these explanations emphasizes pre-independence (re)distributive land policy and links land issues to colonial legacies (Austin 2010; Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001). The main claim made here is that land disputes in Africa are mostly still a result of the restructuring procedures that went along with the social, political, and economic policies, which place a strong emphasis on land governance.

The continuous use of state borders established by colonial conquerors as a means of administering regions without taking into consideration pre-existing land traditions is a prime example of this (Boone 2012; Klaus 2017). Yamano and Deininger (2005) note that "in many African countries, formal institutions for land administration were often simply superimposed on traditional structures without a clear delineation of responsibilities and competencies, implying that they lack both outreach and social legitimacy." This observation is in line with this point of view. In essence, it is thought that these behaviors restricted communities to particular regions (Khadiagala, 2010). Of fact, others have argued that political structure in Africa, such as kingdoms, had an impact on many types of political violence prior to colonial rule and that "Africa's history does not begin with colonialism and its legacy" (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). Land conflicts predated colonial occupation, therefore understanding the precise causes of the current land issues necessitates a detailed investigation of regional contexts and changes in property rights that occurred throughout colonization (Keller 2014).

Other research on land disputes in Africa has focused on the politics of resource extraction and unequal rent distribution between the elite and common people (Janus 2012). These analyses are predicated on the premise that a small group of corrupt rent-seeking elites control a significant portion of who receives the majority of natural resource revenues (Boone 1990; Ovadia 2022). According to Rigon (2014), this hierarchy-based connection between elites and citizens is built on duality and operates as a vertical-dependence structure. As a result, citizens lack the authority to challenge the inequities in the distribution of natural resources. These arguments, which mostly follow the "resource trap" and "resource curse"

theories, demonstrate links between the availability of natural resources and the risk of violent land conflicts (Carmignani & Chowdhury 2010; Frynas, Wood, and Hinks 2017). These theories argue that violence is more likely to occur among those who have less access to or more to benefit from such resources, whilst the elites preserve the domination of natural resources under their hands to maintain power.

To highlight the cultural aspects of conflict and how they affect people's identities and sense of belonging with regard to land use, access, or ownership, more and more academics are turning their focus to the "sons of the soil" literature (Boone 2017; Mitchell 2018). Here, land is negotiated as a kind of identity that is similar to contemporary notions of citizenship and frequently linked to family trees (Keller, 2014). The historical value of land and how it is assigned to people who are born into a common society have an emotional meaning (Lonsdale 2008; Boone 2012; Mitchell 2018). People become outraged when the identity of that common community's land, autonomy, and/or security is threatened—whether through land grabbing, climate change, political takeover etc. (Boone 1990; Klopp 2000; Dunn 2009).

2.5.3 Kenyan Perspective: Land as a Cause of Conflict

In Kenya, land policy reforms were witnessed by the adoption of the national land policy provided in the 2010 Constitution, Land Act 2012 and National Land Commission Act 2012. However long-term land policy strategies could result to further conflict and could pre-empt possible threats to national and global security (Lemarkoko, 2011). Land policy reforms have equally failed to meet the public's expectations and governments' targets and thus resulting to more land related conflicts (Adeoye & Henry, 2019). Land reforms have been defined as redistribution of land property rights for the benefit of those that do not own land yet mostly the farm's labourers and tenants (Peters, 2016). Land reforms in Africa have been characterized on economic, political, equity, justice considerations as well as regime populism. Land reforms centers mostly on land use, ownership and access. Despite the reforms, there is consistence prevalence of land related conflicts in Africa where land arrangements are still engrossed in contradictions and complexities that affect sustainable land utilization and development in Africa (Adeoye & Henry 2019).

Locally in Kenya, past injustices over land are the major causes of disputes and ethnic tension. The issue of land conflicts has been thriving from precolonial era to post-colonial era. Land related conflicts in Kenya has doted the history of Kenya from the precolonial

period to the post-colonial period. In 1963, Kenya, a British colony, gained independence. According to British citizens, the majority of indigenous Africans maintain African customary tenure agreements, which are incompatible with practices of development and global modernity. By effectively designating all land as Crown land, the British were able to abolish the conventional land tenure system. African resentment of the white immigrants and landlessness were all consequences of the British colonial land tenure system (Mutava 2016). The colonial government established two distinct systems of land tenure: one based on English property law and applicable to high potential regions, and another using an outdated system of traditional property law and applied to marginal or low productivity areas. The Administrators created land rules that completely ignored Africa's traditional reserves and favored highly productive regions. Due to the Africans' hunger for their land, this condition was a prescription for confrontations that eventually led to the battle for independence (Kairu & Maneno 2015).

A study done in Kenya by Langat et al (2016) on the role of Mau Forest resource to local livelihood elaborated the importance of forests were threatened by unsustainable use of land leading to degradation and bio diversity loss which affected the livelihood of the community. The study also noted that the communities around Mau Forest were dependent on the forest for socio economic development and sustained their activities such as livestock keeping/ bee keeping and sale of firewood, timber and herbal medicine from the environs. The study was able to bring to the fore the impact of land use on the livelihood of the community around the Mau Forest.

Mwangi and Feger (2016) conducted a study to establish the effect of land use change within upper Mara River. The findings of the research showed that land use was the main factor driving climate change; with climate change reciprocating and putting more pressure on the economy of the local people by limiting land viability and productivity. According to the findings of the study, diversifying land use has alleviated the conflict on two fronts; the first perspective entails enabling people use the same piece of land for diversified uses that earn higher income than in the case where the land is merely put to one use such as agriculture. The second perspective is that diversifying land use makes the people less worried about the impacts of climate on the viability of their land. The study brought to the fore the contribution of diversifying land use leads to reducing conflicts worry about impact of climate change.

Since independence, conflicts over pasture and wells have become common in Northern Kenya. This is because the government removed the old colonial clan boundaries for rangeland, ushering in a period of ambiguous tenure on land that is officially government trust land and thus open to everyone's use, but is informally perceived to "belong" to one clan or another. According to one observer, "the breakdown of old ways and the lack of clarity surrounding contemporary land tenure systems has resulted in large clans trying to expand their land by terrorizing and attacking their weaker neighbors (Abdi, 1997). By smaller "indigene" clans trying to defend their land rights against stronger arrivals or by dominant clans trying to institutionalize their claim to the land and secure their win, this uncertainty has contributed to the abuse of some areas as zones of ethnic exclusion. It can and does result in localized ethnic cleansing in any scenario. Conflict over rangeland has been made worse by the fact that some Kenyan Somali clans have considerably expanded their numbers and armament as a result of refugee flows from Somalia since 1991.

There is a substantial body of literature from many disciplines that attempts to explain land issues in Africa more broadly, regardless of whether they are seen as issues of belonging, rent collection, or rights. However, there are a number of reasons why Kenyan land politics are particularly interesting. As correctly noted by Boone (2012), unlike land politics in many African nations, which frequently revolve around the use and abuse of purportedly customary power... The main land conflicts in much of Kenya center on how the central state's authority to distribute land has been exploited. This rationale guides the study and discussion of the leading scholarly narratives on land claims in Kenya and how they approach land conflict in the current paper. The goal is to grasp the major points of contention about land dispute and to identify the key players in this conflict. This literature assessment is a component of a broader project that aims to provide a thorough typology of frameworks for ethnic violence and land dispute in Kenya.

The colonial legacy is one of the main causes of land-related complaints, according to the literature on land conflict in Kenya. In addition to changing land tenure systems, colonists' preference for giving some African ethnic groups more advantages, such as land rights, laid the groundwork for land-related violence in places like Kenya's Rift Valley and Central Region (Boone 2011; Mbah 2016). According to Haugerud, "the initial phase of defining and adjudicating clan and individual rights, particular parcels of land, [during colonization] involved both clan elders and appointed officials, such as assistant chiefs and chiefs" (Haugerud 1989: 63). Berman (1990) notes that chiefs were "created" in regions where there

were no existing chiefs to aid in territory governance. These agreements had a significant influence on the delineation of territorial boundaries, as well as the privileges attached to some areas relative to others (Johnson & Toft, 2014).

2.6. Global Environmental Change

The link between climate change and conflicts is indirect. The huge greenhouse gas emissions have considerably altered weather patterns contributing to natural resource scarcity through environmental degradation, deforestation, soil erosion and intensified drought. The sustained effects of recurring droughts and limited precipitation erode the foundational fabric of pastoralism (Okoth, 2006). Protracted droughts have drawn patterns of pastoral conflict in the horn of Africa involving Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia (Cliffe & White 2002). According to Haugerud, "the initial phase of defining and adjudicating clan and individual rights, particular parcels of land, [during colonization] involved both clan elders and appointed officials, such as assistant chiefs and chiefs" (Haugerud, 1989). Berman (1990) notes that chiefs were "created" in regions where there were no existing chiefs to aid in territory governance. These agreements had a significant influence on the delineation of territorial boundaries, as well as the privileges attached to some areas relative to others (Kiamba and Waris, 2022).

Human Rights Watch (2014) reported that global changes in the environment which continue to be experienced threatens the ability of the pastoralist communities in attaining food, water and security. The deterioration of the global environment due to pollution interferes with the rainfall patterns in most of the arid regions which makes them even more inhabitable for the non-pastoralists. These regions do not attract many useful government personnel including police officers. This causes these regions to be underserviced in regards to security and creates an environment of weak regulatory systems. The environmental changes intensify the competition on the limited natural resources available which brings conflicts in some instances.

Conflicts over land in Kenya are frequently explained by environmental issues. Environmental stories involving land disputes are typically featured in the literature on conservation (Agrawal 2005; Brown, Hammill, and McLeman 2007). Environmental justifications for land disputes are based on the increased challenges for food and water security brought on by climatically unpredictable weather. For example, in Tana River County, the agro-pastoralist tribes like the Pokomo are perceived as competing with the

nomadic livelihoods of pastoralist communities like the Orma, especially during times of hunger and drought (Bond 2014).

Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that climate-induced animal movement and human mobility increase conflict between transhumant, sedentary, and nomadic living patterns. According to recent research on the links between climate change and land use conflict in Kenya, rural communities with severe rainfall deficits are more likely to experience violent crime (Linke et al., 2018). Such studies have concluded that "while environmental change and rainfall shortages represent a stress for many households' livelihoods, certain regulations may ameliorate these difficulties" by connecting land conflict with both the needs of agriculture and resource shortages. In summary, these studies show how environmental conditions and an uneven system of property rights both serve to increase conflicts over scarce resources, notably land.

Additionally, migration and mobility patterns, whether rural-rural or rural-urban, which affect the dynamics of ongoing disputes over finite resources like land, have been linked to land conflicts in Kenya (Mwita 2017). Although migrations are not only driven by climate change, it is also true that when populations move to new areas, overcrowding occurs and has the potential to exacerbate already-present socio-economic conflicts both within and across communities (Abuodha 2002). Van Baalen and Mobjörk state in their writing about migrations and the shifting pastoral mobility patterns in East Africa that "resource-dependent populations frequently respond by migrating to areas where resources are available or where there are alternative livelihoods, such as urban areas... Where environmental change disrupts the viability of long-established mobility patterns of permanent migrants, such as livestock herders, it also has an impact on their livelihoods and travels (van Baalen and Mobjörk 2018).

Climate-induced scarcity of land and water in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), comprising 85 percent of land area in the country, with pastoralism as the main livelihood (Government of Kenya 2015), has been argued to be connected with small-scale violent conflicts. Prominent examples include violence between groups such as Samburu and Pokot, and Turkana and Pokot, (Greiner 2012; Ide et al. 2014), with possible spillover effects across administrative boundaries. Direct and indirect effects of climate variability can play a key role here, interacting with existing socio-economic and political factors to influence risk of violence. The “spiral of violence” between Turkana and Pokot for instance, can be connected to grievances fed by experiences of marginalization and insecurities, and exacerbated by

drought, heat stress, diseases, and hunger affecting the livestock, which could even lead to their death (Scheffran et al., 2014; USAID 2018; Siedenburg 2021). Livestock deaths are both economically and culturally devastating for pastoralists, who might move in search of water, pasture, and market access to avoid losing their livestock, and come into conflict with other communities seeking the same resources (Siedenburg 2021).

Increasing frequency of droughts can not only affect livestock health, but also threaten pastoral livelihoods by allowing pastoralists less time to recover from livestock losses (Schilling et al., 2014). Contested access to scarce resources like water, pasture, and livestock, along with the availability of small arms can shape risks of insecurity and violence in the region, manifesting in the form of livestock raids carried out by male youth (Scheffran et al., 2014). For instance, in a study on Turkana County, Ember et al. (2012) find that the intensity of livestock violence is associated with periods of less than normal rainfall. The reasoning for this can be framed around desperation of groups for survival in situations of scarcity where access to resources cannot be arranged peacefully.

However, research has found that drier periods in the drylands could also potentially reduce the risk of conflict and increase the possibility of cooperation, making violent incidents like livestock raiding much less likely (Witsenburg & Adano 2009). This has been attributed to concerns around survival during harsher conditions, decline in economic value of livestock, and the realization that "fighting during a drought is suicidal'' (Eaton 2008), making times of hardship during drought-induced scarcity relatively peaceful. On the other hand, there is strong evidence for the time following wetter years to be less safe than the drier years (Theisen 2012), fueling opportunistic behavior as more time and effort can be given to strategically plan raids (Seter 2016). Hence rather than scarcity, conditions of abundance, including periods with more abundant vegetation, seem to be associated with risk of violence through higher incidence of livestock raiding (Meier et al. 2007; Witsenburg and Adano 2009).

2.7 Cattle Rustling and Banditry as Causes of Inter-Ethnic Conflicts

Cattle rustling and banditry feature prominently as causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Laikipia County. From a grievance standpoint, it was regarded as a means of expanding grazing land, replenish lost herds following harsh climatic conditions and to obtain bride wealth which is quite high in recent years and the belief among the Maasai that all cattle owned by any community must have originated from the Maasai as a community among other reasons. The

belief points out to the cultural justification of embracing cattle rustling. This was the view gradually adopted by all pastoralist communities in Laikipia County. This observation concurs with studies done by (Hendrickson et al, 1996; Mkutu, 2008).

However, interviews with administrators who have served in Laikipia County suggest that prior to 1979, cattle raids were relatively few and the cattle that were stolen were often recovered. Since 1979, however, there has been a dramatic increase in both the number of cattle stolen and the proportion unrecovered. This scenario exists because police posts do not exist in some places, while many raids take place in remote and difficult terrain and do not get known by the police. The police do little even with the stock theft report hence people rarely report to them. Since rustling is not a full time job, the arms skilled *morans* (warriors) switch into banditry. Intra-ethnic raiding became prevalent from the 1990s (Mkutu, 2008). On the greed viewpoint, the inter-ethnic conflicts stem from competition for scarce socio-economic resources between the farming and herding communities over land, pasture and water. This results into wars of subordination and hegemony as one community tries to undo the other in order to control prime resources.

Cattle rustling and banditry is at this level motivated by economic greed and accumulation of economic wealth (Mohamud and Rutu, 2005). The main reason as to why the use of modern weaponry as opposed to traditional ones is popular in carrying out cattle rustling and banditry exemplifies the profit making motive underlying it. Security agents do not arrest these criminals for fear of reprisals; the criminals sell their loot in open field markets, with impunity. The reluctance to break a profit chain is indeed the real reason for this laissez-faire (Mohamud and Rutu, 2005; Markakis, 1999 and Mburu, 1999). This means that cattle's rustling is today an economic activity where some security agents are likely to be collaborators. Cattle rustlers and bandits are always well organized under the cover of darkness. The *morans* execute the raids. These attackers smear their faces with clay during the day to conceal their identity (Akiwumi, 1999).

The cultural orientation of some pastoral communities is such that both men and women embrace cattle raiding. Among the Turkana and Samburu for instance, women who are not satisfied with their husbands raiding prowess can often be heard singing songs to allude that they are widows (Ibrahim and Jenner, 1996). Since the traditional African man is supposed to provide for his family, the complaint from the women views cattle raiding and banditry as

heroic and profitable businesses through which the man is obligated to place food on the table (Lemoosa, 1998 and Waweru, 2006).

The cultural interpretation on the mode of killing livestock thieves causes great animosity between communities in Laikipia County. Pastor John Lorioi Ole Kimiri gave the following account of confrontation between the Kikuyu and the Turkana:

> In 2008 a Turkana young man stole goats from a Kikuyu family in Gatundia area. He was caught red handed and was burnt. The Turkana family struck the Kikuyu homestead on a revenge mission after two weeks. Burning as a mode of killing is not acceptable among the Turkana, Maasai, Samburu and Kalenjin. Sixty people mostly young Kikuyu men died in this hostile encounter. If the Turkana young man had been killed through beating, it would have been okay with the Turkana.

In a similar incident of hostility between the Samburu and the Pokot, one respondent had this to say, in 2009 the Pokot killed a Samburu *moran* at Ol Mutonyi/Damu Nyekundu. The Pokot then went ahead to slaughter the head of the Samburu *moran*. Though theft of livestock is acceptable among the Samburu, the mode of killing the Samburu *moran* is culturally unacceptable. The Samburu avenged by dismembering a Pokot young man.

2.8. Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms

Respondents who accounted to 9.5% attributed the occurrence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Laikipia County to the presence of illegally owned arms. Residents of Laikipia County acquired arms only recently (Akiwumi, 1999). This was due to conflicts related to water and pasture by well-armed pastoralists who occupy all the land bordering Laikipia County. The KPR creates cartels of renting guns to perpetuate crime and inter-ethnic conflicts (Mkutu, 2008). They legitimize use of both legal and illegal arms by colluding with ethnic vigilante police to heighten inter-ethnic conflicts (Mkutu, 2008). The Greed versus Grievance Theory by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) was qualified since one hires a gun because of greed for money and possesses the same gun as a genuine grievance of self-security.

This study revealed that bandits just like cattle rustlers use sophisticated automatic weapons which overpower the rudimentary ones used by the government security agents. The government's compromised monopoly of the instruments of power and force has opened opportunities to perpetuate illegalities. More often than not, the political elite within government have used a legal process such as mopping out guns from Laikipia County in

order to politically empower certain communities. The Pokot have often failed to surrender guns when the Samburu and Turkana do so (Mkutu, 2008). The discriminated community automatically loses confidence in the state apparatus to ease tension and takes the law in their hands (Mkutu, 2007).

Some of the modern weapons used by the bandits cattle rustlers include the German made rifle called G3, Russian sniper rifles, Kalashnikov, AK-47, short guns and the American sniper rifle. All have high reliability, precision and shooting rage of hundreds of metres. In the 2008 Small Arms Survey Report (SASR), Kenya was reported to have had a considerable stockpile of weapons, 500,000 to 1,000,000 (GoK, 2008). At the same time, Kenya has a domestic capacity to produce small arms and ammunitions. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) is culprit in lending these guns (Small Arms Survey Report 2008). Studies done by Belshaw (1999) attributed increased cases of insecurity to easy access of illegal arms. Small arms and light weapons have continued to proliferate because of the fear for insecurity and the need to be well prepared during such moments.

2.9 Weak State Capacity and Resource Governance Pathway

Recently in northeastern Kenya, a region affected by drought and resource stress, there have been repeated incidents of violence on schools and teachers by Al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based militant group opposing the Somali government. In retaliation against Kenya's military deployment in 2011 to fight their insurgency in Somalia, Al-Shabaab's activities in Kenya have mainly focused on northeastern counties like Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, in addition to attacks in the capital Nairobi and a military airstrip in Lamu County. One of the most marginalized and underdeveloped parts of Kenya, there are glaring regional inequalities between the north-east and the rest of the country, captured by poor indicators of public health, education, and employment. These inequalities are deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of north-east, with their roots in policies developed during the colonial era that largely neglected this Muslim-majority region. Insecurity risks in this part have continued to persist even after Kenya's devolution, which aimed to provide greater autonomy to the county governments by distributing power and resources from Nairobi to other parts of the country (The World Bank, 2019).

By mobilizing grievances related to persisting inequalities and sense of marginalization in the region, Al-Shabaab's violent activities in the north-east have forced the Kenyan government to withdraw all non-local teachers from the affected counties, resulting in what is being

known as an “education crisis.” Effects of climate variability in this drought-prone region can exacerbate the ongoing crisis, with dire implications for security risks in the region, including livelihood and food insecurity, as it can then provide Al-Shabaab with a fertile ground to recruit discontent youth with lack of access to education and employment (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Moreover, extractive activities like oil exploration with the discovery of reserves in northwestern Kenya, mainly in Turkana and surrounding areas, can amplify already existing climate vulnerabilities and conflict risks (Schilling et al., 2015). Oil extraction in the region has been justified by the government as contributing to economic growth, facilitated by marriage of interests between local elites and external investors. But this process can have detrimental consequences for the environment and people of this region, through pollution of land and water, dumping of toxic wastes, disruption of pastoral migration routes, as well as marginalization and displacement of local populations (Mkutu and Mdee, 2020). This can in turn feed a downward “spiral of violence” and vulnerability, aggravating existing climate-related conflict dynamics between the Turkana and Pokot communities in this ASAL area harshly impacted by rainfall variability and frequent droughts (Scheffran et al., 2014). This can further amplify risks of conflict between local communities and the oil company, as expectations around employment and development remain largely unmet in a region already suffering from weak governance and lack of access to basic services and security (Schilling et al. 2015). Adequate resource governance efforts, including institutional mechanisms for land use and rights, sharing of oil revenues among different stakeholders, as well as non-violent interactions between local communities, oil company and the government would be needed to address and mitigate this vicious cycle of climate-resource-conflict nexus (Schilling et al. 2015).

2.10. Summary of Findings

The findings emphasize the convoluted network of factors that add to the many-sided nature of conflicts within Laikipia County, Kenya. Among these contributing elements, pastoralism emerges as a crucial livelihood activity in the region, with its own set of difficulties. The customary nomadic lifestyle of pastoralist communities puts them in constant competition for limited resources such as water and pasture, which often sparks disputes. These conflicts are further rooted in deep-seated cultural practices, notably cattle thievery, making them particularly challenging to deal with as they are entrenched in the traditions of these communities.

Resource rivalry, a recurring theme, arises from the scarcity of resources, especially in the arid and semi-arid regions. Communities vie for control over land, water, and grazing areas, resulting in confrontations as they strive to establish dominance in these resource-rich zones. The clashes disrupt daily life and pose substantial hurdles to peace and stability in the affected areas.

Marginalization, whether political or economic, compounds the situation. Marginalized communities frequently seek to assert their rights and gain access to resources, thus amplifying the potential for conflicts. Political marginalization becomes a driving force as communities seek better representation and a voice in resource management and decision-making processes. Economic marginalization deepens the divide as these communities face limited access to economic opportunities, further intensifying resource-related tensions.

Land disputes are also a prominent trigger of conflicts, with varying perspectives from global, African, and Kenyan contexts. The scarcity of land resources and the competition for control over them contribute significantly to the prevalence of conflicts in the region. Environmental changes, particularly during resource-scarce periods, worsen conflicts as communities grapple with the consequences of changing climatic conditions, intensifying resource-based disputes.

Cattle thievery and banditry add another layer of complexity to the conflict landscape. These practices are deeply ingrained in local customs and create an ongoing cycle of insecurity and violence. The proliferation of illegal small arms further escalates tensions by equipping pastoralist communities with the means to intensify their clashes, perpetuating a cycle of conflict.

Governance challenges, including weak state capacity and inadequate resource management, play a substantial role in exacerbating conflicts, particularly in resource-rich regions where disputes over control and access to these resources persist. In summary, these interconnected factors demonstrate that the conflicts in Laikipia County, Kenya, are not the result of a single cause but rather a complex interplay of diverse elements, each contributing to the socio-economic impacts and perpetuation of the conflicts in the region. Addressing these issues comprehensively is essential for achieving lasting peace and stability in Laikipia County.

2.11. Conclusion

Inter-ethnic between pastoralist communities in places like Laikipia County emerge from a convoluted interplay of elements, incorporating pastoralism, conflicts among ethnic communities over natural resources, political and economic exclusion, land disputes, worldwide environmental transformations, cattle thievery, the existence of illicit weaponry, and governance hurdles. Dealing with these intricate matters comprehensively is imperative to attain enduring tranquillity and steadiness in these areas.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICTS ON INSECURITY

3.0 Introduction

Conflict consequences afflict the society and impacts on lives and livelihood. The predominant consequences are negative. This sub-section attempted to explore the security implications of conflict, while relating them to Laikipia county situation. Unless the LIC is understood within the context of socio-economic, political and security perspectives, opportunities for appropriate solutions may be missed.

3.1 The Intersection of Insecurity and Resource-Based Conflicts

The word "insecurity" has myriads of connotations. It signifies danger; hazard; uncertainty; lack of protection, and lack of safety. Beland (2005) defines insecurity as the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection. It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This implies that insecurity is an absence of peace, order and security. Achumba, Ighomeroho, Akpor (2022) defines insecurity from two perspectives. Firstly, insecurity is the state of being open or subject to danger or threat of danger, where danger is the condition of being susceptible to harm or injury.

Secondly, insecurity is the state of being exposed to risk or anxiety, where anxiety is a vague unpleasant emotion that is experienced in anticipation of some misfortune. These definitions of insecurity underscore a major point that those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also vulnerable to the threats and dangers when they occur. People engaged in business activity, either directly or indirectly, to satisfy unlimited human wants. Therefore, business has become part and parcel of human existence in particular and global world in general.

United Nations Development Programme (1994) defines security as protection from hidden and hurtful disruptions in the daily activities, at homes, offices or communities etc. This implies that security borders on ensuring safety of lives and properties. Williams (2008) who sees security from the socio-political perspective opines that security involves the capacity to pursue cherished political and social ambitions. That is, security is socio-political in nature as

without security there can be no political stability and consequently social activities will be in chaos.

Conflicts over natural resources are a common global feature, often blended with ethnic, religious and tribal resentments. As explained by Klare (2002), conflicts pose a serious social threat to peace and stability in many parts of the world. Land is one of such natural resources considered the most valuable, with an ever-appreciating monetary value and the foundation of all other economic resources such as minerals. As a valuable resource, land drives conflicts globally (Sifuna, 2009). This assertion is explained by Machira (2008) that land entitlement is a major factor in ethnic, regional and international conflicts, often taking the form of local land and inter-state ownership disputes in many parts of the world.

3.2 The Far Reaching Social-Economic and Health Consequences on Inter-Ethnic Conflicts

The social consequences of the clashes in Kenya were enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these clashes were left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The immediate and real consequence of the clashes in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There was loss of security in the clash-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socioeconomic and political undertakings within the clashes areas.

A flashback on the Government figures of those who died, those who were injured and those who were displaced, reveals far much less number than the above estimates including its own in the joint report with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The clashes in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriage, family and social life. According to the field information collected in different parts of the clashes stricken areas, there were cases of breakdown of marriage and family life. Currently, inter-ethnic marriage between the Luhya (that is, especially the Bukusu) and the Sabaot, Iteso and Sabaot, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo is viewed with fear and suspicion. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes which have also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy, among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency

contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades.

As a result of the clashes, thousands of schools going children were displaced. Some dropped out due to the financial and socio-economic constraints attributed to the menace. For instance, the NCCK estimated that by 1994, over 10,000 in Trans-Nzoia District had been displaced as a result of the clashes. A similar number were out of school in Bungoma and Narok districts. This disruption of education activities was widespread in all the clashes - prone regions in Western Kenya, Rift Valley and Coast provinces. As a result of the clashes, many schools were burned down or looted in parts of Nyanza Province bordering the Rift Valley Province. The same was witnessed in Cheptais, Kibuk, Kamneru, Kaptama in Western province and Sabaoti Division in Trans-Nzoia District. In a number of cases, both students and teachers belonging to the so-called `wrong' (opposition) ethnic groups were attacked, a number of them fatally.

Both the students and teachers belonging to the `enemy' ethnic groups were forced to transfer to other schools while others abandoned schooling and teaching respectively. Some schools such as the Bishop Okoth and Holo schools near the Kisumu and Nandi district boundary were completely closed during the clashes. In all the districts within our study areas, there was a mass exodus of non-Kalenjin teachers who feared for their lives while teaching in the hostile districts. Since then, many schools have had to do without the services of experienced teaching staff and the effect of this problem on the performance of examination classes was very serious the clashes prevented some of the primary and secondary school graduates from continuing with higher education and training because of financial constraints caused by the menace. Apart from the pupils losing their text and exercise books and uniforms, they often went hungry and often fell sick because of food insecurity and poor living conditions in the makeshift camps and schools.

As a result of the clashes in Molo, over 55 primary schools in Molo South catering for over 16,500 pupils did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity. The Standard Eight pupils due to sit for their Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) fled their homes in 1993 because of insecurity caused by the violence. However, during and after the clashes, there had been a crisis in terms of identity and culture, especially for the off-springs of the ethnic groups that fought each other. As earlier recounted, several families have broken down and the children of mixed families are at crossroads in terms of ethnic and cultural identity.

Some have been forced to leave on the paternal ethnic sides, while the others live on the maternal side, depending on where the pressure is most. This trend has created a new dimension in societal lives where children (potential marriage partners) are discouraged from engaging in any affairs with the `enemy' ethnic group. This unless checked, may go a long way to affect inter-ethnic marriages and interactions.

The first-hand accounts by the clashes victims in the affected areas were extremely disturbing as far as health was concerned. The thousands of displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCCK, ActionAid Kenya and the UNDP among others. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clashes zones and had poor ventilation. The grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related diseases.

The mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard. The clashes in various parts of the country brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. In most internal refugee camps, there was inadequate room to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it was, we could expect uncontrolled, indiscriminate sexual behaviour, not only between adult men and women, but also involving sex abuse of young children, particularly girls.

3.4 Economic and Societal Ramification: Unquantifiable Consequences of Inter-Ethnic Clashes

The total economic impact of the clashes in the affected areas is literally unquantified and not easy to quantify. There was gigantic waste of human and economic resources as partly illustrated by figures in the Kiliku Report and other publications (Kiliku Report, 1992). The clashes had lasting consequences that will continue to alter Kenya's economic development for many years. One overall observation that emerges from the study of the clashes in Kenya is the fact that the economic consequences go far beyond the available statistics. Much of the

destruction worked to the economic advantage of the perpetrators of the violence and their close aides. Generally, the clashes allowed some groups of people and individuals to capitalize on the insecurity to usurp land or purchase it at throw-away prices from the victims who had no otherwise. According to this study, one of the long term economic consequences of the clashes was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence.

In a state of insecurity, as was the case in the study areas, agricultural activities were disrupted. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the clashes. In some areas of Trans Nzoia, Kericho, Nandi and Uasin Gishu districts, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked by the clashing enemies. There were other subsequent economic problems related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices and environmental destruction among others.

Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes in the study areas. There was a drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the agro-based industries such as sugar, tea, coffee, cereal (maize), pyrethrum and other agricultural crops. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief (NCCK, 1992). The output of maize and wheat experienced a drastic downfall due to the farmers' insecurity caused by the clashes. For instance, maize production for 1992 was estimated at 2.34 million tons, a 6.1% increase from the previous year, but still 390,000 tons below average. The production of wheat dropped from 195,000 to 125,000 tons from 1991 to 1992 (Reuters, 9th June, 1993). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in its 1993 Report observed that the victims of the clashes in the Rift Valley Province alone needed 7,200 tons of cereals and 1,080 tons of pulses and other food items in emergency aid for that particular year (Daily Nation 14th May, 1993 and 23rd May, 1993).

The clashes also led to the drop in milk production, particularly in the Rift Valley, which is one of the largest milk producing zones in Kenya. Although there were no reliable statistics to illustrate the drop, the figures of milk production in Molo is indicative of this falling trends. For instance, it was reported in a local newspaper that in Molo area, the milk supply had dropped from 75,000 litres per month to only 29,000 litres per month (Daily Nation, 19th June, 1993). This study revealed that many of the victims doubted the seriousness of the Government's participation in food relief and whenever it was distributed, there were instances of discrimination and corruption involving public administrators in charge. There have been disturbing mass media reports recently of land grabbing mania and general corruption in Kenya. There is nothing new in this. Land grabbing and corruption have been going on since independence, creating an explosive situation that continues to sour relations between various ethnic groups. However, during and after the clashes, land grabbing in the clashes-torn areas has become rampant at the expense of the clash victims. Now that most of the urban and rural lands have been taken, pressure is mounting on the remaining land.

After the clashes, there has increasingly been an obsession with land in this country which needs to be re-examined. Land is a thorny issue in the former clash-torn areas and unless serious attention is taken, there is every likelihood of renewed clashes. For instance, the former clash-torn 392 acre-Thessalia Holdings, also called Buru Farm, located in Kericho District is said to have attracted the attention of a senior State House official and a KANU MP who have evicted families from it. The over 600 people (approximately 150 families) displaced from their plots on the farm in December 1993, have expressed fear that the farm L.R. No.3979/2, whose ownership is under dispute, is likely to have been grabbed by the two senior government officials between January and July 1996 (The Clashes Update August 31, 1996, No.43).

Table 1: Economic Factors Results to Inter-Ethnic Conflict

Statements		Very great extent	Great extent	Minimal extent	Very Minimal extent	No extent at all	Mean
Resources that support livestock are often at the center of conflict	F	0	0	0	31	46	3.59
	%	0	0	0	40.7	59.3	
Permanent water sources are rare thus resulting to scramble of the existing ones	F	0	0	0	39	26	3.61
	%	0	0	0	50.8	33.9	
Cattle rustling and banditry have	F	0	0	0	29	48	3.47

changed from low intensity to high intensity conflict	%	0	0	0	37.3	62.7	
Flourishing arms markets from where arms find their way to enhance conflict	F	0	0	0	35	35	3.42
	%	0	0	0	45.8	45.8	
Disagreement in boundaries has led to fighting over limited resources	F	0	0	0	31	46	3.66
	%	0	0	0	40.7	59.3	

The study findings indicated resources that support livestock are often at the center of conflict (mean of 3.59) and when asked whether permanent water sources are rare thus resulting to scramble of the existing ones they agreed with a mean 3.61. When asked if cattle rustling and banditry have changed from low intensity to high intensity conflict, a mean of 3.47 were affirmative. Respondents also concurred that flourishing arms markets from where arms find their way to enhance conflict with mean of 3.42. Moreover, a mean of 3.66 affirmed that disagreement in boundaries has led to fighting over limited resources.

As a result of the clashes, the study areas experienced an abrupt drop in effective demand for manufactured goods due to lack of cash income from the agricultural sector and employed labour in the agro-based industries such as tea, coffee and maize. Subsequently, some of the clashes-prone areas experienced massive unemployment, with all the attendant social and economic consequences as the farming, industrial and distributive trade sectors were forced to lay off workers. The drop in the supply of food and raw materials for the agro-based industries necessitated costly imports of such items as sugar, maize and wheat. This in turn led to hiking and fluctuation of prices of essential commodities in the clashes-prone areas.

3.5 Political Consequences of Inter-Ethnic Clashes

Kenyans must watch out against the revival of ethnic politics as we approach the next General Elections in 1997. Over the years, Kenya has experienced the rise of ethnic tides and tensions which if left to continue may eventually turn into ethnic hatred and violence as witnessed in South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia. As in the past, there is every likelihood that the next General Elections will be decided upon not on national issues but on ethnicity. Since the 1992 General Election, there has emerged an ugly fact of politics in this country- that political parties are vehicles of ethnic sentiments and interests.

The FORD Asili is mainly composed of members from the Kikuyu ethnic community and so is the Democratic Party of Kenya, which of course has a few supporters from the Akamba, Meru and Embu ethnic communities. The other parties like PICK, KSC, SDP, KNC and even

the unregistered Safina have no national outlook in their leadership and composition. The clashes that took place in Kenya between 1991 and 1995 not only increased ethnic animosity and prejudice but also made ethnic politics a reality.

Indeed, the common ideology, especially among leaders of different political parties, is national democracy, but the practice or reality is ethnic democracy for their supporters. There is common talk that the Kikuyu `ate' during the Kenyatta era, the Kalenjin have `eaten' during the Moi era and it is the turn of other ethnic groups like the Luhya, the Luo and the Kisii to eat. In essence, the 1992 election results reflected numerous manifestations of block voting, this time closely related to ethnic nationalism, sectarianism and other forms of parochialism.

The International Commonwealth Monitors observed that as many as 1.5 million eligible voters had not been registered to vote. Indeed hundreds from the clash areas were unable to register because of the violence that prevented them from returning to their home areas. The political thuggery, police brutality and militia-style bloody clashes that rocked the nation, were seen by political analysts as potent ingredients for a national calamity. The escalation of the clashes from the Kalenjin enclaves of Trans Nzoia borders with Nyanza and Western Provinces, to the hinterlands of Kisii, Molo and Njoro in the heart of Kenya, was a manifestation that President Moi's belief that the multi-party democracy could not work in Kenya was being delivered home. On 18th March, 1992, all public rallies were banned as a prelude.

As clashes escalated in the Rift Valley and other provinces of Kenya, there were talks of bringing in the UN peace keeping troops. These troops would have been the last thing anyone wanted in a highly charged environment such as Molo, Londiani and Burnt Forest. Fortunately, a domestic alternative was sought. The Government of Kenya, in response to the deteriorating security situation in the Rift Valley, declared Molo a security operation area on 5th October, 1993 and on 6th October, the same year, the security order was extended to cover other clashes-affected areas of Burnt Forest and Londiani. The statement was very brief and decisive: "The Government today declared Molo a security operation area with immediate effect and no political parties or individuals from outside are allowed to visit or hold meetings in that area." The question that remained unanswered was whether this move by the Government was in response to the intensity of renewed clashes or a reaction to the political scenario that had come with the controversial visits to Molo by Opposition politicians like Mr. Kenneth Matiba and his old friend, Lord David Ennals of the British House of Lords and

that of Ms Kerry Kennedy, the Executive Director of the Robert Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human Rights in the United States.

During the clashes, the Judiciary was seemingly unable to punish the orchestrators of the clashes, due to its manipulation by the Executive that was largely responsible for this menace. The Government claimed that over 1000 charges had been brought for crimes relating to the ethnic violence. The figures for arrests between October 1991 and December 1992 was 1,422; Kalenjins 672, Kikuyus - 430, Luhyas - 146, Luos - 99, Tesos - 23, Kambas - 23, Kisiis - 16, Turkanas - 10 and Maasais - 3. Of these, 1,324 were charged with offences including murder, arson, robbery, unlawful meetings, inciting violence, conveying stolen goods, possession of illegal weapons and stock theft (Africa Watch's interview with Hon Amos Wako, July 12, 1993).

It was increasingly evident that most of those charged even with violent offences were out on bail. Many of the Kalenjin warlords were not arrested or charged with violence against other ethnic communities. Our study revealed that victims who reported violent incidents against them were often turned back by the police who refused to record the statements from the victims. There was partial application of the law during the clashes. Thus although the Government had difficulties in prosecuting Kalenjin warriors, it efficiently prosecuted non-Kalenjins who had acquired weapons to defend themselves after being attacked (NEMU, Courting Disaster, April 29, 1993).

3.6 Summary of Findings

Conflicts affect the economy of any group that perpetuates the vice. Living standards have drop drastically going by the present statistics as a result of prolonged and unresolved conflicts. Conflicts can also be explained by grievances or greed where there are feelings of ethnic or political marginalization as one group is disadvantaged by another in regard to accessibility to natural resources. Conflicts have always emerged from attitudes of lack of trust, self-centeredness, and selfish objectives. The conflicts have left many people homeless, disrupted educations, healthcare, destroyed infrastructures, and many people have lost their lives. This has disrupted the peace that is essential for the development and prosperity of the area thereby threatening to roll back socioeconomic developments and lead to even more conflicts.

3.7 Conclusion

Conflict-affected situations are characterized as situations that are in or have experienced severely disruptive conflict(s). Conflict-affected is not a distinction between war and peace. While there is no single clear definition of conflict-affected situations or states, they are situations where the existing problems are caused by an ongoing or very recent conflict, and/or there are existing problems that are associated with a previous conflict. The effects of conflicts can be the result of explosive conflicts that suddenly erupted or a protracted series of events.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND IMPROVING SECURITY

4.0 Introduction

Conflict management is the principle that all conflicts cannot essentially be resolved, but learning how to deal with conflicts that can decrease the chances of non-productive growth. It involves acquiring skills associated to conflict resolution, self-awareness about conflict modes, conflict skills and establishing a structure for management of conflict in environment. Conflict can be managed through force, where one party has the means and fondness to win regardless of whether the other party losses and whether or not the process of winning causes harm to personnel relationships. In some cases properties or resources to the legal system is also a form of force in that one party can use their better-quality resources to buy better advice raise the stakes.

4.1 Traditional Mechanisms: Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution

One of the recent overarching debates has been over the application and relevance of the traditional approaches to conflict management and resolution. The traditional conflict management mechanisms are referred to as those defined by Boege (2006) as those institutions and processes that developed independently in the context of pre-modern societal structures in the global south and have been practiced in that context over a considerable period of time. In other words, communities have often developed their processes for managing conflict at the local level, often based around the authority of clan leaders and exercised through traditional courts or community meetings. Within the context of this definition, some scholars argue that traditional approaches have played a remarkable role in addressing various social- and resource-related conflicts dating back to the pre-colonial stage (Adjei & Adebayo, 2014).

Apparently, development of such mechanisms and processes emanates from the truth that communities live in constant conflicts among themselves as individuals or incompatibility one group and another due to, among many other things, the of interests on the use of environmental resources (LeBillon & Duffy, 2018). In this context, the maintenance of peaceful coexistence and social harmony needed contextualised mechanisms and processes of conflict management and resolution. Boege (2006) considers them as context-specific due to

what he posits as their nature, processes and practices differing from one place to another. This situation creates a sharp contrast from the modern/western approaches, as according to him, they have been relying on adversarial systems and also operate in a standardised format across the world.

4.1.1 Functions of Traditional Mechanisms

The function of traditional conflict management can be grounded in social capital and solidarity theories. According to Ostrom and Ahn (2009), it is the societal ties and networks that bind communities together towards the pursuit of common interests. They identify key attributes in achieving this as investing in trustworthiness, functioning networking and formation of informal rules that control the group behaviours. It means that being traditional by nature, they operate within the context of socially shared values, beliefs, culture and norms that no single individual would want to be excommunicated from. These are the binding glues of the community. In this regard, traditional conflict management elders work towards the protection of this social bondage against breakage or towards the maintenance of the broken ties by individuals or groups committing acts that are against the norms, culture or attributes that establish trust or bind the community together. In a context like this, compensation for the affected can be decided on or sanctions against wrongdoers offered only to heal the affected party and maintenance of the distorted relations and not with the intention of harming the offender (Faure, 2000).

Traditional mechanisms have focused on setting rules/norms that govern the smooth utilisation of the commons resources in order to enhance sustainable utilisation on the one hand and prevent unnecessary conflicts between users (Chikaire et al., 2018; Khadiaghala & Mati, 2011). Giving an example of Nigeria, Khadiagala and Mati (2011) argue that among the applied methods are hospitality meetings where the traditional head of families, clans, communities, neighbours and/or traditional healers act as mediators in the negotiation for peaceful coexistence and reaching agreement on resource utilisation between farmers and pastoralists.

Notably, where conflicts between farmers and pastoralists erupt, with crop damage and injuries being some of the outcomes, conflicting parties are mediated and where possible compensations are awarded to the deserving party, not because of the need to punish, but to make sure that the social order and relations are maintained (Faure, 2000; Boege, 2006). Khadiagala and Mati (2011) have reported on how the Goodiya system plays a crucial role in

handling farmer-pastoralist conflicts locally through a series of local and Islamic religious doctrines. They also report on a Nigerian case where similar farmer-pastoralist conflicts have been managed by traditional mediators, who are in most cases chiefs or respected elders, while guided by the customary doctrines believed to be shared among the local communities.

In the case of punishment, a social sanction is applied to ensure that disputants comply with the decisions of the mediators in fear of being excommunicated from the social community activities or in fear of hazards that might plague the family particulars when the traditional healers and diviners are involved (Faure, 2000). Some researchers consider that traditional approaches remain relevant in the present day because they build on established cultural rules/norms which regulate the governance and utilisation of the commons such as land, water and forests to enhance sustainability but also prevent potential conflict among users (Chikaire et al., 2018).

These attributes enable the local leaders or communities to manage conflict effectively because they provide the framework within which individuals are expected to behave in order to maintain what the social capital and social solidarity theories contend to be social ties and order. In other words, traditional conflict management practices are built on the shared values, assumptions and commitments regarding equitable utilisation of the commons (land sharing), the breach of which is subject to punishment or social sanctions. The primary custodians of these rules/norms as suggested in various studies may be family heads, chiefs, a given local community or whichever has been improvised as traditional institutions concerning which level of the institution the land belongs to (Sarpong-Anane, 2014; Chikaire et al., 2018). In what can be seen as a form of traditional land-use plans aiming at coping with scarcities and conflicts, communities have been improvising their local systems that separate grazing land from farming land (Moyo et al., 2008). For instance, if a particular village consists of both pastoralists/agro-pastoralists and farmers, a particular piece of land in a particular direction would be designated for communal grazing only without allowing any farming activities.

Niamir (1991) gives a typical case of Zaghawa pastoralists in Chad where there has been a collective agreement to alter grazing between the north and south of Sahara in different seasons for the same purpose of maintaining grazing reserves. He also highlights a case where the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania possess out of the modern regulations that guide them to graze outwardly, particularly during wet seasons, while preserving conducive grazing

areas during the dry season. Although this may contribute to the lesser encroachment of the croplands and ultimately conflicts, Adams raises some questions over its effectiveness as according to his views the extraordinary vast numbers of livestock kept may affect the arrangement. In other words, there is barely any adequate literature showing the extent to which this arrangement has been successful given the overambitious urge to increase the number of herds.

This situation means that traditional mechanisms are increasingly becoming ineffective for dealing with more current circumstances and challenges (where actors are managing much larger herds over larger areas of land). Apparently, this is attributed to the nature of the traditional institutions of being built on family hoods, clan hoods, chiefdoms and community hoods-a situation implying that they are suited to the localised and small-scale conflicts (Faure, 2000). Nevertheless, this knowledge makes a positive contribution to our examination of the potential of various traditional practices in preventing potential conflict between farmers and pastoralists.

The second approach is the actual application of the community rules, norms, beliefs or values to solve the actual conflicts emanating from the actual utilisation of resources (Abe and Ouma, 2017). Regarding this, studies have shown that this often occurs when the rules governing the utilisation of the commons are violated or when there is a direct livestock-crop damage conflict (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014; Sarpong-Anane, 2014). For instance, when farmers have encroached a communally recognised grazing land or where the livestock have damaged crop fields, the disputing parties may often be called before community meetings or respective traditional authority chiefs or respected village elders where their conflicting interests will be reviewed. Involvement of the community members through meetings underpins what Faure (2000) accounts, that, by nature, these kinds of approaches aim at transparently solving the conflicts in order to win the trust and legitimacy of the community towards the maintenance of the societal order/solidarity. This step is often followed by mediated negotiations where the side found to violate the norms/order of the community become subject to sanctions or punishments that are often in the form of reparations or compensation for the damages (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014).

Although in most cases these compensations do not suffice the loss/damage incurred, the agreement is reached in a mutual consensus that ensures the continued relationship between the disputing parties (Sarpong-Anane, 2014; Akov, 2017). This is a positive move towards

sustainable peacebuilding. Most recent theorists, however, have expressed concerns about the relevance of these approaches in a situation where the nature and context of the conflicts keep on changing (Buckles and Gerett, 1999). For example, Shettima and Tar (2008) argue that the current farmer-pastoralist conflicts are caused by many structural factors including environmental changes, political exclusion, population increases and power differences among resource-user actors; a situation they believe has reduced the viability of traditional mechanisms. Instead, these mechanisms are increasingly seen as only capable of addressing petty and superficial conflicts such as those involving livestock-crop damages while not being able to address what is really behind such conflicts (Adjei and Adebayo, 2014).

In a situation that appears to have raised further scrutiny among actors is the fairness of the decisions that have been made when dealing with conflicting parties. This is due to the evidence that most of the decisions reached in, for example, crop-damage cases, have often prompted pastoralists to pay for compensation even when such damage has been prompted by the blockage of the livestock paths or expansion of crop fields into the traditional grazing areas (Shettima and Tar 2008). For example, in the case of Niger, the pastoralists need to pass through the passage on their way to river Niger especially in the dry season, but irrigated market gardening and cultivation on the banks of the river has blocked such passages‖ (Shettima and Tar, 2008). It is thus apparent that destruction of crops on one of the farms would amount to the value of compensation when the case is taken to the traditional conflict management institutions or even the formal institutions. This situation raises questions about the power of the pastoralists in the traditional conflict management on the one hand but also indicates the increased dominancy of the biased policies on agriculture that seem to have equally affected how the traditional institutions work.

4.1.2 Effectiveness of Traditional Mechanisms

Despite these criticisms, this review has a potential contribution to the understanding of how these approaches could prevent what is seen as lower-level conflicts/proximate from escalating into major and extensive ones. Using the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan as a case, Sen et al. (2014) assert that peace between the Arab-speaking pastoralists and non-Arab farmers who were involved in periodic conflicts over land, water and grazing rights was possible because of the role played by traditional authorities in the 1970s. However, it has been argued that the restructuring programmes adopted by the Sudan government after that made the traditional approaches powerless amid the newly empowered statist approaches. In other words, the literature suggests that restructuring programmes had paved the way for

liberalised land tenure rights that are recognised and protected by liberal policies and laws while undermining the role played by the traditional structures. According to Sen et al. (2014), this move has in part contributed to the escalation of the deadly farmer-pastoralist conflict, which also mutated into political and religious sentiments. Although it is difficult to establish the distinguishing line between the undermining of the traditional conflict approaches and other conflict-causing factors such as climate change, particularly in the Darfur region, this review helps us understand the contribution and weakness of traditional approaches with the view of setting out the grounds for much more relevant approaches in handling conflict involving farmers and pastoralists.

Amid the increasingly divided opinions over what causes traditional conflict management mechanisms to seem powerless, many scholars seem to point to the increasing modern resource tenure regimes and the dominance of the western property right protection systems as partly contributing factors (Tyler, 1999). Evidence shows that in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, local farmers and pastoralists have failed to protect their commons land through traditional approaches, following the registration of the grabbed lands by private firms/individuals (Homewood et al., 2004). This means that decisions made by traditional authorities are non-legally binding, therefore leaving behind looming tenure insecurities among the poor farmers and pastoralist commons land users; situations which have paved the way for the increasing scarcity, competition and ultimately conflict between them.

This is not a sufficient reason for undermining the role the customary approaches play in the peacebuilding process in conflict-prone areas as they are capable of addressing cultural sentiments associated with the conflicts at hand (Sarpong-Anane, 2014; Sen et al., 2014). For example, to make pastoralists get rid of the long-held culture of keeping large herds of cattle may need an equivalent intervention of the traditional authorities that are part and parcel of that culture. However, how this potentiality is being exploited by other mechanisms in addressing farmer pastoralist conflict is something that needs further investigation. More generally, traditional mechanisms are increasingly considered by some studies and development actors as mechanisms that are rich in several critical success factors in resource conflict management. Some of the highlighted factors include the wisdom, experience and diligence of the traditional institutions which are increasingly being perceived as core values for carrying out negotiation and mediation within the framework that guarantee consensus and continued relationship among disputants (Faure, 2000; Khadiagala and Mati, 2011).

Despite this, however, their low level of ability to address much more deep-rooted structural causes of the conflicts, as already highlighted in the previous paragraph, still raises questions among scholars. Many studies show that they are instead being linked to crop damage-related and family land conflicts, where compensation for the loss becomes the much-anticipated outcome of the conflict management process (Shettima and Tar, 2008). Nevertheless, unveiling their potential in the management of the perceived lower-level conflicts could contribute to the understating of how best they could be used to address the much more protracted farmer-pastoralist conflicts.

4.2 Collective Action Approaches

One of the pieces of available evidence in the literature signifying the collapse of traditional mediation and conciliation is the emerging attention paid to the use of the collective actions in the resource governance and management of related conflicts. Collective action approaches have their background in what Ostrom and Ahn (2009) call collective actions theories of the second and third generations that are built on the three critical attributes of the social capital theory, namely: trustworthiness, networks and formal and informal rules of institutions. The core assumption behind these theories is based on the cooperation among individuals and various networks while regulated by the self-established institutions/rules in pursuit of shared interests that could not be pursued independently by individual actors without causing conflicts with the rest of the interested actors. Collective action approaches have been considered to be the deliberate creation of institutions or mechanisms for organising and managing interests and conflicts. In most cases, they are ad hoc-based, and they differ from the traditional and state institutions in the sense that they are the integrated processes that may involve actors and processes from traditional, civil and state institutions.

Based on this assumption, many scholars who have written extensively agree that collective action approaches emerged as an alternative approach for containing resource-use conflicts (Ratner et al., 2022; Ratner et al., 2017). In other words, such conflicts need similar integrative approaches which involve a wide range of benefiting stakeholders, the success of which, however, depends on the key attribute of the social capital advanced by (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009) as trustworthiness among actors. Thus, from Fisher (2014) and Ratner et al. (2017)'s viewpoint collective actions are integrative approaches that bring together diverse stakeholders from the community, traditional institutions, government institutions, and interest groups from domestic and/or external organizations in the management of natural resources and conflict management. In his perspective, Cleaver (2012) credited these

approaches as more grassroots-focused, integrated planned approaches which bring on board the inherent social values and connectedness to form a collective action approach he calls bricolage institutions.

4.2.1 Effectiveness of Collective Actions

Collective actions have a wide range of legitimacy from the community which results from equivalent broad representation and collaboration (Ratner et al., 2017). Perhaps what differentiates it from traditional approaches is its richness in the broad representation of actors from grassroots levels, formal and informal institutions, and the applicability of the combined formal and informal rules in the pursuit of a conflict of interest, be it resource sharing or conflict management. Because of this, Buckles and Gerett (1999) view them as unique and enabling features in conflict management as they appear to be best positioned in facilitating the harmonisation of competing interests among resource-use actors. For instance, it is evident in the literature that farmers, pastoralists and conservation authorities possess varying interests when it comes to the use of land, water and forest resources.

Based on collective action theorists, therefore, the three groups may sit down, discuss and agree on the best way and rules to govern the use of the resources without jeopardising each other's interests (e.g., agree on the livestock routes, livestock drinking water points and/or adjust the boundaries of the protected land to alleviate the grazing land scarcity the pastoralists experience). Most importantly, representation and collaboration, which are critical features in collective actions, have been acknowledged by various scholars as entities comprising of multiple actors with a variety of skills, experience and expertise in negotiation but also the long-held sense of social neighbourhood and cooperation in resource governance which are vital in conflict prevention or management (Cleaver, 2012; Fisher, 2014).

A few studies have attempted to examine the usefulness of collective action approaches in resource governance and related conflict management. The first case, as reported by Cleaver (2012), involves the collective governance initiative of 5,000 hectares of the government's reserved land involving reindeer keepers and nearby settled communities in Sweden. Her account insists that in a village with a history of conflicts over property rights among different actors, the collective action approaches in managing the land resource appeared to be a suitable form of conflict management. For her what was behind this success and sustainability was the formation of bricolage institutions which borrowed principles of formal governance but, more importantly, the native cultural traditions of social togetherness,

spiritual attachment to the environmental resources and a sense of neighbourhood in the past. Atlger (2003) acknowledges that collective action has often shown positive gains in the management of natural resources many actors have an interest with, and that this has often been enabled by the social networking of local actors, civil societies and state institutions in the improvisation of rules that regulates the behaviour of actors towards the use of the resources in question. Most importantly, as Atlger further argues, collective actions enable communities to adapt to climate change, scarcity and therefore reducing the potential for the escalation of the conflict over scarce resources through collective governance and improved access. Despite the acknowledgement of these mechanisms which involve the collaboration of actors with diverse interests, there are concerns over how social inequalities (in terms of the decision-making power and actor representation) are being managed in order to achieve the desired results.

Detailing the concerns above, several scholars argue that the level of inequalities in terms of power among actors has been one of the main hindrances for the success of many collective action approaches in resource governance and conflict management. In other words, actors with more powers in terms of material possession and political representation can drag down the weaker actors in terms of decisions (Cleaver, 2012), a situation which erodes the critical pillars of the social capital (trustworthiness and meaningful networking) that are essential for any meaningful collaborative initiatives (Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). In this regard, Ostrom and Ahn (2009) continue to argue that, in typical collective action, there is a risk of a segment of actors using the social capital to collude over particular interests that benefit them at the expense of the rest of the actors, a situation which would fuel inevitable grievances and conflicts.

Other scholars argue that in certain circumstances collective actions do incite even more resource-related conflicts, particularly when they come with decisions or rules that favour the stronger party's interests while undermining those of weaker and marginalised groups (Suliman, 1999; Tyler, 1999). Suliman (1999) gives a case of the eruption of armed conflict between the Nuba farmers and Baggara Arab pastoralists in the Kordofan state of Sudan. According to his study, the conflict was incited by the government's action to back the invasion of the Nuba farmland by the Arab pastoralists and agricultural investors, while doing little to enable the opposing groups to cooperate in finding a joint and sustainable solution. Apparently, in a situation like this, collective action can be counteractive in the sense that it can facilitate the seemingly deprived groups (the marginalised pastoralists) to mobilise

themselves through their lines of identities and production systems to revolt against such bias or resort to violence as an alternative way of winning back their interests. Echoing a similar sentiment, Ostrom and Ahn (2009) iterate that, if not carefully managed, the collective undertaking can lead to grievances and conflicts when a few actors use it for their gain against the interests of the majority of the less powerful actors.

Although most studies seem to acknowledge the use of collective action theories as the most appropriate way of managing resources and conflicts, the insight into how this is being enhanced has not adequately been provided. However, referring to particular cases, Ratner et al. (2017) argue that collective action initiatives such as water user associations, community forestry organizations, and farmer cooperatives provide rules and norms to guide behaviour regarding resource access, use and benefits.

4.3 Decentralisation of Natural Resource Governance

Most scholars possess a shared view linking decentralisation of natural resource governance with effectiveness in related conflict management. Such views are based on the policy narrative that decentralisation shifts decision powers to local leaders and beneficiary groups at the grassroots level (Collins and Mitchell, 2018a). According to (Pedersen, 2012; Ratner et al., 2017), communities with such powers can make or amend rules that regulate the access and use of natural resources, and manage related conflicts in their locality without relying much on the state. Both works reiterate that, while developing countries have been decentralising such powers, they have, on the other hand, failed to disburse sufficient resources implementation to enable full (Collins et al., 2018b). This situation suggests that there are neither sufficient budget allocations nor enough empowered local leaders and community members to be able to turn paper-based decentralised authority into practical reality. Decentralisation is not embraced to enhance effective natural resource governance and management of related conflicts but to pass off budgetary costs from the central government (Ratner et al., 2017).

This implies that important decisions regarding rural land governance and conflict management are still being influenced by state/district officials in principle while, in reality, they do not accord with the underlying values and cultural dynamics of the grassroots communities (Pedersen, 2012). Regarding this, (Collins et al., 2018b) Tanzanian case observation reveals that, until recently, village leaders have been relying on directives from the district state authorities over land governance issues, sometimes contrary to what the land

acts of 1999 would require them to do. This is a clear indication of the lack of capacity or resources to get the reforms implemented according to the law. Therefore, rural farmers and pastoralists are denied sufficient opportunities to exercise powers over their culturally suited land use and control, a situation which may contribute to the perpetuation of conflict.

However, proponents of decentralisation as a tool for effective conflict management argue that, when power is sufficiently devolved, sufficient financial resources are disbursed and community members are empowered accordingly, the potential for minimisation of resource related conflict improves (Pedersen, 2012; Ratner et al., 2017). Perhaps in a stronger tone, Ratner et al., (2017) emphasise that delegation of conflict resolution authority or official recognition of the legitimacy of local institutions can similarly enable positive collective action at the local level to seek out negotiated solutions to resource conflicts. This review therefore sets ground for further enquiry on whether local leaders or community members at the grassroots level possess such authority in handling land conflict involving farmers and pastoralists.

4.4 The Policies and Programme Mechanism

Empirical evidence seems to show that government policies and programmes are essential tools for the management of natural resource conflicts (Tyler, 1999; Ratner et al., 2017; Collins et al., 2018b). Several policies have been formulated for such purposes whenever the need arises. Their purpose is to regulate how resources are being accessed, used and controlled in a bid to enhance sustainability on the one hand and prevent or reduce conflicts among users on the other hand (Castro and Nielsen, 2003), for example, in an attempt to curb the unsustainable land use and conflicts among actors (Fratkin, 1997; Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2022; Fratkin, 2014). The main focus as further iterated by these scholars was on the development of the rangelands and livestock infrastructures such as roads and water dams in order to curtail the unrestricted use of the commons resources/mobility and also to indirectly prevent the pastoralists from maintaining the large size of the herds. Pavanello and Scott-Villiers (2022) emphasise furthermore that with such policies as above in place, the land degradation and potential desertification would be controlled.

Subsequently, because of this, the scarcity of the natural resources would be controlled; a situation which seems to be an essential step in preventing competition and potential conflict with other natural resource users, particularly the subsistence farmers. Equally, in countries like Tanzania, several policies have been formulated aiming at maintaining sustainable land

use and curb land-related conflicts among actors including farmers and pastoralists. Examples of these policies include the Land Policy of 1997 (URT 1997; Shivji 1998) and the national livestock policy (URT, 2006), and the decentralisation policies empowering those at local authority level to be able to govern the land and manage related conflicts (Pedersen, 2016).

While there may be no doubt about their contribution to prevention and reduction of resource-related conflicts, concerns have been raised as to their potential to exacerbate more conflicts or revive the dormant ones (Tyler, 1999; Castro and Nielsen, 2003). Tyler suggested that one factor leading to this counterproductive behaviour is the unilateral process that ignores the broader involvement of farmers' and pastoralists' interests. He argues that the government and its technocrats assume they have all the information about the local situation for particular policy changes while in reality, people at the receiving end are not thoroughly involved. This viewpoint is evidenced by an extensive body of literature addressing how the implementation of such policies has contradicted local people's interests while proliferating conflict (Tyler, 1999; Pedersen, 2012).

However, there are cases such as demarcating lands for environmental conservation or protection of water sources where the government's unilateral actions may be justified and may receive international actors' endorsement (Tyler, 1999; Walsh, 2012). Nevertheless, despite the probable contribution of such measures to reduce water scarcity for both farmers and pastoralists in the future, legitimacy from the affected groups is still paramount to ensure sustainability. In other words, while implementing such policies, responsible institutions need to create awareness among the surrounding communities or even provide them with alternative sources such as allocation of new grazing lands or digging water dams. According to Tyler, considering and addressing alternative communities' interests improves legitimacy, which may reduce the counterproductive effects of such policies.

In contrast, the evidence shows that most implementations have been carried out unilaterally in many developing countries. For example, the action of the Tanzanian government to forcibly evict hundreds of Sukuma pastoralists and more than 300,000 livestock from Ihefu wetland in 2006, under the guise of protecting the Ruaha River and Usangu Game Reserve ecosystems, did not go by without reciprocation (Walsh, 2012). Such unprecedented eviction led to conflicts in their new destinations such as Morogoro, Lindi and Coast regions despite the seemingly good intentions of the policy. Further evidence shows that, in a situation

where policy changes aim to redress realised discrepancies and local resource users' needs and interests, the inequality gap between the marginalised and favoured groups widens (Buckles and Gerett, 1999). One of the reasons given in the literature centres around the idea that quite often policies are made in order to explicitly or implicitly favour some groups' interests while excluding those of others (Tyler, 1999).

As views from various scholars suggest, this is the source of many grievances and conflicts among actors with diverse interests, particularly when the contested resources are increasingly becoming scarce. For instance, while Tanzania's agricultural and livestock policy changes seem to aim at promoting agricultural expansion and modernised livestock keeping respectively, they have on the other hand downplayed the transhumant mode of production (URT, 1997; URT, 2006; Benjaminsen et al., 2009), a practice some scholars claim to be credible (transhumant) for the management of the commons and adaption to climate change led-scarcities (Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2022).

Although there may be some detectable levels of appreciation and most of the customarily owned land has been formalised, the truth of the matter is that the changes have led to even more conflicts, after turning land into a commercial and marketable entity (Collins et al., 2018b). Such a state of affairs jeopardises the existence of the communities' lands while subjecting farmers and pastoralists to competition for the little available land and ultimately to the violence and conflict. In Ratner et al., (2017)'s viewpoint and in what may guide the assessment of the case study, the approaches that undermine the fundamental interests of the target beneficiaries in the first place, precipitate more conflicts among diverse actors rather than help to manage them.

Although not directly related to farmer-pastoralist conflicts, some other examples may widen our understanding of the contribution of the policy changes to natural resource conflict management and the unintended consequences they may bring. In Nepal, while the government instituted policies to regulate water utilisation in a bid to avoid conflicts, the move contradicted customary water utilisation practices and interests, a situation which precipitated conflicts after failure to secure people's legitimacy (Ratner et al., 2017). Moreover, Ratner et al. argue further that, while the move to formalise land tenure in post-genocide Rwanda aimed to reduce conflict between settled communities and returnees from exile, and also improve agricultural productivity, it created grievances because of the disrupted ancestry line of tenure inheritance.

Elsewhere, in Myanmar, the move to register community-owned forests aimed at protecting them against human activities such as large-scale agricultural investments led to the deprivation of the communities' customary rights over access and use of the forest and forest products (Woods, 2010). This state of affairs led to the conflict between forest conservation authorities and the surrounding communities who are the immediate beneficiaries of the neighbouring resources. These revelations underscore previous assertions that any policy change regarding the use of particular resources has implications for the prevention or management of the farmer-pastoralist related conflicts. Perhaps what contributes to the understanding of the case being studied is how such anticipated externalities are managed in order to lead the changes to the desired outcomes – a state of peace between farmers and pastoralists.

4.5 The National Statutory and Procedural Mechanisms

As already discussed in the previous section, farmer pastoralist land conflicts are complex and multidimensional by nature (Boone, 2022b). Such complexity is believed by (Fisher, 2014) to be caused by the social, policy, political or administrative context in which the conflicts occur. Thus, while some may be easily managed through local means, or merely through negotiation and mediation, many of them according to Fisher require equivalent administrative or statutory procedures. His line of argument is centred on the claim that the governance, use and allocation of a particular resource, and land resources, in particular, is often subject to the overlapping laws or administrative procedures, management of which may require the appropriate hierarchical administrative level of a particular institution (Fisher, 2014).

These forms of conflict management are claimed to originate from the western liberal ideologies which allow standardised law procedures to decide upon who has the right and who has not (Doyle, 2012). In particular, these are government institutions such as the local government offices, land tribunals and courts accompanied by their respective law-enforcing institutions such as the local militia, the police and the prisons. In their view, (Fisher, 2014; Sarpong-Anane, 2014) characterise them as institutions which use litigation/legal procedures to get the conflict solved with little regard to the impact on the future relationship between opposing parties on the one hand, and also social cohesiveness. In most cases, decisions made by these institutions are mutually exclusive, meaning that the legal system adopted allows a clear demarcation between who has rights and who has not, while at the same time accompanied by the punishment/ sanction for the loser and reward for the winner. While

decisions based on these approaches are based on substantial evidence presented by the accuser, they still need to leave no reasonable doubt in implicating the accuser in committing a particular offence (clear legal procedures) (Fisher, 2014; Sarpong-Anane, 2014).

In this regard, there is much scepticism over the fairness of the decisions formal approaches would take when dealing with conflicts based on tenure rights in a context where the vast majority of African rural land is not registered. This scepticism is underscored by what many suggest as overreliance on the documented and statutory evidence, such as title deeds, while disregarding the fact that the vast majority of rural land is not registered (Askew et al., 2022; Peters, 2022). While it is evident that farmers and pastoralists own a significant proportion of this land through customary means (Peters, 2022), it is highly likely that a state-centric model of conflict management poses a threat to tenure rights when farmers and pastoralists try to defend themselves against any form of appropriation.

Furthermore, Askew reiterates that discrimination against and ridicule of pastoralists and other indigenous minorities by the authorities and the press is taking institutional form in legislation and judicial precedents that undermine and devalue the livelihood, human rights and economic contributions of indigenous communities who are viewed as backward by many in positions of power‖ (Askew et al., 2022). He emphasises that their lawsuits against deprivation of land rights always end up in failure and disappointment. As such, according to Askew, a sense of paranoia is created among pastoralists against demanding their rights through courts. Although courts have been credited for the protection of individual tenure rights, the current state of affairs suggests that under the current context of increasing land liberalisation it is highly likely that farmers and pastoralists will continue to lose their land before the statutory structures (Maganga et al., 2016). The result is land scarcity which culminates in competition and conflicts between the two land-user groups.

4.6 Use of Multilateral Organizations

Scholars from a variety of disciplines have been paying more attention to the role that multilateral organizations play in conflict management; some seem to be in support, while others seem to be sceptical of their accomplishments. Although they are regarded as valuable by those who are in favor of them, notably in terms of communal, financial, and technological empowerment (Fratkin, 1997; Collins et al., 2018b), those who are critical of them seem to be concerned about their sustainability due to two key factors. First, the project phase is being phased down, and participants will no longer get the direct cash incentives

they formerly did. Second, the strategies employed are top-down in nature or provide little possibility for local participation and creativity; this indicates that the project lacks a feeling of ownership since cultural components of resource utilisation are ignored. According to the literature, the World Bank, USAID, and United Nations Development are a few of the major players in various interventions aimed at resolving the land dispute between farmers and pastoralists in different nations (Fratkin, 1997; UNDPSudan, 2006; Fratkin, 2014; Collins et al., 2018b).

4.6.1 Use of International Organizations

Most of those interventions, particularly those facilitated by the World Bank, were implemented in the broader framework of the modernisation programmes launched in the 1960s, which among others focused on the displacement and resettlement of the African rural population (Thomas, 2002; Badru, 2018). For instance, Fratkin (2014) reports that as an attempt to modernise livestock keeping and curb drought-induced conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Ethiopia, the government – in collaboration with the World Bank – invested 500 million US dollars in establishing permanent water sources for pastoralists in drought-affected areas.

However, following the increasing policy focus on agriculture, pastoralists were never given priority in those areas but rather were further displaced into drought areas to pave the way for resettled agriculturalists (Thomas, 2002; Fratkin, 2014; Badru, 2018). For example, Badru (2018) has reported how the displacement of 56,000 pastoralists led to the disruption of their long-held livelihood system while causing unanticipated land pressure in their new destinations. More surprisingly, the seemingly biased approaches in addressing land conflicts have witnessed a further 3.6 million hectares in Ethiopia being put under investors' possession by 2011, often at the expense of the pastoralists' rangelands (Fratkin, 2014). However, as these arguments seem to suggest, and based on the inherent culture of pastoral mobility and the vast herds being kept, it is hard to be sure that the pastoralists would settle down just because they have a permanent water source without the guarantee of extensive pastureland.

While this has been the basis for several governments' and development partners (World Bank and USAID) led livestock empowerment programmes during both the colonial and post-colonial era in Africa, evidence shows that the impact has often not been as expected. For instance, in a bid to curb land conflicts and integrate livestock in the national economy

through commercialisation, some ranching programmes were established in Kenya and Tanzania's Maasai land in the 1960s and 1970s (Fratkin, 1997). Accompanying these programmes – as studies further suggest – were the establishment of water dams, cattle dips, slaughter hubs, butcher shops, markets, feeder roads to ease transportation and associated education programmes for sustainable resource management (Fratkin, 1997). Similar evidence indicates that, approximately 1.3 million hectares were demarcated for such programmes in Senegal where close to 4,000 beneficiaries were involved in training programmes (Fratkin, 1997). As stated above, the contribution of these programmes to anticipated reduced conflict between farmers and pastoralists has hardly been realised, probably because of some of the aspects below, among others.

Elsewhere in Africa, developmental theory perspectives continued to state that livestock mobility and consequently conflicts with other land users could be curbed through empowerment on rangeland management and livestock commercialisation programmes (Fratkin, 1997, 2014). This viewpoint means enabling pastoralists to make use of the grazing land more sustainably by adopting several recommended husbandry practices, such as farrowing some grazing areas to allow grass rejuvenation, keeping reasonably few livestock, using recommended husbandry practices, and selling in order to invest in other businesses. Emerging perspectives have suggested that such narratives became dominant in many development interventions, particularly after the emergence of Gareth Harding's the popular tragedy of commons thesis (Pavanello and Scott-Villiers, 2022).

The first aspect could be the nature of the political economy inherited by respective countries after independence. For instance, while the Word Bank and USAID's supported group ranches seemed to be relatively successful in Kenya after Maasai pastoralists' acceptance of the project, the situation was the opposite in neighbouring Tanzania (Fratkin, 1997; Homewood et al., 2004). Evidence shows that Kenya adopted a capitalist mode of economy where the privatised model of the economy was well integrated with its land policies and practices, and therefore simplified the adoption process (Van Arkadie, 2016). In other words, there was hardly any free land for the livestock as the majority of it was under private ownership, hence the introduction of group/individual ranches could, therefore, have been an opportunity for the pastoralists to own land which was increasingly becoming scarce. Whereas in Tanzania, research evidence shows that the Ujamaa policies discouraged privatisation of land and encouraged collectivised governance and utilisation of resources (Homewood et al., 2004; Lal, 2015).

Attempting to curb pastoral mobility and conflicts between farmers and pastoralists through ranches and promote commercialised livestock keeping implies going against this policy and a seemingly favouring a situation for utilising the land as a shared resource for all. In other words, studies show that pastoralist mobility in Tanzania was more guaranteed due to the ready availability of land as common property and a public entity (Fratkin, 1997). This viewpoint means that the encroachment of grazing or farming land was never halted by this programme, and conflicts have continued to escalate instead. Nevertheless, this contributes to our understanding that the effectiveness of the particular intervention is dependent on the nature of the political economy in place.

Second, it appears that the well-established infrastructures such as roads, markets and water dams became even less beneficial to the pastoral mode of economy contrary to being part of the sustainable solution. Some studies claim that these infrastructures attracted farmers and other migrants who started agricultural activities and settlement in the pastoralists' designated areas (Fratkin, 1997). While favoured by the increasing focus of the government's policies on agricultural expansion and investment, the new migrants have been purported to cause a further increase in proximity between livestock and cultivated crops on the one hand and also to further marginalisation of the pastoralists (Fratkin, 2014). These circumstances are being looked upon by many scholars as precipitators of the conflicts rather than solvers. However, still, analysing conflict management from development programmes' perspectives at this stage is very important for the understanding of how selective interventions (aimed at farmers or pastoralists alone) may fail to contribute immensely to the alleviation of the conflicts between them.

Further literature has shown that foreign interventions have also featured in the quest for land policy changes with the assumption that some of the land conflicts including those involving farmers and pastoralists could be managed through adjustment of policies; in particular, anticipated reforms aimed at protecting the security of customary tenure through amendment of the existing legislation in order to eliminate earlier reforms-led inequalities and exclusions (Boone, 2017; Collins and Mitchell, 2018a; Boone, 2019). In what has been credited as a success, the 1990s Ghana and Tanzania reforms are said to have evidenced the protection of the customary tenure rights through new land acts that give power to local authorities for control and distribution of the land according to local priorities (URT, 1999a; URT, 1999b; Collins and Mitchell, 2018a).

Most importantly, some studies stress that this seemingly decentralised land governance has contributed notably to the securitisation of the smallholder farmers' and pastoralists' land tenure through legal means and have since been perceived to reduce evictions and displacement (Boone, 2017; Collins and Mitchell, 2018a). However, some studies show that there have been increasing concerns about the evidence of increasing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in different countries despite the reforms in place. Some express their scepticism whether the associated customary land legislation, which allows land titling and registration, could reduce conflicts, as according to their views, they have instead exposed land to market predation and therefore contributed to its increasing scarcity (Boone, 2017). They argue that registration of the customary land encourages self-willing transactions because of the increased market value and legal transferability.

According to Boone (2019), agreeable land trades imply that additional village land continues to diminish as the engaged farmers look for other pieces of land to cultivate due to their growing populations. According to him, this has significantly contributed to the close closeness of these two groups, as well as their rivalry, violent encounters, and conflicts as they fight to take advantage of land resources in order to improve their quality of life (Boone, 2017). Contradictory viewpoints have connected this poor execution and interference of the village choices by the district authorities in the separate nations, therefore the truth regarding this emotion may require further empirical data. According to Tanzania's village land statutes of 1999, for instance, the village general assembly and the village authorities must both approve the allocation of any land to a person or business from outside the community (URT, 1999b). With this authority, they may weigh their priorities, such as ensuring that there is adequate land for farming and animal husbandry, before making judgments.

The rights of the local peoples over grazing or farming land have been perceived as being violated by studies that show that some directives regarding the size and specific land to allocate as well as to whom it should be allocated have been coming directly from higher authorities (Pedersen, 2012; Collins et al., 2018b). Studies reveal that other organizations are running efforts in line with the World Bank's recent reforms, which were pioneered by the World Bank, to empower local people on inclusive governance as one of the viewed cures for conflict mitigation (Pedersen, 2012; Collins et al., 2018b). In essence, it was assumed that community governance of land resources would give all land users a chance to participate in decisions about how the resource should be distributed to serve parties' interests without causing conflict or where conflicts are present, they could be managed peacefully. For

instance, UNDP-Sudan (2006) reported on a case in Darfur in the 2000s where UNDP and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) were involved in various programs to support local institutions' capacities in advocating for the change of the policies perceived to be a source of inequality and conflicts between farmers and Arab pastoralists (UNDP-Sudan, 2006).

4.6.2 Limitations of Use of Multinational Organizations

First, there is the issue that pastoralists' constant migration from one location to another, especially during the dry season in search of water and pasture, hinders their success (Mwaikusa, 1993; Elhadary & Planning, 2010). In these situations, it appears that these interventions are more skewed in favour of farmers' sedentary production, which, in contrast to pastoral production, affords them plenty of opportunities to engage in various administrative institutions. As a result, even though the aforementioned strategies may result in more inclusive decisions about the better management and utilisation of land resources, the interests of pastoralists are rarely taken into account due to the nature of their mobility production system, which denies them such a chance, particularly in Sudan (Elhadary and Planning, 2010). Elhadary believes that this is the cover for poverty, which leads to conflicts.

The second is the newly popular viewpoint that empowerment programs, particularly those focusing on rural customary land security (land formalization), significantly contribute to the loss and subsequently lead to even greater shortage (Elhadary and Planning, 2010; Maganga et al., 2016). A researcher with this point of view has suggested that many of these outside activities have ultimately helped to register customary lands, making them appear slightly more official and recognized by the state (UNDP-Sudan, 2006). While this may be seen as a success in resolving the issue of land tenure and the ensuing conflicts, concerns have been raised that the registration has accelerated land grabbing (Elhadary and Planning, 2010; Maganga et al., 2016) by increasing the value and marketability of the land (Boone, 2019). Additionally, the pastoralist culture of mobility in quest of the grassland and water they regard as communal resources that may be accessed without limits seems incongruous with land registration.

Third, the research also reveals that although foreign actors' involvement are helpful for resolving farmer-pastoralist disputes over land resources, there are instances where government policies have the opposite effect. This is primarily due to the fact that specific interventions are frequently founded on a deal with the relevant government, which is maybe

based on national priority, as it was in the case of the soil conservation project in the northern Sudanese state in the 1970s (UNDP-Sudan, 2006). The UNDP-led soil conservation initiative in this nation, as the UNDP-Sudan further explains, concentrated more on enhancing smallholder agricultural production simply because it was one of the government's development goals. One factor cited in various studies as a hindrance to achieving peace between farmers and pastoralists is the rising trend among African governments to view pastoralist production as a primitive and environmentally destructive form of agriculture that doesn't merit special consideration in terms of national priorities (Berger 2003; Benjaminsen et al., 2009).

The literature claims that several examples are demonstrating the effects of such targeted intervention. For instance, Collins et al. (2018b) have argued that in Tanzania, the majority of development programs concentrate on improving the agricultural sector while giving the livestock sector little consideration, as was the case with the Kilimo Kwanza (agriculture first) program, which sought to increase productivity for small-, medium-, and large-scale producers (Collins et al., 2018b). Similarly, Berger (2003) argued that in neighboring Kenya, the pastoralists' interests in the country's development have become more and more marginalized, which has led to a progressive loss of grazing land (for agriculture and nature protection, particularly in Samburu), as well as competition and conflict among pastoralist groups and migration that has led to conflicts with other sedentary crop producers. Therefore, one might draw the conclusion that initiatives that prioritize farmers' interests while ignoring pastoralists' have little likelihood of preventing disputes between the two groups.

4.7 Public Sensitization

Inter-clan disputes can be settled, in accordance with Aluvi (2013), by raising public awareness about the voluntary surrender of illicit weaponry. Such Barazas were used to settle disputes that arose in Kuria. Public Barazas served to educate the general public on the need of voluntarily turning up any guns that are being possessed unlawfully. They were made aware of the need of returning all unlawfully obtained guns, the drawbacks of doing so, and the effects such possession has on the neighborhood's peace and security. Between 2009 and 2011, a total of 42 firearms and 106 rounds of ammunition have so far been willingly surrendered (Aluvi, 2013). We still have inter-clan confrontations, despite the fact that local leaders have done a lot of sensitization in public Barazas about the need of having a cohesive community, therefore further research is necessary in this area.

4.8 Beefing up Security

Additionally, the creation of AP positions lessens violent clashes. When the Kuria clans started fighting, the district's security was boosted by the establishment of additional administrative police posts. The posts were set up at key locations along the Kenya/Tanzania border as well as the border with the Trans Mara area. Since they were established, security as well as quiet and tranquillity have been restored. Their establishment has also been crucial in that it has assisted in lowering instances of livestock rustling along the shared boundaries. Increased patrols have also helped to improve security at the border and in other high-risk areas (Aluvi, 2013). Aluvi (2013) contends that the creation of a district peace committee helps to lessen inter-clan disputes. In June 2010, the Kuria East District Peace Committee (DPC) was created. Numerous meetings have been held to raise awareness of the need for peace and cohesion in population placement since the organization's founding: People were forced to flee their homes in great numbers as a result of the violence, according to a June 2009 assessment from the United Nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA).

Effective post-conflict recovery depends not only on state actions but also on non-state actors who, within various societal sectors, have a careful symmetry of institutions, structures, and processes that are essential to carrying out both short-term and longer-term reconstruction activities (UNDG, 2007). The study looks at pertinent literature on how non-state and state actors are involved in managing conflicts.

The State is always the primary body for exerting public power in specified boundaries and as the foundation of international relations. The state is made up of inter-territorial and formal institutions or rules that control political, social, and economic involvement and organizations that operate at the national and sub-national levels under these regulations, such as the executive, legislative, judicial, and ministry levels (DFID, 2010). Only overtly formal governmental intervention was effective. The macro-level leaders of opposing groups are often brought together to negotiate a cease-fire and peace pact, which, when accomplished, is automatically accepted by the whole populace (Thania, 2002). When negotiating a cease-fire and peace accord, the conflicting sides typically have a common perspective. It is also criticized for failing to address local concerns and challenges, but it has the advantage of incorporating influential figures who can instigate or put an end to widespread violence and restore order to society (Severine, 2008).

4.9 Use of Traditional Justice and African Customary Law

African customary law and traditional justice systems are two informal methods of dispute resolution. According to Pkalya and Mohammud (2006), local justice mechanisms that use bottom-up law-making to define common ground rules between various local systems and acknowledge and work with local concepts and socio-political structures have been successful in producing "agreements" and "declarations" that resemble official laws. The National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peace Building and Conflict Management was established with the goal of coordinating different peace building activities, such as local peace committees. The NSC developed a draft national policy on conflict management. But implementation is yet not complete (KNHRC, 2011). Foreign and local governments, civil society organizations (CSOs), corporate sector organizations (CSOs), and mainstream groups are examples of some non-state players. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, a network of over 1000 civil society organizations created in 2005, claims that successful tactics include "bottom up" and "top down," but emphasize local ownership (UNDP, 2008).

The usual now is for broad provisions to represent embedded peacekeeping (instead of traditional ones) and genuine peace-building actions; mandates, however, seldom expressly include peace-building. This perspective emphasizes the necessity of post-conflict healing. Western justice and peace concepts are being deliberately attempted but unsuccessfully implemented in certain post-conflict nations (UNDP, 1994). For instance, when peace accords are negotiated as a result of international pressure, even fighting groups are not significantly involved. Such accords further rely on the UN's infrequent participation in the task (Ottaway, 2006). Despite a much-publicized peace accord between northern and southern Sudanese elites in 2005, the country has been on the verge of disintegrating ever since a fresh uprising in Darfur in eastern Sudan began in 2003.

In order to avoid seriously ignoring local composition and failing to develop truly sustainable solutions, a number of influential thinkers have rejected international peace-building interventions because they tend to reflect the interests of foreign donors rather than the needs or rights of local actors (Richmond, 2001). This approach is referred to as "imperialism for confrontational management" (Haider, 2009). In his presentation to the Security Council in 2004, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized the use of local and informal traditions in the administration of justice or resolution of conflicts in conformity with both international norms and local custom (UNDP, 2006).

As a result, the international community expressly examined various ethnic approaches as feasible options in integrated post-conflict management plans (Emstorfer 2007). Nevertheless, post-conflict case studies show that the international community still struggles with some strategies, whether they be American, conventional, or hybrid (Werner, 2010). Among such labor is the difficult chore of figuring out the best strategies that may be used.

4.10 Summary of Findings

Conflict management strategies employed in resolving conflicts and improving security are traditional mechanisms, collective action approaches, decentralisation of natural resource governance, policies and programme mechanism, national statutory and procedural mechanisms, use of multilateral organizations, public sensitization, beefing up security and the use of traditional justice and African customary law.

4.11 Conclusion

Understanding the underlying reasons of conflict and having the ability to reasonably and quietly debate and resolve dispute are important and beneficial skills for a successful life. Developing leadership abilities and having a system in place to handle disagreements are examples of conflict management tactics. Additionally, they strive to be aware about the causes of disputes, increase resources, provide chances for growth, and welcome change. The final outcome of disputes turning into conflicts is conflict resolution. Depending on the circumstance, leaders frequently employ a variety of methods, such as talks, punishment, coercion, compromise (win-win outcomes), avoidance, and ignorance, as well as taking into consideration the differences between people.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study sought to analyse causes and implications of insecurity in Laikipia County. This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

5.2 Summary of Findings

5.2.1 Root Causes of Conflicts

Conflicts between communities generally result from inequality in resource distribution, marginalization, proliferation of small arms, land ownership and tenure and political incitements. This chapter reviews literature on the root causes of literature from various sources including journals, manuscripts, magazines, books and articles. The literature reviewed will be linked to the root causes of conflicts in Laikipia County, Kenya. Most of the time, conflicts don't have just one cause. Due to the nature of some of the disputes, they are complex. They stem from several reasons. Sometimes a disagreement may have one cause for the parties involved but a different cause for others. There are several elements that, in differing degrees, were crucial in charting battles.

5.2.2 Socio-Economic and Political of Implications of Conflicts in Laikipia County

Conflict consequences afflict the society and impacts on lives and livelihood. The predominant consequences are negative. This sub-section will attempt to explore the security implications of conflict, while relating them to Laikipia county situation. Conflicts affect the economy of any group that perpetuates the vice. Living standards have drop drastically going by the present statistics as a result of prolonged and unresolved conflicts. Conflicts can also be explained by grievances or greed where there are feelings of ethnic or political marginalization as one group is disadvantaged by another in regard to accessibility to natural resources. Conflicts have always emerged from attitudes of lack of trust, self-centeredness, and selfish objectives.

Numerous individuals have lost their lives as a result of the wars, which have also impacted healthcare, education, and infrastructure. This has harmed the peace that is necessary for the region's growth and prosperity, endangering socioeconomic advancements and provoking new conflicts. While governments have made an effort to use conflict management

techniques, it seems that these efforts only produce brief periods of "silenced guns," which eventually roar back to life. Unwarranted loss of life and property is typically the regrettable result of any battle. The circumstance creates the "conflict trap" phenomena, which makes it likely that there will soon be widespread ethnic violence and wanton destruction of property. Opportunities for effective solutions may be lost if the LIC is not recognized in the context of socioeconomic, political, and security considerations.

5.2.3 Conflict Management Strategies Employed in Resolving Conflicts

The idea behind conflict management is that while some disagreements can't really be resolved, understanding how to handle them will lessen the likelihood of unproductive growth. It include developing conflict resolution abilities, self-awareness of conflict modes, conflict skills, and putting in place a system for managing conflict in the environment. Force can be used to resolve conflicts when one party has the resources and will to prevail, regardless of whether the other side loses or not and regardless of whether or not the winning process damages the relationships between employees. In certain circumstances, assets or resources are also a kind of coercion since they allow one side to purchase superior legal counsel using their higher-quality resources raising the bar.

Some less comprehensible but frequently no less effective types of force include combative negotiating techniques, political correctness, election manipulation, use of the media to mobilize the public, public protest, witch hunts, defamation, and withdrawal threats. It should be remembered that addressing conflict is a laborious and dynamic process. The parties may alter their approaches to conflict management during the course of the dispute's many rounds of talks. The mediator or other third party is summoned to assist or engages for its own purposes in order to aid both sides to a disagreement (and finally only one of them). Numerous different taxonomies have been used to measure conflict management strategies in the past and are being used today.

There are several different behavioural philosophies that may be used to resolve interpersonal conflict. Allowing for the other person's needs to be realized typically means sacrificing some of your own. If someone doesn't care about the problems or if they don't have much influence in the situation or the relationship, then using this method to handle conflict is beneficial. People with greater self-awareness are better at managing their problems, and as a result, our interpersonal and professional relationships. Person conflict management training improves engagement in conflict, which results in feelings of relief and understanding, improved

communication, and increased productivity for the person and the team. People expend less energy on laborious duties like systematic conflict when their disputes are managed more skilfully, allowing them to devote more of their energy to their job initiatives and strengthening their relationships.

5.3 Conclusion

The study concludes that the identified causes of conflicts in Laikipia County include inequality in resource distribution and marginalization, proliferation of small arms, land ownership and tenure and invasion of farmlands by pastoralists, political incitements, and ethnic animosity. This is after analysing secondary data and adapting it to the objectives of this study. However, this study observes that the root causes of the conflicts have not been well highlighted and singled out. The approach employed by snakes in the ales tends to lump the causes thus blurring the requisite distinction. Therefore, this study highlights the issue of land use and tenure as well as marginalization as a being at the core of the conflicts. The other causes thus prey on the core coma and thus are surface causal factors or triggers of the conflicts in Laikipia County.

Further, on the implications of conflicts in Laikipia County. The study concludes that there have been profound negative impacts on socioeconomic aspects of the County. Food production, deaths and destruction of property, disruption of education as well as medial services, fomented ethnic animosity are just some of the implications. The study also concludes that there is scarcity of studies looking into the political and security implications respectively. The available studies are skewed towards the effects of politics on conflicts and not the other way round and thus the dew cannot adequately address the objective if this study on the political implications of the conflicts: due to the diem of the variable relationship that is, conflicts influencing politics. Similarly, data on the security implications of conflicts in Laikipia County is scarce. From adapted findings from the neighbouring Samburu County, socially implications touch on proliferation of small arms, abrogation of security responsibilities by certain communities and the use of the firearms to propagate critic suet as cattle rustling.

This study observes that security implications ran go beyond the issue of proliferation firearm and their misuse. Security implications can entail food security, environmental security, physical security, socio-cultural security among others. Whereas the finding, highlight the various conflict management approaches attempted in Laikipia County. This study concludes

that the measures do not adequately address the root causes of the conflicts and thus the recurrence of conflict. The mot causes are not well identified and defined and thus targeted conflict resolution measures cannot be instituted. Furthermore, most of the approaches are formal and ignore traditional/cultural aspects of conflict resolution, which maybe more acceptable to the communities. The study also concludes that the role of county governance in security management within the County has largely been diminished despite being closer to the people and seized with regional conflict dynamic.

5.4 Recommendations

To foster enduring harmony in Laikipia County, the investigation puts forth an array of suggestions aimed at tackling the underlying causes of strife and enhancing security, governance, and compliance with the Kenyan Constitution. These suggestions acknowledge the intricacy of the matters at hand and the necessity for all-encompassing strategies:

5.4.1. All-Encompassing Framework for Conflict Resolution: The Laikipia County administration should establish a comprehensive framework for resolving conflicts. This framework should incorporate both official and informal conflict resolution methods, considering the diverse cultural and societal dynamics within the region. The focus of this framework should lie in addressing the fundamental causes of conflict, especially issues pertaining to land tenure and marginalization. By amalgamating various conflict resolution approaches, including mediation at the community level and legal procedures, the county can devise a more holistic and efficacious strategy for upholding peace.

5.4.2. Fortifying Long-Term Security Agencies: The Ministry of Interior should allocate resources towards establishing long-term security agencies that are well-equipped and technologically advanced. These agencies should encompass a robust intelligence framework for early warning systems, enabling the identification and swift response to burgeoning conflicts. Additionally, concerted endeavours should be undertaken to curb the proliferation of firearms and diminish criminal activities. This entails implementing stricter measures for gun control, initiatives for disarmament, and monitoring illicit arms trade within the county.

5.4.3 Institution of a Permanent Vetting Board: To bolster adherence to Chapter 6 of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010, the national government should establish a permanent vetting board. This board should be presided over by the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Its primary objective would be to vet government officials and civil servants to ensure their conformity to the integrity and ethical

standards mandated by the constitution. By upholding Chapter 6, which centres around leadership and integrity, the government can diminish corruption and nepotism, which are frequently linked to marginalization and resource allocation issues that contribute to conflicts in Laikipia County.

These suggestions epitomize a multifaceted approach to resolving the intricate issues that contribute to Inter-Ethnic conflicts in Laikipia County. By amalgamating mechanisms for conflict resolution, reinforcing security measures, and ensuring ethical governance, the county and national government can collaborate towards fostering enduring peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, these steps align with broader national objectives of good governance, security, and adherence to constitutional principles.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: BUDGET

ACTIVITY	COST (KSHS)
Proposal writing	20,000
Proposal printing	2,000
Pilot survey	5,000
Research permit	1,500
Production of questionnaires	500
Data collection	5,000
Data analysis	10,000
Internet services	3,000
Thesis printing	7,000
Thesis binding	5,000
Journal Publication	10,000
Contingencies	3,000
Total	**82,000**

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH PERMIT

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APPENDIX II: WORK PLAN

Monthly activities	May 2022	May-June 2022	May - June 2022	June-July 2022	Aug-Sept 2022	Oct-Dec 2022	Jan-Mar 2023	Mar-Apr 2023
Topic identification								
Problem statement								
Literature review								
Thesis presentation								
Thesis corrections								
Research permit								
Data collection								
Data cleaning, analysis and report writing								
Report writing								
Research thesis presentation								
Thesis corrections								
Thesis submission								